C Explanatory memorandum, by Mr Lindblad
1 This war: a reason
for alarm
1. An all-out war in Europe, more
than 600 casualties, 192 000 displaced persons and uncountable suffering
and destruction.
2. Europe must be worried. Not only because it did not manage
to prevent this war but also because the conflict is far from being
over: ethnic Georgians in South Ossetia suffer violence and abuses
against which Russian forces fail to protect them; part of the Georgian
territory, including outside South Ossetia, is subjected to a military
occupation by Russian forces; South Ossetia and Abkhazia have declared
their independence from Georgia; Russia has given its blessing to
these declarations and concluded co-operation agreements with South
Ossetia and Abkhazia, including in the field of defence; the Geneva
conference foreseen by the EU-brokered ceasefire to discuss mechanisms
to ensure security and stability in the region will only be a technical meeting,
as no agreement could be found on the format of the conference.
3. We are a very long way away from cooling down the burning
ashes of this war. It is for all of us in Europe, including PACE,
to work with alacrity to create the preconditions for lasting peace.
2 Each one has
its share of responsibility
4. Once hostilities erupted in
Georgia in August this year, our Assembly decided that it was necessary
to clarify the facts and identify each player’s responsibilities.
To this end, the Bureau of the Assembly established a delegation
which visited Moscow, Tbilisi and South Ossetia last week, of which
I was a member. At the same time, the decision to initiate enquiries
was taken both by the Georgian and by the Russian parliaments, whilst Georgia
lodged cases against Russia before the European Court of Human Rights,
the International Court of Justice and the International Criminal
Court.
5. Establishing the facts, through commissions of enquiry or
through the work of courts of law, is certainly important. But politics
can also give an interpretation of the facts and judge responsibilities:
- there is a responsibility for
causing the war, which is the most difficult aspect to define. Once
and if evidence were to prove the exact sequence of events in the
night between 7 and 8 August, it would be possible to say who the
aggressor was that night. And yet, it would be unfair to attribute
to this aggressor the entire responsibility for the war as that
night was the culmination of a process which had started long before;
- there is a responsibility for the way in which the war
was conducted which, as described by the PACE Committee on Legal
Affairs and Human Rights, falls on both countries as the scale of
their military action, the targets and the kind of weapons employed
were disproportionate to the aim which the parties claimed to pursue;
- there is also a responsibility for creating the conditions
for a peaceful, lasting and lawful settlement of the conflict, which
implies complying with the terms of the ceasefire, protecting civilians
against violence and human rights violations in the areas subjected
to a country’s de facto control, and refraining from any act acknowledging
the mutilation of Georgia’s territorial integrity outside a peaceful
negotiation process. This responsibility falls mainly on Russia.
6. In addition to the parties who directly participated in the
conflict, the Council of Europe should also accept its part of responsibility:
either we grossly miscalculated the risks of an open conflict, in
which case we are to blame for our short-sightedness; or we saw
it coming but we did not have the courage or the means to exercise more
pressure on the countries involved, that are our own members. In
either case, our Organisation has a duty now to contribute to the
creation of conditions for a peaceful, durable and lawful settlement
of the conflict.
2.1 The run-up to
the war
7. In the months preceding the
outbreak of the hostilities there had been signs indicating a deterioration
of the situation:
- repeated
provocations, or acts perceived as such, from both sides;
- continued skirmishes and exchanges of fire between the
Georgian forces and the South Ossetian militias;
- a lull in the negotiations for the settlement of the conflicts,
which each part attributes to the lack of interest of the other
side;
- the announcement made by the Russian authorities in April
2008 that they would establish formal relations with the separatist
de facto authorities in Tskhinvali and Sukhumi;
- the strengthening of Russian military forces in the region,
in terms of troops and material.
8. In addition, the quest for a peaceful solution was inherently
hindered by two fundamental obstacles:
- the peacekeeping mechanism established by the 1992 Sochi
agreement was not workable. This agreement resulted in entrusting
Russian, Georgian and South Ossetian troops with peacekeeping tasks.Note It
was predictable that, if tensions surpassed a critical threshold,
these troops would drop their peacekeeping uniforms to wage war
against each other;
- similarly, it was not difficult to predict that the unilateral
bestowing of Russian citizenship on the majority of the population
of South Ossetia could be used by Russia to legitimise the use of
force to protect its citizens.
2.2 The war
9. Both Russia and Georgia accuse
the other side of having acted on the basis of a premeditated plan. Proving
the veracity of these claims goes beyond the capacity of the Assembly.
However, comparing the sequence of events on the night of 7 August
presented by the two parties, the key fact which remains to be ascertained
is whether:
- the Russian 58th
Army was brought into South Ossetia in response to the indiscriminate
and massive shelling of Tskhinvali by the Georgian artillery – as
the Russian authorities maintain – or;
- the shelling of Tskhinvali was in reaction to the massive
arrival in South Ossetia of Russian military contingents – as the
Georgian authorities argue.
10. So far no objective, independent and conclusive evidence,
such as satellite photographs, has been put forward in support of
either line.
2.3 The aftermath of the war
11. The behaviour of the two sides after the conclusion
of the ceasefire is also important in order to pinpoint responsibilities:
- Russian troops failed to comply
with the commitment to withdraw immediately to the positions they
held prior to the hostilities. According to the EU-brokered ceasefire
implementation agreement, their withdrawal should now be undertaken
by 10 October. However, the Russian authorities declare themselves
ready to withdraw their troops to be replaced by EU monitors only
from the so-called “buffer zone”, while they argue that, since Abkhazia
and South Ossetia are now two independent states, the deployment
of monitors in their territories is their sovereign decision. Similarly,
the withdrawal or deployment of troops is a separate issue regulated
by bilateral agreements;
- in this context, Russia’s recognition of the two separatist
regions as independent states defies European values and standards
and makes the return to the situation quo
ante more difficult to attain;
- Russian troops still de facto present in the so-called
“buffer zone” and South Ossetia are failing in their responsibility
for protecting people against violence, human rights violations
and ethnic cleansing.
3 Kosovo as a precedent:
a prediction or an announcement?
3.1 Russia’s recognition
of the independence of Abkhazia and South Ossetia
12. Russia’s recognition of Abkhazia
and South Ossetia as sovereign and independent states is contrary
to international law and a politically unacceptable act for a member
state of the Council of Europe to commit.
13. Given the gravity of this decision, I cannot but express disconcertion
at the fact that both chambers of the Russian Parliament unanimously
voted resolutions asking President Medvedev to recognise the independence
of the two breakaway regions. I consider such unanimous support
as a sign of the inability of Russia’s elected representatives to
interact with the executive in a democratic manner and to question
their government’s positions in foreign policy.
14. The promptness with which recognition was declared makes me
think that the script had already been written before. Indeed, in
the previous months, there had been numerous statements by high-ranking
Russian officials indicating that “the declaration and recognition
of Kosovo’s independence will force Russia to adjust its line regarding
Abkhazia and South Ossetia, where the majority of the population
has Russian citizenship”.
Note
15. The prediction that the independence of Kosovo would be used
as a precedent eventually came true. I cannot help asking myself
if, rather than a prediction, this was an announcement that Russia
would consider itself free to rely on Kosovo as a precedent: only
two months after the declaration of independence by the Kosovo Assembly,
Moscow announced that it would drop the embargo against the de facto
authorities in the two separatist Georgian regions and that it would
establish formal relations with them.
16. In Moscow, I had the opportunity to hear the arguments in
support of the independence of Abkhazia and South Ossetia:
- these regions have a history
of statehood and neither of them was part of Georgia at the time
of the Soviet Union;
- the population of these regions wants, and is ready for,
independence; in addition there are functioning institutions in
place;
- after the genocide attempt by the Georgians against the
population of these territories, it is inconceivable that they could
return under Georgia’s sovereignty.
17. With all due respect for the South Ossetian and Abkhaz victims
of this war, I think that labelling the Georgian attack against
Tskhinvali as attempted genocide is a deliberate exaggeration, which
is used to justify Russia’s disproportionate military intervention,
advance political objectives and manipulate the public opinion. At
the same time, any comparison with Kosovo does not hold water:
- Kosovo unilaterally declared
its independence following more than two years of painstaking negotiations,
after that a UN envoy had recommended independence as the only possible
outcome, and after a deadlock had emerged in the UN Security Council
due to Russia’s refusal to accept the solution recommended by the
envoy;
- Kosovo’s independence should be seen in the context of
the dissolution of the former Yugoslavia;
- Kosovo declared its independence after nine years of international
administration during which the sovereignty of Serbia over this
territory was purely formal;
- Kosovo Albanians had been subjected to ethnic cleansing
at the hands of Serbia, which made it inconceivable for them to
return under Serbia’s sovereignty.
18. In the light of some remarks I heard in Moscow about the fact
that people in South Ossetia hold Russian citizenship, that South
Ossetians feel that they are one single people with the North Ossetians,
that they were living in a single state at the time of the Soviet
Union, and that there is an excellent understanding between them
and the Russians, both being Slavs, I would not exclude that the
script continues with the outright incorporation of the self-declared
independent republic of South Ossetia into the Russian Federation,
and its merging with North Ossetia.
3.2 More consequences
in Russia’s near-abroad?
19. During the meetings in Moscow,
our delegation was repeatedly told that Abkhazia and South Ossetia are
unique cases and that Russia cannot see any other situation presenting
similarities. Will these cases be used as precedents? I do not know
if we can say so for sure.
20. The first obvious danger is that the declaration of independence
by Abkhazia and South Ossetia will inspire other regions, such as
Nagorno-Karabakh, to do likewise. Such a gesture would most probably
entail an armed conflict between the two states concerned. Besides,
the potential risk of enlargement of such a conflict to neighbouring
countries, one of which is a NATO member, should not be underestimated.
21. Secondly, even if Russian officials in Moscow assured us that
they do not have any interest in seeing any further changes of borders
in Europe, Russia’s closest geographical neighbours are preoccupied:
in Crimea, where the great majority of the population is ethnic
Russian, the process of “passportisation” has already started. It
has been going on for some time in the separatist region of Transnistria,
as well as in the Baltic states, where Russians are a sizeable minority
which, according to Moscow, suffers from severe discrimination.
22. Certainly, one of the consequences of the recent war between
Russia and Georgia is that all the former members of the USSR have
received a strong warning that they should respect Russia and its
strategic interests. This attitude is reminiscent of the “near-abroad
policy” – which Russia took the commitment to abandon upon becoming
a member of the Council of Europe – and the doctrine of limited
sovereignty for the countries belonging to the sphere of influence
– or interest – of a global power.
23. It is inevitable for a global power to have strategic interests;
the problem is how such interests are pursued. Members of the Council
of Europe should co-operate with one another in a constructive and
friendly spirit but, as the Speaker of Parliament of Georgia said
during the meeting with our delegation, how is it possible to have
friendly and good neighbourly relations with a big and powerful
country which disputes the sovereignty, the territorial integrity
and the freedom of choice of the other?
3.3 Consequences
in the Russian Federation?
24. Russia might also have underestimated
the consequences of the recognition of the independence of Abkhazia
and South Ossetia within the borders of the Russian Federation:
will Chechen separatists rely on these precedents to give more strength
to their demands? Are not there risks of further turmoil in Dagestan
and Ingushetia? What arguments would Russia use then? Would it still
call for the preservation of the territorial integrity of sovereign
countries?
4 Strategic interests:
defence and energy
4.1 Defence
25. Russia has always made clear
its discontent with NATO’s expansion and with the close ties that
the United States have established with some of its neighbours,
especially Georgia, but also central Asian countries which have
accepted to host US military bases or to make them available to
them.
Note Similarly,
it has repeatedly complained about the high expenditure of Georgia
in armaments and military equipment, and for the role played by
the United States in training and modernising the Georgian army.
26. The recent war has had immediate strategic advantages for
Russia in the field of defence, namely:
- the guarantee of having military bases in Abkhazia and
South Ossetia and the dismantlement of Georgia’s military capability;
- in addition, despite the establishment of the NATO-Georgia
Commission straight after the conflict, the war might have instilled
doubts in some NATO members about the wisdom of expanding NATO membership
to states such as Georgia and Ukraine, for fear of being dragged
into an armed conflict due to the reckless behaviour of some political
leaders. The war, therefore, might have led to a set-back to some
European countries’ aspirations to NATO membership.
27. On the other hand, the war has also had the effect of catalysing
the positions of those European states which want the West to stand
against Russia’s “imperialist and revisionist policy in the East
of Europe”, such as the Baltic states and Poland.
Note It is not
irrelevant that, on 14 August, Poland and the US signed an agreement on
the deployment of the missile-shield on Polish territory. A few
days later, amidst declarations from Russian military officials
that the Baltic Fleet based in Kaliningrad would be equipped with
nuclear warheads, Russia tested a stealth rocket which could penetrate
the US shield. This confrontational attitude on the part of Russia is
inexplicable, as the missile-shield is not directed against Russia
itself but at other non-European countries such as Iran. On the
other hand this flexing of muscles cannot but lead to an arms race
and, eventually, convince even more European countries that perhaps
it is exactly against Russia that they should be protected.
4.2 Energy
28. Georgia has a pivotal role
as a transit country for transporting Caspian oil to world markets,
bypassing Russia. In addition, gas from Azerbaijan and central Asia
transits to Europe through the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan (BTC) pipeline,
the Baku-Tbilisi-Erzurum pipeline, and by railroad, to be shipped
from Georgian ports such as Poti. Georgia also imports gas from
Azerbaijan through the Baku-Supsa pipeline and imports gas from
Russia to be transited to Armenia.
29. When the hostilities broke out, the BTC pipeline was shut
down because of an unrelated incident. Then, also the other pipelines
were shut down as a precautionary measure, while exports by sea
were severely hampered by the bombing of the port of Poti and the
naval blockade imposed by the Russian navy. After the formal cessation
of the hostilities, the rail route from Azerbaijan was also shut
down because of an explosion in the vicinity.
30. Energy is central to the recent war, at least in four respects:
- as one of the main world suppliers,
Russia’s confidence in its international relations is bolstered
by European dependency. On previous occasions, Russia has shown
that “it can close the tap”, which is an enormous means of pressure;
- due to the evident volatility of the security situation
in the region, customers and investors might tend to be more wary
of Georgia as a reliable transit country, which, on the one hand,
negatively affects Georgia’s economy and, on the other hand, increases
reliance upon Russian routes;
- the energy dependency on Russia is an element which divides
European states in their foreign policy towards this country. It
has not gone unnoticed during this crisis that countries which are
more dependent tend to be less critical than the others, and are
less prepared to agree to the enforcement of sanctions. This divide
undermines the unity of a common European position and diminishes
its strength;
- the simultaneous closure of all Georgian transit routes
has led another country in the region, Azerbaijan, to abstain from
taking an open position.
5 A new cold war?
31. It is not uncommon to hear
comments arguing that the West and Russia are engaged in a confrontation on
the world scene and that a new cold war has started. I must say
that I do not believe in this interpretation; in fact I think that
it is dangerous.
32. We should be careful not to be dragged into cold war stereotypes
or a cold war mentality, with mutual accusations between Washington
and Moscow of wanting to change the world’s geopolitical and strategic balance
and Europe being caught in between. The risk of this kind of discourse
is the re-emergence of a deep dividing line in Europe. This is contrary
to the very essence of the Council of Europe and we should act to prevent
this.
33. On the other hand, I agree that it is necessary to consider
the wider geo-political implications of this war and its consequences
for the maintenance of peace. Some European countries, led by France
– the current holder of the EU Presidency – have initiated a reflection
on the future of transatlantic relations, with a view to putting
forward a single European vision for it. In this process of reflection,
it will be important to take account of Russia’s concerns regarding
the current framework of European security and discuss its proposal
for a new collective treaty on European security.
6 What the Council
of Europe should do
34. It is also incumbent on the
international community, including the Council of Europe, to ensure
that the consequences of the war are, in so far as possible, redressed
and that there are no further consequences.
35. The Council of Europe, therefore, should draw some lessons
from its inadequacy in preventing tensions between its member states
from escalating into war. In so doing, it should critically reflect
on its activities and means of exercising leverage, in the light
of the fact that it is composed of countries with different and sometimes
opposed strategic interests, one of which is a global power.
36. In my view, the Council of Europe should:
- be firm as regards its principles
and values while preserving dialogue with all the parties involved
in the war;
- establish an enhanced monitoring procedure by the Committee
of Ministers of Russia’s and Georgia’s commitments and obligations,
as proposed by the Swedish Chairmanship of the Committee of Ministers;
- enhance co-operation with the countries concerned, with
a view to strengthening the implementation of democracy, human rights
and the rule of law;
- equip itself to act swiftly and flexibly to prevent tensions
between its member states from escalating beyond a critical level.
For instance, PACE could set up ad hoc committees of parliamentarians
drawn from different PACE committees with different specialisations,
with the task of parliamentary diplomacy, to promote the implementation
of previous PACE resolutions, or to mediate between the parties.
In a nutshell, the Council of Europe, and its Assembly, should develop
a role in the field of conflict prevention;
- naturally, having a role in the field of conflict prevention
implies having the political courage to address frozen conflicts
and other conflict situations affecting the close national interests
of some member states, including “old democracies”;
- envisage a new system of sanctions, which enables the
Organisation to exercise leverage without excluding the country
which is sanctioned from dialogue.
7 Conclusions of
the rapporteur
I share the main views expressed by the rapporteurs of the
Monitoring Committee. However, I would like to add the following
considerations:
- both Georgia
and Russia share a part of the responsibility for the conflict and
the prospects of its solution;
- at the same time, this share of responsibility is not
equal, weighing more heavily on Russia, namely as regards its line
of conduct after the cessation of the hostilities;
- Russia should withdraw the recognition of the independence
of the two breakaway regions of Abkhazia and South Ossetia;
- the territorial integrity of Georgia cannot be questioned,
cannot be subjected to any negotiations, and must be preserved by
refusing to do anything which might lead to the acquiescence of
the secession of parts of Georgian territory;
- in its foreign policy, Russia should refrain from any
temptation to consider its neighbouring countries as having limited
sovereignty: each state should be free to choose its alliances and
its course of foreign affairs;
- Russia should immediately put an end to its policy of
granting passports to citizens of other member states who have not
requested it;
- Russia should refrain from using citizenship and energy
as means to advance its political objectives;
- the Council of Europe should acknowledge its responsibility
for not having being able to prevent the war;
- the Assembly should:
- preserve
dialogue with all the parties involved in the war;
- develop an active role in the field of conflict prevention
and conflict resolution and, to this end, set up mechanisms for
parliamentary diplomacy;
- address systematically the question of frozen conflicts
in Europe;
- envisage a new system of sanctions, which enables the
Organisation to exercise leverage without excluding the country
which is sanctioned from dialogue.
Reporting committee: Committee on the Honouring of
Obligations and Commitments by Member States of the Council
of Europe (Monitoring Committee).
Committee for opinion: Political Affairs Committee. Reference
to committee: Reference No. 3489 on 29 September 2008.
Opinion approved by the committee on 1 October 2008. See Resolution
1633 and Recommendation 1846 (35th Sitting,
2 October 2008).
