B Explanatory memorandum,
by Mr Walter SchmiedNote
1 Introduction
1. More than a decade has elapsed
since the Barcelona Declaration which, when announced in 1995, held out
the promise of a stabilised and gradually more integrated Mediterranean.
Today, this prospect is growing more remote and the Barcelona project
seems very fragile. This change from hope to uncertainty warrants
a look at the geopolitical dynamics at work in the Mediterranean
since 1995.
1.1 The
Euro-Mediterranean promise in 1995
2. In November 1995 the European
Union accorded the Mediterranean all the attention that this region demands.
At the time, the Barcelona Declaration sent a powerful signal of
hope in a region that seems capable of reaping the dividends of
the new post-bipolar world order. Following on from Europe’s Mediterranean policies
launched in the 1970s, the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership (EMP)
was seen as a dual geopolitical challenge. The EU hoped to raise
its profile on the international stage by extending its security
and defence policy and its natural zone of economic and commercial
expansion in order to give substance to the concept of Europe as
a world power. For the Mediterranean partner countries (MPCs) of
the southern and eastern Mediterranean,
Notethe main
aim is to secure a much-needed external foothold at a time when
their development is marking time and globalisation is accelerating.
Behind this strategic alliance, which seeks ultimately to reconcile
the EU’s security needs with the southern shore’s economic growth
imperatives, two specific aspects of the EMP should not be overlooked:
the multilateral dimension of the co-operation (with, in particular,
the presence side-by-side of the Palestinian Authority and Israel)
and the absence of the United States.
3. Technically, this partnership is divided into three sections
(political, economic and sociocultural), corresponding to three
objectives pursued in the Mediterranean: the development of an area
of peace and stability, the creation of a free trade area by 2010
and the strengthening of human and social relations. These aims
were attractive because they foreshadowed the gradual building of
an integrated Euro-Mediterranean area. At the time, then, hearts
and minds were united in a determination to join the destinies of
the two shores of the Mediterranean.
1.2 Frustrations
and uncertainties in 2007
4. Unfortunately, in the space
of a decade, the Euro-Mediterranean promise has turned to disappointment. There
is no denying the reality of the far-reaching changes that have
affected the region in the last few years. On the one hand, the
failure of political Europe is hastening the erosion of European
influence in the world. Yet the Euro-Mediterranean cannot be built
without a strong and determined Europe. On the other, the hoped-for political
opening and reforms have not materialised in the countries of the
southern Mediterranean. However, the profound societal changes taking
place there are creating new aspirations among the population.
5. Despite the aims set out in Barcelona, the Mediterranean Basin
today is neither more stable nor more prosperous. On the contrary,
all the great global divisions are concentrated there. The gathering
pace of globalisation and shifting international geo-economic balances,
due partly to the take-off of Asia and stagnation of Africa, highlight
and exacerbate the disparity between the two shores of the Mediterranean.
And this region, riven by fear and passion, seems to be sinking
deeper into conflict and withdrawing further into itself.
6. An impression of disorder therefore hangs over Euro-Mediterranean
co-operation at present: anxiety and disappointment prevail over
satisfaction and trust. Nevertheless, criticism of the MPCs should
mask neither the importance of the EMP nor its role and relevance.
Failing to act is not a solution in this region of the world and
a Euro-Mediterranean non-partnership would be costly in many ways.
7. The problems facing Euro-Mediterranean cooperation can be
put down to a great many factors. One of these is that insufficient
account has been taken of certain strategic sectors. Agriculture
is one area to which scant attention has been paid within the Euro-Mediterranean
context, and yet it occupies an essential and strategic place therein:
essential because it is fundamental to the maintenance of social
equilibrium, being situated at the interface between the economy,
politics and culture; strategic because important political and trade
issues and the resolve to build a more cohesive Mediterranean region
depend upon the ways in which it develops and is dealt with.
8. To highlight the strategic dimension of agriculture in the
Mediterranean and review the development of the agriculture question
within the EMP are the first two aims of this report. Without overlooking
the role played by the major international and regional institutions
present in the region, the report will end with an exploratory look
at the future of the Euro-Mediterranean project with specific reference
to agriculture.
2 Strategic overview of agricultural
and rural dynamics in the Mediterranean
9. Agriculture stands out as a
strategic sector of the societies and economies of the Mediterranean
Basin. This finding is based on a range of factors, which can be
summed up under five major headings: demographic trends, the vulnerability
of agricultural trade, rural development issues, the environmental
challenge, and the question of food security and safety.
2.1 A
key socio-demographic variable
10. The Mediterranean population
is set to double in the space of half a century, rising from 285
million in 1970 to 544 million in 2020.
NoteBut
this population growth nevertheless presents a contrasting picture
because while the north of the Mediterranean has remained stable
in population terms for a number of decades, the southern shore
is undergoing a tremendous population explosion (331 million inhabitants
estimated for 2020 as compared with 116 million in 1970, that is
a tripling of the population in 50 years). Some countries have started
their demographic transition, notably those of the Maghreb where
population growth now takes place in the cities, but other southern
countries still exhibit the same overall demographic dynamics with
a numerical increase in the rural population, as in Egypt.
11. In 2005, a third of the Mediterranean population was still
living in rural areas and a third of the labour force in the southern
shore countries was still working in agriculture.
Note This rural and agricultural
population has naturally swollen on the southern shore with the
demographic boom, while at the same time, in the north, the rural
population has been decreasing faster and faster, as has the number
of people employed in agriculture.
NoteIn
these early years of the 21st century, let us be clear about one
thing: the Mediterranean is not solely urban, coastal and service
oriented.
2.2 A
worrying agricultural trade situation
12. The worsening agricultural
trade balances of the Arab MPCs warrant particularly close attention.
For three decades now, these countries have been in a chronic situation
of food dependence and some states now seem to be suffering from
major structural deficits (Algeria, Egypt). The MPCs’ agricultural
trade relations with the rest of the world showed a negative balance
of nearly €9 billion in 2004. Only Turkey had a positive balance, but
it should be borne in mind that this country accounts for 48% of
the MPCs’ agricultural exports to the rest of the world.
13. Where Euro-Mediterranean trade
Noteis
concerned, three important messages need to be put across.
- First, the asymmetry of the
trade relations: trade with the 10 MPCs makes up only 2% of agricultural imports
and exports in the European Union (EU25),Notebut
the EU attracts 52% of their agricultural exports and accounts for
28% of their exports. Consequently, there is a very clear differential
between the north and the south of the basin in terms of the intensity
of agricultural trade.
- Secondly, the deceptive balance in Euro-Mediterranean
trade, which is in the MPCs’ favour (+0.6 billion dollars in 2004)
simply because Turkey alone accounts for nearly half of the MPCs’
agricultural exports to the EU25. The upshot of this is that without
Turkey’s agricultural power, the MPCs’ agricultural trade balance
with Europe shows a deficit (1.5 billion dollars in 2004).
- Thirdly, the opening up of the MPCs to the world market:
despite their trade preference for the EU25, 72% of their imports
in 2004 were purchased from the rest of the world. Europe, therefore,
is not the only major exporter to the southern Mediterranean: the
United States, Argentina, Brazil and Australia are leading players,
as evidenced by the exports of cereals from these countries to the
southern Mediterranean.NoteThe
attitude of Morocco, which signed a free trade agreement with the
United States in 2004, shows that some MPCs are now seeking to form
political and trade alliances outside the Euro-Mediterranean perimeter.
14. Furthermore, the agricultural and agrifood products traded
between the EU countries and the countries of the southern and eastern
Mediterranean reflect to a large extent the two regions’ agricultural
specialisations. The EU’s main exports to the southern and eastern
Mediterranean countries (SEMCs) are cereals 16%), dairy products
(15%) and sugar (8%). Leaving aside these three groups of products,
however, one can see a great diversity in the other products, especially
in the processed food category. Exports from the SEMCs to the EU are
much more specialised. Over half of them (54%) are fruit and vegetables,
fresh or processed. Added to this are seafood (10%) and olive oil
(also 10%).
15. Lastly, it should be remembered here that agriculture remains
a major determinant of the national economies of the southern shore
countries, accounting on average for between 10% and 15% of Gross Domestic
Product (GDP), though with some extremes (23% in Syria, but only
3% in Jordan).
2.3 Rural
development at a standstill
16. The urgent need to develop
the rural areas of the southern Mediterranean looms large among
all the issues facing the region. The main focus continues to be
on combating poverty, a persistent scourge in these areas. The number
of persons living on less than a dollar per day is even said to
have increased since 1990, a decade in which the effects of structural
adjustment programmes weighed heavily on the development process
in these countries. While significant progress was recorded in the
MPCs in the 1970s and 1980s, the trouble since the early 1990s has
come not only from the underdevelopment which can be perceived but
also from the non-development which can sometimes be felt. Community
infrastructures are lacking or deteriorating (access to water, health
services and education), and there are problems concerning gender
inequality, which is still greater in rural areas than in the cities.
17. In these countries there is also a risk of new territorial
imbalances. The gap is widening dangerously between coastal urban
areas and the rural areas of the interior. The marginalisation and
pauperisation of country-dwellers are increasing in line with the
opening up to world trade of the urban coastal strip running from Agadir
to Istanbul. It is as if the southern Mediterranean no longer needed
its hinterland in order to develop, salvation being dependent, according
to the prevailing liberal thinking, on foreign trade links. While
the coastal cities have been propelled into the future, rural areas
have become backwaters of no interest to anyone.
2.4 A
range of environmental challenges
18. The wealth of natural resources
and varied landscapes of the Mediterranean make it a globally outstanding
ecoregion. Yet, with human and industrial development, this environmental
heritage is gradually being eroded. Despite nearly 30 years of international
efforts to protect this unique ecosystem, it remains fragile and
continues to decline as a result of the increased pressure exerted
on the environment. Already vulnerable, the Mediterranean region
is therefore further weakened by human activity, which often works
to the detriment of the environment, so much so that the Mediterranean
is now threatened with non-sustainability. Several main trends can
be identified.
- There is growing
evidence of climate change, with significant and unpredictable temperature
variations, an increasing number of extreme weather events and a
fall in mean annual precipitation. Pollutant emissions caused by
fuel consumption should continue to increase in the years ahead
despite measures taken by the EU in the northern part of the basin.
- Biodiversity continues to dwindle and the threats now
facing the Mediterranean ecosystem are unfortunately commensurate
with its wealth. The Mediterranean is thus becoming an at-risk ecosystem, rendered
increasingly vulnerable by desertification, deforestation and the
extinction of certain animal and plant species. Mediterranean land
resources are suffering too, with, on the one hand, the loss of farmland
to rampant urbanisation and, on the other, whole areas deprived
of water and irrigation.
- Indeed, water is the focus of environmental tensions.
As it becomes increasingly scarce it is increasingly coveted in
a region already known for its water shortages (60% of the world’s
“water-poor” population, that is, with less than 1 000 cubic metres
per inhabitant per year) and the unequal distribution of resources
(the southern shore countries possess only 13% of total resources).
Looking to the future, water is confronted with competition between
sectors (agriculture, human consumption and industry), bearing in
mind that some 80% of the demand for water is currently accounted
for by the agricultural needs of the countries on the southern shore
of the Mediterranean. At the same time, access to clean water for
the population remains a problem (water quality is effectively becoming
a factor for social discrimination) and the basic infrastructures
are clearly in need of improvement (wastage and leaks due to the
lack of efficient supply networks). Lastly, a debate is beginning
about the possible usefulness of the concept of virtual water (quantity
of water needed to produce an imported agricultural product).
19. The combination of all these elements confirms the lasting
relevance of the environmental variable to strategic analysis of
the Mediterranean Basin.
2.5 Two-tier
food security and safety
20. Given the scale of population
growth in the region and the observed deterioration in agricultural
trade balances, food security for the populations of the Mediterranean
remains an issue. First of all there is the quantitative aspect,
because malnutrition remains a scourge (approximately 4% of the
population of the southern Mediterranean suffers from undernourishment
on a daily basis), one that is increasing numerically as a result
of the population explosion (7 million people in 1990, 9 million
in 2002). Focusing again on the quantitative aspect, the example
of dependence on cereal imports in the great majority of Mediterranean countries
should be cited, with two eloquent figures: the Mediterranean currently
accounts for 22% of world cereal imports but represents only 7%
of the world population. As for the MPCs, they attract 12% of world
cereal imports but account for only 4% of the world population.
21. Coming on top of the quantitative problem, there is unfortunately
growing concern about the quality of food. Although the Mediterranean
diet is recognised by the World Health Organization and singled
out as one of the finest heritages of the Mediterranean Basin, the
Mediterranean countries are moving increasingly away from it. Dietary
changes are a universal phenomenon accompanying economic development
and urbanisation. This transition, gradual in the north and sudden
in the south, has brought with it a drop in food quality. The increased
rate of obesity is one significant indicator among others of this
trend, which has adverse effects on the community and on the welfare
of populations (especially among the young: in the Maghreb, 17%
of children under the age of 5 are obese).
22. Reading between the lines of these findings, a Mediterranean
north-south divide emerges once again. Europe, hit by headline-making
health alerts in the 1990s (dioxin, mad cow disease), has now succeeded
in enhancing product traceability and safety (quality and certification
policy based on the setting up in 2002 of a European food safety
authority). However, whatever efforts are made, the countries of
the southern Mediterranean remain handicapped by these health requirements
(seen as the region’s new non-tariff barriers) in the absence of
any appropriate, operational structure for guaranteeing food safety
and certifying the quality of their products.
23. Population growth, globalisation of trade, regional underdevelopment,
environmental tensions and stricter requirements for the nutritional
and health quality of products: however simplistic it may be, this
pattern reveals the many challenges now faced by Mediterranean agricultural
sectors. Their future could be summed up as follows: produce more,
produce better and produce clean.
3 From
partnership to neighbourhood: agriculture in the Euro-Mediterranean
context
24. Since the 1995 launch of the
Barcelona Process agriculture has consistently been regarded as
a sensitive and therefore special sector of the EMP. After a brief
account of Mediterranean policies conducted by Europe pre-Barcelona,
we shall examine the three separate periods into which Euro-Mediterranean agriculture
debate since 1995 can be divided.
3.1 The
European Union and the Mediterranean: the Barcelona turning point
25. Since the 1960s Europe has
had relations with most of the countries on the south shore of the Mediterranean.
That posture was chiefly dictated by economic imperatives, as confirmed
by, among other things, the establishment of Euro-Arab dialogue
at the time of the oil tensions in the 1970s. Preferential trade agreements
were concluded in 1969 with Algeria, Morocco and Tunisia. They were
revised and added to in the 1972-92 period, in a second, “whole-Mediterranean”
approach, in which Egypt, Jordan, Syria and the Lebanon were now
involved.
26. Europe’s southwards enlargement in the 1980s, followed by
the new international geopolitical order after the fall of the Berlin
Wall prompted the European Union to develop its relations in the
region: this brought about the third phase, that of “new Mediterranean
policy”. The many accelerating transitional processes (socio-demographic,
economic, geopolitical and cultural) which the Mediterranean Basin
was then undergoing within a radically altered world strategic context
lent fresh impetus to cooperation. Thus was born the Euro-Mediterranean
concept, fully realised in the November 1995 Barcelona Declaration.
The innovative and promising Euro-Mediterranean Partnership (EMP)
set itself three main objectives: peace and stability in the region,
economic and commercial integration through free trade, development
of intercultural dialogue and promotion of civil societies. In retrospect
the results of this investment in the future have been disappointing.
Note
3.2 1995
to 2002: disagreements and the agricultural exception
27. Although trade was one of the
cornerstones of regional co-operation, with the aim of setting up
a Euro-Mediterranean free trade area by 2010, agriculture remained
a sensitive sector when association agreements between the European
Union and the MPCs were being set up.
NoteBecause
of this agriculture was deliberately played down, despite then being
a central question at the World Trade Organization (WTO) and in
multilateral international negotiations. While the ground for industrial
free trade was prepared, Euro-Mediterranean economic liberalisation
in agriculture was put on hold. The reasons for this are complex
but the diagnosis is fairly well established.
28. In the north, EU producers were afraid of increased competition
if Community preference was abolished. In the south exporters were
pressing for greater access to the EU market. In general the MPCs
were major importers from the EU of basic products such as cereals,
sugar and milk. Because of their weak agricultural food production
they were also reluctant to expose their farming to foreign competition.
In addition, some of the Euro-Mediterranean commercial “conflict”
arose from the risk of increased competition between the northern and
southern Mediterranean in olive oil, fruit and vegetables if trade
was liberalised. And there was one final extremely sensitive matter:
the two-tier nature of the agricultural sector south of the Mediterranean:
alongside a few high-performance agrifood industries ready to compete
in the globalised market were a huge number of tiny family farms
scattered throughout the rural areas and essentially producing for
their own consumption.
29. For this reason agriculture has always received controlled
treatment within the EMP. Quite clearly, something of an exception
was made of agriculture when the association agreements were negotiated.
3.3 Post
2003: opening up despite deadlocks
30. The first Euro-Mediterranean
ministerial conference on agriculture was not held until 27 November
2003 – in Venice, under Italian chairmanship. The main recommendations
were on reinforcing rural development, promoting quality agricultural
production and launching concrete action in the organic farming
sector. Debate now focused on the speed of the process and the methods
to be used. In addition, the decision makers felt that agriculture
had to be handled on a case-by-case basis, according to the sensitivity
of the particular product in EU markets and according to the export
competitiveness of the particular MPC (the differential approach).
This position was reflected in the thinking behind the new European
Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) formulated the same year.
31. In 2005 (10th anniversary of Barcelona Declaration), which
the European institutions designated the “Year of the Mediterranean”,
agriculture came to the fore in the timetable for reforming and
relaunching the EMP. In a communication dated 15 November 2005 the
EU officially announced its decision to open agricultural negotiations
with the MPCs. Negotiations were to start in 2006, with the aim
of gradual liberalisation of trade in agricultural and fishery products,
whether fresh or processed. That decision was built into the five-year
work programme adopted at the Euro-Mediterranean Summit of Heads
of State and Government held in Barcelona on 28 November 2005.
32. Apart from a debate on the Euro-Mediterranean at the WTO,
Notethere
has been confusion about the Euro-Mediterranean Free Trade Area
(EMFTA) to be created around 2010. The first point is that the date
is approximate – full trade between the EU and the MPCs will begin
according to a timetable based on signature of the various association
agreements.
NoteA
further point is that recent impact studies
Noteof the EMFTA’s
effects have raised doubts about its socio-economic sustainability.
33. As regards the EU as a whole, the effects would probably be
limited on account of the MPCs’ underdevelopment as agricultural
exporters. Opening up the markets might, on the contrary, boost
European exports to the southern shore of the Mediterranean, where
there is a considerable and growing need for the basic products
which Europe markets very effectively (cereals, milk and meat).
However, southern Europe, taken in isolation, would be seriously
affected by sudden agricultural liberalisation: producers in the
traditional sectors (fruit and vegetables), who are very widespread
in Spain, the south of France, Italy and Greece, could well be damaged
by the opening up of trade and will probably be set to oppose the
policy if Community protectionism is removed with no provision for
transitional flanking measures.
34. The impact on the MPCs would be much more adverse than on
the EU but there are different scenarios. Firstly, the MPCs’ comparative
advantages are concentrated in the fruit and vegetables sector,
the one that Europe is mainly interested in protecting. Secondly,
opening up would have several agritrade effects: reduced production
of cereals (and other main-crops), meat and milk, increased production
of fruit and vegetables (in all the MPCs), olive oil (Tunisia),
sugar (Morocco and Egypt) and development of agrifood industries
(because of greater access to the European market). Models suggest
slightly positive effects for the consumer on account of opportunities
for buying food products at lower prices.
35. In the MPCs, however, liberalisation and the opening up of
international markets would render both urban and rural households
more vulnerable to price fluctuations, while at the same time the
poorest families would suffer very serious adverse effects. The
fall in prices might increase domestic consumption but would probably
destabilise producers of food crops and small farmers. Thus, the
consequences of liberalisation would go beyond the purely commercial
sphere and affect, both socio-economically and politically, present
societies ill-prepared for the opening up of markets, though a minority
of farm businesses would benefit (being capitalised, organised,
mechanised, input-intensive and geared to export production). Further
impoverishment of the rural and farming population (with women the
first victims) would have a whole series of effects, beginning with
an explosion in unemployment and rural-urban drift or wholesale
emigration. Lastly, there would be greater pressure on the environment
in areas already made vulnerable by scarcity of water and arable
land. Here, even in the event of agricultural liberalisation, full
account must be taken of the MPCs’ limited export potential due
to growing domestic demand and diminishing availability of land
and water (except in Turkey).
3.4 The
Euro-Mediterranean Roadmap for Agriculture
36. Since 2006 the European Commission
has had a committee of experts on the question with responsibility
for implementing the Euro-Mediterranean Roadmap for Agriculture.
The roadmap has various strategic focuses – reciprocal liberalisation
(the effort has to be shared by the two shores), a gradual approach, chronological
asymmetry (it is necessary for the EU to accept slower opening up
on the part of the MPCs) and the drawing up of a country-by-country
list of exceptions setting out the most sensitive products not to
be included in the liberalisation process. In addition, this “roadmap”
stresses rural development, promotion of quality products, exploitation
of typically Mediterranean products, strengthening of private investment
in the agricultural sector and improved access to export markets.
37. In 2006 the European Commission therefore launched bilateral
negotiations with some MPCs. They are in progress with Morocco and
Israel, and there are excellent prospects of achieving a high degree
of agricultural trade liberalisation with the former. An agreement
has also been concluded with Jordan. Because of the political situation
there has not yet been any move with Lebanon, the Palestinian Authority
or Syria. Tunisia and Algeria are warier about the process and have
postponed committing themselves. The Commission hopes to begin negotiations
with Tunisia in the first half of 2007, though the deadlock with
Algeria could continue. Negotiations with Egypt will soon be under
way after its signature in March 2007 of the EU-Egypt European Neighbourhood
Policy action plan.
38. An important point is that there is provision for accompanying
measures, of which the individual MPC would be in charge, under
the ENP action plans and the ENP’s financial mechanism, the European Neighbourhood
and Partnership Instrument (ENPI). The latter has an overall budget
allocation of €11.2 billion for the 2007-13 period. Each MPC is
allocated specific aid, as set out in the strategy documents and
indicative national programmes (INPs), of which notification was
given in March 2007. It is worth mentioning, as regards its multilateral
dimension, which has an allocation of around €343 million for the
2007-13 period, that the ENPI does not have any targeted co-operation
programme on agricultural and rural questions. The subject of agricultural
liberalisation is, however, referred to as a strategic element in
priority 02 (“Sustainable economic development”).
Note
39. There is thus every indication that the Euro-Mediterranean
agricultural negotiation cycle will not be completed before the
end of 2007, particularly as the European Commission is simultaneously
being ever more demanding with regard to non-tariff aspects of trade,
an area where the MPCs are still clearly lagging behind. The year
2007 will thus be a decisive one both for the Mediterranean, with
the establishment of the ENP, and for the agricultural question,
with negotiations which are already shaping up to be difficult and
contrasting. As forecast, the ENP might bring about three types
of relations between the EU and the MPCs: deepening, continuation
of the status quo, or uncoupling. In agriculture, only Morocco,
Jordan and Israel seem at present to be converging with Europe.
40. The western Balkan Mediterranean countries are all members
of the Council of Europe.
NoteAll of them have
also had contractual relations with the European Union for several
years as part of the Stabilisation and Association Process (SAP)
with the western Balkans. Most of them have concluded stabilisation
and association agreements with the EU. The agreements and available
funds vary according to country.
NoteThe country
whose process is most advanced is Croatia, which the EU has granted
applicant status and which accordingly has the benefit of pre-accession
financial instruments (PHARE, ISPA and SAPARD).
Note
41. Great advances were undoubtedly made on Mediterranean agricultural
liberalisation in 2003-06, after it had been one of the main poor
relations of the ENP. The ENP has opened up new perspectives and
some countries of the southern Mediterranean could see their agritrade
relations with Europe progressing. However, the opening up of agricultural
and agrifood trade should not obscure the importance of keeping
the process under control, given the many predicted commercial and
socio-economic impacts.
4 The
other institutional players and agricultural debate in the Mediterranean
42. After our look at European
Commission policies in the Mediterranean
Notethis
section will present the range of major institutional players present
in the Mediterranean and working for agricultural, rural and food
co-operation. We shall give only outline descriptions and the picture
will be somewhat simplified.
4.1 World
players
43. Three institutions of world
stature are actively engaged with Mediterranean agricultural issues:
the United Nations Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO), the
World Bank and the World Trade Organization (WTO).
a The FAO is present in the region
in its main areas of expertise: food security, fisheries and aquaculture, trade
in agricultural products, technical co-operation, agricultural management
training, and management of natural resources and water. A regional
office for the Near East (the RNE) has been operating in Cairo since
1947 and in fact covers all of the southern Mediterranean. Its functions
match those of the FAO.
NoteIn 1996
a sub-regional office for North Africa (SNEA)
Notewas established
in Tunis with the aim of strengthening the agricultural sector in
the countries of the sub-region and, in particular, advising on
general policy, institutional consolidation and enhancement of human
resources. Lastly the FAO has several offices in countries of the
southern Mediterranean (Morocco, Jordan and Syria). The countries
of the northern shore are represented in the Regional Office for
Europe and Central Asia (REU), established in Rome in 1961.
NoteThe Regional
Conference for Europe and the European Commission on Agriculture
meet as part of it.
b The WTO is at the heart of Mediterranean agritrade issues.
All the countries of the northern shore are WTO member states, and
so are quite a few countries of the southern and eastern shore –
Egypt, Israel, Morocco, Tunisia and Turkey were admitted in 1995,
Jordan in 2000. Algeria is awaiting admission. Lebanon and the Palestinian
Authority have observer status. The paradox to which most of the
MPCs draw attention regarding multilateral trade negotiations is
that the wealthy countries (which include the EU ones) continue
to support and protect their agriculture whereas the poorest countries
(including some countries of the southern Mediterranean) are committed
to reducing their support and liberalising their agricultural trade.
A point worth noting is that the Euro-Mediterranean does not exist
within WTO, and WTO has no Mediterranean regional dimension.
Note
c The World Bank is present in the Middle East/North Africa
(MENA) region
Noteand runs
programmes concerning, in particular, rural development, agriculture,
water and the environment. Its work also takes in all the challenges
to do with governance and socio-economic development in the countries
of that region.
4.2 Parliamentary
players
44. In Europe several parliamentary
institutions are doing positive work on Mediterranean questions:
the Council of Europe Parliamentary Assembly, the European Parliament
and the Euro-Mediterranean Parliamentary Assembly.
a The Parliamentary Assembly of the
Council of Europe has 636 members from the national parliaments of
the 47 member countries (including all the northern Mediterranean
countries, one of which is Turkey). Its Committee on the Environment,
Agriculture and Local and Regional Affairs deals, in particular,
with agriculture, rural development, food, fisheries and forestry.
NoteOther
committees likewise deal with Mediterranean issues within their
own fields of responsibility.
Note
b The European Parliament, with its 785 members, played
an important role in the signing of the Euro-Mediterranean association
agreements concluded with the MPCs since 1995. It also guarantees
a follow-up to the Barcelona Process by its Committee on Foreign
Affairs and in plenary. In addition, the European Parliament’s interparliamentary
delegations together with the member states of the Barcelona Process
organise regular meetings and visits in the area. The European Parliament
has also made a large input to the interparliamentary Euro-Mediterranean
dialogue by creating a Parliamentary Euro-Mediterranean Forum, which
includes representatives from national parliaments of the southern Mediterranean.
c The 2003 inception of the Euro-Mediterranean Parliamentary
Assembly (EMPA) made it possible to bring parliamentarians from
north and south together for intensified debate.
NoteIt
is now the EMP’s parliamentary organ, with an advisory role. It
gives parliamentary impetus, input and backing to consolidation
and development of the EMP, delivering views on all matters to do
with the EMPA, including the implementation of association agreements.
Lastly it adopts non-binding resolutions and recommendations to
the Euro-Mediterranean ministerial conferences.
NoteNote
45. For the record, the Council of Europe Parliamentary Assembly
and the European Parliament, in association with the International
Federation of Agricultural Producers (IFAP) Mediterranean Committee
and the CIHEAM, instigated the Euro-Mediterranean conferences on
agriculture held in Strasbourg, the first of which took place on
14 and 15 June 2001 and the second on 28 and 29 September 2006.
The specific aim of the conferences was to take stock of trends
in Euro-Mediterranean co-operation in agriculture and rural development
and move joint thinking on new and remaining challenges a stage
further.
Note
4.3 Other
regional players
46. Six other regional players
deal with agricultural and rural matters in the Mediterranean: the
CIHEAM, the European Investment Bank (EIB), the Organisation for
Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), the IFAP, the Blue
Plan and the League of Arab States.
a The
CIHEAM, a joint Council of Europe-OECD initiative, was set up on
21 May 1962.
Note It is an intergovernmental organisation
which at present has 13 member states from the Mediterranean Basin (Albania,
Algeria, Egypt, France, Greece, Italy, Lebanon, Malta, Morocco,
Portugal, Spain, Tunisia and Turkey). It is organised around a general
secretariat located in Paris and four Mediterranean agronomic institutes
(Bari, Chania, Montpellier and Saragossa). As a monitor of agricultural
and agrifood policies the CIHEAM plays a practical part in sustainable
agricultural development in the region. It had a pioneering role
in the emergence of a Mediterranean research policy. It is currently
working towards a Mediterranean area for agronomic research and
training. Central to its work are three basic functions (training,
research and co-operation). It focuses on agriculture, food and
rural development in the Mediterranean. Since 1999 it has held twice-yearly
meetings of the agriculture ministers of its 13 member countries
(the latest was in Cairo in December 2006).
b The EIB has long been present in the Mediterranean, granting
a series of strategic loans more particularly in the fields of infrastructure,
energy and environment protection. Since October 2002 the EIB’s
activities in the MPCs have been grouped together within the Euro-Mediterranean
Investment and Partnership Facility (EMIPF), whose purpose is to
help the MPCs meet the challenges of economic and social modernisation
and improved regional integration, in particular with an eye to
setting up a customs union with the EU around 2010. As a priority
the EMIPF finances projects conducted by the private sector, whether
local initiatives or involving direct foreign investment. In 2003
the EIB opened a Mediterranean regional office in Cairo. More recently
two local offices have opened in Tunisia and Morocco. In 2002-2006
the EIB granted some €6 billion in finance to seven Mediterranean
projects. The EMIPF predicts an overall budget of €8.7 billion for
allocation to MPCs (other than Israel) in 2007-2013.
c The OECD, which has a number of Mediterranean member countries
(Portugal, Spain, France, Italy, Greece and Turkey), is actively
involved with agriculture, food, rural development, fisheries and
the environment. In the Middle East/North Africa region its activities
focus mainly on governance, promotion of investment and analysis
of migratory flows.
d The IFAP is the world organisation of farmers. It was
set up in 1946 and represents over 600 million family farm businesses
belonging to 115 national organisations in 80 countries. It has
a Mediterranean committee
Notewhose work
is based on lobbying of European institutions, setting up platforms
for exchanges of regional agricultural ideas and experience and
promoting technical co-operation not only between member agricultural
organisations but also with some of its partners, such as international organisations,
research institutes and agriculture co-operation and development
bodies. Its work currently focuses on three areas – diversification
of production, improvement of product quality and improved water
management.
e The Blue Plan operates as a regional activity centre under
the Mediterranean Action Plan (MAP), which itself comes under the
United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP).
NoteAs a tool
for forward-looking analysis and research concerned with the future
of the Mediterranean Basin, it is particularly active in the fields
of environment, water, rural areas and forests, marine and coastal
matters and energy. It takes part in the Mediterranean Commission
for Sustainable Development, instituted in 1996, and played a key role
in drawing up the 2005 Mediterranean Strategy for Sustainable Development.
f The League of Arab States set up the Arab Organisation
for Agricultural Development (AOAD) in 1970. This has several aims:
making best use of natural and human resources in the agricultural
sector, improving agricultural efficiency and productivity, promoting
agricultural integration of the Arab countries, developing agricultural
production with a view to greater self-sufficiency, facilitating
agricultural trade between the Arab countries, promoting the setting
up of agricultural enterprises and industries and improvement of
living conditions. AOAD membership comprises the 22 members of the
League of Arab States.
Note
47. This overview of the main players in the Mediterranean whose
activities and functions are concerned with agricultural and rural
matters would be incomplete without mention of United States policy
in the region. The United States, as a strategic power in the Mediterranean,
has in particular concluded a number of free trade agreements with
countries of the southern Mediterranean, including Israel, Jordan
and, more recently, Morocco. The agreement with Morocco includes
key sections to do with agriculture. Interestingly, Morocco is currently
negotiating liberalisation of its agricultural trade with the EU
on the basis of the concessions in the 2004 agreement with the United
States, which took actual effect in 2006. The United States Agency
for International Development (USAID) is likewise present in some
Mediterranean countries (Egypt, the Palestinian territories, Jordan,
Lebanon and Morocco) in matters to do with rural development and management
of natural resources.
5 Mediterranean
agriculture – the future
48. Framing future scenarios for
the Mediterranean region is risky, since its famously unpredictable
and turbulent character makes it more than likely that any forecast
will need correcting later. If pessimism is the fashion, then the
Mediterranean theatre offers it – alas – plenty to feed on. In fact,
one of the area’s chief problems is lack of a strategic vision,
combining pragmatism, conviction and a shared sense of purpose:
all too often, back, not forward, to the future is the pattern.
49. Taking things already said and points already made as a basis,
we can sketch three contrasting scenarios for the agricultural and
rural situation in the Mediterranean in 2020. These are simply possible
futures which may, quite modestly, prompt people to (re)act and
try to make the region’s actual future more promising.
5.1 The
present trend scenario: a Mediterranean undermined by emergent,
intractable divisions
50. This scenario is an extension
of current trends, that is to say a Mediterranean at the heart of
international and geopolitical disorder, treated with growing suspicion
by Europe, and lamed by the southern countries’ inability to introduce
reforms and work together.
51. There are also certain factors which tell against development
in the Mediterranean: the region is suffering from distortions caused
by the globalisation of trade, and missing the pathway to growth
which globalisation theoretically provides. Intercultural dialogue
is becoming harder, since the culture of dialogue is being lost.
Spectator and not player in a world where new geo-economic balances
are being struck, the Mediterranean is being shaped by asymmetries
and antagonisms. Inequalities are developing between north and south,
and within certain regions as well. Little by little, the two shores
of the Mediterranean seem to be turning their backs on each other.
This situation generates tensions and frustrations, and mortgages
the region’s chances of making a historic recovery. With an uncertain
future and a thankless present, Mediterranean societies look nostalgically
back to a far-distant past, when their region was the world’s centre –
and dynamo.
52. Both structural and circumstantial, these poor weather conditions
are compounded by the dense fog which hangs over Euro-Mediterranean
co-operation. Abandoning the multilateral approach agreed in Barcelona,
the European Neighbourhood Policy is now focusing on bilateralism,
at the risk of permanently compromising prospects for progressive
regional integration. With the Mediterranean countries developing unevenly,
the Euro-Mediterranean area is being put together on the à la carte
principle.
53. In this situation, agricultural and rural challenges are not
among regional co-operation’s strategic priorities. Decisive they
may be for all the countries on the Mediterranean seaboard, but
these problems are being tackled in commercial terms only, and by
a minority of states. Trade between those states and the EU is gradually
being liberalised: phased adjustments and lists of sensitive products
are being agreed. But none of this offers a basis for a Mediterranean
agrifoodstuffs system capable of weighing in the balance at world
level.
54. In a Mediterranean with no ideal future to strive for, the
only parts which ultimately matter are the useful, globalised areas
– the cities, the coastline and the tourist locations. In spite
of their importance, rural areas are neglected. This useful, globalised
Mediterranean behaves as if its countryside and country-dwellers
were now surplus to requirements.
5.2 The
worst-case scenario: a Mediterranean of tensions
55. The second possible future
is the worst-case scenario, marked by high-speed modernisation of Mediterranean
agriculture. Although it has brilliant urban civilisations, the
Mediterranean still has peasant societies. Some countries remain
profoundly rural today, and others are indelibly marked by having
been profoundly rural in the past. Attempts are being made to duplicate
some of the approaches to agricultural modernisation once used in
Europe, for example, rapid mechanisation or a drastic reduction
in agricultural manpower. But the problem is that minimum employment
in agriculture means maximum unemployment in rural areas. Little
by little, something totally new is happening: an impoverished,
dispossessed and disorientated peasantry is simply disappearing.
High birth rates and low agricultural productivity are aggravating
the risks of serious food shortages and social crisis. These agricultural
problems are compounded by environmental tensions and the threat
of conflict over access to water, which is more coveted than ever. Political
and religious extremism feeds on the socio-economic vulnerability
and anxieties of rural areas.
56. One dramatic development in the south is final severing of
the ties between town and countryside. The hinterland is cut off
from society, excluded from economic growth, forgotten by the public
authorities, and so doomed to poverty and isolation. Peasant communities
are destabilised, and are left with no option but migration to cities
or to Europe.
57. In this scenario, the divisions in Mediterranean societies
are deepened. Various crisis-causing factors are accentuated: natural
resources are over-exploited, poverty spreads, unemployment rises
and the economy stagnates. Conflicts persist or intensify. This
is the way things are going on the hapless Mediterranean seaboard,
where divisions are accumulating, separating areas of poverty from
pockets of prosperity in an explosive and claustrophobic geopolitical
confrontation.
58. Europe, which is becoming less ambitious politically, and
also less influential internationally, views these regular upheavals
on its southern periphery with alarm. The EU’s Mediterranean countries
are unable to focus its attention on the geopolitical area which
bounds it to the south. In most of the MPCs, political reform is lagging,
and there is a widening gap between governing elites and large sections
of the population who want more openness and freedom.
59. As a result of all this, Euro-Mediterranean co-operation flounders
and confidence disappears. Security becomes the prime concern, and
the door to the future is locked. The Euro-Mediterranean project
is dropped, and no one pauses to calculate the strategic cost of
failing to achieve partnership. At a time when major regional centres
are developing worldwide, Europe and the Mediterranean simply choose
to ignore each other. Fading by degrees from the global geo-economic
landscape, the Mediterranean becomes a sounding board for the major
ills which afflict the planet.
5.3 The
positive action scenario: a Mediterranean based on collective effort
and solidarity
60. This scenario involves resolute
political action to give the Mediterranean a secure position in
the 21st century. It offers a historic vision of the future, based
on the real, and not merely the desirable. In fact, global dynamics
and growing strategic interdependence are realities, and will force
Europe and the Mediterranean to work together – if they want to
retain their vitality. This is necessarily a long-term process,
but it needs to start now to produce visible effects by 2020.
61. This scenario is subject to certain conditions. First, we
need to strengthen the partnership dimension of Euro-Mediterranean
co-operation, which should be more visible and play a more concrete
role in the development of the southern countries, while allowing
Europe to continue to act as a separate entity on the international
geopolitical and economic scene. This means that Europe and the
south Mediterranean countries must pursue convergent aims. Secondly,
we must restore confidence between the peoples: the Euro-Mediterranean
region will become a reality only if it plays a positive part in
the daily lives of individuals, and so wins recognition as a responsible,
solidarity-based process. Thirdly, we must make a consistent and
resolute choice of strategic priorities for the Euro-Mediterranean
region. Here, we shall certainly have to start with areas of common
interest, where we face the same challenges, and where opportunities
for mutual development really exist. Fourthly, we shall have to
maximise the region’s human potential by providing better education
and training. If we do all of this, the Mediterranean will stop
being a conflict zone and become a project.
62. From this standpoint, agriculture may bring the two sides
together and offer an effective platform for building the Euro-Mediterranean
alliance, employing bold strategies based on complementarities,
special characteristics and challenges present in the region. Just
as agriculture played a driving role in reconciling European countries
after the two world wars, Euro-Mediterranean agricultural co-operation
can reasonably be expected to open the way to progress on the path
to a peaceful future. For this to happen, however, the region still
needs a more favourable political and economic climate – and more
dynamic links with the globalisation process.
63. This scenario brings Mediterranean agriculture onto the international
scene, thanks to progressive alignment of European and southern
positions at WTO. Mediterranean agriculture protects itself, but
also opens itself to the outside world, where quality, authenticity
and a distinctive character are the hallmarks of its produce. This
process is sustained by three principal things:
- mobilisation of all those active
in farming and the rural world, inter
alia by giving private operators and local communities
(decentralised co-operation) a bigger role – not forgetting active
participation of civil society alongside producers, and improved
organisation of the agricultural sector;
- a genuine strategic plan for rural development in the
south Mediterranean, which diversifies activities, strengthens social
cohesion, expands infrastructure and reconnects countryside and
towns, all with a view to sustainability;
- responsible management of natural resources and preservation
of the environment to ensure sustainable development, which should
not simply serve to correct the effects of globalisation, but provide
a powerful means of bringing rural communities out of their present
undeveloped state.
64. This vision of future convergence would not be complete without
a mention of a possible second positive action scenario, that is,
“intra-Mediterranean mobilisation”. The recent past suggests that
not all EU countries will necessarily get involved in Euro-Mediterranean
regional integration. However, location and proximity make this
project meaningful for the EU’s southern members (Cyprus, France,
Greece, Italy, Malta, Portugal, Slovenia, Spain), who may well choose
to act on their own, but collectively, to deepen and expand co-operation with
the countries on the southern shore. In this second scenario, the
Mediterranean countries would mobilise among themselves, and this
increased co-operation would be accepted and encouraged by the European Union.
6 Conclusions
65. Many futures are possible for
the Mediterranean Basin. However, as we have seen, three contrasting scenarios
seem conceivable. The first is based on current trends, and looks
ahead to the problems which failure to relaunch Euro-Mediterranean
multilateral co-operation will inevitably cause. The second is the
worst-case scenario, in which the Mediterranean region is at odds
with itself, and fear and withdrawal shape the future. The third,
proactive scenario is one in which Europe and the Mediterranean
prefer working together to declining separately. This pragmatic
alliance focuses on agriculture because agriculture is central to
the region’s identity and offers a strategic area for co-operation.
66. If Europe wants a real international role, it cannot afford
to ignore the Mediterranean Basin, which tomorrow may provide an
ideal testing ground for a new kind of globalisation. Europe and
the Mediterranean have become so interdependent strategically that
they obviously need to forge special partnerships. Groundbreaking
co-operation with the countries of the south will allow Europe to
play a part in globalisation, and explore prospects for a type of
sustainable co-development in which human, social and environmental variables
are quite as important as economic and political factors. Responding
to the region’s urgent requirements, reflecting its special features
and boldly implemented, this scenario might centre on agriculture.
67. The Mediterranean’s agricultural and rural problems are multidimensional,
and Euro-Mediterranean mobilisation is needed to solve them. Agriculture
is the basis of Mediterranean identity, and decisive for the region’s
societies. Convergent action in this sphere could result in close
co-operation, mobilising people and resources on the basis of solidarity,
human sympathy and mutual benefits for both sides of the Mediterranean.
