A Explanatory Memorandum
1 Introduction
1. During the Second Part of the Fourth Ordinary Session the Consultative Assembly adopted a Recommendation on the relations between the Council of Europe and the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (Recommendation 37), in which it recommended the Committee of Ministers " to request N.A.T.O. to provide the information necessary for a Report on the general problems of European defence, to be drawn up regularly each year by the competent Committee of the Council of Europe, with a view to its discussion in the Assembly ".
2. The Committee of Ministers replied to this Recommendation in its Fourth Report to the Assembly in which the Ministers stated that they had authorised " the exchange between the two Secretariats of documentary material relating to the activities of the organisations in the non-military field ". And this statement was followed by the inclusion in the Committee's Message to the Assembly at the opening of the Fifth Ordinary Session of a Resolution
Note to the following effect. " Considering that arrangements embodied in the exchange of letters between the Secretary-General of the Council of Europe and the Secretary-General of the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation make such provision as is appropriate for the exchange of information between the two organisations; Resolves that no other measures altering the existing relationship between the Council of Europe and the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation need to be taken at the present time. "
3. In the opinion of the Committee this reply of the Committee of Ministers is tantamount to a refusal to give satisfaction to the request of the Assembly, in the first place because the use of the expression " documentary material... in the non-military field " suggests that the Committee of Ministers is not prepared to accept the distinction which has always been made by the Assembly between the political aspects of defence problems and information which is of a strictly military character; and, secondly, because the information transmitted to your Rapporteur under these arrangements has in fact been limited to material already made available to the Press.
4. In attempting, under the arrangements made by the Committee of Ministers, to obtain information on which to base this report, your Rapporteur has found himself placed on the same footing as the newspaper correspondents duly accredited to N. A. T. 0. In connection with his responsibilities' in the Second Chamber of the Dutch States-General, and in other ways, he has had access to information going far beyond what the Secretariat of N.A.T.O. was formally authorised to give him in his capacity as your Rapporteur, but he has considered that he was bound loyally to observe the arrangements made by the Committee of Ministers, and the subject-matter of the report now presented to you is thus taken exclusively from the information obtained under those arrangements, all of which, as has been said, had already been made avalable to the Press. After considering this report, the Committee suggests that it will be for the Assembly to decide whether another attempt should be made to establish closer relations with N.A.T.O.; or, alternatively, whether it is worth while for Representatives of the standing of the members of the Assembly to continue to discuss reports on the progress of European Defence, based on the very restricted information made available to them under the present arrangements.
5. It is the opinion of your Committee that the Assembly could give considerable assistance to N.A.T.O. in various ways indicated hereafter in this report, and the conclusions submitted for your consideration include a proposal that a further approach be made to N.A.T.O. as foreseen in the Reply to the Fourth Report of the Committee of Ministers. There it is stated that " the Assembly takes note of the statement of the Committee of Ministers, and reserves the right to re-examine this question after experience of the practical value of the present arrangements
Note".
2 Progress and Prospects of European Defence
6. Since the discussion of the report tabled by your Committee in the Assembly at the Fourth Ordinary Session, the following are the developments which arc of special importance in connection with the progress of Eiiropcan Defence viewed in its political aspects:
6.1 Meeting of the Council of N. A. T. 0. of December, 1952;
6.2 Meeting of the Council of N. A. T, 0 of April, 1953;
6.3 Publication of the Report of Allied Command Europe covering the period May, 1952 to May, 1953;
6.4 Developments in certain European Parliaments in connection with the Treaty establishing a European Defence Community;
6.5 The signature of a Treaty of Friendship and Co-operation between Greece, Turkey and Yugoslavia, 28th February, 1953.
7. This Report considers certain leading questions arising from these developments, and relates them, when appropriate, to the views of the Assembly, as expressed in Resolution 21 adopted during the Second Part of the Fourth Ordinary Session.
2.1 Progress achieved in the build-up of NATO forces
8. As General Ridgway, Supreme Allied Commander Europe, stated in his Report to the Standing Group of the Military Committee of the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation, dated 5th June, 1953, the NATO nations, which were almost defenceless in 1950, can in 1953 be justifiably proud of their increased strength. Considerable progress has been made in the numerical build-up in all arms of the NATO forces, and in their training, equipment, supplies and organisation, and this progress has been paralleled if not surpassed, in connection with the infra-structure programme, both from the point of view of the work actually completed and of the detailed planning agreed for the next three years.
9. This progress, however, gives no grounds for complacency. Whatever may be the real purpose behind the recent apparent change in Russian tactics, the military threat provided by the enormous armies maintained on a war footing by Russia and her satellite countries has in no way diminished. This is rightly emphasised again and again in the statements issued by the NATO Council and in the reports of the senior Commanders of the NATO forces. There is reason for anxiety in the fact that these warnings, and in particular the very forceful statements made by General Ridgway in his Report, have to a large extent been overlooked in the international press, and have failed to stir public opinion. It would sometimes seem that the European peoples have grown so accustomed to living in a permanent state of danger that they can only with difficulty be stimulated to respond to a call for further effort. There is, moreover, no doubt that recent Russian policy has had considerable success in bringing European public opinion to believe that the moment has come when, on the contrary, their efforts can be relaxed. Your Rapporteur insists with all the emphasis at his command that it is our duty continually to remind our peoples, however displeasing and uncomfortable that reminder may be, of another statement by General Ridgway from the report quoted above— " Measured against the Soviet capability, our progress is insufficient to give us an acceptable prospect of success, if attacked. We are still far short of the minimum requirements. We lack essential supply and support. "
10. Your Committee believes that the Consultative Assembly, which is for the time being the only international forum in which the Parliamentarians of most of the member countries of N. A. T. 0. meet in public debate, can give invaluable assistance to N. A. T. 0. in informing and stimulating public opinion. If, however, this is to be done effectively, the message which N. A. T. 0. wishes to 'put across' must be more clearly defined. Statements such as the one just quoted by General Ridgway tend to be submerged in the optimism engendered by the assurance that the targets set at Lisbon in February, 1952 had, by the end of 1952, been " in large part met ". Not knowing the relation between the Lisbon targets for 1952 and the final goal of the European defence effort, the public are not compelled to take as seriously as they should the more pessimistic comments made elsewhere in the Report, for example the one already quoted—" We are still far short of minimum requirements ", and in another passage " there is no valid reason to justify a levelling-off of effort until we have progressed at least well beyond the goals now set for 1954 " . No precise indication is given of what those requirements are, and the public is thus incapable of judging correctly the power ratio between the Soviet and the NATO forces and of appreciating the extent of the effort which must still be made to close the gap. The facts can surely be more clearly and more completely given to the public without dmilging confidential information, for, after all, the Russians knowing their ' own strength, can without difficulty accurately jxulge the strength of the forces which would be required to oppose a successful defence to their attack : uniformed European public opinion cannot, and the European peoples may come to the disheartening conclusion that there is no end in sight and that they are being continually asked to build up towards a level which is always just beyond their immediate reach.
2.2 Long-term production programmes and off-shore orders
11. In connection with the question of long-term production programmes and offshore orders, the terms of Resolution 21 should be recalled. The Assembly stressed " the need to ensure the collective defence of Europe, while maintaining European economic stability, and a fair distribution of the burden of rearmament among the countries and classes concerned " and, in a later passage, " believing that the improvement of the social and economic position of Europe is a pre-requisite for strengthening its military power, and being of the opinion that this improvement would be greatly facilitated by a policy of genuine integration of the European armament industries, as fostered by the system of off-shore orders " , stressed " the advantage of establishing long-term plans, under the system of off-shore orders, with a view to ensuring such integration
Note ".
12. It would appear that the U. S. A. is unable for constitutional reasons to bind itself to a long-term programme of off-shore orders. On the other hand, it is certainly difficult for the European members of N. A. T. 0. to plan their military production satisfactorily on the basis of off-shore orders which are placed, and necessarily vary, from year to year, despite the fact that the execution of these orders may be spread over a period of two or three years. This difficulty is particularly acute in the case of the small countries which have less " elasticity " in the allocation of their industrial resources and for which a high degree of accuracy in their planning is correspondingly of even greater importance. It is therefore most encouraging to note, as stated in the communiqué issued after the meeting of the Council of N. A. T. 0. in April, 1953, that N. A. T. 0. is stimulating the adoption by its European member countries of joint production and financial programmes on a long-term basis, and that a successful start has been made in their execution.
13. The official NATO figures given in paragraph 25 below of this report indicate that general agreement has been reached among the member countries with regard to the definition of what constitutes defence expenditure. No corresponding information has, however, been made available to the public or, indeed, to the Parliaments of the NATO countries, to indicate the basis on which has been calculated the proportions in which the NATO programme, in terms both of man-power mobilised and of the allocation of industrial capacity, is to be met by the countries concerned, in such a way —in the words of the Assembly's Resolution quoted above—as to " promote European economic stability " and to " ensure a fair distribution of the burden ".
14. The provision of this information would be of value from the point of view of piiblic morale, through the assurance which it would give that every country was pulling its full weight and that no country was being asked to undertake an unfair share of the common effort.
2.3 Certain political and psychological aspects of NATO strategy
15. In its Resolution 21 already quoted, the Assembly emphasised its belief that " the object of strengthening the military power of Europe is to provide a joint guarantee of the security of all the participating nations, which, in accepting the necessary sacrifices, have an equal right to the defence of their territory ", and requested " that this principle be reflected in the decisions taken by N. A. T. 0. both in the political and in the military fields ".
16. Since the adoption of the above Resolution a threefold reply has been made to the misgivings expressed by the Assembly : in the official communiqué issued after the NATO Council meeting of December, 1952; in the Report of the Supreme Allied Commander Europe of June, 1953, and in the replies to questions tabled in the Second Chamber of the Dutch States-General by your Rapporteur. The relevant passages in the communiqué of the Council of N. A. T. 0. and in General Ridgway's report should be quoted in full.
17. In para. 6 of the NATO Council's communiqué it is stated that " the Council reaffirmed their determination to defend all the territories and peoples of the North Atlantic Treaty area ".
18. In para. 7 of his report, General Ridgway defines the military mission entrusted to the European Allied Command as being " In the event of war to defend N. A. T. O.'s European area and their peoples. Nor is the responsibility only to become effective in some future year when means may be available. The task is to defend all, at any time, if war should occur ".
19. Finally, in replies to questions put to them by your Rapporteur at the Sitting of July 23rd, 1953 of the Second Chamber of the Netherlands States-General, the Netherlands Minister for Foreign Affairs, supported by the Minister for Defence, stated that in December, 1952 the Council of N. A. T. 0. had adopted a report defining the NATO strategical directives, the terms of which left no doubt but that the territory of the Netherlands would be defended in the same manner as that of the other European member countries of N. A. T. 0. In their replies the Ministers added that in the light of this report the Dutch Government was satisfied that the territory of the Netherlands had in its entirety been included in the NATO defence system.
20. Your Rapporteur trusts that he will be excused for having made special mention of the position of his own country, in respect of which he has, as a member of the States- General, been able to obtain more detailed information than has been made available in the public pronouncements of the Council of N. A. T. 0 . and of Allied Command Europe. The replies which he received from his Ministers would seem to confirm, however, that NATO strategical directives provide for the defence of the entirety of the territories of all the other European member countries of N. A. T. 0. also. In view of the paramount importance for public morale in the countries concerned of this confirmation of N. A. T. O.'s military responsibilities in the event of war, it is surprising that General Ridgway's statement quoted in para. 18 above, which could be regarded as not sufficiently definite because it referred only to N. A. T. O.'s general mission, should not have been followed by the assurance that the necessary strategical directives to render this mission effective had also been agreed. It will be of great value to all concerned if the publicity given to this question in the Assembly succeeds in reassuring the European peoples that " in accepting the necessary sacrifices " they can be certain that all their territories will be defended, without exception.
2.4 Relative importance of Western and Eastern theatres in the global planning of Western defence
21. There has recently been a revival of the discussion with regard to the relative importance of the Western and Eastern theatres in the global planning of Western defence, and the report on the Foreign Aid Programme presented to the U. S. A. Congress on August 17th by President Eisenhower provides for a shift in the emphasis of that programme in favour of Asia. Thus, for the current fiscal year the European theatre will receive of the total sum made available (§4,500,000,000 of " n e w " money, plus 82,100,000,000 brought forward from last year, making a total of $6,600,000,000), 50 % as against 73 % last year, and the Asian theatre will receive 37 %, as against 14 % last year.
22. It is not within the scope of this Report to pursue an argument as to whether in view of recent events the military danger has tended to be displaced from the West to the East. But, since the world is round, and the influence of distance on military strategy becomes daily less and less important, it is clearly impossible to divide the world into two strategical areas, or to suggest that operations in one of those areas will not have an immediate and substantial effect on the other. This is clearly proved, for example, by the experience of France, the heavy burden of whose campaigns in Indo-China has a direct influence on her ability to meet her military obligations in Europe without serious internal dislocation.
23. Measures have been taken in the Foreign Aid Programme to assist France in her special situation, to the extent that, of the 37 % to be allotted to the Asian theatre, $400,000,000 or approximately 6 % of the total foreign aid will be specifically set aside for French operations in Indo-China. Nevertheless, even if it can be argued that this sum should be considered as equivalent to a contribution to the Western theatre because made available to one of the European members of N. A. T. O., it remains a fact that 17 % more of the total foreign aid appropriations will this year be spent on the defence system of the Far East and 17 % less in Europe.
24. A reduction of these proportions, against the background of the expressed opinion of Congress that all Foreign Aid should cease two years from now, could have very serious repercussions on the possibility of completing the required build-up of the European defence forces. It is, of course, the wish of Congress, as it is of every European, that Europe should as soon as possible become self-sufficient in respect of the supply and maintenance of her forces. But this self-sufficiency is a function of her productive capacity, and that capacity depends in turn on the availability of foreign markets, and in particular on a tariff policy in the U. S. A. which will allow European goods to compete in that country on a fair and equal footing and to earn dollars. The imaginative generosity of the United States foreign aid policy since the war may make it seem ungrateful and ungracious to do so, but it is our duty to issue a warning that the defence capabilities of the European members of N. A. T. O. will be very severely restricted, if substantial cuts in the Foreign Aid Programme are not accompanied by the adoption by the U. S. A. of a more liberal tariff policy and by an increase in the volume of U. S. private investments abroad.
25. In the same connection, there is another question which your Committee submits for consideration by the Assembly. The responsibility of N. A. T. 0. is limited to the defence of Europe, but, as has been stated, it is impossible to isolate the plans for the defence of Europe from defence planning in other parts of the world. At present the European countries with overseas responsibilities are required to plan in two, so to speak, separate compartments. As far as the defence of their metropolitan territories in Europe is concerned, they reach agreement on the measures to be taken, within the NATO framework. As far as their overseas responsibilities are concerned, they each plan individually. What each can do in one " compartment ", with its own resources, is inevitably and strictly governed by the commitments it has accepted in the other and in many cases may well fall short of what should ideally be done. It must, in fact, be recognised that, for the time being, the overseas strategy of the Etiropean countries concerned depends ultimately, in large part, on the amount of foreign aid voted by the U. S. Congress and its allocation. The evidence is given once again that, so long as they remain divided, the European countries can no longer, any of them, be really masters of their own affairs. It is therefore essential that every effort should be made to reach agreement among all the members of N. A. T. 0., on the measures which could be taken to ensure that the European countries are in a position fully to meet their overseas responsibilities.
Defence expenditures of NATO countries
Tho following tablo represents the defence expenditures in millions of dollars of member countries of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, year by year, from 1949-50 and 1952-53. Except where noted otherwise, the figures are calculated on the NATO year (July 1st to June 30th). Because they have been adjusted to an agreed NATO definition of what constitutes defence expenditures and because in many cases they have been adjusted also to tho NATO year, the figures given do not necessarily agrco exactly with those of tho defence budgets voted in member countries.
European Defence
| COUNTRY |
1949/50 |
1950/51 |
1951/52 |
1952/53 |
| Belgium |
155.04 |
196.95 |
346.56 |
483.82 |
| Canada |
441.20 |
763.30 |
1,643.40 |
2.125.70Note |
| Denmark |
53.00 |
56.04 |
87.75 |
131.33 |
| France |
1,458.20 |
2,041.00 |
3,219.88 |
4,047.02 |
| Greece |
124.09 |
172.16 |
203.96 |
206.18 |
| Italy |
520.29 |
613.33 |
813.06 |
996.51 |
| Luxembourg |
2.79 |
4.15 |
8.16 |
9.82 |
| Netherlands |
230.83 |
228.45 |
309.80 |
423.75 |
| Norway |
49.59 |
67.07 |
96.22 |
146.13 |
| Portugal |
45.66 |
48.06 |
50.91 |
75.83 |
| Turkey |
274.35 |
284.27 |
315.99 |
324.13 |
| United |
Kingdom |
2,450.00 |
2,750.00 |
4,095.00 |
4,995.00Note |
| United |
States |
12,809.00 |
21,947.00 |
43,374.00 |
49,500.00Note |
2.5 The European Defence Community
26. The progress made towards the ratification of the Treaty establishing a European Defence Community has been most disappointing and unsatisfactory. The present position in this respect in the six European countries concerned is set out in paragraph 34 below of this report.
27. In reaffirming his belief that a German contribution to the defence of Europe remains essential—a view shared by the majority of the Committee—your Rapporteur can find support in the opinions of those best qualified to judge, namely, Generals Eisenhower and Ridgway. These your Rapporteur thought fit to quote in full.
28. In the first annual report of Allied Command Europe, dated April, 1952, General Eisenhower said. " Even with the maximum potential realised through the collective efforts of member nations, there is little hope for the economical long-term attainment of security and stability in Europe unless Western Germany can be counted on the side of the free nations. Here in the heart of Europe is an area of roughly 100,000 square miles populated by nearly 50,000,000 industrious and highly-skilled people. Rich in natural resources and production facilities, Western Germany alone produces onehalf as much steel annually as the rest of Western Europe combined. The coal of the Ruhr, along with the industrial sinews it feeds, is a prime economic fact in Europe. As the geographic center of Europe, Western Germany is of great strategic importance in the defence of the continent. The Northern plain of Germany, with its extensive network of modern roads and railways, offers the best route of advance from the East. As of to-day, our forces could not offer prolonged resistance East of the Rhine barrier. Thus we might lose, by default, the considerable resources of Germany and suffer, at the same time, direct exposure of Denmark and the Netherlands. With Western Germany in our orbit, NATO forces would form a strong and unbroken line in central Europe from the Baltic to the Alps. Depth is always a desirable element in defence; in the restricted area of Western Europe, it is mandatory. Defensive depth is indispensable in countering the striking power of mechanised armies, and the speed and range of modern aircraft. "
29. In the second annual report of Allied Command Europe, dated June, 1953, from which other quotations have already been taken, General Ridgway stated : " During my year of command I have followed closely the plans for the European Defence Community. The benefits which the early ratification of the Treaty would have brought to our efforts and to European unity included the contribution of West Germany, which I consider indispensable to our defence system. SHAPE has maintained constant liaison with the Interim Committee of the European Defence Community and has observed and assisted in its planning. Its plans are workable and sufficiently advanced to avoid delay in developing a German contribution.
30. If it is therefore accepted that a German contribution is an essential element in the European defence system, no delay in finding the means of mobilising this contribution should be tolerated. In the words of the NATO Council—in which it should be remembered are represented five of the six countries that signed the E. D. C. Treaty-—-it is " essential that the Member Governments (of N. A. T. 0.) should continue to develop he free Atlantic Community which should include a European Defence Community to be established as soon as possible in an ever more closely united Europe ".
31. It is unnecessary once again to review the reasons which have led to the conclusion that in the foreseeable future the only acceptable way in which the German contribution can be made is through the establishment of the European Defence Community.
32. It is probable that the understandable hesitations and doubts, which have held up the ratification of the Treaty in certain of the signatory States, would have been removed if the United Kingdom had found it possible to become a Member of the Community. It is now recognised that this is not possible, but the United Kingdom, through the guarantees which she has offered to underwrite, has come into the closest possible relationship with the Community short of full membership. In the light of the understanding reached at the Brussels Conference of the Council of N. A. T. 0. in December, 1950 and of the declaration made jointly by the U. S. A. and the United Kingdom on 27th May, 1952, it may be assumed that these guarantees are backed up by the declared intention of the United Kingdom to maintain British divisions on the Continent. If any further doubts remained with regard to the reality and the binding effect of the undertakings accepted by the United Kingdom, they should have been dispelled by the conclusions which can be drawn from the speech made by Sir Winston Churchill in the House of Commons on 11th May, 1953, in which he said : " We have stationed our largest military force with the French on the Continent. We have the strongest armoured force which exists between the Elbe and the Rhine. We have very intimately associated all our air forces. We have placed our troops in Europe under the command of General Ridgway, the NATO Commander-in-Chief and, should war come, he can move our divisions about, after reasonable consultations such as we had in the late and preceding world wars, in accordance with strategic requirements, or even tactical requirements. What more is there then that we could give, apart from completely merging ourselves with the European military organisation? We do our best for them. We fight with them under the orders of the Supreme Commander. On the Continent, we share their fate. "
33. Apart from the United Kingdom's guarantees, special protocols to the Treaty, designed to meet other objections, have been agreed and have been presented together with the Treaty, for ratification by the Parliaments of the signatory States.
34. The time has come when a decision can no longer be postponed. The Parliaments concerned must accept their responsibilities and vote for or against the Treaty; and in a report which is concerned with the progress of European defence and with the steps which shoxild be taken to ensure the solidity and strength of the European defence system, there can be no doubt of the conclusion to be drawn : the Treaty must be ratified.
Summary of the progress of the ratification procedure of the Treaty establishing the E. D. C. -
FRANCE
1. Examination by Committees of tho National Assembly. - 1. Partly completed.
1. Partly completed.
3. Examination by tho Committees of tho Council of the Republic.
4. Debate and decision by tho Council of the Republic.
4. Debate and decision by tho Council of the Republic.
BELGIUM
1. Opinion expressed by tho Council of State. - 1. Tho opinion has been pronounced.
2. Examination by Committees of the Chamber of Representatives. - 2. In progress.
3. Debate and decision by the Chamber of Representatives.
4. Examination by Committees of the Senate.
5. Debate and decision by the Senate.
0. Signature by the King.
GERMAN FEDERAL REPUBLIC
1. Examination by the Committees of the Bundes-tag. - 1. Completed.
2. Debate and vote by the Bundestag. - 2. The Treaty has been adopted.
3. Examination and decision 3. by the Bundesrat. - 3. The Treaty has been adopted in part.
4. Optional appeal to the Bundcsverfassungsgericht (Constitutional Court). - 4. The Court has been seized of an appeal.
5. Signature by the President.
ITALY
1. Examination by the Committees of the Chamber of Deputies. - 1. Completed; Treaty approved.
2. Debate and decision by the Chamber of Deputies.
3. Examination by the Committees of the Senate.
4. Debate and decision by the Senate.
5. Signature by the President.
1. Opinion expressed by the Council of State. - 1. The Council of State has declared its opinion that an amendment to the Constitution will be required before the Treaty can be ratified.
2. Examination by the Committees of the Chamber. - 2. In progress.
3. Debate and decision by the Chamber.
4. Signature by the Grand- Duchess.
NETHERLANDS
1. Opinion expressed by the Council of State - 1. The opinion has been pronounced.
2. Examination by the Committees of the Second Chamber. - 2. Completed.
3. Debate and decision by the Second Chamber. - 3. The Treaty has been adopted.
4. Examination by the Committees of the First Chamber.
5. Debate and decision by the First Chamber.
6. Signature by the Queen
2.6 Non-military activities of N. A. T. 0.
35. In. once again including in its agenda the question of the progress of European Defence, the Assembly intended that a debate should take place on the political aspects of the military problems with which N. À. T. 0. is confronted, and there may be a feeling that it would be out of place for comment to be made in this report on the non-military activities of N. A. T. 0. The NATO Council, however, has itself laid emphasis on the need for the military effort of its member countries to find a basis in a similar collaboration in other fields. With the affirmation in its communique of April, 1953 of its conviction that " in unity lies the greatest strength of (those) countries ", it placed on record the fact that the latter were " resolved to broaden cooperation in every field, economic, political and social, as well as military, and so to make the Atlantic Community a lasting reality ". Further, the Council of N. A. T. 0. in September, 1951, established a Ministerial Committee composed of representatives from Belgium, Canada, Italy, the Netherlands and Norway with the responsibility of taking suitable action to give effect to this resolve.
36. N. A. T. 0. is, moreover, inevitably led to the study of problems which, although not themselves military in character, are automatically involved in modern military planning. Attention has already been drawn to the effects which military requirements necessarily have on the economic and social conditions of the countries involved. In addition, the military planners of N. A. T. 0. find themselves faced with particular and imoxpected difficulties in other, apparently unconnected fields. To take one example, a large number of young emigrants leave Europe every year to establish themselves overseas. The great majority of those involved have completed their military service, and represent an important fraction of the trained reservists of their countries. When they emigrate they cease, of course, to be liable to call-up in the forces of their countries of origin in the event of an emergency, and the problem of filling their vacant places is a very difficult one to resolve.
37. The example quoted is, however, concerned with a specific and detailed problem which would not seem to enter into the competence of the Assembly, and your Rapporteur will confine himself to submitting two observations of a general character in connection with this question of the non-military activities of N. A. T. 0.
38. In the first place, it would seem that the time is approaching when serious consideouvrirration should be given to the question of the relations between the Council of Europe and the " growing Atlantic Community " . Although many countries belong to both groups, their membership is not identical. On the other hand, apart from its origins in and continuing connection with the defence system built up by N. A. T. 0., the fundamental aims and purpose of the Atlantic Community would not appear to differ much, if at all, from those of the Council of Europe. This question, though of great importance and under consideration by your Committee, is not the immediate subject of this Report. Nevertheless, it is evident that in its activities in the economic, social and cultural fields, about which very little information has so far been made available, there is a real danger that N. A. T. 0. will duplicate the work already being done in other existing organisations, including the Council of Europe.
39. There may be valid objections to the release by N. A. T. 0. of information about its military activities for discussion in the Assembly, although the evidence now given, for the second time, of the Assembly's firm resolve to discuss only the political aspects of defence, should help to remove them. These objections cannot apply to the suggestions for a close collaboration between the two organisations in the non-military fields, a collaboration which would avoid duplication of effort and stimulate and improve the work of each.
3 Conclusions
40. The conclusions to which your Committee has attempted to give expression in the draft Recommendation and draft Resolution which are submitted for consideration by the Assembly may be summarised as follows :
40.1 There must be no slackening in the defence efforts of the European members of N. A. T. 0. To this end, a greater effort must be made to explain clearly to the European peoples the continuing urgency of the situation, and the means must be found, through a closer collaboration between N. A. T. 0. and the Assembly, for informing and mobilising the support of European Parliamentary opinion.
40.2 The Treaty establishing a European Dement fence Community must be ratified without further delay.
40.3 NATO military plans, in their economic and social aspects, must be carefully fitted into the general picture of European economic and social development, not only through the negotiations which already take place between N. A. T. 0 . and the individual Governments of its member countries, but by means of discussion and close collaboration with the other interested international organisations. In this context, every effort must be made to ensure the further development of joint long-term production and financial programmes among the European members of N. A. T. 0.
40.4 In order to offset any possible future reduction in the mount of U. S. foreign aid, continuing attempts must be made to secure a considerable liberalisation of the United States tariff policy and an increase both in the trade between the U. S. A. and European countries and in the volume of U. S. private investment abroad.
40.5 It is important that the collaboration between the countries concerned, which in the European theatre is made effective through N. A. T. 0., should be extended to non-European theatres, thus ensuring that the European countries are in a position fully to meet their overseas responsibilities.
40.6 Care must be taken to ensure that all duplication of effort is avoided by establishing close contact and collaboration in the nonmilitary fields between N. A. T. 0. and other existing international organisations.
