D Explanatory memorandum, by Mr Pieter
Omtzigt
1 Introduction
1. As Rapporteur for opinion of the Committee on Legal
Affairs and Human Rights on the report on developments as regards
the future status of Kosovo (by the Political Affairs Committee),
I visited Pristina, Mitrovica and Belgrade from 22 to 25 October
2007. I would like to express my gratitude to the authorities in Belgrade
and in Pristina, as well as to the Council of Europe field offices
in Belgrade and Pristina, for their valuable co-operation.
2. In addition, together with Lord Russell-Johnston, the Rapporteur
of the Political Affairs Committee, I had a meeting in Strasbourg
on 2 October 2007 with Mr Kostunica, Prime Minister of Serbia, and
a discussion with the (now former) General Prosecutor of the International
Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY), Mrs Carla del
Ponte, on 17 October 2007 in The Hague.
3. During my visit to the region, a number of interlocutors regretted
the strong “instrumentalisation”, by all parties concerned, of legal
and human rights issues in Kosovo. I fully share their concern.
4. Both in Pristina and Belgrade, I stressed on several occasions
that irrespective of Kosovo’s future status, the main concern should
be the full implementation of Council of Europe standards in the
field of democracy, rule of law and human rights. I further stressed
that all parties concerned should guarantee the rights of all citizens
of Kosovo, without discrimination and regardless of their ethnic
origin. In addition, any settlement should establish mechanisms
to ensure that any alleged human rights violation in Kosovo is thoroughly, impartially
and independently investigated.
5. From the outset, I was also faced with the so-called status
versus standards dilemma. It refers to the “standards for Kosovo”,
Notea
policy document approved by the United Nations Security Council
and launched on 10 December 2003, which provides a set of targets
that Kosovo must meet. The standards describe a multi-ethnic society
where there is democracy, tolerance, freedom of movement and equal
access to justice for all people in Kosovo, regardless of their
ethnic background. In 2005, recognising that the undecided status
of Kosovo was hampering the full implementation of the standards,
the international community changed its initial approach of “standards
before status” and launched the process to determine Kosovo’s status.
Progressively, expectations surrounding the status process distracted
attention from the standards. However, during my visit, a number
of interlocutors stressed the need for a renewed and resolute focus
on the standards in the current tense political context of the definition
of the status, in order to foster trust. Indeed, in some areas standards have
not been implemented. If this situation does not improve substantially
rapidly, the future of Kosovo society will remain bleak.
6. The present opinion is based on information gathered prior
to, during and after my above-mentioned visit. It provides an overview
of the main rule of law and human rights issues of concerns in Kosovo,
and examines the mechanisms or institutions for human rights protection
and accountability in Kosovo.
Note
2 Overview of the main rule of law issues in Kosovo
7. Any forthcoming settlement should establish mechanisms
ensuring that any human rights violations by any person in authority
in Kosovo are thoroughly, impartially and independently investigated.
There should be an independent judiciary in both civil and criminal
matters and victims of human rights violations must be guaranteed
access to redress and reparation. At present, despite the ongoing
progressive steps to strengthen the judiciary, the justice system
is still a particularly weak element in the current institutional
framework.
2.1 The judiciary
8. In 1999, the United Nations Interim Administration
Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK) was mandated to re-establish the rule
of law in Kosovo. One special aspect of the Kosovo judicial system
is the existence of international judges, appointed by the Special
Representative of the UN Secretary General (SRSG). In addition,
the SRSG still has authority over the Ministry of Justice and the
Kosovo Judicial Council.
9. Despite some progress in a number of areas, the Kosovo judicial
system still suffers from major shortcomings, in particular the
lack of independence, the length of procedures, the failure to enforce
court judgments, the inadequacy of resources and the backlog of
cases. Intimidation of witnesses and the lack of proper witness
protection measures is also a high concern in criminal cases (see
also chapter on co-operation with ICTY below).
10. In addition, the lack of legal certainty resulting from the
existence of parallel Serbian courts and administrative structures
in certain parts of Kosovo under the de facto authority of the Serbian
Government was often raised by my interlocutors during my visit
at the end of October 2007. Indeed, in Kosovo-Serb-inhabited areas,
structures such as courts, schools and hospitals continue to answer
directly to Serbian authorities, thus operating in parallel to the
UNMIK administration. Sometimes, they can be complementary to the
system, covering gaps and subsequently ensuring access to certain
services for members of minority communities. In this respect, I
should also add that the idea that a community can only be served
by members of its own community is embedded in the perceptions of
both Kosovo Serbs and Kosovo Albanians. These parallel structures
hamper a common future for the inhabitants of Kosovo. For instance,
parallel school systems, in which only the language of one’s own
community is used, lead to a generation of children who do not know people
of other communities and do not speak their language.
11. Obviously, parallel structures are a highly politicised issue.
But it is also equally obvious that the existence of parallel Serbian
courts seriously hampers the establishment of the rule of law. In
this respect, it is important to note that the Kosovo Standards
Implementation Plan (KSIP), although not legally binding, required that
parallel structures be dismantled or integrated into the Provisional
Institutions of Self-Government (PISG).
Note
12. Concerning parallel security structures, in Mitrovica, I could
observe the presence of the Serb “Bridge-watchers” at the Ibar River.
Reportedly, the Bridge-watchers consider themselves to be a security
structure aimed, inter alia,
at preventing Kosovo Albanians from entering northern Mitrovica
and gathering information on Kosovo Albanians living in the north.
The Bridge-watchers continue to monitor the bridge and are said
to play a vital role in maintaining the balance of power in northern
Kosovo.
13. As stressed by the Organization for Security and Cooperation
in Europe, a system in which all peoples’ rights (in particular,
the right to equal access to education and health care, the right
to freedom of movement, property rights and the right to an effective
remedy) are protected and ensured must prevail when resolving the issue
of parallel structures in Kosovo.
14. On a positive note, a new special prosecutor’s office for
organised crime, trafficking, inter-ethnic crimes, terrorism and
corruption, including both international and local judges is being
set up. In addition, the transfer of responsibilities/ownership
of reform by Kosovo institutions is on-going and local institutions
continue to assume additional responsibilities in the judicial field.
2.2 The need to eradicate impunity and to foster truth
and justice
15. Prior to UNMIK mandate (1999), ethnic Albanians were
subjected to widespread violations of human rights by the Serbian
authorities in Kosovo. After the UNMIK mandate, a number of ethnically
motivated crimes have been reported against members of minority
communities, mostly Serbs of Kosovo.
16. During my visit, a number of interlocutors denounced the continuing
impunity or lack of accountability enjoyed by some perpetrators
of war crimes and crimes against humanity committed prior to the
UNMIK mandate, as well as impunity for ethnically motivated crimes
perpetrated since June 1999, including those committed in March
2004.
Note(For
examples of non-accountability of international institutions in
Kosovo, see Part VI below.)
17. I stressed that all human rights violations in Kosovo – committed
before and after the establishment of UNMIK in Kosovo – should be
thoroughly investigated and prosecuted.
2.2.1 Co-operation with ICTY – fair and effective domestic
war crimes trials
18. As already stressed on several occasions by the Assembly
Noteand
by the (now former) General Prosecutor of the ICTY, Mrs Carla del
Ponte, the authorities of the region must fully co-operate with
the ICTY in order to hand over alleged war criminals, irrespective
of their ethnic origin.
19. In December 2007,
NoteMrs del
Ponte asked in particular the European Union member states and the European
Union’s Commission to maintain their position of principle by insisting
on Serbia’s full co-operation with the International Tribunal as
a condition in the EU preaccession and accession process.
20. During my meeting with her in The Hague, Mrs del Ponte raised
the case of Mr Ramush Haradinaj, as did also a number of NGOs both
in Pristina and Belgrade during my visit to the region. They pointed
out that Mr Ramush Haradinaj was a candidate to the elections to
the Kosovo Assembly although he was indicted by the ICTY for war
crimes and held in pre-trial detention.
NoteIn my discussions
with ICTY representatives, the alleged intimidation of witnesses
by a minister in Kosovo in the Haradinaj case and witness intimidation
or obstruction of justice in the Seselj case were given as worrying
examples of the lack of co-operation.
21. It is disturbing that people who are suspects of the ICTY
continue to play important political roles in political life. The
authorities, governments and politicians in both Kosovo and Belgrade
should commit themselves to full co-operation with the ICTY. Those
who are convicted or sought for war crimes, witness intimidation
or obstruction of justice should be asked by their respective parties
not to play any political role.
22. The importance of domestic efforts to prosecute war crimes
should be emphasised. Fair and effective trials of the remaining
suspects at the domestic level are essential to further combat impunity
and build respect for the rule of law.
23. Implementation of the legislation on witness protection as
well as concrete measures to ensure adequate witness protection
and relocation are necessary.
2.2.2 Ethnically motivated abuses
24. In 2006, the Council of Europe Committee of Ministers
noted that “the perceived impunity of actors of violent crimes against
Serbs, as well as against Roma and others, is a particularly serious
problem that needs to be addressed as a high priority”.
NoteI
reiterated during my visit that all minority communities in Kosovo
should have access to effective remedies against discrimination,
that ethnically motivated crimes should be properly investigated
and their alleged perpetrators prosecuted and, if found guilty,
effectively punished.
25. Finally, during my visit I had the impression that much remains
to be done to pave the way for reconciliation.
3 Overview of the main human rights issues in Kosovo
3.1 Minority communities in Kosovo: general concerns
26. According to most sources, within the general population
in Kosovo, ethnic Albanians represent around 90% of the whole population
and the remaining 10% are made up of Serbs, Roma, Turks, Bosniaks,
Gorani, Ashkali, Egyptians and Croats. While these make up the minority
of the overall population in Kosovo, there are some areas in Kosovo
where ethnic Albanians are in the minority. Serbs and Roma tend
to live in mixed or singleethnic villages and enclaves scattered
all over Kosovo.
27. According to the Ombudsperson Institution in Kosovo, general
problems faced by all minority communities throughout Kosovo are
education, unemployment and the inability to use their respective languages,
should they not be Albanian or Serbian, in an official context.
In addition, malicious damage to the property of members of minority
communities is still reported and freedom of movement of members
of minority communities is still limited in a number of areas.
28. The prospect of a new political status has highlighted the
uncertainty over the future protection of minority communities.
Greater efforts are needed to improve the security situation in
Kosovo, which is increasingly reported to be volatile. Systematic
monitoring of the human rights situation of returnees and populations
in a minority situation who are at risk of displacement is also
essential.
3.1.1 Kosovo Serbs
29. Most, if not all, issues concerning the life of Kosovo
Serbs remain highly politicised. Most of them live in enclaves in
various parts of Kosovo. Despite improvements in the general security
situation in Kosovo, freedom of movement remains problematic in
a number of places. In addition, Kosovo Serbs continue to rely for
the most part on parallel structures supported by the authorities
in Belgrade for the provision of basic services (in this respect,
see Part II above). Various representatives of the PISG criticise
the inhabitants of the enclaves for this, while the latter complain
that the PISG does not support them.
Note
30. During my visit to the region, a number of Serbian interlocutors
raised the issue of the Serbian cultural heritage. Although this
issue belongs to the highly politicised ones, one has to recognise
that the protection of the rich cultural heritage of Kosovo is crucial
for the achievement of inter-communal reconciliation and that both sides
should learn to respect each other’s heritage. Regardless of the
future status of Kosovo, protection of Serbian Orthodox churches
is of the utmost importance. Without it, intercultural dialogue
would not be possible.
31. The sensitivity of the cultural sector was demonstrated by
the events in March 2004 which led to attacks on cultural property
belonging to the two ethnic communities (Orthodox churches in Kosovo
and Islamic mosques in Belgrade and Niš).
32. The Council of Europe, together with other international organisations,
should continue to provide its support and expertise in the field
of cultural heritage in Kosovo.
Note
3.1.2 Roma, Ashkali and Egyptians (RAE)
33. According to estimations, around 35 000 to 40 000
Roma, Ashkali and Egyptians (RAE) still live in Kosovo.
NoteAll
my interlocutors recognised that the RAE constitute the poorest
and most vulnerable community in Kosovo. It would appear that the
problems of RAE have recently received increased attention from international
circles and local authorities. It is imperative that the undue politicisation
of this essentially humanitarian and human rights problem is avoided
and that the well-being and health of the Roma remains the primary
consideration of all concerned.
Note
34. Some observers predict that if Kosovo gains independence,
the minority population structure in Kosovo might change in such
a way that the number of Kosovo Serbs might slightly decrease while
the number of RAE might increase. Taking into account the current
situation, the neglect of their needs and concerns in the plans for
the future Kosovo, the anticipated return of RAE could lead to a
severe deterioration of the situation.
Note
35. The Council of Europe co-ordinator of activities on Roma issues,
as well as the European Roma and Travellers Forum, have expressed
concerns about the lack of involvement of the Roma in the Kosovo
status process.
3.2 Refugees and internally displaced persons (IDPs):
concerns about forced returns and conditions for voluntary return
36. According to the Office of the United Nations High
Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), the overall situation in Kosovo,
lack of freedom of movement and inadequate conditions for sustainable
reintegration (limited access to employment and public services,
housing, land and property issues) continue to affect the prospect
for the sustainable and safe return of IDPs from Kosovo. In addition,
the IDP population is waiting for the outcome of the status and
no substantial movements should be expected before then. Reportedly,
many RAE, but mostly Serbs, face hostilities and harassment upon
their return to Kosovo.
37. During my visit, a number of interlocutors also expressed
concerns about the situation of IDPs from Kosovo in Serbia. They
pointed out that social conditions in a number of IDP collective
centres and informal settlements are very poor and that many IDPs
are not able to obtain official papers and thus lack access to public
services. More efforts are needed to take care of these people.
The authorities have a duty to make public services available to
these people.
38. Representatives of the UNHCR in Kosovo and in Belgrade insisted
that IDPs should not be held hostage to future political settlements.
Note
39. They also stressed that the number of refugees, IDPs and stateless
persons might increase in the light of future developments related
to the definition of the status and expressed concern that, even
before a resolution on the future status of Kosovo, some countries
are making preparations to forcibly return to Kosovo persons who,
apparently, remain in need of temporary protection as well as others
whose claim for refugee status should be considered. Many of these
people are members of minority communities.
Note
40. My interlocutors considered that a mass influx of returnees
(forced or voluntary) would not be sustainable and could destabilise
the already fragile security situation and increase ethnic tensions.
3.3 Other issues
41. During my visit, a number of other issues of concern
were mentioned, in particular corruption, organised crime, trafficking
in human beings and domestic violence, as well as violence and discrimination
against sexual minorities.
4 Enhancing human rights protection and accountability
in Kosovo
4.1 Applicability of Council of Europe instruments
in Kosovo and functioning of their respective control mechanismNote
42. According to the Constitutional Framework for Provisional
Self-Government in Kosovo, the European Convention on Human Rights
(ECHR), the European Charter for Regional or Minority Languages
and the Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities
are, inter alia, directly
applicable in Kosovo.
4.1.1 European Convention on Human Rights and its control
mechanism, the European Court of Human Rights (the Court)
43. Under the Constitutional Framework for Provisional
Self-Government, the ECHR rights are legally implemented in Kosovo,
at least in substantive terms, but there is no legal basis for the
exercise of jurisdiction by the Court. In other words, inhabitants
of Kosovo do not enjoy the right of individual access to the Court.
For this reason, Kosovo has been considered on several occasions
as a “black hole” in Europe.
Note
44. In February 2006, the Court decided that it did not have competence
to rule on a petition submitted on behalf of Roma, Ashkali and Egyptians
living in lead-contaminated camps in Mitrovica in relation to violations of
their rights under the ECHR, on the ground that UNMIK was not a
party to the Convention.
Note
45. The question of the applicability of the Convention in Kosovo,
and the obligations – if any – of the states participating in Kfor
in alleged human rights violations have been examined by the Court
in two recent cases (Behrami and Saramati) which were declared inadmissible/struck
out.
NoteNote
46. Any status agreement should ensure that the ECHR is fully
applicable and its control mechanism fully in force in Kosovo.
4.1.2 European Convention for the Prevention of Torture
and Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment and the Council
of Europe Anti-Torture Committee (CPT)’s access to detention facilities
in Kosovo
47. On the basis of an agreement concluded in August
2004 between the Council of Europe and UNMIK and an exchange of
letters in 2006 between the Secretaries General of the Council of
Europe and NATO, the CPT was granted access to UNMIK and Kfor detention
facilities and carried out its first visit to Kosovo in March 2007. During
my visit, I called on UNMIK to authorise the publication of the
CPT report as soon as possible.
4.1.3 Framework Convention for the Protection of National
Minorities (Framework Convention)
48. The monitoring of the Framework Convention has been
made possible by an Agreement concluded between the Council of Europe
and UNMIK on “technical arrangements related to the Framework Convention for
the Protection of National Minorities”, signed on 23 August 2004.
49. In June 2006,
Notethe Council
of Europe Committee of Ministers concluded that “protection of national minorities
is an area of paramount importance for human rights as well as for
peace and stability in Kosovo, and the agreement concluded between
the Council of Europe and UNMIK related to the monitoring of the Framework
Convention is an important step in improving the international accountability
of the authorities in Kosovo in this area”.
50. It further concluded that “the present complex and ambiguous
institutional arrangements, coupled with uncertainty as regards
the future status of Kosovo, have at times obscured the respective
authorities’ responsibilities and accountability for the implementation
of the Framework Convention, to the detriment of persons belonging
to minority communities. Therefore, whatever the outcome of the
status talks, it is essential that the authorities that are effectively
in charge in Kosovo, be they international and/or local, clearly
assume their responsibilities for the implementation of this treaty.
At the same time, it is clear that, regardless of the institutional
arrangements, the implementation of the principles of the Framework
Convention remains difficult in Kosovo, where interethnic violence
has seriously eroded trust between communities.”
51. In June 2006, the Council of Europe Committee of Ministers
also addressed a number of recommendations in this respect to the
authorities in Kosovo, both international and local.
NoteHowever,
it would appear that little has been done to implement them.
4.1.4 Future settlement
52. Any future settlement should ensure that the main
international and European human rights instruments are fully applicable
throughout Kosovo and their respective mechanisms fully in force.
In particular, I consider it of the utmost importance to ensure
that Kosovo inhabitants enjoy individual access to the Court after
having exhausted all possible domestic remedies.
53. In addition, the future possible EU Rule of Law Mission in
Kosovo should define a clear rule of law and human rights strategy
and, together with all parties concerned, implement it without delay.
The Council of Europe, as the leading human rights watchdog in Europe,
should be closely associated with this EU mission.
4.2 Domestic human rights protection mechanisms: the
crucial role of the Ombudsperson Institution
54. It would appear that human rights concerns are not
sufficiently present in the programmes of UNMIK and PISG, although
human rights units have been created within each ministry in order
to implement the human rights strategy. Also, the problem of Kosovo
legislation is not so much its quality but the lack of its proper implementation.
55. The Ombudsperson Institution in Kosovo was established in
2000 by UNMIK Regulation No. 2000/38 as an independent institution
with a mandate to address issues dealing with alleged human rights
violations or abuses of authority by both international and local
public authorities in Kosovo. It had an international ombudsperson,
Polish lawyer Marek Antoni Nowicki. In 2006, the UN Special Representative
of the Secretary General (SRSG) promulgated UNMIK Regulation No.
2006/06, according to which the Ombudsperson Institution can only
deal with cases in which human rights violations occur as a result
of actions of Kosovo institutions. In addition, the institution
has become a local Kosovan one.
56. Reportedly, with its multi-ethnic character and field presence,
it enjoys a high degree of confidence among Kosovo’s population,
including minority communities, and has – at least before the curtailment
of its jurisdiction – been among the most effective mechanisms of
accountability for international institutions in Kosovo. In addition,
it is, according to the acting ombudsperson, the only independent
human rights protection mechanism in Kosovo that holds the PISG
accountable by law.
57. So far, the Kosovo Assembly has failed to appoint a permanent
national ombudsperson. In addition, concerns were expressed in October
2007 about the process by which candidates for the post of ombudsperson
in Kosovo have been selected. Allegations of political interference
in the appointment are of extreme concern. The ombudsperson is required
to perform his or her duty thoroughly, independently and impartially
in full compliance with the Paris Principles.
NoteMoreover,
following my visit, concerns have also been expressed about proposed
budget cuts which could undermine the sustainability of the institution.
58. This institution, whose independence should be preserved,
should play a crucial role in the establishment of the rule of law
and address the human rights concerns, including those of minority communities
and other vulnerable groups. It should be strengthened instead of
being undermined.
4.3 The accountability “gap” of international institutions
in Kosovo
59. The legacy of impunity in Kosovo described by a number
of NGOs has been compounded by the general problem of accountability
Noterelating
to the status of Kosovo. The staff of international organisations
enjoy immunity and their acts are not controlled as to their compatibility
with human rights standards. In this respect, it should again be
stressed that the Ombudsperson Institution was stripped of its mandate
to investigate UNMIK and Kfor in 2006 (see above).
60. I was presented with the following concrete examples of non-accountability:
4.3.1 Criminal responsibility
- Impunity of UNMIK Romanian
police contingent for its alleged role in killing two protesters
on 10 February 2007.
- Lack of remedies and compensation for the Behrami family
who lost one son and whose other one was deformed by an unexploded
ordinance (UXO) in a territory declared as safe by Kfor. The Court
declared this case inadmissible (see above).
- Lack of remedies and compensation for Mr Saramati, who
alleged that he has been extrajudicially detained for a prolonged
period of time by Kfor (same decision of the Court (application
inadmissible/struck out).
4.3.2 Administrative responsibility
The cases may range from property rights cases, overreactions
by the international police and NATO-led peacekeepers Kfor (car
accidents, sexual misconduct, etc.) where there is no standing mechanism
for looking at public complaints so that they could be addressed.
Human Rights Watch has suggested a number of ways to overcome the
current vacuum.Note
61. For UNMIK, the general problem of accountability
has been alleviated to an extent by the establishment of a Human
Rights Advisory Panel providing an independent opinion to the SRSG
in the case of alleged human rights violations by “internationals”.
However, the panel has yet to start its work (it finally convened
for the first time in November 2007) and it would appear that this
advisory mechanism’s authority remains contingent on UNMIK readiness
to abide by its findings. Over the last few years there has been
no place to turn to for people who felt their basic human rights
had been violated by the United Nations.
4.4 Enhancing accountability
62. While an international civilian administration and
military presence remains in Kosovo, irrespective of whether it
is led by the UN, NATO or the EU, its acts and omissions should
continue to be subject to independent scrutiny, investigation and
oversight. Individuals who make complaints against such authorities should
be guaranteed access to remedies.
63. NGOs have stressed that despite the number of analyses on
the international accountability gap in Kosovo, there has been little
progress towards closing the gap. Defining a new status should offer
new opportunities to do so. The Ombudsperson Institution should
have a key role in this respect and its mandate should be modified
accordingly.
5 Kosovo status and international law
64. During my visit, the authorities in Serbia argued
that the definition of the status of Kosovo was a legal issue and
stressed that depriving Serbia of its territorial integrity would
mean undermining the international legal order. I replied that the
definition of the status of Kosovo was a very sensitive political
issue with important legal and human rights aspects. As to the argument
of international law, I fully share Lord Russell-Johnston’s view
according to which Kosovo is a unique situation in Europe and “the
tension between the principle of self-determination and the respect
of territorial integrity need not in each and every case be resolved
in favour of the latter”. In fact, “the case of Timor-Leste shows
very well that, in very special circumstances, the United Nations
can also decide in favour of the establishment of an independent
state, regardless of the principle of territorial integrity”.
NoteKosovo
is indeed a unique situation in Europe. Two key elements should
be recalled in this respect: first, violence was committed by the
authorities against its own population (namely the Kosovo Albanian
population) and prompted a reaction by the international community
in 1999; second, Kosovo has now been under UN administration for
eight years.
6 Concluding remarks: status and standards
65. In a nutshell, it is clear that the undecided status
of Kosovo hampers the full implementation of the “standards for
Kosovo”. However, it is equally obvious that a renewed focus on
the “standards for Kosovo” is now necessary, in order to address
the serious issues of concern and to enhance human rights protection
and accountability. I should add that my visit has highlighted the
shared responsibility of all parties concerned – be they in Pristina,
in Belgrade or among the international community in Kosovo – in
the current situation.
66. I consider that the Kosovo status should allow the full implementation
of the “standards for Kosovo”, the strengthening of human rights
protection mechanisms in Kosovo, that of ownership of reforms by
Kosovo institutions, as well as an increased accountability of all
parties concerned, including of the international community in Kosovo.
67. Kosovo should be a place where the most important international
and European instruments in the fields of human rights and rights
of minorities, in particular the European Convention on Human Rights
(ETS No. 5), the European Convention for the Prevention of Torture
and Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment (ETS No. 126) and
the Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities
(ETS No. 157) are fully applicable and their respective control
mechanisms fully in force and where the values of democracy, tolerance and
multiculturalism are shared by its people and institutions.
68. Consequently, all parties concerned, including the international
community, should:
- fully respect
and, if and where necessary, protect the rights of Serbs and other
persons in a minority situation in Kosovo, irrespective of their
ethnicity;
- put a renewed and resolute focus on “standards for Kosovo”
and, in any case, increase co-ordination between all actors involved
in the implementation of the standards;
- define a clear rule of law and human rights strategy and
to implement it without delay;
- address the well-known deficiencies of the judiciary in
Kosovo, as well as the issue of the Serbian parallel institutions
in Kosovo, which are deeply undermining the rule of law in the region;
- increase accountability for human rights violations, including
by “internationals”, in Kosovo; and
- strengthen human rights protection mechanisms in Kosovo,
in particular the institution of the ombudsperson, which enjoys
a high degree of confidence among Kosovo’s population and whose independence
should be preserved.
69. Any possible future EU Rule of Law Mission in Kosovo, as well
as the other parties concerned, should define a clear rule of law
and human rights strategy and implement it without delay.
70. In addition, the parties concerned should fully co-operate
with the ICTY and ensure that all human rights violations in Kosovo
– committed before and after the establishment of UNMIK in Kosovo
– are thoroughly investigated and prosecuted, in order to foster
truth and justice and to pave the way for reconciliation.
71. The people of Kosovo have suffered long enough and merit a
brighter future. The economic situation is bleak, with mass unemployment.
Full focus on status and standards (which include human rights and
the fight against corruption and impunity) is the only way forward
for a better future for all people of Kosovo.
Reporting committee: Political Affairs Committee.
Committee for opinion: Committee on Legal Affairs and Human
Rights.
Reference to committee: Reference No. 3324 of 16 March 2007.
Opinion approved by the committee on 21 January 2008. See
4th Sitting, 22 January 2008 (adoption of the draft resolution and
the draft recommendation, as amended); and Resolution 1595 and Recommendation 1822.
