Observation of the parliamentary elections in Poland (15 October 2023)
Election observation report
| Doc. 15861
| 16 November 2023
1 Introduction
1. On 8 August 2023, the President
of the Republic of Poland called for elections to the Sejm and the Senate
for Sunday 15 October 2023. A week later, the Sejm ordered a nationwide
referendum on matters of particular importance to the State for
the same day. On 24 August 2023, the Speaker of the Sejm invited
the Parliamentary Assembly to observe the parliamentary elections.
2. In anticipation of observing these regular elections, the
Bureau of the Assembly, at its meeting on 19 June 2023, decided
to observe these elections,
Note subject
to receiving an invitation, and to set up an ad hoc committee composed
of 30 members as well as the two co-rapporteurs of the Committee
on the Honouring of Obligations and Commitments by Member States
of the Council of Europe (Monitoring Committee) and to conduct a
pre-electoral mission. At its meeting on 23 June, the Bureau approved
the composition of the ad hoc committee (revised by the Bureau on
14 September, see Appendix 1) and appointed Ms Mireille Clapot (France,
ALDE) as its Chairperson.
3. In line with the co-operation agreement signed between the
Assembly and the European Commission for Democracy through Law (Venice
Commission) on 4 October 2004, a representative of the Venice Commission
was invited to join the ad hoc committee as a legal adviser.
4. A pre-electoral delegation visited Warsaw on 26 and 27 September
2023 to assess the pre-electoral climate. The programme of the pre-electoral
mission is set out in Appendix 2. The delegation noted a particularly
heated and polarised campaign environment in the run-up to the parliamentary
elections and the widespread concerns about the uneven playing field,
which undermined public trust in the fairness of the electoral process
(see the statement in Appendix 3).
5. The Assembly’s ad hoc committee (PACE delegation) worked from
13-16 October 2023 as part of an International Election Observation
Mission (IEOM) together with a delegation from the OSCE Parliamentary Assembly
(OSCE PA) and the Limited Election Observation Mission of the Office
for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights of the Organization
for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE/ODIHR LEOM). The programme
of the delegation’s meetings is set out in Appendix 4.
6. The IEOM concluded that the parliamentary elections in Poland
were competitive but marred by the misuse of public resources and
public media bias. The elections were characterised by record high
voter participation, there was a wide choice of political options
and candidates were able to campaign freely, but the campaign was
tarnished by the notable overlap between the ruling party’s messages
and government information campaigns. Together with distorted and
openly partisan coverage by the public broadcaster, this provided
a clear advantage to the ruling party, undermining the democratic
separation of State and party. The joint press release is reproduced
in Appendix 5.
2 Political context
7. Since 2005, Poland's political
landscape has been shaped by the rivalry between two major parties,
Law and Justice (PiS) and Civic Platform. Both parties have consistently
won parliamentary elections and formed governments either independently
or in coalition. From 2005 to 2015, governments alternated between
PiS and Civic Platform. However, a landslide victory in the 2015
elections, enabled PIS together with its partners in the “Unified
Right” to govern with majority.
8. Andrzej Duda's presidential win in 2015 helped further solidify
PiS's dominance. Prime Minister Mateusz Morawiecki has led the government
since 2017. PiS's rise can be attributed to its commitment to supporting the
social groups excluded by the political and economic transformation
of the 1990s, especially in rural areas. However, this era also
witnessed a consolidation of national power, the diminishing of
local authorities’ autonomy, threats to the judiciary's independence,
the curbing of democratic freedoms, and a decline in parliamentary
transparency.
9. Poland's relationships with the European Union and Council
of Europe became strained due to concerns about rule of law violations,
leading to Article 7 of the Treaty on European Union's activation
as a result of legal reforms introduced by the government which
jeopardised the independence of the judiciary. The European Commission
initiated several infringement proceedings against Poland, questioning
its commitment to EU law.
10. In 2019, PiS secured 43.59% of the parliamentary votes, translating
to 235 seats in the Sejm. The subsequent year saw Andrzej Duda's
re-election as president, narrowly beating Civic Platform candidate
Rafał Trzaskowski. Interestingly, the 2019 parliamentary elections
resulted in an unprecedented-in-Poland power distribution, with
different political groups controlling both parliamentary chambers.
Note This dynamic affected
the proper functioning of the system of checks and balances, created
legislative challenges and impacted the election of key state officials.
11. The period post-2019 witnessed further judicial reforms, affecting
judges' independence and strengthening the government's control
over the courts. These reforms led to an international backlash,
with institutions such as the European Court of Human Rights and
the European Court of Justice (ECJ) challenging the legitimacy of
certain Polish courts. In December 2019, the Sejm passed a judicial
reform, popularly known as the "muzzle" law, the main aim of which
was to prevent Poland's legitimate judges from reviewing the irregular
judicial appointments made by the reformed National Council of the
Judiciary, thus preventing Polish judges from refusing to rule with
or overturning the acts of deficiently appointed "judges". The appointment
of individuals by the reformed National Council of the Judiciary,
including to the Chamber of Extraordinary Review and Public Affairs,
among the tasks of which is also the final validation of election
results, further politicised the justice system.
12. In 2020, the ruling of the Constitutional Tribunal on abortions
spurred massive public protests highlighting concerns about police
brutality and fuelling societal divisions.
14. In June 2023, the Sejm passed the “Law on the State Commission
to Investigate Russian Influence on the Internal Security of the
Republic of Poland in the period 2007-2022”, also known as the Anti-Tusk
act. An urgent opinion
Note by the Venice Commission’s strongly
criticised the law, also as it lacked guarantees against political
abuse and instrumentalisation to eliminate political opponents.
By September, although the State Commission had been formed, it
had not begun its operations.
15. Reports in 2019 hinted at surveillance activities in Poland
using the Pegasus program, intensifying by 2021. The Senate, in
response, set up a commission in 2022 to investigate illegal surveillance.
Its findings revealed the use of the Pegasus program on individuals
who were openly critical of PiS policies. The Assembly in its
Resolution 2513 (2023) “Pegasus and similar spyware and secret state surveillance”
concluded that “the Polish parliamentary election of 2019 was not
fair as Pegasus was used against political opponents during the electoral
campaign”.
Note
16. In the lead-up to the 15 October parliamentary elections,
three further contentious developments impacted the electoral process:
- local elections were delayed
from autumn 2023 to spring 2024, extending the term of local authorities;
- the Election Code was reformed less than six months ahead
of the elections (Chapter 3.2);
- a referendum was set to occur simultaneously with the
parliamentary elections (Chapter 3.3).
17. Poland's local elections were set for autumn 2023. However,
a 2018 government reform increased local government terms from 4
to 5 years. To avoid clashing with parliamentary elections, the
Sejm extended the current local government term to 30 April 2024.
This adjustment means local elections scheduled between 31 March
and 23 April 2024, might overlap with European Parliament elections.
3 Electoral
system and legal framework
3.1 Legal
electoral framework
18. Elections in Poland are primarily
regulated by the relevant articles of the 1997 Constitution regarding parliamentary
elections; the Election Code (2011, last amended in March 2023),
the Law on Political Parties (1997, last amended in 2016), the Law
on the National Media Council (2016) and supplemented by the regulations
of the National Electoral Commission (NEC). Poland is party to major
international and regional instruments related to the holding of
democratic elections.
Note
19. The 460 seats in the Sejm (the lower chamber) are elected
in 41 multi-member constituencies, using a proportional representation
system in which voters can express a preference for one of the candidates
on the list. For this reason it is referred to as an "open list
proportional system", although technically it is not a fully open
list. The small size (in terms of number of seats allocated) of
constituencies mitigates the effect of the proportionality of the
system. In fact, the constituency sizes combined with the electoral
thresholds produce majoritarian outcomes, strengthening the representation
of the two major parties.
20. In order to participate in the distribution of constituency
seats, a party list or a citizen group list must obtain at least
5% of all valid votes cast at the national level, while coalition
lists are required to obtain at least 8% of the vote. However, lists
representing national minorities, such as the German minority, are
exempt from the electoral threshold requirements.
21. Elections to the Senate, which is composed of 100 members,
take place under a plurality vote system in an equal number of single-member
constituencies. Most of the opposition parties have signed the so-called “Senate
pact”, under which they have agreed to enter one commonly accepted
candidate in each district. This strategy granted them a majority
in the Senate in the 2019 elections despite being in a minority
in the Sejm.
22. Electoral constituencies are created within the boundaries
of pre-existing administrative divisions. Sejm mandates are allocated
proportionately to constituencies based on the population size.
Notwithstanding legal obligations and despite a proposal submitted
by the NEC in 2022,
Note the
parliament has not adopted changes to the distribution of seats
amongst constituencies for the Sejm since 2015 and to the boundaries
of the Senate constituencies, since 2011.
23. The Venice Commission's Code of Good Practice in Electoral
Matters refers to “passive electoral geometry” when an initially
correct distribution of seats ends up generating inequality as a
result of its failure to adapt to demographic changes. To avoid
passive electoral geometry, the Code states that seats should be redistributed
at least every ten years, preferably outside election periods, so
as to limit the risks of political manipulation.
24. Although the 10 years have not been exceeded, the lack of
revision in the case of Poland has clearly led to the fact that
constituencies in rural areas, which have lost population, are now
over-represented and constituencies in urban areas, which have gained
population, are under-represented. This is a breach of the principle
of equality of the vote and it is a particularly serious one because
it is a politically biased inequality that favours one of the competitors
that traditionally has a majority in the over-represented areas.
25. In addition, the current system of assigning all overseas
voters to existing Sejm and Senate constituencies in Warsaw without
increasing the number of seats, has also an impact on the equality
of the vote.
Note In
the current electoral process, 606 265 voters were registered to
vote in 416 polling stations abroad. All these votes were incorporated
into the Warsaw I constituency, which was already under-represented
due to the lack of revision, so the under-representation effect
was doubled.
3.2 Recent
amendments
26. The Code of Good Practice in
Electoral Matters highlights that the stability of the law is crucial
to the credibility of the electoral process. According to the Venice
Commission, changes to fundamental aspects of the election system
should not take effect less than one year prior to an election.
Note The
Polish Constitutional Tribunal ruled in 2019 that no significant
amendments should be made to electoral legislation within a period of
less than six months.
27. On 26 January 2023, the Sejm passed legislation amending the
Election Code and certain others, which was published in the Journal
of Laws on 16 March 2023 and, with certain exceptions, entered into
force on 31 March – during the legislative silence period, which
began on 14 February.
28. The amendment introduced a number of significant changes,
including:
- the introduction
of the Central Register of Voters (CRV), which centralised the database
of voters, streamlining the electoral process;
- a reduction in the minimum number of inhabitants covered
by the boundaries of a polling district (from 500 to 200), without
reducing the maximum number (4,000 inhabitants), which resulted
in the creation of 3 664 new polling stations throughout the country
– most of them in rural areas;
- providing free transport to the polling station from the
place of residence/stay alternatively with free transport from the
agreed place for persons meeting certain conditions of disability
or those over 60,Note organised
by the municipality;
- extending the right of proxies and citizen observers to
record the activities of polling stations to the time of voting
as well, while at the same time requiring the recorded material
to be handed over to the State authorities – be it the Election
Commission or the ministry of digitalisation;
- the addition of a requirement that before the precinct
election commission (PEC) determines the validity of a ballot paper,
the validity of a vote or the casting of a vote for a particular
list or candidate, each ballot paper shall be presented to all members
of the PEC present. This provision, intended to increase the transparency
of the determination of the results of the vote, has been criticised
as unduly prolonging the counting process.
29. Some of the provisions introduced in the Election Code affected
the procedure and are likely to become highly problematic regarding
the counting and transmission of results. For example, the wording
of Article 230(2) of the Election Code imposes an obligation on
PECs set up abroad and on Polish maritime vessels to communicate
the voting result to the Warsaw I constituency within 24 hours after
the polling ends. If this deadline is not met, voting in such a
PEC will be considered null and void, and consequently any votes
cast will not be counted in the voting.
30. Although the aforementioned provisions have been in force
at least since the Election Code was enacted and the NEC indicated
that there had never been a case before where a vote in a foreign
precinct had been declared null and void, the situation differed
from previous elections in at least three respects: these elections were
combined with a national referendum, the introduction of the new
provision concerning the presentation of each ballot to all commission
members, which increased the time needed for counting, and there
was a considerable increase of interest in voting by the Polish
communities abroad.
Note
31. In reaction to several complaints, the ministry of foreign
affairs increased the number of PECs abroad from 320 (in 2019) to
416. Nevertheless, as well as the unreasonably rigid deadlines imposed
on the PECs abroad, other problems remain with regard to out-of-country
voting, such as the cancellation of postal voting for voters abroad,
excessive numbers of voters registered in some of these polling
stations and the attachment of all foreign votes (608000 voters
registered) to one Warsaw electoral district which, according to
several civil society organisations, could encourage so-called “electoral
tourism” on election day.
3.3 Controversial
referendum
32. The parliamentary elections
of 15 October were held in conjunction with a national referendum.
Although the Assembly delegation was not invited to observe the
referendum as such, it is impossible to ignore its impact on these
elections.
33. On 17 August 2023, the Sejm voted on a motion by the Council
of Ministers to hold a nationwide referendum on matters of particular
importance to the State and passed a resolution to this effect.
It was decided that four questions would be put to citizens:
“Do you support the selling off
of State assets to foreign entities, leading to the loss of Poles'
control over strategic sectors of the economy?”
“Do you support an increase in the retirement age, including
the restoration of the increased retirement age to 67 for men and
women?”
“Do you support the removal of the barrier on the border
between the Republic of Poland and the Republic of Belarus?”
“Do you support the admission of thousands of illegal
immigrants from the Middle East and Africa, in accordance with the
forced relocation mechanism imposed by the European bureaucracy?”
34. Many electoral experts immediately expressed their criticism
of what they saw as an explicitly partisan use of one of the most
important consultation mechanisms in any democracy. The PACE pre-electoral delegation
also echoed the concerns of various interlocutors suggesting that
the referendum was intended to mobilise voters sympathetic to the
ruling party, to polarise electoral discourse on issues that do
not constitute a real social problem and to circumvent campaign
financing regulations and other restrictive measures applied to
the parliamentary elections.
35. In order for the referendum to be binding, at least half of
those eligible to vote must participate. As part of the referendum
campaign, the opposition called to boycott the referendum by actively
refusing to take the referendum ballot paper. This however raised
serious concerns about the violation of the secrecy of the vote for
those wanting to participate in the elections but not in the referendum.
A voter wanting only to take part in the electoral vote and not
the referendum was forced to indirectly reveal his/her electoral
preferences to the election commission in a polling station by actively
refusing to take the referendum ballot. This refusal was then recorded
in the register of voters. PACE delegation members were informed
of some cases of elderly voters in villages preferring not to go
to vote for fear of being socially stigmatised as a consequence
of not taking the referendum ballot.
4 Election
administration, voters lists and registration of candidates
36. The parliamentary elections
and the national referendum were conducted by the NEC together with
its administrative arm, the National Election Office (NEO), and
its 49 delegate offices, 41 constituency election commissions (CECs)
and 31 073 precinct election commissions (PECs). In addition, the
ministry of foreign affairs established 416 PECs in diplomatic representations
in 91 countries.
37. The NEC is a permanent decision-making body and supervisory
body responsible for the overall conduct of elections and referenda.
These were its first parliamentary elections after being restructured.
It now comprises of two judges from the Constitutional Tribunal
and the Supreme Administrative Court, and seven members nominated
by the Sejm from various political parties. Their selection is based
on the parties' representation, and these members are expected to
possess qualifications fit for a judge. This was a change from the
previous setup, which involved nine judges drawn from different
courts.
38. The NEO, as the executive body, is crucial for the elections'
administrative and logistical aspects. The role of the NEC, on the
other hand, concerns oversight; it ensures that electoral laws are
adhered to, maintains voter lists, and announces the final election
results. Decisions within the NEC require a majority vote with at least
2/3 of members present.
39. Women are under-represented in the upper echelons of election
administration. Currently, the NEC has no female members, but the
NEO's chairperson is a woman and 37% of CEC members are women. There
are no requirements for gender representation within the election
administration.
40. CECs, temporary entities set up 48 days before the elections,
ensure the proper implementation of electoral rules. They are also
responsible for registering candidate lists and overseeing election
day procedures. Recent amendments have removed the requirement for
CEC members to be serving or retired judges and require CEC nominees
to hold a “university degree in law" and provide "a guarantee of
proper performance of this function”. These changes potentially
increase the candidate pool, while they may contribute to the appointment
of less experienced individuals.
41. PECs, formed at least 21 days prior to an election, play a
crucial role in the actual voting process. They consist of 9 to
13 members nominated by electoral committees, with a chairperson
appointed by each PEC from among its members. The training of PECS
members is based on a standardised curriculum and is conducted by
election officials and other representatives of the NEO and the
local administration.
42. Citizens over 18 are eligible to vote. Voter registration
is passive and centralised. The 2023 amendments provided a legal
basis for the creation of a centralised voter register to replace
the 2 477 separate voter registers previously maintained by individual
municipalities. Municipalities are now responsible for gathering information
on residents while the ministry of digitalisation maintains the
voter register. There is general confidence in the accuracy and
maintenance of the voter lists, but the introduction of large-scale
changes close to the elections may have negatively affected the
process of voter registration and identification. Citizens can check
their inclusion on the lists and apply to vote in a place of temporary
residence.
43. By default, voters were assigned in the central voter register
to a specific PEC based on their official registered address regardless
of their voting address. One-time changes could be made up to three
days before election day. Over 900 000 voters requested to vote
at a temporary residence, and 450 540 collected Absentee Voter Certificate’s
permitting them to cast their vote in any polling station in Poland.
On election day, this system permitted “electoral tourism”: opposition
parties openly encouraged their supporters to go to vote in rural
areas where the ruling party had a traditionally strong position.
44. According to the Constitution, persons deprived of their legal
capacity, including on the grounds of mental or psychosocial disability,
automatically lose the right to vote and, consequently, the right
to be elected. Furthermore, the Act on Associations prohibits persons
with legal incapacities from forming public associations or initiating
public meetings. The disenfranchisement and other restrictions on
freedom of assembly and association are contrary to international
standards.
45. Public information on elections was widely disseminated. The
NEC and NEO used traditional and social media platforms to ensure
citizens were informed. Provisions were made to cater to various
needs, such as sign language interpretation and large-print texts
for the visually impaired.
46. Expatriate voters cast their ballots in person at consulates
and embassies and must actively register for each election. Voters
can register in person, by email or through an online portal, and
the ministry of foreign affairs is responsible for identifying and
setting up polling stations abroad. Votes cast abroad are attributed
to the first electoral district of the Warsaw municipality. Given
the recently clarified counting procedures and the impact this would
have on a number of very large polling stations abroad, there were
some concerns about legal provisions that would invalidate all the
votes coming from that overseas precinct if the results were not received
by the relevant CEC within 24 hours of the close of polls. In addition,
on this occasion, polling stations abroad also had to count referendum
votes, which it was feared would affect their ability to complete
the count within 24 hours.
47. Vote counting is comprehensive. The CECs verify the counts
from PECs, which are then sent to the NEC for final validation.
The NEC distributes the seats among the eligible lists of candidates
according to the D'Hondt method and assigns the mandates to the
individual members of each list, taking into account the number
of preferential votes received. After verifying the fairness of
the electoral process, the NEC announces the results of the elections,
which are published in the Official Journal of the Republic of Poland.
48. Eligibility criteria and regulations for candidates are explicit.
Candidate lists are submitted to the relevant CEC at least 40 days
before election day, with a requirement of 5 000 supporting signatures
for Sejm candidate lists and 2 000 signatures for each Senate candidate.
Electoral commissions that register Sejm candidate lists in more
than half of all constituencies are automatically registered nationwide,
without requiring supporting signatures from the remaining constituencies.
The law does not prescribe specific standards or procedures for the
verification of signatures, except that the signatures must come
from voters in the district according to the registry.
49. Citizens with the right to vote who are at least 21 or 30
years old have the right to stand as a candidate for the Sejm and
the Senate respectively. The Constitution prohibits standing for
elections to those who were convicted of an intentional crime prosecuted motu proprio, as well as those who
have been incapacitated by a court decision, including on the grounds
of mental or psychosocial disability.
50. The Election Code provides for 35% representation of each
gender on each list of candidates but does not require a specific
gender order on the lists; the voting system allows voters to indicate
their preference on the list for a particular candidate. Some parties
indicated that they have internal requirements for the order of candidates
in order to increase representation.
51. In total, 44 % of the Sejm candidates were women and women
led 83 out of the 320 lists. The share of women candidates in the
first fifth of the positions on candidate lists varied from 52%
to 11%. Only 19% of the senatorial candidates were women.
52. The process of candidate registration was open and inclusive.
Candidates can only be nominated by electoral committees formed
by political parties, coalitions or by groups of over 15 voters,
the latter having to present at least 1 000 supporting signatures.
By the 28 August deadline, 85 electoral committees had registered
with the NEC. These committees could then nominate candidates or
lists of candidates to the respective CEC, after obtaining the required
number of supporting signatures. In an inclusive process, the CEC registered
6 655 candidates on 320 lists for the Sejm, presented by 13 electoral
committees, and 359 candidates for the Senate (from 49 committees).
In total, 56 Sejm lists and 27 senatorial candidates were rejected,
which was attributed to stricter verification of supporters’ data.
53. The work of the NEC and NEO was positively assessed by most
civil society organisations. They fulfilled the obligations imposed
on them by the electoral calendar. The NEC issued the necessary
guidelines within the legal deadlines and the polling station commissions
were formed on time and with the required composition.
5 Election
campaign and financing
5.1 Election
Campaign
54. The official campaign period
began on 8 August 2023. By law, the official campaign period begins
upon the announcement of elections, and contestants may campaign
upon registration, with a campaign silence period, including the
prohibition of publishing opinion polls, taking effect 24 hours
before election day. The regulation of the use of public space for
contestants during the campaign is under the purview of the municipalities.
55. The Election Code does not explicitly regulate campaigning
by public officials, which has been a long-standing recommendation
by ODIHR. However, they are obliged to maintain impartiality in
the performance of their official duties and to strictly separate
official acts from campaign activities. In the period leading up
to the elections, there was intense pre-election campaigning, with
some publicly funded events demonstrably promoting the incumbent
party's campaign messages. While the campaign was pluralistic, the
playing field was extremely uneven, with the incumbent party benefiting
in many ways from the use of State resources.
56. The Referendum Act provides for the campaign to be conducted
by citizens, political parties, associations, foundations and other
entities. The NEC issued guidelines stating that participants in
both campaigns should strictly separate these activities. The government
was allowed to campaign for the referendum, and there were no requirements
for it to remain neutral in the referendum campaign. Several PACE
interlocutors suggested that the referendum was intended to mobilise
voters sympathetic to the ruling party. The fact that the referendum
was held at the same time as the election campaign led to an overlap
of messages between the two campaigns.
57. A number of state-owned foundations registered to campaign
for the referendum, using free airtime on public television and
radio, and the referendum campaign of a state-owned energy company
reinforced the messages of the ruling party, as did some public
officials. To cite some particularly striking examples, foundations
of large state-owned banks, energy companies, the railway company,
the main state-owned insurance company as well as the agri-food
group promoted by the ministry of agriculture were registered and were
participating in the campaign. Some individual candidates were reported
to have used the referendum campaign to promote themselves.
58. Fundamental freedoms were generally respected during the campaign
period. All candidates actively campaigned throughout the country,
focusing on small-scale local activities and events. In addition,
Civic Coalition (KO) organised a rally in Warsaw that attracted
hundreds of thousands of people, and PiS held large congresses across
the country.
59. The campaign environment was extremely polarised, highly confrontational
and often negative. Candidates repeatedly used inflammatory and
discriminatory rhetoric. Despite this, the campaign period was largely
peaceful, with only isolated incidents and threats. Campaign rallies
focused on the economy, national security, migration, the state
of democracy, relations with the European Union and Ukraine, and
personal freedoms.
60. The ruling party's campaign focused on its achievements in
office and recent promises of social benefits, as well as messages
on national sovereignty and security, which often overlapped with
the referendum issues. PiS and Confederation used anti-migrant narratives,
some of which were highly negative and at times xenophobic and misogynistic.
Personal verbal attacks against the main party leaders were widespread.
61. Criticism of the government's foreign policy, its handling
of Covid-19 and controversies over alleged corruption, including
in the issuing of visas by the ministry of foreign affairs, were
prominent themes in the opposition groups' campaign. KO's campaign
also promised to reverse changes to the judiciary and improve relations
with the European Union, implement health and education reforms,
and guarantee women's rights, including a right to abortion up until
12 weeks of pregnancy.
62. The Confederation's main messages revolved around limiting
the country's welfare system and restricting aid to Ukraine and
refugees, while Third Way focused on reinstating national unity
and breaking the PiS-KO dual polar political spectrum, and the New
Left on social issues and women's rights. Some members of the Roman
Catholic clergy campaigned for the ruling party, which, although
not prohibited, was seen by many as a clear advantage.
63. Candidates of the incumbent party reportedly participated
in publicly funded events, inaugurations and opening ceremonies
in their own constituencies, contrary to international standards
and OSCE commitments. Several government officials, including ministers,
campaigned at such events. Some local authorities amplified KO's
messages. The ruling party's campaign was reflected in government
information messages and in the advertising and information campaigns
of state-controlled enterprises.
64. All parties ran extensive social networking campaigns and
used online advertising. The ODIHR LEOM, which monitored the campaign
activities of 40 accounts belonging to political parties or coalitions
and key politicians and political actors on X and Facebook, reported
that most politicians relied on X, yet the promotion of events was
also widespread on Facebook. Political parties and their leaders,
with the notable exception of Jarosław Kaczyński, were active on
these platforms, with video messages and live video conferences,
sharing content from campaign events, reflecting on political developments
and promoting campaign promises. Overall, the tone of the posts
was often negative, with mutual accusations, mirroring the offline
campaign.
5.2 Campaign
financing
65. The Election Code
Note and the Law on Political Parties
provide the legal framework for the regulation of political and
electoral campaign financing, establishing public financing and
specifying permissible sources of private financing. Annual public
funding is granted to parties having received more than 3% of the
votes in the previous Sejm election and to coalitions having received
more than 6% of the votes. In addition, a one-off State subsidy
is granted to political parties, coalitions or electoral committees
of groups of voters who obtain at least one seat in the Sejm, the
Senate or the European Parliament.
66. The legislation has evolved to make parties less dependent
on private sources of funding and more reliant on public subsidies.
This system has promoted a substantial equalisation of the resources
available to each party, establishing a direct link between subsidies
and electoral results. However, political financing has been at
the centre of political debate in recent years. A referendum in
2015 asked voters whether the public financing system should be
maintained.
67. Campaign finance rules allow private sources of funding and
set limits on donations and spending. Private donations are allowed
from citizens permanently resident in the country. Anonymous donations, contributions
from foreign sources and legal entities are prohibited. Specific
campaign spending limits are set for each electoral committee on
the basis of the number of registered candidates (for the Sejm)
or contested constituencies (for the Senate). Electoral committees
may not spend more than 80% of the spending limit on campaign advertising.
68. Third-party campaigning is prohibited by law, but there are
no sanctions for such activities. Certain forms of in-kind contributions
to election committees are permitted, a point of concern raised
by many IEOM interlocutors, including the election administration.
In March 2023, the NEC issued an explanatory note on the activities
of third parties campaigning on behalf of political parties on the
Internet, stressing that these are subject to the same rules as
the provision of services to political parties by commercial entities.
69. Supervision is carried out by the NEC on the basis of post-election
audits of candidates' financial reports on campaign income and expenditure.
Under the 2023 amendments to the Election Law, committees are required
to submit these reports electronically with an external audit within
three months of the election. There is no pre-election campaign
finance reporting requirement. Violations of campaign finance regulations
result in a reduction in State subsidies, and parties whose annual
financial reports are rejected are denied public funding for three
years, regardless of the severity of the violation. While campaign
finance regulations are strict, the current monitoring system lacks
mechanisms to monitor and investigate potential violations during
the election campaign.
70. Holding a referendum and parliamentary elections at the same
time provided an opportunity for the ruling party to circumvent
campaign finance regulations by using referendum spending to promote
the party's core election issues. In addition, foundations with
links to state-owned companies, which had donated heavily to PiS,
could participate in the referendum campaign. Campaign spending
limits under the Election Code apply only to elections, not to referenda;
there are no limits on spending, donations and contributions and
on who can donate to a referendum campaign.
6 Media
environment
71. Freedom of expression and the
right to receive information are enshrined in the constitution,
yet some existing legal provisions limit their full exercise. Acts
such as defamation still falls under criminal offenses, contrary
to previous recommendations from international bodies, and are often
used in strategic lawsuits against public participation (SLAPPs)
targeting the media and activists. The selective allocation of advertisements
by government and state-run entities tends to favour media outlets
with favourable editorial policies, impacting media independence.
72. The media landscape in the country is both diverse and pluralistic,
but it is sharply divided along political lines. Although online
media platforms and social networks have been gaining traction,
television remains the predominant source for political news. Public
broadcaster Telewizja Polska (TVP) has the largest viewership, followed
by private channels such as TVN and Polsat. Notably, in 2022, a
decision was made that exclusively permitted TVP to continue broadcasting
in an older digital format, limiting access to other media for many households.
The National Broadcasting Council (NBC) register includes more than
200 private television and radio stations.
73. While the physical circulation of print media has declined,
regional newspapers remain the main source of local news. In 2021,
PKN Orlen, a state-controlled fuel entity, acquired media giant
Polska Press. This takeover, which saw a reshuffling of senior editorial
roles, was widely seen as an attempt by the governing party to strengthen
its influence over regional media. The subsequent challenges faced
by opposition parties in placing advertisements in Polska Press
publications further fuelled these concerns. That same year, a controversial
law intended to curb foreign media ownership faced widespread criticism
and was eventually vetoed, although not without causing licensing
challenges for channels like TVN24.
74. The NBC is the constitutional body charged with safeguarding
freedom of expression and the public interest. It is composed of
five members for a six-year term (two appointed by the Sejm, two
by the President and one by the Senate). All current members of
the NBC were appointed in October 2022.
75. Alongside it, another body, the National Media Council (NMC)
has been set up, which is composed of five members appointed for
six years (three appointed by the parliament and two representing
members of opposition parties appointed by the President). It appoints
and replaces the management of public television and radio stations
at national and local level. Many IEOM interlocutors perceived this
body and its powers as a means of exerting political influence over
public broadcasters. Many warned that, in the run-up to the elections,
it had begun to exercise control over the management teams of the
public media.
76. Campaign committees contesting at least half of the available
Sejm seats are entitled to a total of 15 hours of free airtime on
national public television and 30 hours on national public radio,
and Senate candidates are entitled to a free allocation of 5 hours
and 10 hours on television and radio respectively. Sejm and Senate
candidates are also legally entitled to free airtime on regional
public media. Private media are obliged to offer the same conditions
to all candidates for the purchase of airtime for paid political
advertising. Broadcasters must report to the NBC on their allocation
of airtime to electoral candidates.
77. The NBC did not proactively monitor the media landscape. Instead,
it mainly reacted to complaints received, and its efforts were seen
as insufficient in addressing evident media bias. The NBC met four
times during the campaign period, in closed sessions, to discuss
the allocation of frequencies and license-related matters. Despite
its mandate, the NBC did little to address the clear partiality
and bias evident in public television broadcasts. In total it reviewed
44 complaints, including 40 concerning the public broadcaster. Overall,
the body failed to curtail the evidently partial and biased coverage
of the public television despite its constitutional obligation to
safeguard the public interest in broadcast media. Many IEOM interlocutors mentioned
that this bias was not only affecting elections but it skewed the
political playing field in general.
7 Complaints
and appeals
78. The legal framework offers
both judicial and administrative channels for voters and electoral
contestants to seek legal remedies. However, some NEC decisions
can only be challenged by contestants. Appeals against the NEC's
refusal to register electoral committees go to the Supreme Court,
while candidates whose registration is rejected by the CEC can appeal
to the NEC and then the Supreme Court. Issues such as free airtime
distribution on public media and campaign finance issues are overseen
by the NEC. Disputes relating to the dissemination of false information
are handled by district courts, while challenges to the election
results must be sent to the Supreme Court’s Chamber of Extraordinary
Control and Public Affairs within 7 days.
79. The NEC had to address 42 appeals against the CEC's decision
to deny candidate registrations. A predominant reason for these
denials was not meeting the signature requirements. Out of these,
just one was upheld, with 19 not considered due to procedural grounds,
and 22 dismissed outright.
80. The Supreme Court dealt with over 60 election-related cases.
A significant number of these pertained to appeals against the NEC's
decisions on candidate registration, some also questioning NEC and
CEC decision-making processes. The Supreme Court's verdicts on several
key issues either upheld, overturned, or reviewed various NEC decisions.
On 6 October 2023, it dismissed an appeal which challenged procedural
aspects of handling election and referendum ballots concurrently,
among others, relating to secrecy of the vote for those choosing
not to vote in the referendum.
81. Importantly, the transparency and efficiency of the legal
process were evident as both NEC and Supreme Court provided well-reasoned
and timely decisions, which were promptly made public on their websites,
thus enhancing transparency. However, despite these efforts, concerns
remained about the independence and impartiality of the judiciary,
especially in the wake of recent reforms. There were also voices of
criticism hinting at perceived politicised decisions by the Supreme
Court, especially as the elections approached.
82. Decisions of election commissions may be appealed to each
respective higher-level commissions up to the NEC. NEC decisions
related to a voter’s exclusion from the voter register may be appealed
to the regional court, and the court’s decisions are final. Decisions
related to rejected candidate lists may be appealed initially to
the NEC and subsequently to the Supreme Court. The 2023 changes
to the Election Code reduced the time for Supreme Court decisions
on appeals against the rejection of an electoral committee from
three to two days, which may diminish the effectiveness of this
judicial remedy. Electoral committees can file complaints related to
the distribution of free public airtime to the NEC. Certain election
related crimes such as interference, violation of the freedom of
the vote, and electoral bribery, all of which are punishable by
imprisonment, are elaborated in the Criminal Code.
83. Complaints pertaining to the validity of the elections may
be lodged with the Supreme Court by any registered voter, a chairperson
of an election commission, or by a representative of an electoral
committee, within seven days of the announcement of the results.
The Court determines whether a breach of the Code has taken place
and whether it had an influence on the outcome of elections. The
Chamber of Extraordinary Review and Public Affairs is responsible
for validating elections within 90 days of the election.
84. Although stakeholders did not raise specific concerns about
election dispute resolution procedures prior to the 2023 elections,
a general concern persisted over the independence of the Supreme
Court chamber responsible for validating election results. Indeed,
even the European Court of Human Rights, in the case of
Dolińska-Ficek and Ozimek v. Poland,
Note ruled
expressis verbis that this Supreme
Chamber “is not a court established by law” within the meaning of
the Convention.
8 Citizen
and international observers
85. The Election Code allows for
both local and international observers. It allows electoral committees
to assign representatives to all election commissions, including
to polling stations on election day. Candidates' proxies may observe
at polling stations and monitor the activities of the electoral
commissions they are assigned to.
86. The 2023 amendments provided for candidate proxies to be paid
for observing, potentially compromising their independence with
a transactional relationship with the PECs they observe.
87. Citizen observers do not need formal accreditation but must
have a certificate from their nominating bodies. In August, the
NEC stated in its guidelines that public observers were not allowed
for the referendum, restricted citizen observers' scope of activities
to election day only and banned them from commenting on or tracking
the transport of the protocols to the PECs. Despite the Supreme
Court overturning this, the NEC left this information online, causing
confusion. The last revision of the guidelines did not take place
until 12 October 2023, namely three days before election day, which
caused some confusion in the polling stations on election day.
88. The PACE delegation believes that the need to defend the rights
of observers at the level of the Supreme Court is not conducive
to co-operation between observers and electoral management bodies.
89. Recent amendments allow proxies and citizen observers to record
the voting process at polling stations, but these recordings must
be given to the PECs or a ministry of digitalisation database. This
might compromise the secrecy of the vote and intimidate observers,
potentially limiting the collection and retention of important evidence
for use in court cases.
90. While international observers get accreditation from the NEC,
delays and lack of transparency have hindered their work. The PACE
delegation deplores that as many as 6 members of the IEOM and 120 observers
from international non-governmental organisations were not accredited
even a day before the elections, a move it deems unacceptable. No
explanation was given as to why, three days before the elections, 29
accreditations of IEOM observers were first withdrawn, then six
were retained and finally, under international pressure, these accreditations
were accepted. It was unprecedented for observers to learn of their
non-accreditation after arriving in the country.
91. Overall, the elections and referendum garnered significant
interest not only from the observers but also from the voters. On
election day, observers were mostly free to observe the process,
with most polling stations providing the necessary information.
Where hesitations arose about the rights of citizen observers, these
were mainly due to committee members being unaware of guideline
changes.
9 Election
Day
92. Election day saw a record turnout
of 74.4%, the highest since 1989, a sign of exceptional voter engagement.
The process itself proceeded calmly, without any significant incidents.
93. The PACE delegation was divided into 14 teams and observed
the election day procedures in 144 polling stations in Warsaw and
its surroundings (11 teams), Gdansk (2 teams) and Krakow (1 team),
as well as the closing and vote counting in 11 polling stations
in Warsaw. As the OSCE/ODIHR did not send any short-term observers,
no general statistics were provided on IEOM observations. Almost
all PACE observations were positive about the various stages of
election day procedures.
94. PACE teams observed the opening in 14 polling stations, all
of which were assessed as very good or good. Voting materials were
available and voting started on time. However, some procedural problems
were observed during the opening, such as the ballot box not being
properly sealed, namely only taped and not closed with a lock or
the plastic seal provided for this purpose.
95. The delegation noted the high motivation of citizens to exercise
their right to vote, starting in the early hours of the morning,
resulting in sometimes long queues and some polling stations in
Warsaw and Krakow running out of ballot papers.
Note The
high turnout, combined with poor queue management and sometimes inadequate
polling station layout, led to overcrowding in many polling stations.
96. In contrast to the election campaign, which was marked by
heightened rhetoric, fabricated tensions over relations with neighbouring
Germany and Ukraine, and the government's decision to add a controversially worded
referendum to the two ballots for the Sejm and Senate, the atmosphere
at the polling stations observed was very different: Voters queued
in large numbers, patiently and in good spirits and polling stations
were mostly run calmly and politely, although sometimes in a somewhat
chaotic or disorderly manner.
97. The main shortcoming noted in all polling stations was the
general violation of the secrecy of the ballot. The lack of secrecy
manifested itself in a number of ways – and often in combination:
the lack of an adequate number of places to ensure secrecy; the
inadequate size of some of the polling stations; and the overall massive
practice of group or family voting, which occurred almost everywhere.
Even where secrecy was available, it did not seem to be relevant
to voters. In many cases, voters did not fold their ballot papers
properly and their choices were easily visible to bystanders. On
several occasions, however, observers noted instances of one person
trying to help several others, which could have been intended to
influence voters.
98. In the vast majority of cases, electoral commissions did not
react to breaches of the secrecy of the ballot. In a number of cases,
the presiding officers of the observed polling stations explained
that family voting was an accepted, if not traditional, practice
in Poland. There seemed to be a general lack of awareness of the importance
of secrecy. However, this was partly due to organisational problems,
such as overcrowded polling stations, the simultaneous handling
of election and referendum ballots, the large size of the Sejm ballot
paper, and the lack of general instructions or prior voter awareness
campaign on how to fold the different ballot papers.
99. For the PACE delegation, by far the most serious problem with
regard to ballot secrecy was the secrecy of the referendum vote.
The principle that the binding nature of the referendum was determined
by the number of valid ballots taken from the ballot box meant that,
in practice, the only way of not participating in the referendum
was to refuse to take the referendum ballot. However, this was a
gross violation of the secrecy of the vote, as it revealed the will
of the voters to those working in the commission and those present
in the polling station. Again, although the PACE observers did not
observe any intimidation of voters by this procedure within the
polling stations, they were told of cases of people who did not
come to vote because they did not want to be stigmatised by their
acquaintances in the electoral commissions after the vote.
100. The fact that voters had to state their wish not to participate
in the referendum when they received their ballot paper made the
process of issuing ballots more difficult. Cases were reported of
PS commission members asking voters whether they wanted a referendum
ballot paper, and of commissions issuing referendum ballots to voters
who had stated that they did not want them. The NEC issued a communique
to all polling stations, stressing that their members should not
ask voters whether they wanted a referendum ballot. The NEC stressed
that it was the voters’ right to refuse the ballot but the polling
station members were obliged to hand out all three ballots.
101. In a number of polling stations observed, campaign posters
and materials were present directly in front of the polling station.
In most polling stations, at least one civil society representative
was present to observe the process, while PACE observers did not
meet any party proxies.
102. The majority of polling stations visited had proper access
for voters with disabilities or it was clearly posted outside the
polling stations where people with mobility disabilities could vote.
Voting was also available in brail.
103. PACE delegation members observed vote counting in 11 polling
stations, assessing the process in all but one case as very good
or good, despite the extremely lengthy procedures. Civil society
observers reported some cases of non-compliance with the procedures
as foreseen in the guidelines, motivated by the desire to speed
up the process or to simplify it. In a number of polling stations
observed, the commission did not count the valid ballots before
counting the votes cast for individual candidates and the referendum.
104. The Warsaw I district election commission was reported to
have received all protocols from the PECs abroad within the 24-hour
limit.
Note Nonetheless, the problems raised
in paragraph 31 remain pertinent.
105. The NEC announced the final results on 17 October 2023:
The Sejm (460 seats):
- United
Right - Law and Justice (PiS): 35.4% (194 seats)
- Civic Coalition (KO): 30.7% (157 seats)
- Third Way: 14.4% (65 seats)
- The Left: 8.6% (26 seats)
- Confederation: 6.8% (18 seats)
The Senate (100 seats)
- Civic
Coalition (KO): 28.91% (41 seats)
- United Right - Law and Justice: 34.81% (34 seats)
- Third Way: 11.5% (11 seats)
- The Left: 5.29% (9 seats)
- Senate Pact Independents: 2.68% (4 seats)
- Independents: 2.98% (1 seats)
106. PiS remained the largest party
in the Sejm, but with about 35% of the vote, lost its majority and
will most likely be unable to form a government. The three main
opposition groups, Civic Coalition, Third Way and The Left, took
54% of the votes, winning enough seats (248) to allow them to take
power. The German Minority Electoral Committee failed to win any
parliamentary seat for the first time in 32 years.
107. The opposition parties owe their high score to the extraordinary
mobilisation of young voters and women. Moreover, the various campaigns
targeted at women and the share of female candidates on electoral
lists give grounds to expect that the future parliament will have
the highest percentage of female MPs in Polish history. 74.7% of
women (compared to 73.1% of male voters) cast their vote. Whereas
over 80% of voters in their 40s and 50s cast their votes, over 70%
of young people between 18 and 29 came to vote, which is an exceptionally high
turnout, especially considering that there is no electronic way
of voting in Poland.
108. The new composition of the Sejm will include 135 female members
(29,3%) and 20 new female senators (20%). The previous composition
of the Sejm included 132 women, thus these elections added only
three more female legislators to the Sejm. With the high level of
participation of women voters in these elections, it may be hoped
that the next elections in Poland would see more women entering
politics and that political parties themselves would introduce quotas
for gender balance in top positions.
109. In other aspects of electoral demographics,
Note it
is interesting to note that the support to the ruling party grew
in a linear way with age (from 14.4% of 18-29-year-olds to 52.8%
for 60 and older) whereas support to KO was very even among all
age groups (between 27.6% – 34.5%). 47.6% of the rural population
supported PiS whereas the support diminished proportionally to the
size of towns and cities (33.7% in towns smaller than 50 000 to
21% in towns with population over 500 000 inhabitants, compare with
KO – 33.4% to 42.9%). By professional profiling, company owners,
managers, experts, administrative services and students voted predominantly
for KO candidates, whereas farmers, workers, retired and unemployed
gave their overwhelming support to PiS.
110. 29 532 595 persons or 40.91% of the registered voters participated
in the referendum, which fell below the minimum validity threshold
of 50%.
111. On 6 November 2023, President Duda asked Mateusz Morawiecki to
form a government. This move was criticised by the opposition, as
no party that would allow PiS to reach a majority agreed to join
them for coalition talks. In protest, on 10 November, Civic Coalition,
Poland 2050, Polish People's Party and New Left signed a coalition
agreement. The Sejm was summoned on 13 November. If Mateusz Morawiecki
does not secure the Sejm's vote of confidence before 27 November,
the Sejm will then elect a new Prime Minister, who is then supposed
to be officially appointed by President Duda before 11 December
2023.
10 Conclusions
and recommendations
112. Poland's parliamentary elections
in 2023 were characterised by fierce competition, offering voters
a wide range of political options. However, the ruling party's disproportionate
control over State resources and public media gave it an undue advantage.
The historic voter turnout demonstrated the deep-rooted concern
of the Polish public about the democratic future of their country.
113. The PACE delegation recalls that an election, and its observation,
does not only concern the polling day, but is a process with several
stages, all of which need to be analysed and evaluated in order
to assess the entire electoral process.
114. The political atmosphere in the run-up to these elections
was highly polarised. They were perceived by the population as being
critical to Poland’s future on key matters, including the resilience
of democratic institutions, personal freedoms and foreign policy
approach.
115. While the candidates campaigned openly, the electoral discourse
was marred by rhetoric characterised by intolerance, xenophobia
and misogyny, particularly at the expense of their opponents and
migrants.
116. The electoral administration functioned effectively and, despite
doubts about its neutrality, enjoyed general public confidence.
However, its decision-making lacked transparency. While questions
remain about the independence of the judiciary, the Supreme Court's
handling of election-related cases was transparent and encouraged
greater participation by observers.
117. However, the legitimacy of key courts remains an issue. As
underlined by the European Court of Human Rights' position on the
Chamber of Extraordinary Review and Public Affairs, there is an
urgent need for the new authorities to prioritise the restoration
of the rule of law and respect for human rights in the country.
118. The electoral framework is adequate for the conduct of democratic
elections. However, major last-minute changes without substantive
public debate deviated from international best practice. In order
to insulate the electoral process from abrupt legislative changes,
mechanisms should be put in place to prevent any changes to election
and referendum procedures within six months of an event, as mandated
by the Constitutional Tribunal. This would allow sufficient time
for all stakeholders to adapt and prevent any undue advantage.
119. New legislation focused on increasing voter turnout favoured
pro-government rural areas and neglected the recalibration of seats
based on current population figures. Recommendations from previous
elections regarding suffrage rights, the misuse of administrative
resources and improved transparency of campaign financing have yet
to be addressed.
120. The inaction of the Sejm in adjusting the distribution of
electoral seats is a cause for concern and calls for the introduction
of a mechanism for automatic demographic realignment of the distribution
of Sejm seats among electoral districts, which should take place
before each parliamentary election and be based on the latest data
from the NEC (without the need for parliamentary involvement). It
is also proposed to reduce the number of voters per constituency
from 4 000 to 3 000 in the interests of efficiency.
121. The central register of voters functioned satisfactorily despite
its recent introduction. The PACE delegation sees potential benefits
in a digitalised voter verification system, a feature common to
many European countries.
122. Election day ran smoothly. However, the secrecy of the vote
was compromised by overcrowded polling stations, poorly prepared
polling booths and a lack of voter awareness. The NEC should intensify
voter education on ballot secrecy and ensure that voting remains
confidential. The size of the ballot paper and how preferences are
marked on it should also be reconsidered for future elections.
123. In light of the additional (time) pressure put on polling
stations abroad, Polish authorities should review without further
delays, and in due time before the next elections, the regulations
guiding voting abroad, and consider the methods of voting (such
as reintroduction of postal voting, or introduction of electronic
voting) as well as the allocation of votes (which are concentrated
in one constituency, thus triggering “electoral tourism”).
124. The government-initiated referendum held concurrently with
the elections served to reinforce the ruling party's campaign. The
referendum clearly helped the ruling party to circumvent stricter
campaigning and campaign finance regulations. The overlap between
the ruling party's campaign messages and the government's information
campaigns, as well as state-controlled companies and their foundations campaigning
for the referendum, gave the ruling party another significant advantage.
The lack of detailed campaign finance reporting prior to election
day, as well as ineffective regulation of the referendum, had a negative
impact on the accountability of political parties and campaign finance.
Given the complexities that arise when parliamentary elections and
a national referendum are held simultaneously, it is crucial to
develop strategies that ensure the compatibility of procedures and
the secrecy of the ballot in both cases.
125. Freedom of expression is enshrined in the Polish Constitution,
but defamation and public insult remain criminal offences, despite
previous international recommendations. The media landscape shows
increasing political influence, which should be addressed. The public
broadcaster showed a clear bias towards the ruling party, which
was not regulated by the National Broadcasting Council.
126. Gender equality, although guaranteed by the Constitution,
is not reflected in political representation. Further efforts are
needed to increase women's political participation.
127. While the Election Code allows for both domestic and international
observers, the accreditation process for many international observers
was marred by delays and a lack of transparency. A standardised
procedure for the accreditation of international observers should
be established by the NEC in co-operation with the ministry of foreign
affairs. This should include a clear deadline for the submission
of applications and the delivery of accreditations.
128. The rights of citizen observers also need to be harmonised
and enshrined in law, including during a nationwide referendum.
A universal electronic certificate for proxies and observers could
help to streamline procedures. It would also be fair for organisations
sending citizen observers to have the right to lodge complaints
against guidelines or statements issued by the NEC.
129. All in all, the PACE observers found that Polish voters, regardless
of which party they supported, voted in a way and in a manner that
reflects their hopes for a calmer and less divided political future.
130. The Assembly stands ready to work with the Polish authorities
to address the issues highlighted, guided by the Reykjavík Principles
of Democracy adopted at the Reykjavík Summit of Heads of State and Government.
This work should be carried out within the framework of the Assembly's
monitoring procedure and in close co-operation with the Venice Commission.
Appendix 1 – Composition
of the ad hoc committee
Based on the proposals by the political groups
of the Assembly, the ad hoc committee was composed as follows (*
members of the pre-election delegation):
Chairperson: Ms Mireille CLAPOT
Socialists, Democrats
and Greens Group (SOC)
- Mr Constantinos EFSTATHIOU,
Cyprus
- Mr Yunus EMRE, Türkiye
- Ms Aurora FLORIDIA, Italy
- Ms Blerina GJYLAMETI, Albania
- Mr. Didier MARIE, France
- Mr Givi MIKANADZE, Georgia
- Mr Stefan SCHENNACH, Austria*
Group of the European
People’s Party (EPP/CD)
- Mr Corneliu-Mugurel
COZMANCIUC, Romania*
- Ms Marie-Christine DALLOZ, France
- Mr Reinhold LOPATKA, Austria
- Mr Chris SAID, Malta
- Mr Andrius VYŠNIAUSKAS, Lithuania
Alliance of Liberals
and Democrats for Europe (ALDE)
- Ms Mireille CLAPOT,
France*
- Mr Jean-Pierre GRIN, Switzerland
- Ms Valentina GRIPPO, Italy
- Mr Robert TROY, Ireland
- Ms Lesia ZABURANNA, Ukraine
European Conservatives
Group and Democratic Alliance (EC-DA)
- Mr Thibaut FRANCOIS,
France
- Mr Oleksii GONCHARENKO, Ukraine
- Lord Simon RUSSELL, United Kingdom*
- Mr Jose Maria SÁNCHEZ GARCIA, Spain
Group of the Unified
European Left (UEL)
- Mr Andrej HUNKO, Germany*
Co-rapporteur AS/MON
(ex officio)
Venice Commission
- Mr Óscar SÁNCHEZ MUÑOZ,
Substitute member, Spain
- Mr Michael JANSSEN, Administrator, Venice Commission
Secretariat
- Ms Ivi-Triin ODRATS,
Secretary of the ad hoc committee, Election Observation and Support
Division
- Ms Anne GODFREY, Assistant, Election Observation and Support
Division
- Ms Carine ROLLER-KAUFMAN, Assistant, Election Observation
and Support Division
Appendix 2 – Programme
of the pre-electoral delegation of the Parliamentary Assembly
Tuesday,
26 September 2023
8:45-9:25 Delegation meeting with introductory words by:
- Mireille Clapot, Head of Delegation
- Pawel Wierdak, Head of the Council of Europe Office in
Warsaw
- Practical information from the secretariat
9:30-11:00 Meeting with Mr Douglas Wake, Head of the OSCE/ODIHR
Limited Election Observation Mission, Ms Tamara Otiashvili, Deputy
Head of Mission, and members of the core team
11:30-12:45 Meeting with the President and judges of the Chamber
of Extraordinary Control and Public Affairs of the Supreme Court:
- Joanna Lemańska, President of
the Supreme Court, managing the work of the Chamber of Extraordinary
Control and Public Affairs,
- Aleksander Stępkowski, Judge of the Supreme Court, Spokesman
of the Supreme Court
- Marcin Stębelski (Ph.D.), member of the Office of Studies
and Analyses of the Supreme Court
- Przemysław Szuty, judicial assistant of the Supreme Court
12:50-14:15 Working lunch with Mr Radosław Fogiel (MP), Chairperson
of the Foreign Affairs Committee
14:30-16:00 Meeting with representatives of civil society:
- Patryk Wachowiec – Civil Development
Forum
- Maciej Nowicki – Helsinki Foundation for Human Rights
- Adam Gendźwiłł – Warsaw University, Batory Foundation
- Zofia Lutkiewicz – Responsible Politics Foundation
16:15-17:45 Meeting with representatives of media monitoring
organisations
- Sylwester Oracz
– Responsible Politics Foundation
- Konrad Siemaszko – Helsinki Foundation for Human Rights
- Krzysztof Bobiński, Andrzej Krajewski – Towarzystwo Dziennikarskie/
Journalistic Society
- Dominika Bychawska-Siniarska – Batory Foundation and Prague
Civil Society Center
18:15-19:00 Meeting with Tomasz Grodzki, Speaker of the Senate
19:30 Meeting with members of the diplomatic corps (Austria,
United Kingdom, Germany, Romania), hosted by Etienne de Poncins,
Ambassador of France in Poland
Wednesday, 27 September
2023
08:00-08:45 Meeting with Mr Marek Suski (MP) and Mr Daniel
Milewski (MP) – Law and Justice (PiS)
08:45-09:45 Meeting with the Head and members of the National
Election Commission (NEC)
- Sylwester
Marciniak, Chairman of the National Electoral Commission
- Magdalena Pietrzak, Secretary of the National Electoral
Commission
- Lech Gajzler, Director of the Legal and Election Organisation
Team
- Krzysztof Lorentz, Director of the Team for Control of
Financing of Political Parties and Election Campaigns
10:00-10:45 Meeting with Małgorzata Paprocka, Secretary of
State
11:00-12:15 Meeting with Kamila Gasiuk-Pihowicz (MP) and Aleksander
Pociej (MP) – Civic Coalition
12:30-13:45 Working lunch with Tomasz Giziński, Advisor to
National Media Council (NMC)
14:00-14:40 Meeting with Anna Maria Żukowska (MP) – Lewica
14:40-15:20 Meeting with Krzysztof Paszyk (MP) and Mr Marek
Sawicki (MP) – Koalicja Polska
15:20-16:00 Meeting with Paweł Zalewski (MP) and Mr Stanisław
Zakroczymski, Director of the Office – Polska 2050
16:00-16:20 Meeting with Paweł Kukiz (MP) – Kukiz’15
17.00-18:00 Debriefing meeting of the pre-electoral delegation
and preparation of the statement
Appendix 3 – Statement
of the pre-electoral delegation of the Parliamentary Assembly
Poland: PACE
pre-electoral delegation notes a heated and polarised campaign environment
A PACE pre-electoral delegation, concluding a visit to Poland
(26-27 September 2023), has noted a heated and polarised campaign
environment in the run-up to next month’s parliamentary elections.
The delegation listened to widespread concerns about potential democratic
backsliding, threatening to undermine public trust in the fairness
of the electoral process.
The five-memberNote cross-party delegation, led by
Mireille Clapot (France, ALDE), conducted its assessment in Warsaw,
engaging with high-ranking state officials, members of the judiciary,
election authorities, political party representatives, civil society
organisations and independent media monitors, as well as representatives
of the diplomatic corps.
The delegation highlighted concerns surrounding the simultaneous
referendum during the parliamentary elections, which various interlocutors
suggested was intended to circumvent campaign financing regulations. The
delegation was also worried that the wording of the referendum questions
pre-empted the answers, and felt that the obligation for voters
to actively refuse to take the referendum ballot paper might endanger
the secrecy of the vote for those wanting to participate in the
elections but not in the referendum.
Furthermore, the delegation expressed concerns about the legitimacy
of key courts being questioned domestically and internationally,
as well as the European Court of Human Rights no longer recognising
the Chamber of Extraordinary Review and Public Affairs of the Polish
Supreme Court as a legally established tribunal. These factors could
lead to uncertainty if the election results were to be challenged.
The members of the pre-electoral mission were informed about
several amendments to the Electoral Code introduced during a period
of legislative silence, including a switch to a central voter register
without large-scale testing prior to the elections. Moreover, they
expressed their disappointment at the Parliament’s failure to adjust the
number of seats in constituencies to reflect changing population
levels, as mandated by law and proposed by the State Electoral Commission.
However, the delegation was pleased to note that there was a high
level of trust in the ability of local election officials to carry
out their roles.
The delegation noted with satisfaction that candidates’ freedom
to campaign remains unhampered in Poland but echoed the concerns
of certain interlocutors about unbalanced media coverage by public
outlets.
The delegation also took note of concerns raised about the
blurring of the line between state and party activities by political
parties and the transparency of campaign financing.
The voting process for Polish citizens residing abroad was
also an issue raised by some of the delegation’s interlocutors,
particularly the changes to legal provisions which might invalidate
out-of-country precinct votes if they are not received by the National
Election Commission within 24 hours of polls closing.
The delegation acknowledges that addressing some of these
issues before election day may be challenging, but it strongly urges
action on those that can still be rectified.
A fully-fledged PACE delegation comprising 30 members, accompanied
by legal experts from the Venice Commission, will travel to Poland
to observe the vote on 15 October.
PACE – which represents parliamentarians from 46 European
nations – is observing elections in Poland with a full-scale delegation
for the first time since the Parliamentary Assembly decided to open
a procedure in January 2020 to monitor Poland’s honouring of its
statutory obligations vis-à-vis the Council of Europe.
Appendix 4 – Programme
of the meetings of the International Electoral Observation Mission
Friday,
13 October 2023
09:00-10:15 PACE delegation meeting
- Welcome by the Head of the delegation, Mireille Clapot
- Presentation of the pre-electoral mission by its members
- Intervention by the co-rapporteur, Azadeh Rojhan
- Presentation by Óscar Sánchez Muñoz, member of the Venice
Commission
- Practical information from the secretariat
10:30-10:45 Welcome and Introductory Remarks
- Pia Kauma, Special Co-ordinator
- Mireille Clapot, Head of PACE Delegation
- Pere Joan Pons, Head of OSCE PA Delegation
10:45-12:45 Briefing by the ODIHR Limited Election Observation
Mission
- Welcome and overview
of the EOM's work – Douglas Wake, Head of Mission
- Political overview, the Contestants and the Election Campaign
– Julia Manchin, Political Analyst
- Campaign Finance – Jeffrey Carlson, Campaign Finance Analyst
- Media – Ivan Godarsky, Media Analyst
- Legal Framework, Electoral dispute resolutions – Eirini
Skouzou, Legal Analyst
- Election Administration and E-Day– Peter Michalik, Election
Analyst
- Security – Michal Galkowski, Security Expert
Questions and Answers
14:00-15:30 Political and Social Context
- Piotr Buras, Head, ECFR Warsaw
- Kinga Łozińska, Deputy Chairperson, Committee for the
Defence of Democracy
- Zosia Lutkiewicz, President of the Management Board, Political
Accountability Foundation
- Maciej Nowicki, President of the Board, Helsinki Foundation
for Human Rights
- Monika Wiszyńska-Rakowska, Commissioner for Human Rights
16:00-18:00 Party Representatives and Candidates
- Jakub Banaś, Confederation Freedom
and Independence
- Wlodzimierz Czarzasty, Co-Chair, The Left (SLD, Wiosna
& Razem)
- Miloslawa Zagłoba, Senior Legal Advisor and representative
of the Third Way (Polska 2050 & Koalicja Polska)
- Aleksander Pociej, Senator, Civic Coalition (KO)
Saturday, 14 October 2023
08:30-10:30 Election Campaign and Media Coverage
- Marcin Duma, President, IBRIS
- Piotr Kierzkowski, Chief of TVP3, Public Television
- Bartosz Wieliński, Deputy Editor-in-Chief, Gazeta Wyborcza
- Michal Samul, Editor-in-chief, TVN24
- Maciej Swirski, Chairperson, National Broadcasting Council
- Bartosz Weglarczyk, Editor-in-Chief, Onet.pl
11:00-12:00 Election Administration
- Dariusz Lasocki, member of the National Electoral Commission
- Krzysztof Lorentz, Head of Department of Financial Control
of Political Parties and Election Campaigns, National Electoral
Office
- Aleksander Stępkowski, Supreme Court Chamber of Extraordinary
Control and Public Affairs / Spokesman
- Janusz Cieszynski, Minister of Digital Affairs
12:00-12:30 ODIHR EOM Briefing continuation
- Briefing by Long Term Observers deployed in
Warsaw
Sunday, 15 October 2023
All day Election Day – Observation
in polling stations
(Polling stations open at 07:00 and close at 21:00)
Monday, 16 October 2023
08:00-09:00 Debriefing for PACE
Delegation
15:00 Joint press conference
Appendix 5 – Press release
of the International Election Observation Mission
Poland’s parliamentary
elections were competitive but marked by misuse of public resources
and public media bias, international observers say
WARSAW, 16 October 2023 – Poland’s parliamentary elections
were characterized by record high voter participation with a wide
choice of political options and candidates able to campaign freely,
but the campaign was tarnished by notable overlap between the ruling
party’s messages and government information campaigns. Together
with distorted and openly partisan coverage by the public broadcaster,
this provided a clear advantage to the ruling party, undermining
the democratic separation of state and party, international observers
said in a statement today.
Yesterday’s elections took place in a highly polarised atmosphere
and were regarded by many as critical to Poland’s democratic future.
The joint observation mission from the OSCE Office for Democratic
Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR), the OSCE Parliamentary Assembly
(OSCE PA) and Council of Europe’s Parliamentary Assembly (PACE),
found that the legal framework provided a sufficient basis to hold
democratic elections. While recent legal amendments incorporated
some previous recommendations made by ODIHR, their adoption occurred
shortly before the elections and without meaningful public consultation.
“This Sunday’s parliamentary elections, while offering Polish
voters different political alternatives, took place in a complex
and polarized political environment," said Special Co-ordinator
Pia Kauma. "This translated into a campaign dominated by a highly
confrontational tone, with regular use of inflammatory rhetoric
and personal attacks against the main party leaders.”
Over 29 million voters were registered for yesterday’s elections,
including over 600,000 who applied to vote abroad. The national
election commission prepared for the elections efficiently and despite
some questions being raised about their impartiality, generally
enjoyed public trust. All sessions were closed to the public, resulting
in a lack of transparency in their decision-making process. Election
day itself was calm, and the process was efficient and well organized
in the polling stations visited by observers. However, the secrecy
of the vote was frequently compromised by overcrowding, voting booths
not being spacious enough to conceal large ballots, and voters marking
ballots outside the booths. While concerns about independence of
the judiciary remain, the handling of election-related cases by
the Supreme Court was transparent and supported greater observer
participation.
"We witnessed a polarized campaign environment where heightened
rhetoric, recent changes to the legal electoral framework and serious
concerns over the judicial system undermined citizens’ trust in
the institutions,” said Azadeh Rojhan, alternate head of the PACE
delegation. “Nevertheless, the historic high turnout demonstrated
the commitment of citizens to upholding democracy in Poland."
While freedoms of association and assembly were respected
in a pluralistic campaign, it was marred by the misuse of state
resources. The overlap between the ruling party’s campaign messages
and government information campaigns as well as state-controlled
companies and their foundations, including on the referendum, gave
a further significant advantage to the ruling party. In addition,
the lack of detailed campaign finance reporting ahead of election
day as well as ineffective regulation for the referendum had a negative impact
on the accountability of political party and campaign finance.
The run-up to the election remained peaceful overall. However,
the campaign was highly confrontational and often negative, with
candidates repeatedly using intolerant, misogynistic and discriminatory
language, including anti-migrant narratives from some parties that
were at times xenophobic. Personal verbal attacks against the main
party leaders were widespread.
“While the elections in Poland were competitive, we noted
the erosion of checks and balances to gain further control over
state institutions by the governing party, including the courts
and the public media,” said OSCE PA head of delegation Pere Joan
Pons. “This tilted the playing field, which meant the opposition
did not have fully equal opportunities.”
While Poland’s media landscape is diverse, the purchase of
most regional daily newspapers and many other regional media outlets
by a state-controlled energy company, attempts to limit foreign
media ownership, and protracted license renewal processes indicate
increasing political control by the government. The observer mission
found that while public television gave free airtime to all contestants,
its political coverage clearly promoted the ruling party and its
policies and at the same time demonstrated open hostility towards
the opposition. Most monitored private media adopted a critical
editorial line against the ruling party, while some clearly favoured
the opposition.
“Equality, inclusiveness and transparency are key to good
election administration and vital for an election to fully meet
democratic standards,” said Douglas Wake, head of the ODIHR limited
election observation mission. “But while Poland’s election administration
performed efficiently, transparency was regrettably limited. More troublingly,
we observed that the ruling party and its candidates gained a clear
advantage from the misuse of state resources, undermining the separation
between state and party.”
The international election observation mission to the Polish
parliamentary elections totalled 154 observers from 44 countries,
consisting of 33 ODIHR-deployed experts and long-term observers,
94 parliamentarians and staff from the OSCE PA, and 27 from PACE.
