Political consequences of the Russian Federation's war of aggression against Ukraine
- Author(s):
- Parliamentary Assembly
- Origin
- Assembly
debate on 22 June 2023 (18th sitting) (see Doc. 15797, report of the Committee on Political Affairs and Democracy,
rapporteur: Mr Emanuelis Zingeris). Text
adopted by the Assembly on 22 June 2023 (18th sitting).
1. Seventeen months after launching
a large-scale invasion, Putin’s regime persists in its brutal war
of aggression against Ukraine. After the battle of Bakhmut (August
2022-June 2023), which has been the longest in the war and has had
a huge human cost, the Ukrainian counteroffensive is currently under
way. As the Ukrainians advance and liberate areas of their territory
illegally occupied by the Russian Federation, it is to be feared
that new evidence of war crimes will emerge. The magnitude of the
consequences of the destruction of the Kakhovka Dam, on 6 June 2023,
will only be known in the coming weeks. This attack, aimed at delaying the
Ukrainian counteroffensive, confirms the barbarism of Putin’s war
machinery and constitutes both a war crime and ecocide.
2. Recalling its previous resolutions and recommendations on
this matter, the Parliamentary Assembly reiterates its firm condemnation
of the Russian Federation’s aggression against Ukraine as a violation
of international law and an act of unprecedented gravity, in itself
and because of its far-reaching political, geopolitical, legal,
humanitarian, environmental and economic consequences, in Europe
and beyond.
3. By defending the sovereignty, independence and territorial
integrity of their country, Ukrainians are protecting the values
of the Council of Europe and the basic principles enshrined in the
United Nations Charter, which are the foundations of the peaceful
co-existence between States. One of the main political consequences
of the Russian Federation’s war of aggression against Ukraine is
that it has forged a renewed bond among democracies in support of
Ukraine.
4. The 4th Summit of Heads of State and Government of the Council
of Europe, held in Reykjavik on 16 and 17 May 2023, is the expression
of this unity around common values, the resolve to support Ukraine
for as long as it takes and the willingness to ensure that the Russian
Federation and its leaders are held to account for their crime of
aggression and manifold other wrongdoings. The Assembly welcomes
the strong stance taken by European political leaders in Reykjavik,
supports the summit’s final declaration and will participate in
the follow-up within the Assembly’s remit, competences and outreach.
5. The Reykjavik Declaration sets the tone in unequivocal terms:
supporting Ukraine should be a political imperative for the Council
of Europe and its member States. To turn this commitment into a
reality, it is of the utmost importance to step up assistance to
Ukraine, complete and give effective implementation to a comprehensive
system of international accountability of the Russian Federation,
remove legal gaps and loopholes in the sanctions system and isolate
the aggressor regime diplomatically.
6. For Council of Europe member States, supporting Ukraine is
important not only as an issue of rule of law and international
justice but also the protection of democratic security and stability
in Europe. Not only has the Russian Federation brought a devastating
war of aggression to Europe, it has also pushed the limits of what can
be used as a weapon, for example migrants, energy, economic leverage,
elite capture, ecocide, kidnapping of Ukrainian children and other
citizens and the Russian “passportisation” of Ukrainian citizens
in temporarily occupied territories.
7. The Russian Federation’s war against Ukraine has had significant
global consequences, in particular food insecurity, massively increased
energy prices, poverty and hunger. The resources that are now being used
to remedy these problems can no longer be invested in achieving
the United Nations Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs), which impedes
global development. More than half of the 17 goals have been negatively
affected by the Russian Federation’s war. Because of the Russian
Federation we will regress in the achievement of the SDGs, including
concerning climate change.
8. The reach of the hybrid war of the Russian Federation is global
and is felt in all corners of Europe. The Republic of Moldova, Georgia
and the Western Balkans are subject to pronounced Russian-backed
hybrid warfare methods that are designed to destabilise their democracies.
The Assembly is alarmed by the extensive and unscrupulous use of
disinformation, energy blackmail, nuclear blackmail, economic leverage
and disinformation by the Russian Federation to exacerbate existing
tensions and fractures in democratic societies.
9. In addition, the aggression and the resulting new geopolitical
context magnify security risks because of their impact on the functioning
of multilateral mechanisms aimed at preventing and resolving conflicts,
including those established under the auspices of the Organization
for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE).
10. At the same time, hard security is a grave concern. The Russian
leadership has brandished reckless threats of nuclear warfare and
has increased the risk of nuclear accidents involving the Zaporizhzhia
nuclear power plant, which is illegally under Russian control. The
Russian Federation uses the occupation of the Zaporizhzhia nuclear
power plant for blackmail purposes in contravention of the Convention
on Nuclear Safety and the safeguards system of the International
Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), of which the Russian Federation is
a member. The Assembly welcomes the visit of a delegation of the
IAEA to the site on 15 June 2023 and calls for its recommendations
to be fully executed. The Assembly expresses its gravest concern
that the Russian Federation may be planning to carry out a deliberate
attack on or cause a deliberate incident at the Zaporizhzhia nuclear
power plant, as mentioned by President Zelensky on 22 June 2023.
This would risk provoking an escalation in the war, and lead to
a radiation leak with devastating consequences for Europe.
11. The Assembly is deeply concerned by the deployment of Russian
tactical nuclear weapons in Belarus, which started in May 2023,
and by reports that the deployment of strategic weapons may be under consideration.
As Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons
(NPT), both the Russian Federation and Belarus are in violation
of their non-transfer and non-possession obligations, under Articles
1 and 2 of that treaty, respectively. Similarly, the Assembly deeply
regrets the withdrawal of the Russian Federation from the Conventional
Armed Forces in Europe (CFE) Treaty, a cornerstone of European security and
stability and of conventional arms control architecture.
12. Europe can only achieve enduring peace if the Russian Federation
becomes a democracy and loses its military potential to attack its
neighbours. Thus, engagement and co-operation should be strengthened
with Russian democratic forces and civil society organisations that
aspire to a democratic change in the Russian Federation, share the
values of the Council of Europe and support the sovereignty, independence
and territorial integrity of Ukraine, as well as with those advocating
for the principle that the Russian Federation, as a State, should
provide full compensation to Ukraine once the war is over, and endorsing
the idea that the Russian regime should face an international tribunal
for its actions. Similarly, the Belarusian democratic forces and
their leader, Sviatlana Tsikhanouskaya, as well as others who are
ready to rise up against the Lukashenka regime in Belarus deserve
the full support of the Council of Europe and its member States.
13. Since the last time the Assembly debated this war of aggression,
a number of peace initiatives have been launched. In this regard,
the Assembly reiterates its position laid down in Resolution 2463
(2022) “Further escalation in the Russian Federation's aggression
against Ukraine” that any peace talks can only take place on the
conditions set by Ukraine. It highlights, in this regard, that the
Reykjavik Declaration expresses full support for the principles
of a just and lasting peace as outlined in President Zelensky’s
Peace Formula.
14. 14. As the Reykjavik Declaration points out, there cannot
be peace without accountability. The Assembly therefore welcomes
the establishment of the Registry of Damage Caused by the Aggression
of the Russian Federation against Ukraine. The Assembly shall continue
to pursue its efforts in view of the establishment of an international
compensation mechanism and a special tribunal for the crime of aggression
to prosecute the political and military leadership of the Russian
Federation, as requested by the Assembly in several texts and most
recently in Resolution 2482 (2023) “Legal and human rights aspects
of the Russian Federation’s aggression against Ukraine”.
15. 15. The Assembly points out that international accountability
must extend to all private military companies, proxies and allies
linked to the Russian Federation that are committing crimes and
illegal acts on the territory of Ukraine, including the Wagner Group
and the military forces of Ramzan Kadyrov. An INTERPOL Red Notice
(warrant) should be issued by Council of Europe member States against
the leaders and members of these international terrorist groups.
16. Supporting Ukraine also requires curtailing the Kremlin’s
ability to finance its war of aggression. A large coalition of countries
and the European Union have imposed an unprecedented range of diplomatic,
financial and economic restrictive measures against the Russian
Federation and should continue making joint efforts to increase
the pressure of sanctions and international isolation of the violating
State. The existence of loopholes in the sanctions system, however,
and the development of various techniques of sanctions avoidance
by the Russian Federation and private companies – especially involving
third countries – have considerably reduced the system’s effectiveness.
The Assembly believes that the international community should address
this problem with resolve and without any further delay. The issue
of Council of Europe member States helping the Russian Federation
circumvent sanctions should be examined by the Assembly Committee
on the Honouring of Obligations and Commitments by Member States
of the Council of Europe (Monitoring Committee) in its work. In
addition, helping the Russian Federation bypass sanctions should
be a circumstance that precludes future candidates from joining
the Council of Europe.
17. The Assembly condemns the biased and misleading narratives
being spread by the Russian Federation, and amplified by some countries,
about the war of aggression and the restrictive measures introduced
against Putin’s regime. The Assembly considers that Council of Europe
member States should be proactive in countering this pervasive misinformation
and disinformation.
18. In light of the above considerations, as regards accountability,
the Assembly:
18.1 welcoming the
fact that 45 States and the European Union have already joined or
indicated their intention to join the Enlarged Partial Agreement
on the Register of Damage Caused by the Aggression of the Russian
Federation against Ukraine, invites the largest possible number
of countries to join;
18.2 calls on the countries represented in the Conference of
Participants of the Register of Damage to clarify in the register’s
rules on admissibility that the register will also record acts committed
by private military groups, paramilitary groups and other military
groups fighting for the Russian Federation, including the Wagner
Group and Kadyrov’s forces;
18.3 calls on member States and other States having custody
of the Russian Federation’s assets to establish an international
mechanism for compensation, making use of confiscated assets to
pay for war damages in Ukraine without delay;
18.4 calls on member States of the Core Group on the Establishment
of a Special Tribunal for the Crime of Aggression against Ukraine
to accelerate their negotiations to set up a special international criminal
tribunal for the crime of aggression against Ukraine, and calls
on additional States to join the Core Group;
18.5 welcomes the launch of the International Centre for the
Prosecution of the Crime of Aggression against Ukraine (ICPA);
18.6 invites parliaments of Council of Europe member States
to designate the Wagner Group and Kadyrov’s Guard as terrorist organisations
and to call for the full accountability of all military and paramilitary
groups that participate in the Kremlin’s aggression against Ukraine;
18.7 supports the investigation of the situation in Ukraine
by the International Criminal Court (ICC), calls on all States Parties
to the Rome Statute to execute the arrest warrants issued by the
ICC and asks the ICC to issue arrest warrants against the members
and leaders of the above-mentioned Wagner Group and Kadyrov forces;
18.8 welcomes the adoption of the Ljubljana–The Hague Convention
on International Cooperation in the Investigation and Prosecution
of the Crime of Genocide, Crimes against Humanity, War Crimes and other
International Crimes and urges Council of Europe member States to
ratify it as soon as possible in order to deliver justice to the
victims of those crimes;
18.9 joins the call to facilitate the supply of additional
capabilities, including by means of re-export, for the self-defence
purposes of Ukraine;
19. With a view to strengthening Europe’s democratic security
and resilience against soft and hybrid security threats, the Assembly
calls on Council of Europe member States to:
19.1 enhance co-operation and political dialogue with countries
and regions that are particularly exposed to the Russian Federation’s
interference, bilaterally, through the Council of Europe and international
platforms;
19.2 redouble efforts to promote the further European integration
of Ukraine, the Republic of Moldova, Georgia, Albania, Bosnia and
Herzegovina, Montenegro, North Macedonia, Serbia and Kosovo
Note;
19.3 step up international co-operation to fend off interference
by the Russian Federation in their democratic processes and introduce
a whole-of-society approach to building societal resilience against disinformation
and misinformation;
19.4 step up diplomatic efforts to isolate the Russian Federation
and Belarus as its accomplice, at the international level, as a
result of the war of aggression against Ukraine, and thus deprive
them of support;
19.5 counter the false narratives about the war of aggression
and the sanctions system spread by the Russian Federation, its allies
and partners;
19.6 set up a platform for reflection on mechanisms for conflict
prevention and resolution in Europe, taking into account the new
geopolitical context.
20. The Assembly also calls on Council of Europe member States
that are North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) members to support
Ukraine to become a member of NATO.
21. As regards assistance in the reconstruction and democratic
governance of Ukraine, the Assembly:
21.1 calls on all member States of the Council of Europe Development
Bank to rapidly subscribe to the capital increase, approved in 2022,
to endow the bank with the means to continue its support to Ukraine
and to neighbouring countries hosting refugees and persons displaced
by the war against Ukraine;
22. Also welcoming that the 11th package of sanctions to be adopted
by the European Union aims at enhancing the effectiveness of the
system of restrictive measures, the Assembly:
22.1 calls on countries aspiring to join the European Union,
including Council of Europe member States, to ensure strict alignment
with decisions taken under the European Union Common Foreign and Security
Policy;
22.2 calls on European Union member States, in the course of
such negotiations, to support robust deterrent measures and the
introduction of secondary sanctions;
22.3 invites the European Union to expand efforts to withhold
financial assistance to those who support the Kremlin in its war
of aggression. This should include financial assistance which is
provided to third countries, for example in the context of partnership
and co-operation agreements;
22.4 calls on the parliaments of Council of Europe member States
to withdraw from the pending ratification of the free trade agreement
between the European Union and the Republic of Cuba (PDCA);
22.5 encourages Council of Europe member States to introduce
full-scale political and economic sanctions against the Iranian
regime;
22.6 supports the sanctions against the Russian Federation
introduced by the United States of America.
23. The Assembly joins the anti-war movement in the Russian Federation
calling on the member States which have passed “Magnitsky laws”
and the European Union to add those responsible for the arbitrary prosecution
of Vladimir Kara-Murza to the list of persons subject to targeted
sanctions.
24. The Assembly calls on Council of Europe member and observer
States and the European Union to take into account the following
elements, as they provide an effective framework to address sanctions
avoidance:
24.1 creating strategic
European economic autonomy from Russian oil and gas that are used
for Russian imperialistic geopolitical purposes;
24.2 introducing measures to reduce the resale of Russian oil
and gas to Europe via third countries;
24.3 expanding the list of individuals and entities targeted
by restrictive measures in the Russian Federation and third countries;
24.4 identifying the major categories of entities and individuals
which play a significant role in sanctions avoidance, such as banks,
insurance companies, financial advisers, financial institutions, transport
and logistics companies, ports and service companies;
24.5 setting up effective mechanisms to monitor compliance
with sanctions, for instance a dedicated task force;
24.6 introducing and implementing secondary sanctions, and
monitoring compliance with them;
24.7 setting up a public register of companies and individuals
working for Russian interests;
24.8 setting up a public register of companies and individuals
involved in sanctions avoidance;
24.9 introducing international guidelines for financial institutions
to assess risks carefully for customers and transactions prone to
sanctions avoidance. These guidelines would require heightened scrutiny when
dealing with individuals or entities operating in jurisdictions
known for evading sanctions;
24.10 strengthening co-operation and harmonising sanctions among
like-minded countries, in order to avoid loopholes;
24.11 enforcing robust tracking and verification systems to
prevent sanctioned goods and materials from entering global markets
through indirect channels, including by conducting regular audits
and collaborating with industry partners to ensure compliance throughout
the supply chain;
24.12 introducing significant financial penalties for sanctions
avoidance;
24.13 introducing criminal liability for individuals and groups
of individuals who deliberately provide assistance for the purpose
of evading sanctions;
24.14 considering the establishment of a pan-European body with
the authority to investigate and prosecute persons involved in sanctions
avoidance. Such a body (task force), working as a register of the
States and entities, banks and firms that are circumventing sanctions,
should be established as soon as possible and it should work in
parallel with the Register of Damage;
24.15 introducing monetary incentives for whistle-blowers reporting
specific details of sanctions avoidance.
25. As regards its own work, the Assembly:
25.1 resolves to establish channels of dialogue and co-operation
with Russian democratic forces and civil society organisations that
aspire to a democratic change in the Russian Federation, share Council of
Europe values and support the sovereignty, independence and territorial
integrity of Ukraine, including the Russian Action Committee;
25.2 encourages further reflection on the issue of sanctions
against the Russian Federation;
25.3 reiterates its concern at Russian abuse of the right to
veto, which is an international threat to the international rules-based
order and the democratic security of Council of Europe member States.
In this respect, the Assembly supports all efforts and discussions
seeking to unblock the situation at the United Nations, thus enabling
the latter to deliver on its mandate.
