B Explanatory memorandum
by Mr Pierre-Alain Fridez, rapporteur
1 Introduction
1. On 26 May 2023, the Committee
on Social Affairs, Health and Sustainable Development tabled a motion for
a resolution entitled “Social mobilisation, social unrest and police
Note reaction in Council
of Europe member States: need for a new social contract?”. The motion
was referred to the committee for report and I was appointed rapporteur
on 25 March 2024.
2. The motion for a resolution was prompted inter alia by the social mobilisation
surrounding the planned pension reforms in France in 2023. This
reform sparked social mobilisation on a scale rarely seen, with
violence directed against demonstrators and law-enforcement officers
alike. The reform, which was approved by the Constitutional Council,
was pushed through by the French Government, invoking Article 49.3
of the Constitution.
3. In line with the motion for a resolution, I have thus taken
as my starting point the social mobilisation in France. The French
examples have indeed been striking in several respects: the recurrence
and, sometimes, radicalisation of social unrest and the violence
of the police response. I start from the premise that this dynamic reveals
a feeling of disconnection between certain sections of the population
and those in power, as well as structural difficulties in establishing
dialogue in a less vertical way of operating. The issue in hand
is to examine the conditions for a renewed social contract that
motivates citizens to feel and act as full members of society.
4. The report also aims to explore other countries’ experiences
of social mobilisation, to demonstrate that the challenges facing
France are not unique. In 2023, for example, Greece experienced
a protest movement following the Tempi rail disaster, marked by
clashes with the law-enforcement officers and criticism of the disproportionate
use of force; in the Netherlands, in 2024, pro-Palestinian demonstrations
in Amsterdam led to violence and arrests, sparking a public debate
on the police response and the balance to be preserved in a State
governed by the rule of law.
Note It
was obvious from the outset, when preparing this report, that France
does not have a monopoly on social mobilisation or on the use of
force in the event of excesses – these are commonplace. On the other
hand, it became clear over the course of documentary research, meetings,
and hearings, that the report could usefully draw on protest management
models, social dialogue frameworks, and democratic practices from
various Council of Europe member States, insofar as these offer
avenues for reflection and improvement. In my opinion, such mechanisms,
whether they be strategies for dialogue and de-escalation in the
handling of demonstrations or citizen participation and community
policing practices, are likely to increase the legitimacy and authority
of, and build trust in, institutions and prevent social polarisation.
They presuppose a process of critical reflection on methods of State
intervention, to which this report will attempt to contribute.
5. The traditional concept of liberal democracy is confronted
in all member States with multiple challenges, and everywhere cohesion
and pluralism are threatened by the loss of public trust in institutions
and elected officials, by the polarisation of a large segment of
the population, and by the questioning of institutional legitimacy.
I hope that this report will contribute to the ongoing reflection
on current social and political dynamics and on how best to address
the lack of connection and erosion of trust between citizens and
the authorities, particularly those responsible for maintaining
public order.
6. The ultimate aim will be to identify ways of living together
better that align with the New Democratic Pact for Europe announced
by the Secretary General of the Council of Europe.
2 Working methods and scope of the report
7. This report does not purport
to provide an exhaustive analysis of the underlying issues. The
examples provided have been selected to illustrate my point and
to convey certain messages.
8. This choice primarily concerns the social movements studied.
The term “social movements” generally refers to “a set of concerted
collective actions aimed at changing or defending the social order”.
Note With this in mind,
I analysed five different types of social mobilisation over a six-year
period in France. The first, in chronological order and in terms
of scale, is the “Gilets jaunes” (yellow vest) movement: having
begun in 2018 as a protest initially focused on fuel tax increases,
it quickly broadened to include concerns about economic inequalities
and the feeling of decline among the working and middle classes.
I then looked at the high school and student protests that emerged
in 2018 in reaction to reforms to the baccalaureate and access to
higher education. I also cited the example of the 2023 protests
around the mega-basin of Sainte-Soline, a reservoir designed to
store water for agriculture. The fourth example is the situation
that prompted the motion for a resolution: the 2023 pension reform,
as embodied in the law of 14 April 2023 amending the financing of
the social security system (“pension law”), which sparked widespread
massive protests throughout the country. Lastly, although not strictly
speaking a social movement, I examined the urban riots that broke
out in the summer of 2023 following the death of a young man during
a roadside check.
9. Secondly, the choice concerns the stakeholders interviewed
all of whom are “insiders”, legitimate and essential in a State
governed by the rule of law. I was authorised by the Committee on
Social Affairs, Health and Sustainable Development to carry out
a fact-finding visit to Paris. On 20 and 21 January 2025, I met
with representatives of the strategy and inspection departments
of the police and gendarmerie at the Ministry of the Interior, the
Defender of Rights, representatives of the National Consultative
Commission on Human Rights (Commission nationale consultative des
droits de l’homme (CNCDH)) and the Human Rights League (LDH), Mr Sébastian
Roché, sociologist and research director at the National Centre
for Scientific Research (CNRS), specialist in security, policing
and institutional trust, members of the French Democratic Confederation
of Labour (Confédération française démocratique du travail (CFDT)).
On 6 May 2025, I met with members of the French Parliament and representatives
of police trade unions UNSA (National Union of Autonomous Trade Unions)-Police
and Alliance Police Nationale. I wish to take this opportunity to
thank all those with whom I spoke, and their colleagues who made
these high-level exchanges possible (a list can be found in the Appendix).
10. I also heard first-hand accounts from young people who confronted
law-enforcement officers and who came to give their testimony. On
7 March 2025,
Note the Committee on Social Affairs,
Health and Sustainable Development held a hearing in Paris with
an activist from the association Action Climat Justice (Paris) who
was injured by a shot fired during environmental protests in 2023;
representatives of the association Ghett'Up, which works to promote
equality, citizenship and social justice and to empower young people
from disadvantaged neighbourhoods; and representatives of Droits
dans les yeux, an association run by and for young people to help
them know and understand their rights. Mr David Dufresne, a journalist,
writer and documentary filmmaker specialising in police violence
and social movements, was also heard.
11. Thirdly, the choice was guided by my desire to understand
the root causes of the unrest. The fact-finding visit gave me an
opportunity to talk to senior gendarmerie and police officials as
well as police unions about their vision of law enforcement and
expectations. These interlocutors emphasised in particular that
clashes between law-enforcement officers and protesters are rare,
and that the vast majority of demonstrations take place in an orderly
and peaceful manner, a message to which I was highly receptive and
which I wish to transmit as an element to be kept in mind.
12. The report is structured around the three pillars of the social
contract. After looking at the place of law enforcement in a democracy
(symptoms of structural divides), the report turns to measures that
reinforce social control while at the same time exacerbating marginalisation
(the root causes of divides) before, lastly, exploring institutional
practices that have the potential to build citizens’ confidence
and prevent polarisation (ways to heal divides).
3 Mobilisation
and repression: symptoms of structural breakdown of the social contract
13. This chapter addresses several
visible and specific manifestations of the breakdown of the social contract
in France. Protests and other forms of dissent are symptoms of frustration,
expressed through immediate and visible responses to issues felt
by parts of the population. The discussions that I held with representatives
of law enforcement, police unions, the executive and members of
parliament showed that some recent social movements have been marked
by the emergence of organised “rioter groups” whose intention is
to provoke violence against institutions, as well as by a weakening
of the structure of protests – or even the absence of any clearly
identified organisers.
Note
14. The way in which the State deals with such “unrest”, using
strong, sometimes violent means to restore order, is another tangible
manifestation of this breakdown. This is not the first time that
the Parliamentary Assembly and other Council of Europe bodies express
concern about this issue and relay the recommendations made by civil
society.
Note Only recently, in a judgment
handed down on 27 February 2025, the European Court of Human Rights
ruled against France, holding that it had violated the right to
life through serious mistakes that led to the death of Rémi Fraisse,
an environmental activist killed by a grenade in 2014.
Note Among the issues of concern already
raised, I would like to highlight two where I hope my proposals
will meet with broad support both in France and beyond.
3.1 Choices
around actions
15. One observation must be made:
since the third national mobilisation of the “Gilets jaunes” on 1 December
2018, which numbered around 136 000 demonstrators according to the
Ministry of the Interior and was marked by violent clashes with
law enforcement officers, we have witnessed a change in the public
order doctrine. Historically based on keeping demonstrators at a
distance, avoiding direct contact and using strictly proportionate
and exceptional force, this doctrine has long been a model for the
democratic management of crowds, in a context where public support
for republican institutions remained solid. In recent years, however, it
has tended to be replaced by a more rapid and offensive intervention
approach, based on the principles of “mobility, responsiveness and
firmness”.
Note This evolution has been accompanied
by an extension of police practices, initially reserved for situations
of urban violence, to all law-enforcement operations.
Note
16. I chose to examine one characteristic aspect of this shift,
namely the increasing use of intermediate-force weapons (non-lethal),
Note in
particular defence ball launchers (LBDs),
Note which use a “projectile
designed to collapse or disperse on impact and limit the risk of
penetration into a living body” aimed at “deterring or neutralising
a violent and/or dangerous person” prior to the use of individual
weapons.
Note “In
the early 1990s, these less lethal intermediate weapons, i.e. weapons
that are not supposed to kill, began to appear. Gradually, these
tools spread from specialised units to the BAC [Anti-Crime Brigade],
in response to rioting in the suburbs. Their use was then extended
to community police officers in 2000, after which they became widely
available in law enforcement units.”
Note
17. Although “less lethal”, the fact remains that LBDs present
all the features of weapons of war and their use in demonstrations
causes serious, sometimes irreversible, mutilating and even fatal
injuries
Note.
The “Gilets jaunes” movement saw a sharp rise in the use of such
weapons, particularly by non-specialist law-enforcement units. During
the period covering the “Gilets jaunes” movement, according to the
National Police Inspectorate General (IGPN), 13 460 LBD rounds were
fired by police officers, 15% of which were fired by members of
the CRS (Republican Security Corps) and 85% by urban police officers.
The National Gendarmerie Inspectorate (IGGN) estimated the number
of rounds fired at around 1 000.
Note In
2023, the IGPN put the number of LBD rounds fired at 21 989.
Note
18. Equipping law-enforcement officers, in particular urban police
forces, with LBDs and authorising their use in crowd control are
political decisions. The differences between European countries
serve to illustrate this point. Only France, Poland and Greece allow
the unrestricted use of LBDs. In Spain, all regions use them except
Catalonia, but they are reserved for the gendarmerie. Ireland, the
Scandinavian countries, the Netherlands and Austria do not use LBDs.
Elsewhere, for example in the United Kingdom, they may be used, but
not in policing demonstrations.
Note In
Switzerland, the Bern cantonal police use them in violent demonstrations,
while in the Vaud gendarmerie, only the Rapid Action and Deterrence
Unit uses them, and then only occasionally in prisons or to subdue
dangerous individuals.
Note In
Germany, police officers are not equipped with grenades, including
tear gas grenades. The weapon of choice is water cannons. LBDs are banned
in all but two of the sixteen Länder and are reserved for special
units. Police unions themselves are opposed to the use of weapons
of this kind.
Note
19. “If we get rid of LBDs, there will be deaths from bullets.
I'd rather cause a guy to lose an eye than put a live bullet in
him”.
Note This
argument, put forward by some unions, is not borne out by any credible
studies.
Note There are
plenty of reports and proposals that can feed into the debate and
challenge such assumptions. Since 2018, the Defender of Rights has
been calling for LBDs to be withdrawn from the list of equipment
issued to police officers carrying out law-enforcement operations.
Note In 2021, the
French National Assembly recommended banning the use of the LBD
during crowd movements, with certain exceptions.
Note. In 2019, the Council
of Europe Commissioner for Human Rights had taken up the baton.
Note In 2024, the United Nations Human Rights
Committee recommended that France “reconsider […] whether the law
enforcement authorities should be authorized to use intermediate
weapons, in particular explosive grenades and handheld projectile launchers,
to maintain order during demonstrations”.
Note As
a matter of fact, almost all of the civil society representatives
and experts met during the fact-finding visit are of the same view:
aside from the issue of training in the handling of LBDs, which
remains grossly inadequate for the non-specialised forces that are
the main users,
Note it
is questionable whether such weapons should be used at all in law
enforcement operations: “arbitrary and dangerous, their use in policing
demonstrations is counterproductive.” This is due to their technical
characteristics – LBDs are an imprecise weapon, whose outcome when
used in crowd control is highly unpredictable.
3.2 Choices
around words
20. I have taken note of the reflection
initiated by several Council of Europe member States on de-escalation (GODIAC
project), which places dialogue and avoiding indiscriminate use
of force at the heart of law enforcement. The explanation for these
choices lies not in the fact that the countries in question do not experience
violence during demonstrations of course, but rather in their evolving
conception of the relationship between law-enforcement authorities
and the public and the role of the police in a democracy.
Note Within the framework of this project,
the police are viewed as a partner promoting a relationship of trust
with the public, with the aim of safeguarding the democratic right
to demonstrate and reducing the overall level of violence. The model
that emerges highlights four concepts: knowledge of protest groups,
facilitating the smooth running of demonstrations to enable them
to achieve their legitimate goals, communication at all stages of
the demonstration and differentiation so that anyone causing trouble
can be dealt with individually.
Note
21. It must be noted that, despite the presidential announcements
before the Assembly
Note and a revision of the national law enforcement
plan in 2020 which in particular allowed the withdrawal of explosive
grenades from the arsenal,
Note the
practices observed in France over the last few years do not seem
to be based on a strategy of de-escalation, but rather tend to raise
tensions upstream by often anticipating demonstrations as a place
of conflict rather than as a legitimate space for democratic expression.
22. The handling of the protests against the mega-basin in Sainte-Soline
in March 2023, with the aim at preventing access to the site is
a case in point. Instead of adopting a communication approach aimed
at ensuring that the demonstrations remained peaceful, as per the
best practice recommended by the Council of Europe and the United
Nations,
Note long
before the protests started, a government minister branded the environmental
activists as “eco-terrorists” and predicted scenes reminiscent of
a war zone. Such rhetoric, which has been observed in other European
countries, has been criticised by Michel Forst, United Nations Special
Rapporteur on Environmental Defenders under the Aarhus Convention.
Note Describing the
sequence of events in Sainte-Soline, a report by France’s Observatories
of Public Freedoms and Police Practices notes that “even before
the protesters arrived at the site (...), pairs of armed gendarmes
wearing motorcycle helmets and mounted on 20 quads came into contact
with the processions. (...), the decision had clearly been taken
to use force against the processions (...) in the absence of any
hostile acts on their part, and without any warning.” The report
also notes the indiscriminate use of 5 015 tear gas grenades, 89
stingball grenades, 40 explosive devices and 81 LBD rounds fired
at 30 000 demonstrators over a period of two hours, in what is described
as an “exceptionally intense display of excessive use of force”.
Note
23. Of course, there are violent groups within these demonstrations
who seek to clash with the police at all costs. However, the authorities
themselves observe that these actions are carried out by a tiny
minority
Note and that they could be managed
more effectively if the police adopted a more collaborative approach
with the organisers and participants. The French National Assembly's
commission of Inquiry into the violence surrounding the spring 2023
protests clearly supports this approach. Among the measures to strengthen
the arsenal of law enforcement, it recommends improving communication
with protesters, increasing co-operation with organisers and providing
in-depth training in crowd control for non-specialised units.
Note
24. New approaches to crowd psychology have emerged which suggest
policing strategies based on an interactionist model that, rather
than pitting the police against protesters, includes the police
in the assessment process. Such approaches help the police to perceive
their actions from the standpoint of the demonstrators, providing
keys to preventing the escalation of violence. It was on this basis
and drawing on experiments conducted in several European countries
that the aforementioned GODIAC model was developed.
Note The Belgian
reference framework is one of the most successful iterations of
this model in Europe today. From the 2000s, Belgium decided to abandon
the concept of maintaining order in favour of “negotiated management
of public space”. In concrete terms, recognising the inherently
conflictual nature of relations between social groups, the Belgian
authorities advocated a role for the police in accompanying demonstrations
from a risk management perspective. The function of the police is
to act as a third-party mediator and, for each public order event,
to strike a balance between the individual and collective demands
and interests of all stakeholders. This transformation owes much
to the Belgian police’s open-minded attitude to social science research.
Note
4 Relations
with young people from disadvantaged neighbourhoods: roots of a
breakdown of the social contract
25. This chapter focuses on young
people from “disadvantaged neighbourhoods” (meaning neighbourhoods that
face significant social disadvantage). Following the approach chosen
for this report, I decided to start from the situation in France
to explore the interaction between the police and these groups and
how they perceive each other. I am well aware that disillusionment
with school, the spatial confinement of young people in “peripheral”
areas, the failure of public services in disadvantaged neighbourhoods,
and the role of social media in shaping perceptions are major background
factors in the feeling of powerlessness and the use of violence as
a means of expression in such neighbourhoods,
Note even
if these factors cannot be examined within the compass of this report.
26. This issue has found its way onto the political agenda of
many member States.
Note In
France, I observed a gap between strong reformist pressure and structural
inertia.
Note Here
too, I consider that the relationship of trust between authorities
and the public is a key element for building on avenues for improvement
that I deem both realistic and acceptable. Indeed, these avenues
– considered in a comparative perspective with other member States
– emerge from surveys conducted among law enforcement officers themselves
and resonated in my discussions with representatives of the Ministry
of the Interior and police unions
4.1 Choices
around actionsNote
27. In 2018, France was the scene
of student protests in response to reforms to the baccalaureate
and access to higher education, which were criticised in particular
for the inequalities of opportunity and discrimination they could
generate.
Note These
fears led to demonstrations, school blockades, acts of violence and
clashes with the police. On 6 December 2018, in Mantes-la-Jolie
(Yvelines), around 150 young people, mainly secondary school pupils
aged between 12 and 21, were arrested following violence during
a blockade of secondary schools. A police officer filmed the scene
showing rows of students kneeling with their hands on their heads,
as helmeted, armed police officers looked on. The police officer
can be heard saying, “Now there’s a class that knows how to behave,”
a phrase that has come to be seen as emblematic of the events. The images,
which went viral, shocked both the public and politicians across
the board.
Note While
social networks most likely played a role in amplifying the situation
while ignoring the overall context, for many young people living
in disadvantaged neighbourhoods, the arrests were the epitome of
unfair, excessive and humiliating treatment and marked a turning
point. “I was a high school student in Mantes-la-Jolie in 2018.
That episode shaped us.” “What happened that day changed my life.
After that, I was committed.”
Note The
IGPN’s administrative investigation into the officers involved in
the arrests was closed in 2019, while the judicial inquiry launched
in response to a civil complaint led to the case being dismissed
in April 2025. The findings were more or less the same: the law
enforcement practices used pursued a legitimate aim and were necessary
and proportionate.
28. The urban violence that took place from 27 June to 7 July
2023 following the death of Nahel Merzouk – a young man shot dead
by a police officer at a traffic stop in Nanterre – also left a
lasting impression because of its scale and intensity. 750 towns
across France were affected, 50 000 rioters took to the streets,
the majority of them young people, and 45 000 law enforcement officers
were deployed. Tragically, two people died and around a thousand
were injured, mostly law enforcement officers. There was also extensive
damage to property. The report produced by the parliamentary commission
of inquiry into the riots
Note notes “the violent outburst
of anger at institutions and representatives of public authority”
fuelled “by a feeling of social exclusion, based on a disconnect,
which is endured or nurtured, between the rioters and the rest of
the population” not to mention the impact of group dynamics and
the role of social media. The report concludes with recommendations
focused on strengthening security and penalties for demonstrators.
One discovery made during the discussions with the CNCDH and the
Defender of Rights was that no steps have been taken in the wake
of these protests to address the root causes of the violence. The
only structural response has been a bill aimed at restoring the
authority of the justice system over juvenile offenders and their
parents. Driven by the feeling that “some of our teenagers are slowly
sliding into a form of isolation, individualism, and in some cases worse:
a form of unbridled, shameless, lawless violence”, it aims in particular
to encourage parents to take greater responsibility.
Note
29. Underlying these tensions between young people in disadvantaged
neighbourhoods and the law-enforcement officers, identity checks
are the most visible “sore point”.
Note “The first
time I was stopped, I was ten years old. The last time was three
days ago.”“Compared with the population as a whole, all other things
being equal, young men who are perceived as Arab/North African or
Black are 20 times more likely to be stopped than others”.
Note
30. Although governed by the Code of Criminal Procedure, which
requires that there be objective grounds for suspicion, statistics
and field surveys confirm that identity checks disproportionately
affect young Black and Arab men, or those perceived as such, living
in disadvantaged neighbourhoods, something many observers interpret
as ethnic profiling.
Note On 9 April 2025, the Defender
of Rights published the results of a field investigation in the
Paris region and stated that they demonstrate that there is an institutional
policy within the national police force aimed at removing from Parisian
public spaces categories of people defined by the police as “undesirable”
on the basis of their age, gender, ethnic and racial profiling,
and economic precariousness.
Note
31. Repeated checks, perceived as discriminatory and humiliating,
as well as multiple fines/verbalisations, fuel resentment towards
law-enforcement officers, who in turn have to contend with a growing
number of incidents involving verbal abuse and defiance. In 2023,
the Conseil d’État acknowledged that discriminatory checks were
not “isolated cases”, but did not consider them to be “systemic
and widespread”,
Note while a 2024 report by France’s
Court of Auditors described the practice as taking place on a massive
scale with little oversight and “unclear objectives”: 47 million
checks were carried out in 2021, 94% of which did not result in any
arrests.
Note Our
Assembly and the European Commission against Racism and Intolerance
(ECRI) have been condemning such practices for years.
Note In
2024, addressing the United Nations Human Rights Committee, which
was concerned about allegations of profiling by the law-enforcement
officers,
Note French representatives
stated that “there can be no ethnic profiling within our Republic”.
Note
4.2 Choices
around words
32. “My first experience with the
police was when I was 15. I was slapped. I didn't file a complaint
because I didn't know my rights. We are seen as a nuisance, as enemies.
We don't even know how to communicate with the police to clarify
what they want if there is a misunderstanding”.
Note From the perspective
of the young people interviewed, the sense of misunderstanding runs
deep: first and foremost, they seek to understand what attitude
they should adopt when faced with a negative interaction with the
police, such as yet another identity check. From the law enforcement
perspective, beyond the fact that identity checks objectively serve
to combat crime, there is a similarly deep sense of incomprehension
regarding the decline in “respect for the institution” they represent.
This disconnect can be attributed, in part, to insufficient training,
which those concerned are the first to acknowledge: young recruits
sent to the front line in disadvantaged neighbourhoods are not made aware
of the effects of cognitive and discriminatory biases, are often
unaware of the specific traits of the areas they patrol and can
quickly find themselves in a confrontational situation and exposed
to tensions (insults and verbal abuse).
Note
33. This asymmetry of views is not unique to France. In almost
all European countries, critical incidents, knowledge produced by
non-governmental organisations and efforts by independent human
rights bodies have helped to raise awareness and make police checks
a topic of public debate. These initiatives have led to reforms
in legislation and policing policies to varying degrees, depending
on the pressure exerted by civil society on political players.
Note
34. Receipts containing information on the context of the identity
check, the legal basis, the specific reasons for the check and its
outcome are one common reform when it comes to analysing models
of practice and identifying bias. In the United Kingdom, the process
of reflection began in 1981 after the Brixton riots, when the widespread
use of stop and search among young Black men was identified as one
of the immediate causes of the unrest. The first legislative move
was to require the police to record their stops and make the data
available to those stopped. In 2014, another round of reforms led
to a review of the legislation governing reasonable suspicion, the
scrapping of individual targets for officers in relation to identity
checks, a review of stop and search training and the introduction
of training on unconscious racial bias.
Note In England, between 2008-2009 and 2018-2019,
the number of recorded stop-and-searches fell sixfold (from around
1 500 000 to fewer than 300 000). The British approach inspired
the Strategies for Effective Police Stop and Search (STEPSS) project, launched
in 2007 for 22 months in eight locations across Spain, Hungary and
Bulgaria to combat ethnic profiling during identity checks by introducing,
among other things, the requirement to fill out a stop form.
Note
35. In France, the Defender of Rights, the CNCDH and non-governmental
organisations, followed by the Court of Cassation,
Note have succeeded in bringing the
issue of identity checks to the attention of policy makers. These
campaigns have yielded results, with the deployment of body-cams
within the police force, the widespread use of identification numbers
Note, and the introduction of a
complaints mechanism for reporting inappropriate behaviour by law
enforcement officers. This is not enough, however. Not only is the
decision to switch on the camera left to the officer’s discretion,
but also complaints are filed with inspection services staffed by
police officers or gendarmes, there is nothing to ensure that officers
actually wear their ID badges and display them clearly, and the
traceability of checks and their follow-up remain inadequate.
Note Our Assembly, the ECRI and the
United Nations Human Rights Committee have called for the introduction
of an effective traceability and monitoring system to highlight
discrimination, ensure that the police are accountable for their actions
and build trust in them.
Note Despite presidential campaign
promises and pressure from the courts, these reforms have not been
adopted: in 2025, the French authorities are unable to provide information
on the number of identity checks carried out, the locations and
times of these checks and the populations affected. As for training,
this consists of a few hours of theory, with participants being
issued with a copy of the code of conduct in which the word “citizen”
appears for the first time on page 10 and the word “dialogue” is
absent.
Note
36. Another area for possible progress warrants close attention,
in the light of a fast-growing line of inquiry in Anglo-Saxon countries
around the concept of “procedural justice”. This is based on the
premise that the legitimacy of law-enforcement authorities stems
more from their operational methods – such as listening, respectful
conduct, communication, and availability – focused on crime prevention
through knowledge of local communities and challenges, than from
measurable outcomes of police interventions.
Note
37. What particularly interests me as rapporteur is that, although
the concept is not widely recognised in France, the reflection on
procedural justice is at the root of public policies aimed at better
integrating the police into the social fabric – such as the community
policing model of the “guardian of the peace,” which is, for its part,
widely supported in France.
Note Since the phasing-out of this model of
policing since 2003 is seen as having contributed to the deterioration
in relations between the police and the public, it is reasonable
to suppose that reintroducing community policing alongside special
police units would help to bring the police closer to the community
in neighbourhoods where this is needed. Experiments conducted in
various member States have shown that with its local roots, visible
presence and the development of local partnerships, community policing helps
to prevent tensions and better meet local expectations in terms
of security and dialogue.
Note
5 Disconnections
in the democratic process: consolidating the social contract
38. “Democracy is not about consensus
but dissensus.”
Note Free
elections, separation of powers, and a multiparty system are essential
components of democracy, but they alone do not guarantee a truly
vibrant democratic life. This chapter aims to explore how certain
dynamics of a somewhat top-down model of democratic governance can
foster a sense of disconnection between the top of the State and
society. Two particularly significant factors emerge. First, a tendency
to no longer view protest as a legitimate contribution to democratic
pluralism, but as a disruption to public order – an outlook that
can encourage the rise of alternative, sometimes violent, forms
of dissent.
Note Second, a high degree of power centralisation.
While this model offers certain advantages – such as a clear embodiment
of the State, the ability to project a long-term vision, and to
arbitrate between conflicting interests – it also reveals limitations,
particularly regarding the space granted to checks and balances,
public debate, and social dialogue. On the basis of these findings,
I sought to explore more horizontal models of governance which,
far from undermining representative democracy, complement it by
opening up more inclusive and pluralistic spaces for deliberation
– thereby helping to improve relations between citizens and institutions
through strengthened democratic dialogue.
5.1 Choices
around actions
39. Demonstrations are particularly
important in France: they are not only a means of political expression, but
also a veritable social ritual, deeply rooted in the relationship
between citizens and the State.
Note On
a number of occasions, the streets have been able to influence government
decisions and help broaden the public debate. However, while the
capacity for spontaneous mobilisation remains strong, it appears
that since 2016,
Note the integration
of this expression into a fully inclusive democratic process has
tended to be eroded in favour of an increase in social conflict.
40. The “Gilets jaunes” movement, which began on 17 November 2018
in response to the increase in the carbon tax on fuel, was one of
the most striking mobilisations. On its first day, around 287 000
people mobilised in the country across more than 2 000 blockade
points. The weekly protests (“acts”), held every Saturday, continued
uninterrupted for 60 weeks.
Note They
brought together individuals from “invisible France” who “live on the
periphery due to lack of means to live in metropolitan centres,
unwilling to move to nearby suburbs”,
Note and dependent
on cars for work. The government’s initial response came on 10 December
2018 in the form of a €10 billion social package. Seen as an attempt
to buy social peace without addressing the root causes, it had the
opposite effect. The above-mentioned security response, combined
with preventive and punitive judicial treatment of protests – 10
000 arrests and 3 100 convictions
Note –
also reinforced resentment. The movement maintained high popular
support and lasted a total of 17 months, until early 2020.
41. I was struck not so much by the lack of a party or union structure
as by the “Gilets jaunes” refusal to be represented and, above all,
to engage in dialogue with the authorities, as if they had settled
from the outset into a state of mistrust and the conviction that
appointing a representative and negotiating were a sure path to defeat,
and that the only way out was to establish a power struggle with
the government. The absence of a programme is also characteristic,
even if, in the end, observers agree on seeing unifying watchwords
in the demand to “live with dignity from one's work” and for a “more
horizontal society”.
42. In a completely different vein, the social movement against
pension reform in 2023 was equally emblematic. Initially, the systemic
reform proposal from 2019 had been the subject of extensive dialogue
with trade unions. The CFDT, with whom I met, did not oppose the
principle of reform, while clearly setting red lines – especially
regarding the retirement age. After being put on hold during the
pandemic, the project returned in 2023 as a parametric reform aiming
to reduce public expenditure by raising the retirement age from
62 to 64. Unlike in 2019, this new version was drawn up without
meaningful negotiations with trade unions, who unanimously rejected
it – including the CFDT. Public opinion strongly supported this
rejection: there were fourteen days of mobilisation over six months,
involving around 12 million demonstrators.
Note On
16 March 2023, the government decided to use Article 49.3 of the
Constitution to pass the law through the French National Assembly
without a vote. On 14 April 2023, the Constitutional Council validated
most of the reform, including the use of Article 49.3, and the law
was promulgated. This action, recognised as legally valid internally,
Note was seen
as a denial of democracy and led to a radicalisation of the mobilisation,
outside the trade union framework, and an outburst of violence
Note that resulted in numerous injuries, mainly
among the law-enforcement officers but also among the demonstrators.
Note
43. I analyse this sequence as revealing of a power system marked
by a weakening of intermediary bodies, where the State is seen to
act as a management body rather than as the expression of shared
sovereignty.
Note In this context, the
demonstration becomes much more than a simple protest tool: it asserts
itself as “a mode of collective enunciation that aims to make visible
a social voice relegated to the periphery of the decision-making
system”
Note in the face of “legal
democratism”, understood as a democracy centred on respect for procedures
without always guaranteeing effective citizen participation or real
consideration of social demands.
Note The
danger of governing against the visible forms of expression of the
people – in the name of the people themselves – is well known: a
democracy that is no longer nourished by public debate, but operates
in isolation, within its own procedural logic.
Note
44. The “Gilets jaunes” movement and the mobilisation against
pension reform both reflect the same deterioration in the relationship
between the governed and those who govern, reinforcing the perception
of a power structure which is deaf to the demands expressed in the
public arena. This erosion of confidence is confirmed by the CEVIPOF
Barometer of Political Confidence published in January 2023: only
26% of French people place their trust in the French National Assembly,
23% in the government and 20% in political parties.
Note
5.2 Choices
around words
45. Beyond distrust in institutions,
it is representative democracy itself that seems shaken. While this
is not unique to France, some member States have managed to maintain
stronger bonds of trust between the governed and the governing.
For instance, 54% of Danes express trust in their government – one
of the highest rates in the European Union.
Note This
high level of trust, which can be found in all the Scandinavian
countries, can be explained by the political culture specific to
these States: decisions are the fruit of in-depth dialogue among
different political perspectives, leading to broad compromises,
which reduces social tensions and reinforces the feeling of democratic
inclusion.
Note The
Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD)’s
2024 survey on the determinants of trust in public institutions
confirms that the sense of having a say in government decisions
is a central driver of trust – more so than socio-economic or demographic
factors.
Note
46. Switzerland offers a political, social and institutional context
that is unique in Europe. With its long tradition of direct democracy,
Switzerland calls on its citizens to vote four times a year on an
average of ten issues: new laws on immigration, retirement age or
social benefits, for example. In addition to these votes, the citizens
have other instruments at its disposal to influence the legislative
process: the mandatory referendum is automatic for all constitutional
amendments approved by parliament; the optional referendum, with
50 000 signatures collected in 100 days, makes it possible to demand
that any bill approved by parliament be submitted to a national
vote; and the popular initiative allows citizens to propose an amendment
to the Federal Constitution by collecting 100 000 signatures in
18 months.
Note These institutionalised
mechanisms contribute to a relatively calm social climate and a
high degree of legitimacy for public decisions.
47. While the political, constitutional, and social realities
of Denmark and Switzerland cannot be directly transposed to other
national contexts, they show that trust in institutions and social
peace can be increased by institutionalising forms of participatory
democracy to complement traditional representative mechanisms –
as recommended by the Assembly and the Committee of Ministers of
the Council of Europe.
Note
48. From this perspective, intermediary bodies also play a central
role; strengthening them means “guaranteeing citizens permanent
spaces for expression and deliberation”.
Note In this respect, Germany offers an instructive
example because, despite major challenges such as the Hartz IV reforms
designed to guarantee the financing of the pension system, it has
solid democratic shock absorbers that limit the effects of mistrust. This
is due to the political culture of consensus: the federal parliamentary
system, combined with proportional representation, encourages the
formation of government coalitions, forcing negotiations and the
integration of differences in the construction of public policies.
In addition, trade unions and employers' organisations are essential
partners and are involved in major social policy decisions thanks
to a co-determination mechanism, which has the effect of channelling
social conflict upstream.
Note The
unions, strengthened by their legitimacy, favour smaller but more
strategic mobilisations. As a result, demonstrations are quickly
listened to by institutions, because they are part of an ecosystem
in which the collective voice has already been integrated.
Note
49. A growing interest in deliberative and participatory democracy
practices has emerged across Europe. I am convinced that the link
between parliament and these mechanisms represents an important
lever for responding to the crisis of democratic representativeness.
The citizens' assemblies in Ireland are often cited as an example
of “an exceptional laboratory for deliberative democracy”.
Note In France, in response to the “Gilets jaunes”
protests, the government launched a Grand National Debate in 2019.
Alongside public complaints registers
(cahiers
de doléances) opened in 16 000 town halls and meetings
involving nearly 500 000 participants, an online platform collected
responses from 400 000 citizens on ecological transition, taxation
and public spending, democracy and citizenship, and public services.
This was followed by the Citizens’ Convention on Climate, comprising
150 citizens drawn by lot. Their 146 proposals to reduce greenhouse
gas emissions in France were submitted to the President in 2020;
most were partially adopted, while 28 were rejected.
Note To date,
although they have been available to researchers and to everyone
since 30 April 2025, the 19 899
cahiers de
doléances containing 217 910 individual contributions
have not (yet) been used politically.
Note
50. I have analysed the criticisms levelled at these initiatives,
in particular the sociological representativeness of the respondents
to the Grand Debate, the absence of an official national summary
of the complaints registers, and the feeling of frustration generated
by the perception that the Citizens' Convention on Climate had had
little impact on policy.
Note I
can understand these criticisms.
51. Nonetheless, what interests me from the perspective of this
report lies elsewhere: “These registers allowed people who were
previously disengaged to participate, gave a voice to those who
rarely spoke out, and brought visibility to life stories that were
seldom told.”
Note Both
the
cahiers de doléances and
the “Gilets jaunes” demands highlighted a desire for a more horizontal
society, with strong calls for proportional representation – a theme
that has recently resurfaced as a response to the crisis of institutional
legitimacy.
Note Furthermore,
lessons have been learned, as shown by more recent initiatives:
representative citizen selection, clearly defined mandates, bottom-up
approaches, and real political implementation. At the local level,
the Grenoble-Alpes Metropolitan Citizens’ Convention on Climate
(2021–2022) produced 219 proposals largely adopted by the metropolitan
council, with oversight entrusted to a dedicated committee.
Note At
the national level, the Citizens’ Convention on the End of Life
(2022–2023), bringing together 184 participants, made recommendations
on active assistance in dying which have been incorporated into
the parliamentary and legislative debates.
Note
6 Conclusion
52. In conclusion, I wish to link
the aims of this report with the initiative launched by Alain Berset,
Secretary General of the Council of Europe, for a New Democratic
Pact for Europe. Presenting this initiative at the 134th Session
of the Committee of Ministers (Luxembourg, 13-14 May 2025), the
Secretary General noted that today’s threats to democracy did not
arise overnight: they reflect disappointed expectations, broken
promises, and a widening gap between governments and the people.
This New Pact seeks to recognise honestly where things should have
been done better, and where action is still possible.
Note
53. With this in mind, I would like to first stress the importance
of rethinking policing strategies in the face of social mobilisation.
Public force, which is necessary to guarantee human and civil rights,
must remain an instrument at the service of all.
Note Policing
practices used in democratic societies must evolve in order to preserve
the balance between guaranteeing fundamental freedoms and the necessary
protection of public order. Calming violence, restoring confidence,
restoring demonstrations’ power of protest and democratic legitimacy:
these are all objectives that call for de-escalation, dialogue and
proportionality wherever possible.
54. Such an endeavour is also a matter of rebuilding a lasting
bond of trust between institutions and citizens, including young
people in disadvantaged neighbourhoods who are disengaged from democratic
processes. This means recognising tensions without denying them,
opening up a frank and trustful dialogue, refraining from stigmatising
certain categories of the population as dangerous or “undesirable”
because of their age, gender, ethnic original race or economic precariousness,
and re-establishing a relationship based on proximity, listening
and mutual respect.
55. Finally, we need to continually innovate. Innovation is needed
to breathe new life and flesh into the democratic bond, to make
citizen participation self-evident and societal debate a living
force. For a democracy that stops renewing itself withers away:
it cuts itself off from reality, from the voices in the squares,
the roundabouts, the assemblies and the streets. Far from opposing
representation and participation, we need to weave them together,
rediscovering in collective deliberation, in the vitality of intermediary
bodies, in the commitment of citizens, the very source of democratic
resilience.
56. As legal scholar Monique Chemillier-Gendreau reminds us, “Democracy
is a horizon”.
Note This report aligns
itself with that horizon, affirming that it is never too late to
rebuild a social contract that lives up to the democratic aspirations
of our societies.
