Relationship between the parliamentary majority and the opposition in a democracy
- Author(s):
- Parliamentary Assembly
- Origin
- Assembly
debate on 15 April 2024 (9th sitting) (see Doc. 15946, report of Committee on Political Affairs and Democracy,
rapporteur: Ms Elvira Kovács). Text adopted
by the Assembly on 15 April 2024 (9th sitting).
1. The promotion and consolidation
of pluralist democracy are among the main objectives of the Council
of Europe and its Parliamentary Assembly. The member States of the
Council of Europe shall endeavour to develop common standards and
practices aimed at promoting a free and pluralist parliamentary
democracy, and the means for their implementation in national parliaments.
2. All national parliaments have provisions acknowledging the
role of the opposition or the parliamentary minority in their dimension
as political groups or individual parliamentarians that do not support
the government.
3. The best way of ensuring that the opposition discharges its
responsibilities is to extend and precisely define its rights. However,
in only a few Council of Europe member States do the laws or constitution
explicitly mention the role of the opposition. Some constitutions
recognise the opposition only in outline, leaving much of the detail
to be determined by ordinary legislation, statutory law or parliamentary
rules of procedure, or by convention, custom and tradition.
4. While there are considerable differences in the political
and institutional cultures and components of European States, it
is however possible to identify certain general principles that
govern the relationship between the parliamentary majority and its
opposition and that reflect the common European constitutional heritage.
5. One major objective of parliamentary democracies is to create
a situation where there is a shared commitment to the essential
principles of democracy by the majority and minority and a common
desire to make “their” parliament work properly for the public good.
There is still a long way to go before this objective is reached
in the wider Europe. A strengthened position for the opposition
in parliaments would be beneficial for the system of checks and
balances in democracies.
6. More than any other forum, parliament is the place where democracy
manifests itself and, in our societies, there is hardly any debate
that radically challenges the actual principle of representative
democracy. Parliament is the institution that embodies society in
the diversity of its composition and opinions, and which relays
and channels this diversity in the political process. Its vocation
is to regulate tensions and maintain an equilibrium between the
competing claims of diversity and uniformity, individuality and
collectivity, in order to enhance social cohesion and solidarity.
7. A democratic parliamentary system presumes an ethic of self-restraint
on the part of the majority, with respect for the rights and interests
of the minority. Not all possible advantages should be taken, nor
are they taken in mature parliamentary systems. In parliaments where
such a political culture exists, often with unwritten parliamentary
conventions, there is less need for legal guarantees for the opposition
and minority. In new democracies, without such democratic traditions,
the need for formal rules protecting the opposition may often be
stronger.
8. Opposition rights are considered as an institutionalised power
possessed by the opposition in parliament, which encompasses and
goes beyond the rights of individual legislators to speak and vote
against government bills. Enshrining and clearly defining rights
and guarantees in law is an effective tool for the functioning of
the parliamentary opposition. Institutional procedures, recognition,
legitimisation and institutionalisation of the parliamentary opposition
are central to the very idea of constitutional democracy and an
integral part of the political culture.
9. The legitimisation of the parliamentary opposition in the
constitution, laws and rules of procedure provides, on the one hand,
legal guarantees within government–opposition relations to limit
the political influence of the parliamentary majority on the minority.
On the other hand, by placing the opposition on an equal footing
with the majority, it requires them to be jointly legally responsible
for the exercise of power.
10. Effective opposition can help the government to avoid mistakes
– or swiftly correct them – thereby improving governance outcomes.
Therefore, the existence of an effective parliamentary opposition
that is able to scrutinise the policy of a governing majority is
a visible symbol of the salvation of the State political order and parliament
itself.
11. The document
“Parameters
on the Relationship between the Parliamentary Majority and the Opposition in
a Democracy: a checklist” (“checklist”) is the result
of long and careful work carried out by the European Commission
for Democracy through Law (Venice Commission), which originated
in Resolution 1601 (2008) “Procedural guidelines on the rights and
responsibilities of the opposition in a democratic parliament” of
the Assembly. The Venice Commission concluded that it is important
to explore the ways and means by which the role of the parliamentary
opposition can be better regulated and protected in a formal manner
and that it is a worthy effort to introduce soft regulations in
an area which is essential for the proper functioning of parliamentary
democracy. The use of the checklist should be widely promoted among
national parliaments, and the Assembly should contribute to this
effort, directly and through its political groups.
12. In the light of these considerations, the Assembly:
12.1 welcomes the development of
the Venice Commission’s Parameters on the Relationship between the
Parliamentary Majority and the Opposition in a Democracy: a checklist,
and endorses this checklist as adopted;
12.2 disseminates and recommends the checklist to the parliaments
of the Council of Europe member and observer States, as well as
to the parliaments enjoying observer or partner for democracy status with
the Assembly;
12.3 encourages member States to ensure that their democratic
mechanisms are given political legitimacy through integrity, as
trust in parliaments shapes both the stability and quality of democracy; only
together can the parliamentary majority and opposition create inclusive,
prosperous and sustainable societies;
12.4 invites the parliaments of the member States of the Council
of Europe to promote the checklist and to take it into account when
revising the relevant national rules or developing best practices;
12.5 encourages the parliaments of the member States of the
Council of Europe to engage in a dialogue on how to improve the
existing national rules on the relationship between the parliamentary majority
and the opposition in a democracy.
13. As regards its own activities, the Assembly resolves to take
into account the checklist in its monitoring work. It also resolves
to play a greater role in promoting the checklist by:
13.1 inviting its political groups
to revise their statutory rules and rules of procedure, and to include provisions
specifying the procedure and requirements for, and the consequences
of, switches in political affiliation and the suspension, expulsion
or resignation of members;
13.2 encouraging its political groups to enhance discussions
on how to improve the relationship between the parliamentary majority
and the opposition in a democracy;
13.3 holding debates on how to develop the legal environment,
including soft law, and the best practices determining the relationship
between the parliamentary majority and the opposition in a democracy;
13.4 stepping up interparliamentary co-operation activities
addressing the improvement of the relationship between the parliamentary
majority and the opposition in a democracy;
13.5 continuing to review, in co-operation with the Venice
Commission, the checklist and the issues raised in it, with a view
to developing it further if required.
