C Explanatory memorandum
by Ms Valentina Grippo, rapporteurNote
1 Introduction
1. This report originated in the
motion for a resolution on “Media concentration and threats to media pluralism
and independence”
Doc. 15916, which was referred to the committee on Culture, Science,
Education and Media for report on 15 April 2024. Its signatories
are concerned by the fact that media pluralism is challenged by
the increased economic pressure and competition through digital
media, but also by the more insidious phenomenon of media capture
and by the emergence of so-called “news deserts”.
2. A certain level of media concentration is not inherently detrimental
and can, in fact, play a beneficial role by ensuring the long-term
sustainability of the media sector, particularly in small markets.
However, effective regulation is essential to mitigate potential
adverse effects on the diversity and quality of available information. As
such, mergers and acquisitions in the media sector should be assessed
according to their impact on media independence and pluralism.
3. In this regard, transparency of ownership structures in the
media sector is of paramount importance for determining whether
or not a company holds an absolute or relative dominant position
and can therefore have an impact on media pluralism.
Note
4. Media capture
Note is “a situation where a group of
interests formed around a country’s political and business power
takes over and abuses the key regulatory and funding mechanisms,
the public media, as well as a majority of the privately owned media
to control the journalistic narrative with the long-term purpose
of maintaining their grip on power and, with it, access to public
resources”.
Note Media capture
uses seemingly legal means to create economic or regulatory barriers
to market entry for independent media, limiting their ability to generate
revenue, to operate, and ultimately inform the public. It is also
an increasingly popular tool of authoritarian and illiberal or populist
governments to control public information, conceal critical voices
and manipulate public opinion.
5. A “news desert” can be defined as “a geographic or administrative
area, or a social community, where it is difficult or impossible
to access sufficient, reliable, diverse information from independent
local, regional and community media”.
Note Local markets may be left
unserved by media outlets, since local news are mostly uninteresting
for big groups, and hence remain uncovered since no journalists
would be dedicated to this purpose. Moreover, local newspapers may
disappear due to lack of financial viability. Consequently, local communities
are compelled to depend on social media platforms as the primary
source and vehicle of information. The consequences of this for
local democratic processes are significant, as it effectively eliminates the
role of critical journalism in these communities.
6. The exponential development of online platforms as gatekeepers
of information raises serious concerns for media pluralism. This
affects not only the variety of media sources that individuals are
exposed to but also to the quality and diversity of the information
they receive and impart, which can result in so-called “filter bubbles”,
generate fragmentation and result in a more polarised society.
7. In line with the motion for a resolution, and following the
change of title accepted by the committee,
Note this report examines the
current growing threats to media pluralism and to the independence
of the media in order to propose concrete lines of action. My analysis
builds on contributions from several experts we heard from.
Note
2 Council of Europe standards
8. The Parliamentary Assembly
and the committee on Culture, Science, Education and Media in particular have
been addressing the issue of media concentration and media pluralism
and independence for several years. In
Resolution 2065 (2015) “Increasing transparency of media ownership”, we recalled
that media ownership transparency is necessary to enable members
of the public to form an opinion on the value of the information,
ideas and opinions disseminated by the media (paragraph 1), and
recommended, among others, that parliaments of the member States
review their legislation to ensure adequate transparency of the ownership
of, and influence over, media outlets (print media, film, radio,
television and Internet-based media), including the disclosure of
hidden ownership (paragraph 8). In its parallel
Recommendation 2074 (2015), the Assembly recommended that the Committee of Ministers
reviewed and further developed Council of Europe standards in this
field; invite the European Audiovisual Observatory to consider extending
its action in line with the technological convergence of digital
media and report on media ownership; co-operate with the European Platform
of Regulatory Authorities (EPRA); and invite associations of media
outlets to set up, in a co-ordinated way, ethical standards on transparency
of media ownership.
9. In
Resolution 2179
(2017) “Political influence over independent media and journalists”,
we called on national authorities to recognise and oppose the threat
that more insidious methods pose to the independence and genuine
pluralism of the media, to the interest of the public in receiving
unbiased, critical information and hence to our democratic systems
(paragraph 3).
10. In
Resolution 2212
(2018) “The protection of editorial integrity”, the Assembly
expressed its concern about the direct intervention of State authorities
in the media sphere, not only by means of direct ownership, but
also through partisan appointments to leadership positions in broadcasting
and allocation of broadcasting licences, favouring selected media
and weakening others by inequitable allocation of advertising budgets
of government agencies and public companies.
11. In
Resolution 2532
(2024) “Guaranteeing media freedom and the safety of journalists:
an obligation of member States”, the Assembly called on member States
to review legislation which can be abused or misused to unduly restrict
media freedom, threaten journalists and seek to silence them; analyse
the political, legal and economic conditions which lead to media
capture, and take adequate measures to counter this phenomenon and
safeguard independent media; improve the legislative and regulatory
framework against political interference and the undue concentration
of media ownership; support genuine public service media, securing their
viability and editorial independence, according to the basic Council
of Europe standards; and ensure that financing schemes for private
media outlets are based on fair and objective criteria and operated
in a transparent and non-discriminatory manner. The Assembly was
concerned, in particular, by the expanding phenomenon of media capture
in Hungary, Poland and Serbia, and the alarming number of journalists
detained in Türkiye.
12. Media concentration and its impact on media pluralism have
also been covered in detailed studies by the Council of Europe intergovernmental
sector.
Note The most important legal instrument
in this regard is
Recommendation
CM/Rec(2018)1 of the Committee of Ministers to member States on
media pluralism and transparency of media ownership, which deals with the challenges that opaque media ownership
and financing, media concentration and convergence pose to the plurality
of ideas and the right of individuals to access and impart information.
Its preamble recalls that transparency of media ownership can help
to make media pluralism effective by bringing ownership structures
behind the media – which can influence editorial policies – to the
awareness of the public and regulatory authorities. This is particularly
important now since ongoing technological, financial, regulatory
and other changes in the media sector in Europe raise concerns for
media pluralism. Therefore, fresh appraisals of existing approaches
to media pluralism would be needed in order to address the resulting
challenges for freedom of expression: more comparative data on individuals’
use of online media content; appropriate media regulation in order
to maintain or restore the integrity of the democratic process and
to prevent bias, misleading information or suppression of information;
new policy responses and strategic solutions to sustain independent,
quality journalism and to enhance citizens’ access to diverse content
across all media types and formats; and ways of addressing the growing
concerns arising from pressure exerted on the media by political
and economic interests, acting alone or in concert, in order to influence
public opinion or otherwise impinge on the independence of the media.
13. According to Recommendation CM/Rec(2018)1, the adoption and
effective implementation of media ownership regulation can play
an important role in respect of media pluralism, enhancing transparency
in media ownership and addressing issues such as cross-media ownership,
direct and indirect media ownership and effective control and influence
over the media.
14. The appendix of Recommendation CM/Rec(2018)1 provides guidelines
on the States’ positive obligations to foster a favourable environment
for freedom of expression and media freedom and to guarantee media
pluralism and diversity of media content. It encourages them to
develop and implement a comprehensive regulatory framework that
takes particular account of media ownership and control and is adapted
to the current state of the media industry. States should also promote
a regime of transparency of media ownership that ensures the public
availability and accessibility of accurate, up-to-date data concerning direct
and beneficial ownership of the media, as well as other interests
that influence the strategic decision making of the media in question
or its editorial line. Finally, they should promote media literacy
with a view to enabling individuals to access, understand, critically
analyse, evaluate, use and create content through a range of traditional
and digital (including social) media.
15. Regarding transparency of media ownership, it recommends that
member States include a requirement for media outlets operating
within State jurisdiction to disclose ownership information directly
to the public on their website or other publication and to report
this information to an independent national media regulatory body
or other designated body, tasked with gathering and collating the
information and making it available to the public. This body should
be provided with sufficient and stable financial resources and staff
to enable it to effectively carry out its tasks. The scope of the
transparency obligations for the media should include legal and natural
persons based in other jurisdictions and their relevant interests
in other jurisdictions.
16. Furthermore, member States are encouraged to adopt measures
conducive to the disclosure of information on the sources of the
media outlet’s funding obtained from State funding mechanisms (advertising, grants
and loans), as well as to promote the disclosure by media outlets
of contractual relations with other media or advertising companies
and political parties that may have an influence on editorial independence.
17. National media regulatory authorities (NRAs) or other designated
body should ensure that the public has easy, swift and effective
and searchable access to data about media ownership and control
arrangements in the State, for example in the form of online databases.
Member States should also encourage NRAs or other designated body
or institution to publish regular reports on media ownership.
18. The 2019
Declaration
by the Committee of Ministers on the financial sustainability of
quality journalism in the digital age encourages the Council of Europe member States to put
in place a regulatory and policy framework that facilitates the
operation of quality journalism in Europe, while not constraining
media outlets’ editorial and operational independence. The Declaration
recommends the implementation of a series of measures aimed at addressing
the impact of the digital transition on the media landscape, as
well as other ongoing challenges, in order to preserve a viable
media ecosystem.
19. Recommendation
CM/Rec(2022)4 of the Committee of Ministers to member States on
promoting a favourable environment for quality journalism in the
digital age calls on member States to promote a favourable environment
for quality journalism in the digital age and provides a number
of guidelines to this effect. Notably, it encourages member States
to take the necessary steps aimed at ensuring the financial sustainability
of quality journalism as a public good, as well as the structural
conditions for its development. States should encourage a variety
of funding models for quality journalism, which may include not-for-profit
organisations and models based on reader payment such as (digital)
subscriptions and membership fees and donations from users and other
actors. Such measures should furthermore pay particular attention
to the situation of those parts of the field that are facing increasing
financial challenges, such as local journalism, investigative journalism
and cross-border journalism. As regards public service media, member
States should ensure stable and sufficient funding for public service
media in order to guarantee their editorial and institutional independence,
their capacity to innovate, high standards of professional integrity,
and to enable them to properly fulfil their remit and deliver quality
journalism. Finally, as regards community and local media, member States
should develop and promote a range of funding schemes and instruments,
including at the local level. This may include the availability
of public funds for the provision of local news in the public interest,
and other measures to ensure that community media, as well as other
types of independent media serving local and rural communities,
have the space and adequate resources to operate on all distribution
platforms.
3 European
Union law and policy
20. Given the European Union (EU)'s
limited competence in the field of media pluralism, the EU relied
until recently on competition law in general and the EU Merger Regulation
Note in particular as a means of addressing potential
plurality concerns in media markets. However, EU competition law
is not intended to replace national media concentration controls
and measures to ensure media pluralism. The EU Merger Regulation
states clearly that “plurality of the media” can be regarded as
a separate legitimate interest and EU member States may take appropriate
measures to protect it (see Article 21.4 of the Merger Regulation),
and as explained by the European Commission in its
News
Corp/ BSkyB decision,
Note a decision based on competition-related grounds
under the Merger Regulation is without prejudice to the media plurality
review of the relevant national authorities. The focus in merger
control is whether there is a "significant impediment to effective
competition", whereas a media plurality review reflects the crucial
role media plays in a democracy and looks at wider concerns about
whether the number, range and variety of persons with control of
media enterprises will be sufficient.
21. The EU can only intervene, however, when there is an internal
market dimension and when the turnover thresholds were very high.
Because of these high thresholds, a major player could become dominant
in the market because of network effects, exercising the advantages
of scale to consolidate its position. Another problem is defining
the actual markets for competition law. The EU tends to take quite
a narrow product market, and therefore it has traditionally seen
different media activities as being distinct from a market perspective.
22. Given the way concentration rules operate and in particular
because they require a case by case analysis that is usually very
complex and time consuming, the EU adopted in 2022 the
Digital
Markets Act (DMA). The purpose of the DMA is to contribute to the proper
functioning of the internal market by laying down harmonised rules
ensuring for all businesses, contestable and fair markets in the
digital sector across the EU where gatekeepers are present. Gatekeepers
are very large and powerful providers of core platform services (including
search engines and online platforms), and the DMA requires them
to ensure that they do not engage in specific anti-competitive practices,
thereby avoiding case by case analysis and being a much faster and clearer
form of regulation.
23. According to the DMA, a provider cannot use data from different
services and use that to its advantage, and it has to avoid certain
forms of anti-competitive practices that are clearly specified there,
such as:
- treat services and
products offered by the gatekeeper itself more favourably in ranking
than similar services or products offered by third parties on the
gatekeeper's platform;
- prevent consumers from linking up to businesses outside
their platforms;
- prevent users from un-installing any pre-installed software
or app if they wish so;
- track end users outside of the gatekeepers' core platform
service for the purpose of targeted advertising, without effective
consent having been granted.
24. Regarding mergers, the DMA includes a reporting requirement
whereby a gatekeeper must inform the European Commission of any
intended concentration where the merging entities or the target
of concentration provide core platform services or any other services
in the digital sector or enable the collection of data, irrespective
of whether it is notifiable to the Commission under that Regulation
or to a competent national competition authority under national
merger rules (Article 14(1) DMA). Moreover, it draws a link with
the Merger Regulation because, when a merger is notified to the
European Commission, a concerned Member State can refer the matter
for consideration by the European Commission even though the merge
does not meet the normal thresholds of the Merger Regulation (Article
14(5) DMA). Finally, in the case of "systemic non-compliance" of
a gatekeeper regarding its DMA obligations, the European Commission
may impose the prohibition, during a limited period, for the gatekeeper
to enter into a concentration regarding the core platform services
or the other services provided in the digital sector or enabling
the collection of data that are affected by the systematic non-compliance
(Article 18(2) DMA).
25. A second important development is the
European
Media Freedom Act (EMFA), a EU regulation that lays down common rules for the
proper functioning of the internal market for media services,
Note establishes the European Board
for Media Services, and aims at safeguarding the independence and
pluralism of media services.
26. The overarching objective of the EMFA is to facilitate the
operation of media across borders within the EU's internal market
with a view to avoiding undue pressure on media entities and to
take into account the digital transformation of the media landscape.
27. Regarding media concentration and pluralism, the EMFA contains
a specific reporting requirement in its Article 22 asking member
States to establish substantive and procedural rules allowing assessment
of media market concentrations which have a significant impact on
media pluralism. It identifies specific considerations that must
be taken into account, including the effects on the formation of
public opinion, and the diversity of media services and media offerings
and the scope for the Commission to issue guidelines on certain
of these elements and to therefore draw on the experience of the
different member States. Although the EMFA does not harmonise national
legislation at EU level, it requires member States to align these
rules, leaving some room for interpretation for each article.
Note
28. Regarding transparency of media ownership, Article 6(1) EMFA
provide that media service providers must make easily and directly
accessible to the recipients of their services up-to-date information
on:
- their legal name or names
and contact details;
- the name or names of their direct or indirect owner or
owners with shareholdings enabling them to exercise influence on
the operation and strategic decision making, including direct or
indirect ownership by a State or by a public authority or entity;
- the name or names of their beneficial owner or owners;Note
- the total annual amount of public funds for State advertising
allocated to them and the total annual amount of advertising revenues
received from third-country public authorities or entities.
29. According to Article 6(2) EMFA, member States must entrust
national regulatory authorities or bodies or other competent authorities
or bodies with the development of national media ownership databases
containing this ownership information.
4 Current
trends
30. Looking back to the last 10
years, the Media Pluralism Monitor (MPM)
Note has
pointed out to a number of developing trends, such as the opacity
of online platform practices, the poor working conditions for journalists, threats
and hate speech in the online environment, strategic lawsuits against
public participation (SLAPPs) and defamation lawsuits.
31. Regarding media pluralism trends, there is a high media ownership
concentration across Europe, reduced plurality of media providers
and the use of concentration as a means of defence. Online platforms have
evolved into powerful intermediaries for information dissemination,
creating significant power imbalances between platform, media and
the State as well. Moreover, traditional media is losing advertising
revenues and paying readership and the need to find alternatives.
There are other worrying trends, such as the personalisation of
news and advertising, the limited willingness to pay for news, increasing
threats to editorial autonomy, attacks by political actors, eroding
social norms, limited independence of public service media, lack of
gender equality in the media, and low media and digital literacy.
32. The
MPM2025
report covers the EU member States plus five candidate countries:
Albania, Montenegro, Republic of North Macedonia, Serbia and Turkey.
Note The
report warns that independent journalism across Europe is facing
mounting pressure from economic, technological, and political forces,
threats that now cut across nearly every EU Member State.
33. Its key findings are as follows:
- Market Plurality is the EU’s most fragile area: both media
ownership concentration and digital platform dominance are at very
high-risk levels. 18 countries still lack mechanisms to assess the
impact of media mergers on pluralism, as requested by the EMFA;
- AI and tech platforms pose new challenges: only a handful
of countries report ongoing negotiations with tech firms over fair
remuneration for media content they benefit from;
- Journalists face growing threats: online harassment (including
deepfakes and AI-driven smear campaigns), SLAPPs, physical intimidation,
and surveillance on journalists are increasing, including in Western
EU member States;
- Working conditions in journalism are “deplorable”: low
pay, shrinking job security, and weak social protections make editorial
independence highly vulnerable to commercial or political pressure;
- Political capture persists, particularly in Central and
Eastern Europe, but not exclusively. Local media are frequently
politicised through skewed subsidies or direct ownership;
- Online political advertising is largely unregulated: while
electoral broadcast rules are generally sound, online campaign transparency
is alarmingly weak across the board, pending the application of
the 2024 EU regulation on transparency and targeting of political
advertising;
- Despite decades of awareness on the issue, women remain
persistently underrepresented in editorial leadership and media
governance across the EU, including in countries that otherwise
score well. The indicator on gender parity is one of the lowest
performing in the entire index, outside of the economic risks.
34. Furthermore, the MPM2025 identifies urgent gaps in institutional
readiness, especially among National Regulatory Authorities (NRAs)
tasked with upholding new EU digital and media laws. The analysis
highlights the need for:
- independent,
well-resourced NRAs with political and budgetary autonomy;
- mandatory transparency of media ownership, including beneficial
owners;
- levelling the playing field between the media and Big
Tech, including regarding AI content use and monetisation;
- assessing the impact of media market concentration on
pluralism and editorial independence, introducing rules that fully
comply with Art. 22 EMFA;
- sustainable quality media, opposing disinformation;
- robust whistleblower, anti-SLAPP and anti-spyware protections;
- sustainable support for local, minority, and public interest
journalism.
5 Particular
issues
5.1 Media
capture
35. Media capture is an increasingly
popular tool of authoritarian and illiberal governments or populist governments
for controlling public information. It uses legal means to create
economic or regulatory barriers to independent media that limit
their ability to generate income, to operate and ultimately to inform
the public. It is a deliberate form of media concentration aimed
at controlling the flow of news and information.
36. Media capture is intended to force media to serve vested interests
of political or economic nature. State-led media capture is an effort
by the dominant political force to use various powers or tools of
the State to control the media to favour a political interest. In
such cases, economic actors and oligarchs act in collusion with
this system and benefit from it, but often the balance of power
lies with the political interest.
37. There are at least four mechanisms by which media capture
operates:
- turning public broadcasters
into government mouthpieces;
- capturing and instrumentalising media regulatory bodies
through political appointees;
- abusing various State resources, like State advertising;
- distorting the media market via State banks in favour
of pro-government media and creating a circle of loyal oligarchs
to run private media in the government's interest.
38. Moreover, in many systems of media capture there are private
media owners who are not necessarily driving this form of State-led
media capture, but nevertheless act in collusion with or benefiting
from it.
39. According to the
2025 Annual assessment of press
freedom in Europe by the partner organisations of the Safety of
Journalists Platform, the Russian Federation, along with Council of Europe
member States Hungary and Türkiye, are prominent examples of media
capture, with other governments seeking to follow their lead:
- In Russian Federation, Article
19 – a partner of the Platform – along with Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty
(RFE/RL), Moscow Times and SOTA, were all designated “undesirable
organisations”, banned from operating in the country and making
anyone associated with them face up to six years in prison. In June
the Ministry of Foreign Affairs added 81 media outlets from across
Europe to an ever-expanding list of banned organisations and journalists
in ‘retaliation’ for the European Union’s earlier decision to block
four Kremlin-linked propaganda networks from broadcasting in Europe;
- In Belarus, over twenty news sites were blocked on instruction
from the Ministry of Information which identified them as ‘extremist’.
In March the BelaPAN news agency was formally liquidated by the
courts completing the State’s years long campaign against it including
the jailing of four BelaPAN journalists in 2022;
- In Türkiye, the broadcast regulator, RTÜK, suspended,
fined, then eventually revoked the license of Acık Radyo, after
a guest referred to the ‘commemoration of the Armenian genocide’.
Acık Radyo, an independent non-profit radio founded in 1995, has
long been a symbol of diverse, independent and human rights-centred
journalism and its closure, on 16 October 2024, is widely mourned.
Numerous news sites and other journalistic content have also been
blocked by the courts.
40. Media capture is particularly effective in Central Europe,
for example in Hungary, where over the past 15 years the government
abused various State tools and regulatory competencies to distort
the media market, disrupt free competition and undermine independent
media. The bulk of mainstream media and public affairs media is
now owned by an effectively government-controlled foundation or
by party-allied, party-aligned or party-dependent oligarchs, many
of whom had been placed there with the help of loans from State-controlled banks.
The remaining independent media faces a deeply uneven playing field,
as the government continued to use its economic regulatory and legislative
influence to undermine their reach and sustainability while propping
up various propaganda voices that they would not be viable without
government subsidies. This model is being borrowed by other governments
like Poland and Slovak Republic.
41. On 11 December 2025, the European Commission decided to open
an infringement procedure
Note against Hungary by sending a letter
of formal notice
Note for
failing to comply with several provisions under the EMFA and certain
requirements under the AVMSD. In particular, Hungary failed to comply
with requirements relating to the public service media, the transparency
of media ownership, the assessment of media market concentrations
and the allocation of State advertising. It is hoped that this infringement
procedure and the results of the 2026 national elections will compel
the new government to undertake a comprehensive renewal of Hungarian
media regulation.
Note
42. A 2025 report
Note by the International Press Institute
(IPI) and the Media and Journalism Research Center (MJRC) provides
a comparative assessment of media capture across seven EU member
States (Bulgaria, Greece, Hungary, Poland, Romania, Slovak Republic,
and Finland) and the legal frameworks in place to protect media
pluralism and editorial independence. The reports focus on the four
key elements of media capture as addressed by the EMFA:
- independence of NRAs;
- independence of public service media;
- misuse of State funds to influence media output;
- media pluralism and political/State influence over news
media.
43. According to the report, Public Service Media continue to
be at risk and remain vulnerable to political influence, with governance
structures failing to ensure editorial independence and a plurality
of views. Hungary represents the most extreme case with public media
effectively serving as government mouthpieces. Also, the recent
change in legal status of the Slovakian public broadcaster from
RTVS to STVR enabled the government to replace the management with
their own appointees. Media regulatory bodies are increasingly politicised
and at risk of falling under government control, with Poland and
Hungary having the most politicised NRAs. State advertising is frequently
allocated in a non-transparent and discriminatory manner, often
favouring pro-government media outlets. Finally, ownership of major
media outlets is often overly concentrated among politically connected
business elites. This is particularly evident in Hungary, where
control over media by government allies dominates the media landscape.
44. The report concludes that, in the absence of clear and detailed
provisions, many countries may seek to circumvent the spirit of
the EMFA by merely complying with its formal requirements without
introducing effective implementation mechanisms. In order to help
reduce the incidence of political interference, the report offers
the following recommendations:
- Independent
NRAs: the European Commission should encourage, and member States
should consider, going beyond the minimum legal requirements outlined
in EU law and introducing mechanisms and processes that help ensure
the autonomy and effectiveness of the NRAs:
- introduce strong guarantees of political independence
of board members by ensuring no political affiliation and providing
a thorough vetting of any potential conflicts of interest that might compromise
a nominations independence;
- distribute the nominations across different political
institutions such as the lower and upper houses and the presidency;
- enable nominations from civil society groups and representatives
of media stakeholders;
- require candidates to have the highest professional qualifications
and experience to be able to perform the tasks effectively;
- introduce staggered rotating terms for the members of
the regulatory authorities, differing from the terms of the parliament;
- introduce mechanisms to ensure voice of opposition parties
in the nomination process for example by requiring any parliamentary
vote on nominations to have a supermajority of, for example, 60%
or more, or by reserving places to be nominated by the smaller parties;
- require NRAs to take decisions as a board with major decisions
on licensing and penalties, also requiring a supermajority;
- require boards to ensure full transparency around the
decisions and their justifications, including considering live-broadcasting
sessions;
- establish independent mechanisms (e.g. with the participation
of NGOs or professional groups) to monitor the activities of the
regulatory authority;
- Independent public service media: the same principles
behind the above recommendations for the establishment of independent
NRAs should apply to the establishment of independent governing
bodies of public service media (PSM). Regarding funding, PSM must
provide budgets that are adequate, sustainable and predictable,
as well as independent of political influence Independent monitoring mechanisms
must be established to oversee the performance of the public service
media and the work of their governing bodies to ensure they meet
their public service mandate (see below the section on PSM);
- Misuse of State funds to influence media output: the implementation
of effective guidelines and best practices can help to minimize
risks. In order to strengthen transparency of distribution of State advertising
and State funds the following is recommended:
- the rules should apply to all levels of government including
local governments regardless of the size of population;
- the transparency rules should apply to all intermediaries
involved in the disbursement of State funds including advertising
agencies and media sales houses;
- the monitoring should encompass all forms of funding including
subscriptions purchased by State bodies;
- cumulative spending should be included as a criterion
for the selection of media companies with a threshold beyond which
no further funds can be distributed without a tender process;
- media service providers should be obliged to clearly label
all State funded advertisements (and other content);
- the institution designated to monitor the distribution
of State advertising should be sufficiently empowered to obtain
the necessary information to ensure State bodies are fully compliant
in their transparency obligations;
- media stakeholders and civil society should be consulted
on the development of the guidelines for distribution and the methodology
for their application, as well as in monitoring and assessing the
application of the rules;
- governments should provide full transparency on all public
tender contracts that are awarded to companies that fall in the
same business grouping as national media service providers;
- Media pluralism and political/State influence over news
media: the European Commission, assisted by the European Board for
Media Services, should develop guidance on a consistent and practical methodology
for assessing media pluralism and identifying the necessary safeguards
to protect media pluralism such as ownership thresholds and guarantees
of editorial independence. Representatives of media stakeholders
should be consulted on building the required methodology and in
reviewing the application of its rules. The methodology should include:
- cross-ownership limits extended
to beneficial owners as well as the official companies that own media
assets;
- a concept of dominant position that aligns with the realities
of the national media market;
- a set of disqualification criteria designed to prevent
companies that receive significant public procurement funding from
simultaneously owning media assets (or vice versa).
5.2 Focus
on public service media
45. Most Council of Europe member
States have established legal frameworks for public service media,
but significant gaps remain, in particular, regarding procedures
for the appointment and dismissal of governing bodies, the protection
of editorial autonomy and the stability of funding arrangements.
46. In a report from July 2025,
Note Reporters without Borders (RSF)
explain that Europe's public service media are experiencing a series
of crises: their funding is regularly called into question, digital
platforms are affecting their relationship with information, they
can easily be turned into government mouthpieces or propaganda tools, and
more in general there is a crisis of public trust in these media.
The report highlights the following issues:
- In more than half of EU member countries, there is pressure
on the public media, mostly of political nature.
- Public service media groups are often criticised for being
too expensive. The broadcast licence fee is often the target of
choice when it comes to lowering taxes. When the licence fee is
replaced by funding from the State budget, the public media budget
falls by around 9 per cent, whereas it rises when the licence fee
is reformed (+14 per cent) or replaced by an earmarked tax (+9 per
cent).
47. RSF makes the following proposals:
- ensuring there are strong guarantees for independence
in the appointment process for public service media leadership,
which should include the participation of civil society;
- developing common practices for monitoring the “internal
pluralism” of public service media among European NRAs;
- creating an independent body to assess the financial needs
of public service media and the establishment of a multiannual funding
plan;
- investigating a system of funding public media via a tax
on digital platforms;
- implementing policies to open newsrooms up to the public,
including the introduction of a "Media Day" on 3 May, which is World
Press Freedom Day;
- establishing pan-European international broadcasting by
working with a combination of European actors in the sector, including
Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty.
48. The
systemic
alertsNote published by the Partner Organisations
of the Safety of Journalists Platform regarding public service media
in Azerbaijan, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Georgia, Hungary, Slovak
Republic, Türkiye, Belarus, and the Russian Federation
Note underline the need for:
- clear legal guarantees of institutional
and editorial independence;
- transparent, merit-based and depoliticised appointment
procedures;
- adequate, predictable and politically independent funding
mechanisms;
- transparency and accountability in governance and decision-making,
including open procedures for appointments and the use of public
funds.
5.3 News
deserts
49. The European Federation of
Journalists (EFJ) with a consortium of partners, the Centre for
Media Pluralism and Media Freedom (CMPF), International Media Support
(IMS) and Journalismfund.eu launched the project “Local Media for
Democracy” to help struggling local, regional and community media
in the news desert areas in Europe by providing financial support
and organisational capacity building. The project started on 1 February
2023 and developed over a period of 18 months. The project was co-funded
by the European Union.
50. This project resulted in a 2024 report titled “Uncovering
news deserts in Europe”
Note focusing
on detecting challenges and opportunities for local and community
media and identifying news deserts in the 27 EU member States. According
to the report, the very existence of local, regional and community
media has become uncertain in many areas of the European Union.
51. The report interprets the concept of news desert in a holistic
way as “an area that is lacking sufficient, reliable and diverse
information from trustworthy media sources”. It assesses the risk
for local and community media through several indicators related
to the number of media outlets, economic and political conditions,
as well as the degree of safety of local journalists and the social
inclusiveness of local and community media towards minorities, marginalised
communities and the capability of engaging with the audience.
52. The report identified examples of best innovative practices
in the local and community media sector that could be deemed beneficial
for a vibrant and open public sphere. It investigated whether news
media organisations are experimenting with innovative responses
to improve reach and audience, proposing new forms of work, journalistic
products or services, and whether there are citizen or civil society
initiatives providing innovative responses to tackle the problem
posed by the decline of local and community news provision.
53. Local media markets in each EU member State have their own
the complexities and specificities. In some countries, the problematic
applies to the entire country, while in others, it is limited to
specific regions or even cities in which certain communities are
left without access to local media that disseminate public interest information.
Political and commercial control over local media is mostly affecting
areas of Central and Southeastern Europe (CEE and SEE).
54. The situation concerning news services in rural areas is becoming
increasingly problematic. This is due to a combination of factors,
including issues related to distribution and a decreasing number
of points of sale. These issues are exacerbated by the ongoing digital
shift and the ageing of the rural population. Moreover, there is
an increasing centralisation of newsrooms and journalists in major
regional cities, with limited reach to remote areas and a shift
towards desk-based journalism.
55. The editorial independence of local and community media is
challenged by the intertwining of two factors: a decrease in advertising
revenues, and a biased allocation of State advertising and subsidies
to local media (see above the section on media capture). Moreover,
the digital transition and the unwillingness of the audience to
pay for news exacerbates the challenges to the sustainability for
local and community media across the EU.
56. Local journalists suffer from unsatisfactory working conditions
(especially freelancers and self-employed journalists) and increasing
online attacks against them.
57. The coverage of marginalised groups, such as women, the LGBT+
community, the elderly, and people with disabilities is particularly
problematic due to their specific/smaller audience, and little research
has been conducted in many EU countries on this topic.
58. Many of the best practices observed in the report are focused
on improving news quality and regaining reader’s attention and trust.
This means offering news in different formats – formats that are
“slower”, more in-depth – and a news production that is eventually
more community-focused and network-oriented:
- Email newsletters have become popular to avoid being locked
into the ecosystems of social media as well as to regain a gatekeeping
power. They offer a high degree of targeting, curated content, distraction-free
analysis and commentaries, and are a useful tool to engage audiences,
regain their trust and encourage new subscriptions. Their success
shows that there is room to compete with mainstream social media
by leveraging their limitations, such as a lack of control over
personalisation, attention-grabbing strategies, and questionable
privacy protections.
Examples:
Viernull (Germany), InsideStory (Greece), and Nyomtassteis (Hungary).
- Podcasts are considered a more active process where listeners
demonstrate a greater degree of engagement and can be consumed at
a comfortable pace, as a form of “slow media”, which creates a personal
connection between the hosts and listeners. At the same time, however,
they can also create a “sense of collectivity” by allowing recommendations
and sharing among users. Podcasts are particularly attractive to
audiences which are seeking a more deliberate, mindful, and meaningful
media experience.
Examples: Viernull
(Germany), Kulturpunkt (Croatia).
- Involvement in public interest activities that eventually
have a social impact is rewarding for local media due to their proximity
to the issues and communities they cover. Particularly meaningful
local media initiatives for social inclusion are the so-called “street
newspapers” sold by people experiencing social forms of marginalisation.
Example: Kralji ulice (Slovenia)
- Transnational networking and co-operation can also be
considered a best practice.
Examples:
International Network of Street Newspapers, InLeaks.
- Alternative funding methods include subscriptions’ models
and grant opportunities offered by national governments, the European
Commission or other institutions.
Examples:
InsideStory, Viernull, podcasts (subscriptions), Spot On Stories
(Netherlands, grants).
- Using online channels to reach audiences is a successful
practice for local news media but can have undesirable consequences.
The economic incentives and logics of social media platforms may,
for example, indeed influence or even drive editorial decision-making
at local news outlets.Note
59. Due to its public interest remit, public service media is
crucial in guaranteeing an adequate coverage of regional and local
areas, both geographically, and in terms of offering services in
minority languages.
6 Media
pluralism in the age of social media and artificial intelligence
60. As previously stated, online
platforms owned by major technology companies have evolved into influential
intermediaries with the ability to control access to content, allowing
to determine not only which content is available but also its visibility
and findability, resulting in significant power imbalances between platforms,
media and the State.
61. Regarding the visibility and findability of content in the
online environment, the European Commission has commissioned a study
Note which examines how European cultural
content is discovered and accessed in today’s digital environment.
The report explains that efforts for safeguarding cultural and linguistic
diversity online have traditionally focused on supporting the production
and availability of diverse cultural content, but nowadays being
available is no longer enough: discoverability has become the next
critical frontier.
62. The report contains the following recommendations:
- Foster collaboration and governance
for fair discoverability through the establishment of an EU multi-stakeholder
forum, by integrating discoverability into EU and national cultural
strategies, and by promoting cross-sector partnerships to address
issues such as transparency, metadata, and data access.
- Enhance data collaboration and knowledge for better discoverability
by strengthening cultural data collection through the forthcoming
EU Cultural Data Hub, developing consistent definitions of “European works,”
improving metadata standards, and undertaking regular consumer surveys
on cultural consumption and discovery.
- Build digital capacity and tools for creators and cultural
organisations: training programmes, peer-learning networks, and
practical tools (including AI-assisted metadata solutions) should
help cultural actors promote their work more effectively in digital
environments.
- Audience-focused measures such as strengthening digital
and AI literacy, running awareness campaigns on European cultural
diversity, engaging young audiences, improving access for linguistic minorities,
and supporting digital inclusion for older users.
- Accelerating research and innovation for discoverability
by supporting R&I initiatives on fair and diverse recommendation
systems, studying the impact of AI-generated content, and developing
tools to improve transparency and auditability of algorithms.
- Bolstering European content supply by expanding funding
for translation and localisation, supporting curated cultural showcases,
exploring prominence mechanisms for European works, increasing algorithmic
transparency for creators and users, and ensuring authenticity in
an era of AI-generated content.
63. As regard the gatekeeping power of Big Tech companies, smart
TVs and their operating systems have become a new battlefield. Connected
TV operating systems are rapidly becoming a central access point
to auto-visual content. For a growing number of European citizens,
a television set is no longer just a receiver of broadcast channels,
but rather a main gateway to information, to culture and entertainment
in the home. Increasingly, access to that content is mediated not
by traditional broadcasters but by platform control interfaces.
Connected TV operating systems have quietly become one of the most
powerful gatekeepers in the media value chain.
64. The EU connected TV operating system market has become more
concentrated around large ecosystem platforms like Android TV, Amazon
Fire or Samsung's operating system. A limited number of operators
have gained the ability to shape the availability and discoverability
of content by controlling access to audiences and content distribution.
When a small number of global players control the TV operating system, the
main user interface, the recommendation logic, the advertising infrastructure,
and in many cases, their own competing content services, they became
structural gatekeepers between media providers and audiences. Connected
TVs amplify this gatekeeping power because switching costs are very
high (TV sets are replaced every 7 to 10 years) and because there
are very few alternative access routes, and because TV interfaces increasingly
aggregate content across services. This means that decisions about
content prominence and ranking had a direct and immediate impact
on audience rates.
65. This issue matters because pluralism today depended not only
on who produces the content, but on who controls access to it. When
visibility is mediated by a single interface, a single assistant,
or a single recommendation logic, editorial choices can be influenced
by the platforms, and economic dependence on gatekeepers increases.
This represents a new form of concentration, one that existing media
ownership rules is not assigned to address. Connected TV operating
systems now perform roles functionally comparable to all the regulated
platform services, but they had until very recently received far
less regulatory attention.
66. In an open letter to the European Commission,
Note the main European broadcasting associations
call on the European Commission, in the framework of the DMA, to:
- designate major connected TV
operating systems and virtual assistant providers as gatekeepers;
- if allegedly none of them meet the quantitative thresholds,
to open a market investigation on the basis of the qualitative thresholds
(Article 3(8));
- review the definition of “business users” for the purpose
of designating VAs as gatekeepers, in the context of the ongoing
review of the DMA. The definition must be interpreted broadly, applied
in a technology-neutral manner, and encompass all entities that
significantly rely on the VAs platform to reach end users.
67. Indeed, the EU already has relevant regulatory tools, such
as the DMA, the DSA, and the EMFA, which can be applied against
structural gatekeeping power. As an example of this, in September
2025, an alliance of NGOs, trade associations and organisations
from the media industry lodged a formal complaint with the German
Bundesnetzagentur (Federal Network
Agency), in its capacity as Digital Services Co-ordinator (DSC), against
Google’s AI Overviews. The signatories argue that by integrating
AI-generated answers (so-called Google AI Overviews) into its search
results, Google is breaching key provisions of the DSA – with serious consequences
for media diversity, freedom of expression and democratic discourse.
Note Later, on 9 December 2025, the European
Commission announced the opening of a formal antitrust investigation
to assess whether Google had breached EU competition rules by using
the content of web publishers, as well as content uploaded on the
online video-sharing platform YouTube, for AI purposes.
Note
68. In the AI field, so-called Generative Artificial Intelligence
(GenAI) applications pose new and significant challenges to media
and information pluralism. In its Guidance Note on the Implications
of Generative Artificial Intelligence for Freedom of Expression,
Note the Council of Europe Steering
Committee on Media and Information Society (CDMSI) states that Generative
AI-powered services are increasingly becoming a gateway to information
and can have a direct impact on the visibility and economic viability
of journalism as well as on its societal role, especially when sources
are disassociated or misattributed, and when media organisations
are not fairly compensated for their content being used to train
or adapt these models.
69. While GenAI has the potential to engender efficiency gains
in the media sector (improving processes within media companies
and supporting journalistic research, documentation, and analysis),
it is imperative that Generative AI remains under human editorial
control, given the risks it carries. GenAI models trained on incomplete
or biased datasets may exacerbate existing biases and undermine
the diversity of editorial voices, viewpoints, formats, and sources
available to the public, thereby undermining media and information
pluralism. The opinions and ideas supported by the owners of Generative
AI tools and products may also be amplified, which could have consequences
for editorial independence and source diversity. Moreover, the use
of GenAI-based augmented search applications as information sources
established new intermediaries between the media and their audiences
and may disrupt the reach and economic viability of the media, and
the use of copyrighted material as input, for training, and in the
outputs generated by AI could diminish the business model and economic
sustainability of journalism, as well as other creative industries
(see above). Finally, the one-to-one communication existing between
GenAI systems and its users has the potential to create a “bubble of
one”, where individuals are fed by personalised streams of information
that reinforce existing personal beliefs and biases, even misperceptions,
diluting thereby the very core notion of a shared and pluralistic
information space is diluted. This holds a risk of making individuals
more vulnerable to manipulation and less likely to agree on basic
facts, ultimately having an impact on the freedom to receive information
and to hold an opinion. In the long term, it can exacerbate the
ongoing process of societal fragmentation of the informational space
and polarisation.
70. According to the recommendations included in the Guidance
Note, member States should take proactive steps to ensure that Generative
AI applications, their design and use uphold and promote freedom
of expression while mitigating potential risks. They are divided
into four action areas:
i Observe
the impact of Generative AI applications and technology on freedom
of expression through proportionate oversight and testing mechanisms
evaluating its potential positive and negative effects. This approach
will enable transparency measures, help identify biases and foster
responsible data governance and accountability.
ii Assess Generative AI systems through ongoing risk and
impact assessments including systematic, tailored, use case-specific
and inclusive freedom of expression impact assessments and due diligence in
public procurement.
iii Enable the full exercise and protection of the right to
freedom of expression, including strengthening socio-technical standards,
which apply a methodological approach to safeguard against human
and societal impacts of technology through technical specifications
and processes.
iv Empower relevant stakeholders, such as States, private
sector, academic and civil society actors, commercial end-users
and individuals, by adopting a wide range of measures aimed at awareness-raising
and participatory approaches to governance (including citizens’
assemblies), education, research, publication of risk and impact
assessment findings, facilitating user choice and other international
co-operative approaches.
7 Conclusions
71. The independence of the media
and media pluralism are under threat from increasing editorial control of
the media sector by political and economic actors (so-called 'media
capture'), mounting pressure against public service media, the emergence
of 'news deserts', and intensifying competition and market dominance from
online platforms. These growing threats require a swift and decisive
response from governments, legislators, and regulatory authorities.
72. Mergers and acquisitions in the media sector should be assessed
according to their impact on media independence and pluralism.
73. Transparency of media ownership can be helpful in making media
pluralism effective by bringing ownership structures behind the
media – which can influence editorial policies – to the awareness
of the public and regulatory authorities.
74. The editorial independence of the media must be protected
at all costs, and the governance and financing of public service
media must be properly regulated as to avoid political interference.
75. Effective measures should be taken to avoid the capture of
the media sector by political and financial actors for the purposes
of controlling public information, concealing critical voices and
manipulating public opinion.
76. Media regulatory authorities must be independent, both in
principle and in practice, and have adequate financial resources
to fulfil their role. Their decisions must be objective, justified,
transparent, non-discriminatory, proportional, and subject to appeal
before an independent appellate body.
77. Journalists must be able to work safely without fear or undue
restrictions.
78. The emergence of "news deserts" must be counteracted by bespoke
measures, and public support for local media be transparent and
fair in allocating resources, including State advertising, in order
to avoid media capture and threats to media independence in general.
The lack of data related to the economic and financial information
for both local and community media must be urgently addressed.
79. It is vital that services of general interest, and in particular
public service media, are given appropriate prominence on online
platforms and TV interfaces.
80. Appropriate measures should be applied so that connected TVs
& virtual assistants do not become gatekeepers with the power
to determine which content is prioritised on our screens.
81. Drawing upon these conclusions, I propose a set of concrete
measures in the draft resolution.
