B Explanatory memorandum
by Mr Christophe Lacroix, rapporteurNote
1 Introduction
1. On 2 May 2022, I tabled a motion
for a resolution titled “Threats to life and safety of journalists
and human rights defenders in Azerbaijan”.
Note Since then, the situation of journalists
and human rights defenders in Azerbaijan has deteriorated even further.
In response to these concerning developments, two additional motions
were tabled and referred by the Assembly to the Committee on legal
affairs and human rights to be taken into account herein: “Growth
in number of political prisoners in Azerbaijan”
Note and “The need to investigate politically
motivated persecution in Azerbaijan”
Note. Considering the different scope
of these motions, I proposed a new title for my report that would
better reflect their shared theme.
2. I am grateful to Ms Hannah Bardell (United Kingdom, NR), former
rapporteur, for her dedication and work on this file, including
her many public statements in reaction to developments in Azerbaijan.
Note
3. I regret that neither I nor Ms Bardell have been able to carry
out a fact-finding visit to Azerbaijan. Out of three dates proposed
by Ms Bardell for a fact-finding visit, none was accepted by the
Azerbaijani delegation for various organisational and substantive
reasons. Following the Assembly’s refusal to ratify the credentials of
the Azerbaijani delegation (
Resolution
2527 (2024)), the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Azerbaijan announced that
members of the Parliamentary Assembly who had voted in favour of
that resolution, would be considered
personae
non gratae in the country.
Note Considering that I was among them,
I would not be allowed to enter Azerbaijan.
4. Regrettably, the Milli Mejlis unilaterally decided not to
participate in the work of the Assembly in 2025 and 2026. I believe
that despite the absence of the Azerbaijani delegation in its midst,
the Assembly owes it to the people of Azerbaijan to provide an objective
and fair evaluation of the situation in this Council of Europe member
State. I deplore the President of Azerbaijan’s announcement that
Azerbaijan would no longer implement judgments of the European Court
of Human Rights, using its non-participation in the Assembly as a
pretext.
Note
2 Situation
of journalists, human rights defenders and reported political prisoners
5. Violence and threats of violence
against journalists and human rights defenders rarely occur in a vacuum.
It is therefore not enough for a State to merely respond to such
acts through after-the-event investigations; it is also necessary
for the State to take action to prevent and combat such acts in
the first place. This involves ensuring adequate protective measures
are in place for individuals considered to be at risk, but also
more generally creating an environment that supports free speech
and where it is clear that strong action would be taken in response
to any such attacks on journalists and human rights defenders.
6. In a healthy, vibrant democracy, it is crucial to establish
a culture and society that facilitates and champions freedom of
expression, pluralism and the crucial role played by human rights
defenders and civil society. It has long been alleged that cases
of threats and acts of violence to the life and safety of journalists and
human rights defenders could be facilitated by, and form part of,
a wider climate of intolerance towards free speech and pluralism
in Azerbaijan. Indeed, from 2014, the actions undertaken by Azerbaijani
authorities have shown a clear pattern of dismantling pluralism
and restricting civic space. Developments occurring since 2023 appear
to have eradicated any remnants of media freedom in the country.
2.1 Background
and independent reviews
7. According to the 2026 World
Press Freedom Index, prepared annually by Reporters Without Borders (RSF),
Azerbaijan ranks 171st out of 180 States, the lowest ranking of
any Council of Europe member States, superior only to several regimes
such as the Russian Federation, Afghanistan, Iran, North Korea and
Eritrea.
Note
8. According to data published by the Justice for Journalists
Foundation, there were 211 attacks on or threats against journalists
in Azerbaijan in 2025.
Note As of 2026, the Council of Europe’s
Platform for the Protection of Journalism and Safety of Journalists
reported 2 journalists killed (with impunity), and 36 journalists in
detention (compared to 4 in 2021).
Note
9. It is worth briefly recalling the existence of previous cases
of killings and violence against journalists and human rights defenders
in Azerbaijan. These include the murder of prominent investigative
journalist Elmar Huseynov in 2005,
Note the murder of writer and journalist
Rafiq Tagi in 2011,
Note and the murder of journalist Rasim Aliyev
in 2015 (following the publication of a Facebook post criticising
a footballer for unsportsmanlike behaviour).
Note
10. According to the most recent list prepared by the “Union for
the Freedom for Political Prisoners in Azerbaijan” (a group of activists
and former “prisoners of conscience”, including a prominent human
rights defender and the Director of the Institute for Peace and
Democracy, Leyla Yunus), as of 13 May 2026 there were 328 political
prisoners in Azerbaijan, including 31 journalists, 8 human rights
defenders and 44 members of opposition and civil society organisations.
Note These numbers increased significantly
since December 2023, when 254 “political prisoners” were reported,
reflecting the growing scale of repression. The authors note that the
list is compiled based on the Assembly’s definition of a “political
prisoner”, contained in its
Resolution
1900 (2012).
11. Below, I will briefly present some of the more concerning
cases involving attacks against or arrests of journalists, human
rights defenders, pro-democracy activists and anti-corruption campaigners.
2.2 Murder
of journalist and LGBTI rights activist Avaz Hafizli, 22 February
2022
12. Avaz Shikhmammadov (a.k.a.
Avaz Hafizli) was killed at home in Baku on 22 February 2022 by
his cousin. Avaz Hafizli was a well-known young LGBTI activist,
who was known for his courageous work in highlighting cases of injustice
or violence against the LGBTI community in Azerbaijan – often in
the face of significant homophobia and transphobia.
Note He also worked as a reporter for
the independent video news website, Kanal 13, where he covered a
range of issues, including LGBTI rights. He took part in rallies
against the Law on the Media in Azerbaijan and staged protests demanding
the government to end discrimination against LGBTI persons. He once
chained himself to the fence outside the chief prosecutor’s office
to protest a lack of action against threats to the gay community.
Note
13. Avaz Hafizli’s cousin, Amrulla Gulaliyev, confessed to killing
his cousin over a dispute relating to Avaz Hafizli’s sexuality,
having gone to his house to confront him about his sexuality and
activism on the topic.
Note Amrulla Gulaliyev has been convicted
of his murder and sentenced to nine years and six months in prison. Whilst
the law enforcement authorities have taken swift action in investigating
this case and in prosecuting the perpetrator, there are criticisms
that the sentence is unduly lenient given the brutal nature of the
murder and that it is a hate crime (it is very much on the lower
end of sentencing for a murder, contrary to the severity of the
crime). There are also concerns that little has been done to investigate
more fully into the context of the killing, in particular to explore
the extent to which it was linked to his activism, journalism, or
identity, and what could be done to prevent such tragic deaths in
the future, such as better laws against hate speech. This case also
raises significant questions about the extent of preventive and
protective actions being taken to ensure that human rights defenders,
and in particular those in the LGBTI community, are adequately protected
in Azerbaijan, and to ensure that swift action is taken for any
hate speech or threats to their life and safety.
14. The level of threats and insults from society in Azerbaijan
against those highlighting issues of homophobia and transphobia
is significant (including often from family members), and yet little
seems to have been done to take action against those encouraging
threatening behaviour or hate speech, let alone to protect Avaz
Hafizli.
Note Indeed, there are concerns that
wider societal stigma in relation to the LGBTI community seems also
prevalent in the police attitudes to this case.
2.3 Kidnapping,
violence and a wider pattern of persecution against human rights
activist Bakhtiyar Hajiyev, 21 April 2022
15. Bakhtiyar Hajiyev, a well-known
blogger and human rights activist, and outspoken critic of the authorities,
was abducted from the street on 21 April 2022 by four masked men.
He was forced into a car, beaten, tortured and subjected to inhuman
treatment. The assailants filmed themselves urinating on him as part
of an effort at humiliation.
Note He claimed that the men demanded
that he admit to having been instructed to write critical posts
about the Interior Minister Vilayat Eyvazov. When he denied any
such instructions, he was stripped and they demanded he delete his
posts about the Minister as well as those about Fuad Muradov, a pro-government
activist. He reported that they threatened to rape and kill him
if he continued to criticise the Minister. He was then abandoned
in a remote area, where they left him bound with duct tape and blindfolded. Bakhtiyar
Hajiyev accused the Interior Ministry of orchestrating his kidnapping
in order to warn him against criticising the Minister. The Government
said that it was investigating these events.
16. This incident is part of a wider pattern of persecution against
Bakhtiyar Hajiyev, which has many elements. He was arrested again
on 9 December 2022 on charges of hooliganism (relating to a dispute
with a neighbour about a kitten), however the charges were widely
considered to be retaliation for his political activities, with
some alleging that these are linked to US sanctions on an Azerbaijani
official.
Note Mr Hajiyev was later charged with
economic crimes relating to the alleged misuse of allocated subsidies.
On 13 February 2023, the Assembly’s co-rapporteurs for the monitoring
of Azerbaijan, expressed profound concern over the continuing detention
of Bakhtiyar Hajiyev, noting that it was “widely believed to be
connected to his activism” and expressing “utmost concern” for the
state of his health. The co-rapporteurs said “Unfortunately, Mr Hajiyev`s
case illustrates a ‘troubling pattern of arbitrary arrest and detention
of government critics, civil society activists and human rights
defenders through retaliatory prosecution and misuse of criminal
law in defiance of the rule of law’”.
Note This detention received general
international condemnation, with the charges being widely understood
as politically motivated.
Note
17. On 13 January 2025, the Baku Court for Serious Crimes convicted
Mr Hajiyev and sentenced him to 10 years' imprisonment, confiscated
his apartment in Baku and the funds in his bank accounts, and banned him
from educational activities for one year after his release.
Note The Assembly’s then co-rapporteur
for the monitoring of Azerbaijan, Lise Christoffersen (Norway, SOC),
and the General Rapporteur for political prisoners, Thórhildur Sunna
Ævarsdóttir (Iceland, SOC) denounced the verdict as unjust and disproportionate.
Note
2.4 Threats
to kill journalist Ayten Mammadova and her daughter, 8 May 2022
18. Journalist Ayten Mammadova,
known for covering lawsuits of public interest including criminal
cases, was attacked on the evening of 8-9 May 2022 in the lift in
her building in Baku. A man entered the lift, held a knife to her
throat, threatened to kill her and her young daughter and demanded
that she stop writing about a trial.
Note Ayten Mammadova contacted the police
after the attack. Medical examinations confirmed traces of a knife
blade on her throat. The Ministry of Internal Affairs confirmed
that a criminal case had been initiated.
19. It was unclear what trial the attacker was referring to, but
Ayten Mammadova had been recently focussing on the trial of the
disappearance and murder in 2019/2020 of Narmin Guliyeva, a 10-year-old
resident of the Dondar Gushchu village of the Tovuz region in Azerbaijan.
2.5 Attempted
assassination of Mahammad Mirzali and links to transnational repression
20. Well-known blogger and social-media
opposition activist, Mahammad Mirzali, has been repeatedly attacked
in France including being shot, stabbed and severely beaten.
Note In Azerbaijan, he was arrested at
a protest in 2013 and tortured. He left Azerbaijan in 2016 after
coming under increasing pressure from the Azerbaijani authorities
and has been living in France as a refugee since. He regularly receives
threats to his life and safety and has been violently attacked.
President Aliyev has denied any involvement in these attacks.
Note
21. On 6 October 2020, Mahammad Mirzali was attacked in France
as he got into his car. His assailant shot him through the car window
with a handgun, wounding him in the shoulder. The victim managed
to drive away and get medical help. The perpetrator of this attack
has not been identified.
22. On 14 March 2021, Mahammad Mirzali was stabbed 16 times and
seriously wounded in an attack, in which he lost three litres of
blood and required lengthy surgery.
Note The attackers reportedly attempted
to cut out his tongue. The Ministry of Internal Affairs of Azerbaijan
said that Azerbaijani authorities had nothing to do with the attack
in France. Four attackers (three from Azerbaijan, one from Georgia)
were arrested and charged with attempted murder in an organised
group. Their trial was scheduled to start before the Cour d'Assises
de Rennes in May 2026.
Note
23. Another suspected conspiracy to murder Mahammad Mirzali occurred
in 2022. On 12 June 2022, French police arrested two suspected hit
men at a motorway toll near Angers. One was an Azerbaijani armed
with a pistol, another was a Moldovan of Turkish origin. Both were
driving Polish-registered cars and had Mahammad Mirzali’s address
entered as the destination in their GPS devices, one having a picture
of Mirzali in his telephone.
Note On 3 June 2025, Khayyam Hagverdiyev
(an Azerbaijani citizen residing in Poland) was sentenced to 10
years in prison for his involvement in this assassination attempt
against Mr Mirzali. The Rennes Criminal Court found that Mr Mirzali
was solely targeted because of his “activity as a freelance journalist”
who published content that criticised “abuses of autocratic power
and leaders of the national oil and gas sector.” According to RSF,
this judgment marked the first time when the direct involvement
of the Azerbaijani government in violence against journalists was
formally established.
Note
24. In addition to the horrific violence that he has been subjected
to, Mahammad Mirzali’s case also exemplifies the level of threats
that journalists and activists can receive. Mr Mirzali told RSF
he gets “an average of 2 000 threatening messages a day, especially
on YouTube”. He said the typical one consists of a profile photo
with a Kalashnikov accompanied by some clearly threatening words
such as “I’m here”.
Note
25. In addition to these violent attacks and threats of violence,
there were many other incidents involving the blogger and his family.
In January 2018, authorities in Azerbaijan arrested Mahammad Mirzali’s
father Fazil Mirzaliyev and his brother-in-law Elman Agayev, allegedly
in an effort to get Mahammad Mirzali to remove material posted on
a Facebook page “Made in Azerbaijan”.
Note Defamation claims have been brought
against Mahammad Mirzali in France, largely unsuccessfully, including
a defamation suit brought by a former Azerbaijani deputy economy
minister. In 2021, an anonymous person threatened to publish intimate
photos of the blogger’s sister and her husband if he did not stop
his blogging.
Note Apparently such photographs were
then circulated.
2.6 Murder
of Vidadi Isgandarli in France
26. Vidadi Isgandarli, a prominent
Azerbaijani human rights defender and former prosecutor known for
his fierce criticism of President Ilham Aliyev, was assassinated
in Mulhouse, France, in 2024, marking a brutal escalation in the
targeting of exiled dissidents. Mr Isgandarli had a long history
of political persecution in Azerbaijan, notably receiving a three-year
prison sentence in 2011 on fabricated vote-tampering charges following
his participation in anti-government rallies, which led Amnesty
International to designate him a prisoner of conscience. After seeking
international protection in France in 2015, he continued his vocal opposition
through online platforms until 29 September 2024, when unknown assailants
broke into his apartment in Mulhouse and stabbed him more than 20
times. He died from his injuries in a hospital two days later, prompting
international calls for French authorities to investigate the killing
as an act of transnational repression by Azerbaijan. As of 2026,
the investigation is ongoing.
Note
2.7 Persecution
of Abzas Media staff and other independent journalists
27. On 20 and 21 November 2023,
members of the editorial staff of Abzas Media, an independent media outlet,
were arrested on charges of smuggling, including Ulvi Hasanli –
its founder. Police claimed to have found €40,000 during office
searches – an accusation immediately denounced by staff as fabricated
and unsupported by any credible evidence. Several other leading
staff and journalists, including editor-in-chief Sevinc Vagifgizi,
investigative journalist Hafiz Babali, reporters Nargiz Absalamova
and Elnara Gasimova, as well as translator and co-ordinator Mahammad
Kekalov, were arrested soon after. Their arrest was linked to the
making of a documentary and a large-scale investigation into high-level
corruption in Azerbaijan. Ulvi Hasanli took part in a joint public
hearing before the Committee on Legal Affairs and Human Rights,
the Monitoring Committee and the Committee on Culture, Science,
Education and Media in April 2023, during which he detailed the
risks faced by independent journalists in Azerbaijan. In a joint
statement, Hannah Bardell (United Kingdom, NR), Mogens Jensen (Denmark,
SOC), the Assembly’s General Rapporteur on media freedom and safety
of journalists, and Sunna Aevarsdottir (Iceland, SOC), the Assembly’s
General Rapporteur on political prisoners, considered his arrest
to be a reprisal for his co-operation with the Parliamentary Assembly
and for his recent investigative journalism into corruption by members
of the government.
Note Addressing the court in Baku, Mr Hasanli
stated: “We have lost our freedom for the sake of free speech and independent
media. Ilham Aliyev may imprison us, but he cannot imprison our
thoughts or our words.”
Note
28. On 20 June 2025, the Baku Serious Crimes Court sentenced six
members of the Abzas Media team and one Radio Free Europe/Radio
Liberty journalist to lengthy prison terms. Ulvi Hasanli, who was
shortlisted for the 2025 Vaclav Havel Human Rights Prize, as well
as Sevinc Vagifgizi, Hafiz Babali, and Farid Mehralizade (an economist
and contributor) were sentenced to nine years in prison, Nargiz
Absalamova and Elnara Gasimova were sentenced to eight years and
Mahammad Kekalov received a seven-and-a-half-year sentence.
Note There
are concerning reports of ill-treatment and inhuman conditions of
their detention. Mr Hasanli embarked on a hunger strike in protest.
Note On 3 April 2026, the Azerbaijan’s
Supreme Court rejected their appeals.
Note
29. In March 2024, dozens of plainclothes police officers raided
Toplum TV’s office in Baku. They confiscated equipment, seized the
phones of journalists, and detained at least ten members of staff
and affiliated activists – some for interrogation, others on charges
of “smuggling”. Toplum TV was known for its investigative reports
on government corruption.
Note During the operation, the authorities
sealed the editorial office, deleted Toplum TV’s YouTube content,
and disabled its social media accounts. The founder, Alasgar Mammadli,
was among those arrested.
30. On 6 March 2026, RSF reported that nine female journalists
imprisoned in Azerbaijan, including three correspondents for Meydan
TV, had recently been threatened with sexual violence, including
rape, subjected to unwanted physical contact by male prison guards
and to other forms of ill-treatment.
Note I find these credible reports shocking.
I note that the European Committee for the Prevention of Torture
and Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment (CPT) recently
visited Azerbaijan, but since Azerbaijan does not consent to the publication
of its reports, their conclusions and recommendations remain confidential.
Azerbaijan should promptly investigate these serious allegations
and make its findings public.
2.8 Persecution
of pro-democracy activists and human rights defenders
31. Akif Gurbanov is a well-known
civil society leader, serving as chairperson of the Institute of
Democratic Initiatives (IDI), and a co-founder of Toplum TV and
spokesperson for the Third Republic Platform political initiative.
On 6 March 2024, he was arrested during a police raid targeting
the offices of Toplum TV, IDI, and the Third Republic Platform.
Authorities charged Mr Gurbanov with offences such as conspiring
to smuggle foreign currency, tax evasion, illegal entrepreneurship,
and large-scale money laundering.
Note Mr Gurbanov and his supporters maintain
that these charges are politically motivated, asserting they stem
from his pro-democracy activities and open criticism of the Azerbaijani
government. His arrest occurred without a court order, and his lawyer
was reportedly denied access during the search of his home. Akif
Gurbanov has faced repeated extensions of his pre-trial detention.
In 2024, he was shortlisted for the Václav Havel Human Rights Prize.
Reports indicate that he has faced threats of torture and pressure
to cease criticism of President Aliyev while in detention.
Note In the past, Mr Gurbanov won a case
before the European Court of Human Rights, which found Azerbaijan
to be in violation of the right to freedom of association (Article
11 of the European Convention on Human Rights) over its refusal
to register the IDI.
Note
32. Ruslan Izzatli is a political activist, former leader of the
D18 Movement, and founding member of the Third Republic Platform.
Mr Izzatli has a history of government harassment – including being
drafted into military service despite being declared unfit, which
he attributed to his public criticism of officials. After his military
service and renewed activism, he was called in for questioning due
to social media posts about challenges facing soldiers and veterans.
Note On 6 March 2024, Mr Izzatli was
detained during the aforementioned raids with other activists but
released the same day. However, he was re-detained two days later
while waiting outside a police station.
Note He was subsequently charged with
“smuggling by an organised group,” the same charge faced by several
other activists and journalists.
33. Dr. Gubad Ibadhoglu is a prominent economist, academic, and
anti-corruption activist. In July 2023, he was violently arrested
by the Azerbaijani authorities and charged with counterfeiting currency
– a charge widely condemned by observers as fabricated. Dr. Ibadhoglu
was held in pre-trial detention under harsh and deteriorating health
conditions without adequate medical care.
Note In April 2024, he was released to
house arrest in Baku, where he remains under strict restrictions
and surveillance. His release coincided with the publication of
an early draft of the Azerbaijan Sanctions Review Act of 2024 –
proposed by US lawmakers – which explicitly called for his release
and threatened sanctions against Azerbaijani officials.
Note Although his pre-trial proceedings
were suspended in July 2024, the charges were not dropped, and his
travel remains restricted, preventing him from seeking treatment
abroad. International organisations and civil society groups have
called for his unconditional release, highlighting his detention
as emblematic of Azerbaijan’s treatment of dissidents and critics.
Note
34. Hafiz Hasanov, the head of the Public Association “Rights
and Development” and a prominent civil society representative, was
detained in March 2025 as part of a sweeping investigation into
foreign-funded civil society groups, an operation that also saw
the arrest of other NGO leaders on charges of abuse of power, money
laundering, and official forgery. While Mr Hasanov was released
from initial custody the same day, he was subsequently placed under
strict police supervision and a travel ban as the criminal investigation continued.
By the end of 2025 and into early 2026, his case remained pending
with hearings ongoing, reflecting a broader state strategy of using
protracted judicial proceedings and “police supervision” to hinder
the activities of human rights defenders without immediate formal
sentencing.
Note
35. On 29 April 2024, Anar Mammadli, human rights defender, election
and climate action observer, and laureate of the 2014 Václav Havel
Human Rights Prize, was arrested and detained on remand. His arrest
was linked to the observation by his Centre for Election Monitoring
and Democracy Studies (an NGO) of the presidential elections and
the announcement of a coalition with other human rights defenders
on climate justice ahead of COP29. In the past, Mr Mammadli won
a case before the European Court of Human Rights, which found his
previous detention to be politically motivated, in violation of
Articles 5 and 18 of the European Convention on Human Rights. The
Court explicitly noted that the actual purpose of the impugned measures was
to silence and punish the applicant as a civil society activist
for his activities in the area of electoral monitoring.
Note The
implementation of this judgment will be discussed further in this
explanatory report, but I wish to note that despite Azerbaijan’s
official statement that his previous criminal record had been expunged,
Note he is currently reportedly being
tried as a repeat offender,.
Note Given his background and circumstances
of his current prosecution, I propose that Mr Mammadli be explicitly
recognised by the Assembly as a political prisoner, in line with
the criteria set forth in the
Resolution
1900 (2012).
36. Rufat Safarov, a former investigator, human rights defender
and founder of the organisation Defence Line, which is dedicated
to monitoring and promoting human rights and the rule of law in
Azerbaijan, was arrested on suspicion of fraud and hooliganism on
3 December 2024.
Note His arrest took place several hours after
he had visited the US Embassy in Baku to obtain a visa for travel
to the United States, where he was meant to receive the US Secretary
of State’s 2024 Human Rights Defender Award. He remains in pre-trial detention.
2.9 Crackdown
on peace activists and independent researchers
37. Bahruz Samadov is a political
scientist, researcher, freelance journalist and peace activist known
for openly criticising the Azerbaijani government and advocating
for peace, particularly around the Karabakh conflict. In August
2024, while visiting Baku from his studies in Prague, Mr Samadov
was arrested and charged with “high treason.” Accusations included
espionage, dissemination of state secrets, and helping a foreign
state or organisation plan hostile activities against Azerbaijan.
The evidence allegedly stemmed from his writings, public calls for
peace, and online conversations with Armenian nationals – interactions
mainly of routine and public nature.
Note
38. On 23 June 2025, the Baku Grave Crimes Court sentenced him
to 15 years in prison. Human rights observers widely condemned the
trial as unfair, pointing to a lack of credible evidence, political
motivations, and violations of the right to a public hearing.
Note He reportedly attempted suicide
and went on a hunger strike after the prosecution demanded a 16-year
sentence. He and his supporters assert that his only “crime” was advocating
for peace with Armenia.
Note
39. Another concerning example of crackdown against academics
is the prosecution of Iqbal Abilov, a Talysh academic and ethnographer
who grew up in Belarus. Previously, he served as a lecturer at the Belarusian
State University and is known for his research on the Talysh, an
ethnic minority group in Azerbaijan. Upon his visit to Baku, he
was repeatedly summoned for questioning by the State Security Service,
had his passport confiscated when trying to return to Belarus, and
was ultimately detained and moved to a Baku detention centre without
his family being notified.
40. On 24 July 2024, Mr Abilov was remanded in pre-trial detention
on charges of “high treason,” “incitement of national hatred,” and
allegedly making appeals against the State, which have been described
by international observers and human rights groups as “fabricated.”
The prosecution reportedly relied on his academic research and a
Skype conversation with an Armenian scholar as grounds for the case
– a tenuous link but sufficient to result in a closed trial and,
in May 2025, a sentence of 18 years’ imprisonment. His conviction
was deplored by the Assembly’s General Rapporteur for political
prisoners, Ms Azadeh Rohjan (Sweden, SOC).
Note
3 Wider
climate of restrictions on free speech in Azerbaijan
41. Since 2023, Azerbaijan has
seen a worrying intensification of repressive measures targeting
anyone perceived as a government critic. The cases mentioned in
the preceding section demonstrate a clear pattern of using a combination
of targeted arrests, restrictive laws, and harassment to dismantle
what remained of its independent media and civil society. This large-scale
crackdown has been characterised by the misuse of criminal law for
political purposes, including through the use of charges such as
smuggling, money laundering or tax evasion. I find it utterly shocking
that a Council of Europe member State, legally bound to abide by
the European Convention on Human Rights, finds itself at the rock-bottom
of global press and academic freedom rankings. The fact that not
a single independent media outlet operates from within Azerbaijan
is, in my view, incompatible with the aim of the Council of Europe.
42. Several international NGOs have denounced a “disturbing pattern
of arbitrary arrests and detentions of government critics, civil
society activists and human rights defenders through reprisal prosecutions
and the misuse of criminal law in disregard of the rule of law”.
Note This repressive strategy is accompanied
by coercive measures such as prolonged pre-trial detention, searches
without procedural guarantees, the freezing of bank accounts, travel
bans and the denial of the right of access to a lawyer. Numerous
reports of ill-treatment, obstacles to effective defence and violations
of the right to a fair trial, particularly during preliminary hearings, have
also been raised. Judicial decisions handed down in this context
are frequently marred by procedural irregularities, lack sufficient
reasoning and appear disconnected from the established facts, reflecting
the lack of independence of the judiciary.
43. Another concerning aspect of restricting free speech in Azerbaijan
is the reported State-sponsored surveillance in Azerbaijan. According
to reports,
NoteNote more than 1 000 Azerbaijani phone
numbers, including those of at least 48 journalists, were selected
as potential targets for the highly invasive Pegasus spyware. Forensic
analysis confirmed that the devices of prominent journalists such
as Khadija Ismayilova and Sevinc Vagifgizi were infected with the
“zero-click” malware, granting operators total access to their encrypted messages,
private photos, and real-time location while secretly activating
their cameras and microphones. On 24 September 2025, the European
Court of Human Rights communicated the case of
Ganbarova and Others v. Azerbaijan,
Note which concerns
the alleged use of Pegasus spyware against the 25 applicants. The
Assembly has already noted and addressed these allegations in its
Resolution 2513 (2023) “Pegasus and similar spyware and secret State surveillance”.
44. The recent introduction of the Centralised Information and
Digital Analytics System, known by the acronym MİRAS, has prompted
concerns regarding an unprecedented expansion of state surveillance
powers in Azerbaijan. Established by a November 2025 decree and
managed by the State Security Service, the platform is designed
to consolidate vast amounts of personal data from across all government
agencies into a single, centralised database that is expected to
be fully operational by May 2026. Human rights organisations, including
Human Rights Watch, have raised alarms that this system lacks judicial
oversight and effectively creates a "sweeping" infrastructure for
monitoring dissidents, journalists, and activists.
Note
45. Despite the well-established case-law of the European Court
of Human Rights, such as the
Mahmudov and
Agazade v. Azerbaijan judgment,
Note criminal
defamation laws that include substantial prison sentences continue
to exist in Azerbaijan. The existence of these laws is part of the
wider picture contributing to a climate of disdain for free speech
and for journalism. The above-mentioned judgment dates from 2008,
Azerbaijan has therefore failed to comply with a binding judgment
of the Court to remove lengthy prison sentences for defamation in
its criminal law for more than 18 years. Such a failure to act in
a reasonable time-frame is not compatible with Azerbaijan’s clear
international legal obligation under Article 46 § 1 of the Convention
to implement that judgment. Moreover, 13 years ago, the European
Commission for Democracy through Law (Venice Commission) adopted
its Opinion on the Legislation pertaining to the Protection against
Defamation of the Republic of Azerbaijan. In particular, the Venice
Commission found it “worrying that, in spite of the authorities’
repeatedly stated commitment to work towards decriminalisation,
defamation is still associated with excessively high criminal sanctions,
including imprisonment”.
Note
46. All of these factors point to a widespread climate of intolerance
towards freedom of expression, political pluralism and the legitimate
role of civil society actors. This targeted repression has clearly
intensified in the run-up to COP29 in Baku, as well as following
the presidential election in February 2024 and the parliamentary elections
in September of the same year.
Note
47. In addition to the above practices, the regulatory environment
for the media has become more difficult with the adoption of draconian
laws to control the media and curtail freedom of expression.
Note The Law on the Media, enacted
in late 2021, confers vast regulatory powers on the executive, undermining
the editorial independence of the media and allowing extensive control
over their activities. It contains ambiguous definitions, especially
around what constitutes a “journalist” or “media entity”, paving
the way for arbitrary enforcement and exclusion of many independent
voices. The Media Development Agency, which is under government
control, exercises discretionary power over registration, as evidenced
by the arbitrary refusal to accredit at least 40 media outlets and
some 20 independent journalists. The media environment is thus being gradually
stripped of all independent voices, with State-controlled media
being used to publicly discredit critical journalists through smear
campaigns. In such a climate, self-censorship flourishes, and investigative journalism
disappears.
48. The Venice Commission, in its opinion of 20 June 2022 on the
Law on Media, came to the conclusion that, in the context of an
already extremely confined space for independent journalism and
media in Azerbaijan, the Law would have a further “chilling effect”.
Note The opinion
noted multiple obstacles to the independent exercise of journalism,
including the centralisation of regulatory power, registration requirements
and discriminatory restrictions applied to journalists not affiliated
with State-recognised media”.
49. Azerbaijani civil society is also subject to a particularly
restrictive legislative framework that hinders freedom of association.
The legal environment established by the authorities severely limits
the ability of NGOs to form, operate legally and receive funding,
particularly from foreign sources. This repressive context is fuelled by
the abusive use of NGO regulations, resulting in arbitrary refusals
to register, unjustified administrative obstacles and intrusive
financial surveillance. The legislation in force requires subsidies
to be registered with the Ministry of Justice, leading to systematic
delays and unjustified blockages. This close monitoring exposes NGOs
to severe penalties for non-compliance, which is often defined in
vague or arbitrary terms. Furthermore, independent organisations
are gradually being marginalised in favour of pro-government entities
(GONGOs), which enjoy the endorsement and support of the state,
in violation of the principle of pluralism of associations.
Note In the absence of official recognition,
NGO members who continue their work are exposed to increased risks of
criminal prosecution, administrative harassment and arbitrary detention.
Note None of the recommendations included
in the Venice Commission’s opinion of 15 December 2014 on the Law
on non-governmental Organisations (Public Associations and Funds)
Note have been
implemented, despite the lapse of over 11 years.
50. This restrictive legal environment contributes to the development
of a climate of violence and self-censorship that necessarily shrinks
the civic space. Since November 2023, government media outlets have intensified
their smear campaign against civil society and media entities, accusing
them of collaborating with Western organisations and human rights
organisations.
Note More than 200 incidents in which
journalists have been prevented from carrying out their duties have
been recorded, without any enforcement of Article 163 of the Azerbaijani
Penal Code, which punishes the obstruction of journalists' legal
professional activities.
51. The European Court of Human Rights has identified, in its
judgments, many serious human rights violations experienced by Azerbaijani
human rights defenders and journalists. The implementation of these judgments
by the Azerbaijani authorities has been very poor.
52. The
Mammadli v. AzerbaijanNote group of cases concerns
human rights defenders and one journalist, who were all targeted
with criminal proceedings in order to silence them for their work.
All of the applicants were subjected to arrests and detentions that
the Court found to have been a misuse of criminal law, which was
used to punish and silence them, in violation of Article 18 in conjunction
with Article 5 of the European Convention on Human Rights. During
its supervision of the implementation of this group, the Committee
of Ministers noted that the judgments revealed “a troubling pattern
of arbitrary arrests and detention of government critics, civil society
activists and human-rights defenders through retaliatory prosecutions
and misuse of criminal law in defiance of the rule of law.”
Note
53. The Mammadli group includes
eight judgments concerning thirteen individuals. As of May 2026,
there were seven individuals in the group who had not received the
individual measures needed to implement their case. The main measure
which remains outstanding is for the Plenum of the Supreme Court
to review their cases, in order to erase their criminal records
and remove all negative consequences of the arbitrary criminal proceedings
against them. Their cases have now been pending at the Supreme Court
for over five years. In its analysis of the cases, the Council of
Europe’s Department for the Execution of Judgments concluded that, judging
by this delay, “In all the circumstances, the implication cannot
be avoided that the political motives found to have prompted the
prosecutions from the outset still persist.” Due to the seriousness
of these cases, the Committee of Ministers reviews them at every
quarterly human rights meeting. Prior to the meetings, the Azerbaijani
authorities assure the Committee of Ministers that the Supreme Court
of Azerbaijan has the outstanding cases on its agenda. However,
the cases never quite get to the top of that agenda.
54. The failure to implement the cases has very significant consequences
for the applicants. A criminal record can have far-reaching effects
on private life in Azerbaijan, including making it very difficult
to find employment. Whilst the cases have been pending at the Supreme
Court, one of the applicants has reportedly committed suicide, another
has tried to commit suicide, and a third has been re-arrested on
what many observers consider to be politically motivated charges.
Youth activist Bayram Mammadov was found drowned in Istanbul, which
the Turkish authorities reported as a suicide (though some observers
regard his death as suspicious).
Note Another youth activist,
Giyas Ibrahimov, reportedly tried to set himself on fire in front
of the Azerbaijani Presidential Administration but was arrested
by the police.
Note As already mentioned,
elections monitoring specialist and Václav Havel Human Rights Prize
winner Anar Mammadli has been re-arrested by the Azerbaijani authorities
in connection with a case that has been widely criticised for being
politically motivated and, despite assurances by the Azerbaijani
government that his past criminal record had been expunged, he is
being tried as a repeat offender.
NoteNote
55. In order to implement general measures in the
Mammadli group, the authorities
must take appropriate steps to prevent any further abuses of the
criminal justice system, including by ensuring the independence
and impartiality of both the prosecution and the judiciary. The
Committee of Ministers has welcomed certain steps taken by the Azerbaijani
authorities in this regard, involving structural changes that were
made to the role of the judiciary within the Judicial Legal Council.
However, the Committee of Ministers has also noted reports of a
wave of recent arrests and detentions of journalists and activists
in the country, which indicates that the changes to the Judicial
Legal Council have had little practical effect. In June 2024, the
Committee of Ministers welcomed the fact that a draft law was introduced
in the Parliament to amend certain provisions of the Law on Courts
and Judges, aimed at curtailing any potential influence on the judiciary
by the executive branch. However, the Committee of Ministers is
still waiting for information on whether the draft law has actually
been passed. Despite the encouragements from the Committee of Ministers,
and the availability of the Council of Europe secretariat, there
has been no high-level dialogue in regard to the implementation
of these cases.
Note
56. The implementation of other judgments concerning journalists
and human rights defenders in Azerbaijan has arguably been even
worse. The case of Khadija Ismayilova v. Azerbaijan
Note concerns a journalist
known for her work on allegations of corruption against the family
of the President of Azerbaijan. She was sent a letter threatening
her with public humiliation if she did not stop her investigative
reporting. When she refused, a video featuring scenes of a sexual
nature involving Ms Ismayilova and her then boyfriend, taken with
a hidden camera secretly installed in her bedroom, was posted on
the internet. Ms Ismayilova contended that the secret surveillance
had been carried out at the request of the authorities, or at the
very least that they failed to investigate it, and that it was part
of a campaign of intimidation against her. The Court ruled that
the events had been linked to Ms Ismayilova’s journalistic activities
and that the Azerbaijani authorities had never properly investigated.
The Court found, in particular, that obvious leads had not been
followed up: for example, no formal statement had been taken from
a telephone engineer who admitted being instructed to install a
second telephone line in Ms Ismayilova’s flat and to trace wires
to it.
57. An investigation was eventually launched, which Ms Ismayilova
noted still did not involve any elementary active evidence gathering,
such as interviewing the telephone engineer to find out who had
instructed him.
Note In
March 2025, the Committee of Ministers issued an Interim Resolution,
finding that the Azerbaijani authorities had still not rectified
the problems with the investigation which had been identified by
the Court six years earlier.
Note In order to implement
general measures in the case, the Committee of Ministers has, inter
alia, invited the authorities to provide information on the creation
of an enabling environment to ensure the safety of journalists against
attacks from state and non-state actors.
Note The Committee of Ministers has not
yet recorded any progress.
58. A serious and widespread problem that human rights defenders
face in Azerbaijan are barriers to forming organisations. Without
the possibility to register legal entities, it is very difficult
for lawyers and activists to work together towards common human
rights goals. The group Ramazanova v. Azerbaijan
Note includes 19 cases involving NGOs
that were unjustifiably dissolved or refused permission to register
by the Azerbaijani authorities. The individual measures of 10 of
the cases remain pending implementation, whilst the Committee of
Ministers is awaiting additional information from the Azerbaijani
authorities on the implementation of general measures needed to
resolve the underlying problem.
Note
59. Furthermore, in April 2025, President Aliyev explicitly stated
that Azerbaijan would no longer recognise the validity of the judgments
of the European Court of Human Rights or implement them. He justified
this by pointing to Azerbaijan’s exclusion from participating in
the election of the Court’s judges, arguing that, since his country
had been deprived of voting rights in the Parliamentary Assembly,
the Court’s decisions would not be valid for Azerbaijan.
Note
4 Conclusions
60. Since 2023, Azerbaijan has
steadily escalated its efforts to silence critical voices, using
a combination of targeted arrests, restrictive laws, and harassment
to dismantle what remained of its independent media and civil society.
The authorities have carried out waves of arrests targeting journalists,
human rights defenders, pro-democracy activists, anti-corruption
experts and political dissidents. Well-known outlets such as Abzas Media,
Toplum TV, Kanal 13, and Meydan TV have seen their reporters detained
on charges such as smuggling, fraud, and other criminal offences
seen as a retaliation for their independent journalism. Some of the
most prominent voices in the civil society remain imprisoned.
61. Experts invited to a public hearing before the Committee on
Legal Affairs and Human Rights in June 2025 noted that, as a result
of the new wave of repressions, not a single independent media outlet
operates in Azerbaijan anymore. Most Azerbaijanis can now only access
news via pro-government television and State-controlled outlets.
Critical journalism has become dangerous, forcing some reporters
into exile and driving others to self-censorship or stop their work
entirely.
62. The Assembly has repeatedly and consistently sounded the alarm
about the systemic pattern of silencing dissent and stifling independent
voices in Azerbaijan. Unfortunately, its calls have fallen on deaf
ears in Baku. Regrettably, the Assembly has often been one of the
few international institutions to speak out. Even worse, all too
often, the debate has focused on what concessions to make to promote
the return of the parliamentary delegation of Azerbaijan to the
Assembly, rather than how to promote a change of direction in Azerbaijan.
63. I would like to recall the words of the Heads of State and
Government of Council of Europe member States in Reykjavik: “We
have a common responsibility to fight autocratic tendencies and
growing threats to human rights, democracy and the rule of law.
Those core values are the bedrock of our continued freedom, peace,
prosperity and security for Europe.” At a time of major geopolitical
shifts, our values are not only our bedrock but also our safety
net. They are the best guarantee of our democratic security.
64. It is in the interests of all Council of Europe member States
that the structural and systemic problems with regard to freedom
of expression, freedom of assembly, freedom of association, the
right to liberty and the right to a fair trial in Azerbaijan are
addressed. This is why, in addition to addressing a number of recommendations
to the Azerbaijani authorities, I am also addressing a number of
recommendations to Council of Europe member States themselves and
the Secretary General. Furthermore, the Assembly should continue to
play a role through its monitoring procedure, as well as by paying
continued and focused attention to the issue of human rights defenders
and independent media in Azerbaijan.
65. Turning a blind eye on systematic, extensive and serious human
rights violations is not a long-term solution and will not lead
to a safer, more peaceful Europe.
