C Explanatory memorandum by Mr Volodymyr
Ariev, rapporteur for opinion
1 General remarks
1. The report drafted by Mr Boriss
Cilevičs on behalf of the Committee on Legal Affairs and Human is
well documented and coherent in its explanations. However, I would
like to make a few additional clarifications and some brief comments.
2. Paragraph 5 of the explanatory memorandum refers to a verbal
confrontation between Western and Russian security experts regarding
reciprocal “hybrid threats”, giving the impression that there is
a kind of balance between the Russian Federation’s actions and the
West’s actions. I do not believe this was the intention of the rapporteur
and would like to stress that we cannot compare, for example, actions
undertaken to achieve independence by ex-Soviet countries, which
entailed the emergence of new democratic States, on the one hand,
and the Russian intervention in Ukraine, leading to armed conflict
in this country and to heavy humanitarian consequences, on the other.
3. In paragraph 7 of the explanatory memorandum, reference is
made to the aim of the “information war”, which is to win over the
population. I would add here another very important category of
audience, notably the decision-makers, who are a decisive factor
for an appropriate response to a hybrid warfare attack, as in the case
of the annexation of Crimea by Russia. The disinformation campaign
about “no Russian troops in Crimea” probably did not intend to deceive
the masses in the West; it was most definitely aimed at delaying
and slowing the decision-making process of the European political
leaders.
4. In the same paragraph 7, reference is made to interferences
by Russia in the electoral process in the United States, Germany,
France and some countries in the Balkan region. I would add that,
according to various sources, as from 2004, Russia interfered in
at least 27 European and North American countries, including cyberattacks
and disinformation campaigns.
5. Paragraph 8 rightly states that the lack of accountability
and attribution online is indeed an obstacle to identifying the
source of the disinformation. At the same time, I would note that
if the information is accurate and legal, it does not matter if
the source is domestic or foreign. A distinction should be made
between the two problems. As an example, Latvia and Lithuania were
temporarily banning Russian television channels not because they
were Russian, but because they were undermining statehood, or the
territorial integrity of Ukraine, or spreading hatred. Many of these
channels also spread false alarm messages, like “your government/Western
elites/Brussels and Washington are secretly planning terror attacks”,
or “they are organising a migration crisis in order to substitute
the white population with Muslims”.
6. In the same paragraph 8, reference is made to the Russian
“troll factories” and to the fact that it is difficult to distinguish
where the line is between online activists’ free speech and State
interference. However, there are a number of indicators suggesting
that the Internet Research Agency based in Saint-Petersburg (also known
as Trolls from Olgino or Kremlebots) is controlled by the Russian
intelligence services, and that it has employed fake accounts registered
on major social networks, discussion boards or online newspaper
sites to promote the Kremlin's interests in domestic and foreign
policy, including Ukraine, as well as attempting to influence the
2016 United States presidential election.
7. To conclude, I fully agree with the rapporteur that in complex
responses to hybrid threats the Council of Europe should play a
prominent role in designing legal responses and contributing its
rich human rights expertise. I feel th a t the amendments proposed
would further strengthen the draft resolution. The following sub-section
briefly provides the rationale of the proposals.
2 Rationale of
the proposed amendments to the draft resolution
Amendment A
It seems appropriate to recall in the draft resolution previous
reports of the Assembly regarding co-operation against cyberterrorism,
security in cyberspace and prevention of cybercrime. The policy
guidelines contained therein are to me most relevant in the present
context.
Amendment B
Although paragraph 2 does not intend to give an exhaustive
list of elements describing “hybrid war”, it seems important to
explicitly mention threats to energy supply, to complete the picture.
Amendment C
In recent years, mass disinformation campaigns have become
more frequent, intense and dangerous. I believe it is necessary
that the Assembly expresses its deep concern about the matter and
calls on States to develop tools to protect democracy from “information
weapons”.
Amendment D
Maintaining exchange of information and sharing experience
and good practice in countering hybrid threats is essential, so
it would be important to have an explicit call in this direction
in the draft resolution.
