B Explanatory memorandum, by Mr Andreas
Gross
1 Introduction
“The
truth and reconciliation commission represents a compromise between
those who want amnesia and those who want retribution.”
Archbishop Desmond Tutu
1. In the past three decades, spectacular progress has
been achieved in many parts of the world, including in Europe, in
bringing to an end dictatorships, internal violent structures and
wars, and in implementing the principles of democracy, respect for
human rights and the rule of law. In very general terms, this trend
could be qualified as transition from violence and repression to
democracy.
2. Although every transformation process has its own particular
features, one of the most difficult issues for an emerging society
is to come to terms with its difficult past, to deal with the legacy
and the public figures of the former regime, or to rebuild the nation’s
unity after a civil war.
3. In order to cope with this task, a number of countries around
the world have established specific bodies known as “truth commissions”.
To date, some 30 counties have had this experience and a few more
are considering it.
4. The term “truth commissions” generally designates officially
established temporary non-judicial bodies at the national level
set up to research and report on tragic violent events in the country’s
past, in particular to investigate human rights abuses committed
during a particular violent period or by the former regime.
5. Though it is difficult to measure the extent to which a given
truth commission has actually fulfilled its goals, the concept as
such has become increasingly popular and is considered as an important
tool, contributing to restoring justice and reconciling the nation
with itself.
6. However, with a few exceptions, this model has not been widely
used in Europe. Yet, there are European countries and regions where
past – and in some cases ongoing – violence has left deep wounds
in the society which need to be dealt with, so that the future is
no longer hostage of the past. The experience of the truth commissions
in other parts of the world could prove to be of significant political
importance and a source of inspiration for those countries.
7. The purpose of the present report is to provide basic information
on the truth commissions, draw lessons from their successes and
failures, analyse their advantages and weaknesses from a political
and a legal perspective, and envisage how these experiences could
be implemented among the Council of Europe member states, particularly,
in the Chechen Republic of the Russian Federation.
8. I wish to express my gratitude to Mrs Priscilla Hayner (International
Centre for Transitional Justice, Geneva), Mrs Francesca Pizzutelli
(Amnesty International, London), Mr Driss El Yzami (Human Rights Advisory
Council, Morocco, formerly a member of the Justice and Reconciliation
Commission), Professor Lyal Sunga (Raoul Wallenberg Institute of
Human Rights and Humanitarian Law, Sweden), and Mr Abdulla Istamulov
(Centre for Strategic Studies and Promotion of Civil Society in
North Caucasus, Grozny) for their participation in the hearing organised
by the Political Affairs Committee on 13 September 2007. Their input
was extremely helpful for my work. I am also grateful to Mr Mark
Freeman (International Centre for Transitional Justice, Brussels)
for his valuable contribution and comments.
2 Historical examples of truth commissions
9. A quick look at the most prominent truth commissions,
namely those in Argentina, Chile, El Salvador, South Africa and
Guatemala, gives an opportunity to understand in which circumstances
these bodies are established.
10. The National Commission on the Disappearance of Persons in
Argentina was created in December 1983 by then-President Raul Alfonsin,
shortly after the restoration of democracy, in order to investigate
the fate of the victims of forced disappearance and other human
rights violations – estimated at between 10 000 and 30 000 – carried
out during the military dictatorship (1976-83). Democratic institutions
were weak, and the military, which retained strong positions, actively
resisted accountability for past crimes. Before restoring civilian
rule, the military rulers granted themselves immunity from prosecution.
The commission was composed of 16 members, and included public and
religious personalities and parliamentarians. The results of the research
on some 9 000 disappeared persons were documented in the Nunca más (Never again) report released
in September 1984, which was followed by the annulment of amnesties
granted and trials of the key leaders of military juntas. However,
under the threat of a new military coup, laws were subsequently
enacted which limited prosecutions. Moreover, in 1989 and 1990 President
Carlos Menem issued two pardons for a number of officers still facing
trials as well as for those already convicted. In the late 1990s,
laws limiting prosecution were invalidated, and several cases were
reopened.
11. In Chile, the eight-member National Commission for Truth and
Reconciliation was established in 1990 by then-President Patricio
Aylwin. The commission’s mandate encompassed human rights abuses
resulting in death or disappearance during years of military rule
under Augusto Pinochet from September 1973 until March 1990. The
report of the commission, known as the Rettig report, was made public
in February 1991. It established that some 2 300 persons were killed
for political reasons. In about 640 cases, the commission could
not conclusively determine that the person was killed for political
reasons. A new effort to come to terms with the legacy of Pinochet’s
rule was made at the beginning of this century, by the National
Commission on Political Imprisonment and Torture established by
President Ricardo Lagos. However, testimony collected by this commission
is classified for fifty years. Therefore, the information cannot
be used in trials concerning human rights violations, nor can it
be made public.
12. The Commission on the Truth for El Salvador was mandated by
the 16 January 1992 UN-brokered peace agreements ending the civil
war in that country. It was set up in July 1992 and composed of
former Colombian President Belisario Betancur, former Venezuelan
Foreign Minister Reinaldo Figueredo Planchart and Thomas Buergenthal,
George Washington University law professor. The commission’s report
on serious acts of violence since 1980, entitled “From madness to
hope: the 12-year war in El Salvador: report of the Commission on
the Truth for El Salvador,” was released on 15 March 1993 at the
United Nations.
13. The case of Guatemala, where the truth commission was established
as part of the internationally sponsored peace process, deserves
special attention. The Historical Clarification Commission (Comisión
para el Esclarecimiento Histórico, CEH) was established on 23 June
1994, as part of the “Oslo Accords”, peace agreements between the
Guatemalan Government and the National Guatemalan Revolutionary
Unit (URNG), to investigate human rights violations committed by
both sides in the thirty-six-year armed conflict in this country
during which an estimated 200 000 people lost their lives.
14. The commission’s terms of reference, set forth by the Oslo
Accords, were as follows:
“I.
To clarify with all objectivity, equity and impartiality the human
rights violations and acts of violence that have caused the Guatemalan
population to suffer, connected with the armed conflict.
II. To prepare a report that will contain the findings
of the investigations carried out and provide objective information
regarding events during this period covering all factors, internal
as well as external.
III. Formulate specific recommendations to encourage peace
and national harmony in Guatemala. The commission shall recommend,
in particular, measures to preserve the memory of the victims, to
foster a culture of mutual respect and observance of human rights
and to strengthen the democratic process.”
15. The commission was chaired by German law professor Christian
Tomuschat of Berlin’s Humboldt University, and included two Guatemalans:
lawyer Edgar Balsells, and Otilia Lux Coti, a Mayan woman and university
professor of pedagogy.
16. The commission heard testimony from thousands of survivors
and attended exhumations of clandestine graves; it also interviewed
former heads of state and high-ranking members of the armed forces.
The final report, entitled “Guatemala: memory of silence”, was made
public in February 1999. It identified a total of 42 275 named victims;
of these, 23 671 were victims of arbitrary executions, and 6 159
were victims of forced disappearances. It found that Maya Native
Americans accounted for 83% of the victims, and that 93% of the atrocities
committed during the war had been the work of the armed forces.
17. The report was handed over to representatives of the Guatemalan
Government and the URNG, as well as those of the UN Secretary-General,
who was charged with its public release.
18. Perhaps the most remarkable example is the Truth and Reconciliation
Commission (TRC) set up in 1995 by the South African Parliament
to investigate human rights violations during the apartheid era
between 1960 and 1994. Its mandate was to bear witness to, record
and, in some cases, grant amnesty to the perpetrators of crimes
relating to human rights violations, and to provide reparation and
rehabilitation to the victims.
19. The TRC was set up under the Promotion of National Unity and
Reconciliation Act,
Notewhich
set forth its terms of reference as follows:
“The objectives of the commission shall be to promote
national unity and reconciliation in a spirit of understanding which
transcends the conflicts and divisions of the past by:
– establishing as complete
a picture as possible of the causes, nature and extent of the gross
violations of human rights which were committed during the period
from 1 March 1960 to the cut-off date, including the antecedents,
circumstances, factors and context of such violations, as well as
the perspectives of the victims and the motives and perspectives
of the persons responsible for the commission of the violations,
by conducting investigations and holding hearings;
– facilitating the granting
of amnesty to persons who make full disclosure of all the relevant
facts relating to acts associated with a political objective and
comply with the requirements of this act;
– establishing and making known
the fate or whereabouts of victims and by restoring the human and
civil dignity of such victims by granting them an opportunity to
relate their own accounts of the violations of which they are the
victims, and by recommending reparation measures in respect of them;
– compiling a report providing
as comprehensive an account as possible of the activities and findings
of the commission contemplated in paragraphs a, b and c, and which
contains recommendations of measures to prevent the future violations
of human rights.”
20. The TRC was composed of 17 high-profile members and was chaired
by Archbishop Desmond Tutu. The commission held public hearings
throughout South Africa at which former victims of human rights
abuses told their stories. Its work was accomplished through three
committees. The Human Rights Violations Committee investigated human
rights abuses that occurred between 1960 and 1994. The Reparation
and Rehabilitation Committee was charged with restoring victims’
dignity and formulating proposals to assist with rehabilitation.
The Amnesty Committee considered applications from individuals who
applied for amnesty in accordance with the provisions of the commission’s
founding act.
21. In order to avoid victor’s justice, no side was exempt from
appearing before the commission, which heard reports of human rights
violations and considered amnesty applications from all sides, from
the apartheid state to the liberation forces including the African
National Congress.
22. The commission was empowered to grant amnesty to those who
committed abuses during the apartheid era, as long as the crimes
were politically motivated, proportionate and there was full disclosure
by the person seeking amnesty. It received more than 7 200 applications
by perpetrators of human rights abuses; about 850 applicants were
granted amnesty and more than 5 400 were refused amnesty.
23. The commission’s report was presented to President Mandela
in October 1998. However, the Amnesty Committee is currently continuing
to process applications for amnesty.
24. The TRC was seen by many as a crucial component of the transition
to full and free democracy in South Africa.
25. More recently, more or less successful examples of truth commissions
may be found in Peru, Timor-Leste, Sierra Leone and Morocco.
26. The European experience of truth commissions is very limited.
One should perhaps mention the Enquet Kommission Aufarbeitung von
Geschichte und Folgen der SED-Diktator in Deutschland (Study Commission for
the Assessment of History and Consequences of the SED Dictatorship
in Germany), set up by members of the German Parliament in March
1992 to investigate human rights violations under communist rule
in East Germany from 1949 to 1989. The 27-member body was headed
by East German parliamentarian and human rights activist Rainer
Eppelmann. There are doubts as to whether this parliamentary project
should be considered as a truth commission, even if a number of
experts believe it was.
27. In the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, the authorities set
up in March 2001 the Truth and Reconciliation Commission in an attempt
to come to terms with the legacy of the wars in the Balkans. The
commission, composed of 15 members, was asked to investigate war
crimes committed in Slovenia, Croatia, Bosnia and Kosovo in the
1990s. Most experts consider that this initiative was a failure.
The commission was appointed without due consultation in the country,
had very little civil society support and clearly lacked credibility.
Its composition prevented it from being seen as an impartial body.
As a result of its inadequate conception, and the lack of the political
will on the part of the authorities to deal with the past in a responsible
way, the commission was dissolved in 2003 without having produced
any results.
28. Nonetheless, the concept of a truth commission as a tool to
investigate the past and help reconcile the society is now more
widely known and gets growing support in Europe; ideas of establishing
a truth commission have been debated in a number of European countries,
including the United Kingdom (Northern Ireland), Spain, Bosnia and
Herzegovina and Estonia.
3 Main characteristics of truth commissions
29. A universal formula of an ideal truth commission
does not exist. A country considering establishing a truth commission
must create its own model appropriate to its local circumstances.
It is nevertheless possible to single out a number of common features
and formulate principles which should govern the setting up of such a
body.
30. Experts outline the following main characteristics
Noteof
truth commissions:
- focus on
the past. The events may have occurred in the recent past, but a
truth commission is not a standing body similar to a human rights
commission, which looks at ongoing and future violations as and when
they occur;
- investigation of a pattern of abuse over a set period
of time rather than a specific event. In its mandate, the truth
commission is given the parameters of its investigation both in
terms of the time period covered as well as the type of human rights
violations to be explored;
- temporary body, usually operating over a period of six
months to two years and completing its work by submitting a report.
These parameters are established at the time of the commission’s
formation, but often an extension can be obtained to wrap things
up;
- official establishment or empowerment by the state. This,
in principle, allows the commission to have greater access to information,
greater security, and increased assurance that its findings will
be given serious consideration. Official sanction from the government
is crucial because it represents an acknowledgement of past wrongs
and a commitment to address the issues and move on. Furthermore, governments
may be more likely to enact recommended reforms if they have established
the commission.
31. The operation of a truth commission usually includes the following
elements:
- taking individual
statements from the victims, surviving members of families, witnesses,
and possibly perpetrators;
- in-depth research and investigation in a limited number
of particularly important cases;
- holding of a public hearing, so as to allow the whole
society to have a look at its recent history and come to terms with
the past;
- publication of a final report, which should be made public
and widely circulated, and would contain conclusions and recommendations
for reform and action by the government.
4 Relation between truth commissions and criminal
justice
32. Truth commissions have as their main goal establishing
what happened in the past. They are not courts, though, and hence
do not have the power to prosecute. A truth commission should be
seen as a method of justice seeking which is distinctive from, but
complementary to, and in no case alternative to, criminal justice.
33. By focusing on a pattern of abuses rather than on isolated
cases, a truth commission is an opportunity not only to look at
what actually happened, but also to reflect on the roots and causes
of events. Truth commissions look at the “big picture” and provide
a larger historical and chronological perspective of events.
34. This approach, which makes it possible to establish institutional
responsibility and create momentum for needed institutional reforms,
can be more far-reaching, in political terms, than criminal prosecution
with its emphasis on individual responsibility. Moreover, the purpose
of a truth commission is not simply to investigate the past but
to draw lessons from past abuses and help create conditions to avoid
such abuses in the future.
35. Another major difference between a truth commission and criminal
procedure is the victim-oriented approach. Interviews and public
hearings are, for the victims and survivors, an opportunity to speak
about what they suffered, which may have a moral healing effect
on them and help restore their sense of dignity. In turn, the fact
that a truth commission is an officially established state body
is a form of recognition, by the state, of its wrongdoings. Large
involvement of the victims and their families in the truth-seeking
process can help reconstitute the sense of full civic membership
for those who were denied the protection of the law in the past. Moreover,
truth commissions have the power to recommend reparations, compensation,
physical and psychological rehabilitation, public apologies and
other forms of redress to victims.
36. A truth commission therefore may be a helpful tool of transitional
justice in circumstances where criminal justice cannot function
in a proper way, which is often the case in transitional societies.
It can also support criminal prosecutions by exposing and documenting
the truth more effectively.
5 Conceptual problems of truth commissions
37. However, some aspects of the functioning of truth
commissions may be questioned from the legal point of view.
38. One of the most controversial issues is related to the power
of some truth commissions to grant amnesties. International legal
experts and human rights activists strongly oppose such practice,
arguing that blanket amnesties contradict the principle of individual
criminal responsibility and undermine the fight against impunity.
On the other hand, amnesties could make the work of a truth commission
much more effective as alleged perpetrators are more prepared to
co-operate if granted some form of immunity, or at least a deal softening
the punishment.
39. I believe that the right attitude would be not to allow amnesties
for crimes under international law. At the same time, conditional,
case-by-case amnesties for less serious crimes could be acceptable.
Moreover, in order to reintegrate displaced civilians and former
fighters, carefully designed amnesties should be encouraged. In
addition, in order to protect the rights of those who may be compelled
to testify against themselves, a truth commission may have the power
to grant use immunity that is acceptable under international law.
Individuals granted use immunity are assured that information they
provide will not be used against them in any criminal proceedings.
40. At the end of the day, it is up to national decision makers
to determine the powers of the truth commission, striking the best
possible balance between respecting universal principles and taking
into account local realities and national interests. In practice,
the only truth commission that has had the power to grant amnesty
was the South African one; it examined applications for amnesty
on a case-by-case basis, and the majority of such applications were
rejected.
41. Another issue which poses a problem is the capacity of a truth
commission to “name names”, that is, to disclose, in public hearing
or in its report, names of individuals who are believed to be responsible
for human rights abuses. As a truth commission is not a judicial
body, such a mention does not constitute declaring someone guilty.
However, for the public perception, it may have exactly the same
effect as if the person concerned were found guilty by a court.
Such situations may have direct consequences on the person and therefore
pose a problem of due process. Additionally, the work of the truth
commission may be blocked if challenged in a court.
6 Political aspects of truth commissions
42. Obviously, in order to achieve a real political transition,
and to turn the page of the former regime or situation, the issue
of dealing with the legacy of the past must be addressed in some
form. The European experience has so far privileged the judicial
approach.
43. However, governments emerging from transition often lack a
solid political base and must look for some form of compromise with
elements of the former regime. In many cases, they would give priority
to restoring the unity of the nation by bringing former enemies
together, rather than risking a civil war by bringing to justice perpetrators
of past human rights abuses which may have retained significant
power or influence. In addition, judicial systems in transitional
countries are often too weak, or simply inappropriate, for such
a task.
44. On the other hand, national traditions and mentalities may
in many cases favour a co-operative and compromise-seeking approach
to an adversarial one proper to the court procedures. As was argued
by a number of former members of truth commissions, it is often
more important for society to find reconciliation, to allow a maximum
of victims to speak out, than to concentrate on a limited number
of criminal trials.
45. In these circumstances, establishing a truth commission would
be a way to introduce some degree of accountability without undermining
national peace, and actually to contribute to reconciliation by
clarifying facts and responsibilities.
46. Additionally, the work of a truth commission could weaken
positions, and eventually allow criminal prosecution of those in
power related to the old regime or to human rights violations, by
publicly exposing their role in the past events. However, whether
a truth commission should publicly “name names” is a matter of controversy
in terms of procedural fairness.
7 Reconciling potential of truth commissions
47. International experience shows that a truth commission
can be an effective tool of justice and reconciliation only when
the conflict is over. It would indeed be difficult to undertake
the necessary inquiries if the conflict is still ongoing, or if
the transition is not achieved and significant power remains with
elements of the former regime.
48. The decision to opt for a truth commission as a way to deal
with the past, as well as the mandate, the powers and the scope
of past abuses to be dealt with, belongs to the country concerned.
It must be taken at the highest political level (president, government
and/or parliament) and gather the support of the main political forces.
Genuine political will on the part of all stakeholders is crucial
for the commission to be effective and to have full access to official
documents. It is even more necessary at the stage of implementing
the commission’s recommendations.
49. A truth commission should not be viewed as a body imposed
from the outside, but as a well-thought out national decision. While
international advice and assistance could play a helpful role, decision
making should be left to the national stakeholders. The national
ownership of a truth commission procedure is essential for its effectiveness
as it is a necessary part of the self-reflection and self-assessment
process.
50. Furthermore, in order to be independent and impartial, and
be perceived as such, a truth commission should be set up through
broad consultations with society as a whole, and include well-respected
public figures with high-profile and solid reputations.
51. The work of the truth commission should be conducted in as
non-politicised way as possible. In fact, some truth commissions
were used solely to discredit the old regime and to legitimise the
new one. Such an attitude, which could be qualified as “victor’s
justice”, would polarise society instead of bringing reconciliation. It
would be particularly damaging in a case of a civil war, where both
sides have “their own truths”.
52. Although most of the truth commissions have sought to bring
reconciliation as one of their main aims, it must be stressed that
the process of rebuilding national unity often requires much more
than establishing the truth and/or naming and punishing those responsible
for past abuses. One cannot decide it by decree, or by issuing a
report. Reconciliation is a long process, where a truth commission
plays an important role, but the results may take years to come.
Accordingly, one should avoid raising expectations too high, which
could prove to be harmful to the process, especially at the stage
of implementing its recommendations.
53. The truth commission’s final report constitutes its legacy.
In addition to summarising its findings and outlining patterns of
past abuses, the report gives an opportunity to analyse the causes
of these abuses, to establish institutional responsibilities for
what happened, and make recommendations to the authorities that would
make such abuses impossible in the future, and eventually help rebuild
the society. Such recommendations may suggest judicial, military
or police reforms, and even broader measures implying constitutional
changes.
54. It is important that these recommendations are duly followed
up and implemented. However, since the work of the truth commission
usually ends with the publication of its report, the question arrises
as to who is going to monitor its follow-up. If no specifically
designated body exists, that role may be assumed by the parliament,
or by civil society. It is necessary therefore that the truth commission
be specific and realistic in its recommendations. It is also useful
to associate, as early as possible, potential actors in implementation. Furthermore,
a broad political consensus on suggested reforms would facilitate
implementation.
55. Finally, one may wonder if dealing with the past by way of
a truth commission could be conceived of in the context of an inter-state
conflict. Although there have been no such cases in international
practice to date, such a possibility should not be excluded. Certainly,
it is hard to imagine a state agreeing to investigation by a truth
commission set up by another state. Nonetheless, if truth commissions
are established in two states and work in co-operation, on the basis
of terms of reference agreed by common accord, they could contribute
to reconciliation and restoration of good-neighbourly relations
much more than procedures in a court. The issue needs further reflection
but should not be rejected just because it has never happened before.
8 General conclusions
56. Dealing with the past and establishing the truth
in war-torn, post-conflict and transitional societies is one of
the key preconditions for the achievement of lasting peace and a
stable future, which are in turn necessary for building democracy
and ensuring the rule of law and respect for human rights.
57. The truth commissions may be an effective mechanism for addressing
past human rights violations, thus bringing reconciliation to a
society emerging from a difficult past. If established in accordance
with basic principles of international human rights law, they may
also play a useful complementary role to criminal justice.
58. A number of countries and regions of Europe still have to
come to terms with the heritage of a tragic past. They should be
encouraged to turn to the experiences of truth commissions, to learn
from their strengths and weaknesses, and to assess whether these
experiences could be adapted to their specific national contexts
and help reconcile divided societies and restore justice, confidence
and hope for a common future.
9 Possibility of establishing a truth commission
in Chechnya
59. One of my objectives as rapporteur on this issue
has been to examine whether the experience of truth commissions
could in practice contribute to peace, justice and reconciliation
in the Chechen Republic of the Russian Federation. With this in
mind, a number of representatives of the authorities and of civil
society of Chechnya were invited to a hearing held by the Political
Affairs Committee on 13 September 2007. On the one hand, it would
have allowed them to familiarise themselves with the concept of
truth commissions and obtain information on lessons learned from
best international practice in this field, and, on the other hand,
to express their opinions on the relevance of such experiences for
Chechnya.
60. Unfortunately, four of the five participants invited from
the Chechen Republic could not attend the hearing. Nevertheless,
during preparations for the hearing, they showed real interest in
the idea of a truth commission.
61. I therefore believe that the committee should make a new effort
in order to bring information on the experiences of truth commissions
to both the Chechen authorities and society. This could be done
by organising a seminar in Chechnya involving leading international
experts on truth commissions, with the broad participation of the
Chechen authorities and local civil society organisations.
62. At present, I would refrain from drawing a definitive conclusion
on whether establishing a truth commission in Chechnya is timely
and feasible. Moreover, it is not for me, or for the Assembly, to
decide that such a commission should be established.
63. Clearly, the society in Chechnya, and in the whole Russian
Federation, needs to deal with the legacy of the conflict in this
region, to reconstitute the history of abuses committed, and violence
and injustices suffered, by all sides involved – many of which are
still largely ignored – and establish institutional and personal responsibilities.
This task is far above the capacities of the judiciary, be it at
national or at European level. A truth commission could be an appropriate
answer to that need.
64. However, international experience shows that, for a truth
commission to be effective, certain minimum conditions must exist
in the society. Those include,
inter
alia:
- a clear break
with past violence, and a real positive transition;
- credible political authorities and an active civil society.
65. Though a number of significant changes in Chechnya could be
observed during my last visit to Grozny (November 2006), I have
some doubts as to the extent to which these basic criteria are met
today.
66. Yet I believe that initiating a public discussion within Chechnya
on a possible truth commission is timely, as it brings to public
attention the problem of dealing with the past. Moreover, the attitude
that the political authorities take regarding this idea could indicate
whether or not their commitment to seek justice and reconciliation
is real.
Reporting committee: Political Affairs Committee.
Reference to committee: Reference No. 3130 of 1 September
2005.
Draft resolution unanimously adopted by the committee on 13
November 2007.
Members of the committee: Mr Abdülkadir Ateş (Chairperson), Mr Konstantin
Kosachev (Vice-Chairperson) (alternate: Mr Victor Kolesnikov), Mr Zsolt Németh (Vice-Chairperson),
Mr Giorgi Bokeria (Vice-Chairperson), Mr Miloš Aligrudić, Mr Claudio Azzolini,
Mr Denis Badré, Mr Radu Mircea Berceanu,
Mr Andris Bērzinš, Mr Alexandër Biberaj, Mrs Guðfinna Bjarnadóttir,
Ms Raisa Bohatyryova, Mr Predrag Bošković, Mr Luc Van den Brande, Mr Lorenzo Cesa,
Mr Mauro Chiaruzzi, Ms Elvira Cortajarena, Ms Anna Čurdová, Mr Noel Davern, Mr Dumitru
Diacov, Mr Michel Dreyfus-Schmidt, Ms Josette Durrieu, Mr Joan Albert
Farré Santuré, Mr Pietro Fassino (alternate: Mr Pietro Marcenaro), Mr Per-Kristian Foss, Ms Doris Frommelt, Mr Jean-Charles
Gardetto, Mr Charles Goerens, Mr Andreas Gross,
Mr Davit Harutiunyan, Mr Jean-Pol Henry, Mr Serhiy Holovaty, Mr Joachim
Hörster, Mrs Sinikka Hurskainen,
Mr Tadeusz Iwiński, Mr Bakir
Izetbegović, Mrs Corien W.A. Jonker, Ms Darja Lavtižar-Bebler, Mr Göran Lindblad, Mr Younal Loutfi, Mr Mikhail Margelov, Mr Tomasz Markowski,
Mr Dick Marty, Mr Frano Matušić, Mr Murat Mercan,
Mr Mircea Mereută, Mr Dragoljub
Mićunović (alternate: Mr Željko Ivanji),
Mr Jean-Claude Mignon (Mr Laurent Béteille), Ms Nadezhda
Mikhailova, Mr Aydin Mirzazada, Mr João Bosco Mota Amaral, Ms Natalia Narochnitskaya, Mrs Miroslava Němcová, Mr Hryhoriy Nemyrya, Mr Fritz
Neugebauer, Mrs Kristiina Ojuland (alternate: Mr Andres Herkel), Mr Theodoros Pangalos
(alternate: Mr Konstantinos Vrettos),
Ms Elsa Papadimitriou, Mr Christos Pourgourides, Mr John Prescott, Mr Gabino Puche (alternate:
Mr Pedro Agramunt), Mr Lluís Maria de Puig, Mr Jeffrey Pullicino Orlando,
Mr Andrea Rigoni, Lord Russell-Johnston, Mr Oliver Sambevski, Mr Ingo Schmitt, Ms Hanne Severinsen, Mr Samad Seyidov, Mr Leonid
Slutsky, Mr Rainder Steenblock, Mr Zoltán Szabó, Baroness Taylor
of Bolton (alternate: Mr John Austin),
Mr Mehmet Tekelioğlu, Mr Mihai
Tudose, Mr José Vera Jardim, Ms Birutė Vėsaitė, Mr Björn Von Sydow,
Mr Harm Evert Waalkens, Mr David Wilshire,
Mr Wolfgang Wodarg, Ms Gisela Wurm, Mr Boris Zala, Mr Krzysztof
Zaremba.
Ex officio: MM. Mátyás Eörsi, Tiny Kox.
NB: The names of those members present at the meeting are
printed in bold.
The draft resolution will be discussed at a later sitting.
