1 SECTION A
The Assembly,
Having examined the London and Paris Agreements;
Noting with satisfaction that the Governments have speedily reached agreement on a solution to the problem of European defence;
"Welcoming the undertaking, of a nature never before given by the United Kingdom, that within this century British forces will stay on the Continent as long as Western European Union so determines ;
Considering that the conclusion of these Agreements has, reinforced the Atlantic alliance,
Notes that the Paris Agreements correspond in large measure to the four principles laid down in Section A of Resolution 63 and to the desiderata expressed in Section B of that Resolution ;
Emphasises the need for early ratification of these Agreements ;
Believes that the Paris Agreements provide the Western Powers with the cohesion necessary to seek by negotiation with the U.S.S.R. a peaceful solution to the problems of European security, and, in the first instance, of the reunification of Germany and a State Treaty with Austria ;
Expresses the hope that these negotiations will be undertaken immediately after the ratification of the Agreements.
2 SECTION B
The Assembly,
Having expressed in Resolution... its Opinion on the organisation of the W.E.U. Assembly and on the question of relations between Western European Union and the Council of Europe,
Expresses the hope :
a that the Council of W.E.U. will be given sufficient means of action for taking the steps necessary'to promote the unity and to encourage the progressive integration of Europe;
b that the meeting of the Working Group envisaged in the Resolution on the Production and Standardisation of Armaments, adopted by the Nine-Power Conference on 21st October, 1954, will result in an agreement which satisfies the principles expressed in this Resolution, in particular with reference to the rational organisation of production and the standardisation of armaments.
3 Explanatory Memorandum (presented by M. BOHY, Rapporteur)
1. The keynote of the last part-Session of this Assembly was a feeling of uncertainty. For differing but equally valid reasons, the failure of the EDO Treaty was deplored by some, hailed with relief by others. But what stood out most clearly was the urgent need for an alternative arrangement, if not to replace the elements of European integration contained in that Treaty, at least to prevent the "Western defence structure from relapsing into chaos.
2. We were on the eve of the London Conference. It was possible for the Council of Europe to play an important preliminary part in that meeting ; it could clear the ground ; its discussions could afford the negotiators in London some indication of the obstacles they were likely to encounter in European parliamentary opinion ; it could bring home to the diplomatists the main preoccupations of European parliaments, the positive results they were counting upon from the agreements to be worked oixt, the principles on which the majority hoped these would be based.
3. These considerations found expression in our Resolution 63 of 24th September, 1954, in which the Assembly indicated the broad lines which it hoped the future agreements would follow. The Assembly then decided to meet again after the London Conference to examine the proposed arrangements and pronounce upon them in a new Opinion based on a comparison between the essentials of Resolution 63 and the agreements actually concluded.
4. Such are the main points which it is proposed to deal with in the present Report. Logically, the first part of the Report should be devoted to the general context of the London Conference and the far-reaching effects of the United Kingdom decision of 29th September, 1954.
5. At the instance of the Committee on General Affairs, however, one of the leading British Representatives to the Consultative Assembly, Mr. Fletcher-Cooke, personally followed the work of the Conference, and submitted to the Committee a Report analysing, in a first part, the problems raised at the Conference and, then, showing the extent to which agreement had been reached on these problems. This document is valuable in two ways: it amply fulfils its principal purpose, and it also deals in felicitous terms with the true significance of the British decision of 29th September, 1954. It is a clear and forthright explanation of the importance of that declaration, and shows how much courage was needed for British statesmen to go as far as they have done towards solidarity which the Continent. It also carries a much-needed warning that this declaration is a completely new departure in British policy, and that it would be out of place and dangerous to read into te texts more than they actually say.
6. Your Rapporteur does not propose, therefore, to deal at any great length with the London Conference, which has been adequately treated by Mr. Fletcher-Cooke, as he could do no more than repeat what has already been said, and to less effect.
7. The London Conference laid down the principles and methods later embodied in the Paris Agreements. The present Report is accordingly planned as follows :
.1 Principles determined at London and embodied in the Paris Agreements.
.2 Summary of the Paris Agreements.
.3 The Paris Agreements and Resolution 63.
.4 The Paris Agreements and Resolution 44.
.5 The Paris Agreements and European political integration.
4 Principles determined at London and embodied in the Paris Agreements
8. The principles agreed upon in London were as follows :
.1 Agreement to terminate the Occupation Regime in the German Federal Republic : restoration of essential rights to Western Germany ; creation of the necessary conditions for international co-operation.
.2 Agreement to integrate the German Federal Republic in the Western defence system and to permit, for this purpose, its rearmament on a restricted scale, within voluntarily accepted limits.
.3 Admission of the German Federal Republic and Italy to an enlarged and appropriately modified Brussels Treaty.
.4 Powers of decision to be vested in the Council of the new Organisation, acting in certain cases by majority vote.
.5 Admission of the Federal Republic to N.A.T.O. with the obligations and rights it assumes under the revised Brussels Treaty.
.6 The Western defence system thus established to be buttressed by the following special guarantees :
a the United States undertakes to maintain the necessary forces in Europe ;
b the United Kingdom undertakes to maintain forces on the Continent as long as there is no majority decision of the Council to the contrary ;
c Western Germany undertakes not to resort to force in order to achieve unification, and agrees not to manufacture certain categories of armaments;
d Canada undertakes to continue to support the Atlantic Pact.
.7 The Government of the German Federal Republic is recognised as representing the German people as a whole.
.8 Intention of concluding a final peace treaty with Germany.
.9 Encouragement of peaceful reconstitution of a free and united Germany.
.10 The Three Powers intend to maintain their position in Berlin.
5 Summary of the Paris Agreements
9. It will be remembered that the German Federal Republic and Italy were invited through It will be remembered that the German Federal Republic and Italy were invited through the normal diplomatie channels to join the Brussels Treaty Organisation. Such a step was out of the question without first putting an end to the occupation régime in the German Federal Republic.
10. The Conference of the Nine was therefore preceded by a Conference of the Four, consisting, on the one hand, of the German Federal Republic, the Power as yet occupied and, on the other hand, of the three occupying Powers : France, the U.S.A. and the U.K. The business of this conference was to draft a Protocol to terminate the occupation of the German Federal Republic, and to define the legal position and respective rights of the parties pending the entry into force of arrangements for the German defence contribution.
11. This general Protocol, which is essentially provisional, is supplemented by the following texts :
Schedule I amending the Convention on relations between the three Powers and the German Federal Republic ;
Schedule II modifying the rights and obligations of the forces of the three Powers in the German Federal Republic ;
Schedule III amending the financial Convention between the former Occupying Powers and the German Federal Republic ;
Schedule IV amending the Convention on the settlement of matters arising out of the war and the occupation.
12. The moment the forces of the three Powers stationed in Germany relinquished their status of an army of occupation, it became necessary to give them a provisional status pending ratification of the Paris Agreements. This matter was the subject of a Convention concerning the security of foreign forces in the territory of the Federal Republic.
13. Lastly, a Three-Power declaration conferred upon the city of Berlin the greatest possible degree of self-government compatible with its special situation.
14. These arrangements cleared away legal complications and gave the Nine-Power Conference the necessary freedom of action. The signatory States of the Brussels Treaty : Belgium, France, Luxembourg, the Netherlands and the United Kingdom invited the Federal Republic and Italy to subscribe to the Treaty.
15. The modifications of the Brussels Treaty necessitated by the accession of these countries were embodied in Protocol No. I concluded between the five Brussels Treaty Powers, on the one hand, and Italy and the German Federal Republic, on the other.
16. The seven Powers, being thus enabled to enter into a mutual undertaking, signed Protocol No. II concerning the forces of Western European Union.
17. This is the most significant of the Protocols and merits a brief, but precise, analysis. It imposes limits on the ground and air forces of the High Contracting Parties placed in peacetime under the Supreme Allied Commander, Europe. It stipulates that the Belgian, French, German, Italian and Netherlands forces shall not exceed the maximum levels prescribed in the special Agreement appended to the Treaty setting up a European Defence Community. This provision is of special significance in that it illustrates a desire to regard the new Agreements as substitutes for those of the E.D.C. The Protocol fixes the British contingent at four divisions supported by the Second Tactical Air Force, and the Luxemburg contingent at one regimental combat team.
18. Further Articles make arrangements for the participation of naval forces, conditions governing expansion and means by which the W.E.U. Council can satisfy itself that obligations are fulfilled and limitations respected.
19. Article 6 is of special importance. It underlines the permanent nature of the British commitment, subject to an emergency occurring overseas, or the financial burden becoming excessive, which latter circumstances are to be assessed by the other Contracting Parties. That is all that need be said at this point with regard to Article 6, the political significance of which will be examined more fully elsewhere in this Report (see paras. 41 et seq.).
20. Protocol No. Ill is concerned with the control of armaments. The minimum military-effort expected from each contracting State is laid down in Protocol No. II. The purpose of Protocol No. Ill is to limit these forces to the necessary minimum required by the pacific aims of the Treaty. We might well rest content with this formula, which it is possible to interpret in the way generally desired, but it would perhaps be preferable to elucidate the position.
21. The aggression in Korea evoked a desire in certain quarters for German participation in Western defence, and there have since been two conflicting schools of thought, one concerned primarily with safeguarding the security of free Europe by means of the largest possible German contribution to common defence, the other based on fear that one of the contracting nations, in particular Germany, may acquire an alarming preponderance in the new military alliance. Protocol No. Ill is designed primarily to allay these anxieties by prohibiting certain weapons and subjecting others to control.
22. Though it appears to spring from the same motives, Protocol No. IV on the W.E.TJ. Armaments Agency is at least as much concerned, in its provisions relating to manufacture and supply of armaments, with economic as with military equilibrium. Appended to this Protocol is a Resolution on the production and standardisation of armaments.
23. The Agreements thus briefly reviewed formally integrate the German Federal Republie in a common organisation for the defence of Western Europe. By virtue of this integration, the Federal Republic now forms part of N.A.T.O., thus fulfilling the desire expressed in our Resolution 63. The incorporation of the Federal Republic required ratification by a Resolution of the North Atlantic Council.
24. In a second Resolution, the North Atlantic Council welcomed the declaration of the German Federal Government and that of the Three Powers whose forces are stationed on German territory.
25. On 23rd October, the North Atlantic Council drew up a Protocol by which the Federal Republic acceded to the. North Atlantic Treaty, and it noted with satisfaction the Protocols, Resolutions and Agreements referred to above.
26. This complex of diplomatie instruments accomplished three successive stages :
a the superseding of the Occupation Statute by transitory arrangements (texts adopted by the Four-Power Conference).
b the integration of the German Federal Republic in Western European Union (Nine-Power Conference).
c the strengthening of the Atlantic Alliance by the accession of Germany through Western European Union (Resolution and Protocols of the Atlantic Alliance).
6 The Paris Agreements and Resolution 63.
27. Here we are concerned with two points :
a How far are the recommendations of Resolution 63 of 24th November, 1954 reflected in the Paris Agreements ?
b Have the general principles of the policy of the Council of Europe, as set forth in Resolution 44 of 26th September, 1953, been respected ?
7 SECTION A
28. Resolution 63, like Resolution 44, is divided into two parts, Section A laying down the broad lines of the policy suggested by the Assembly, and Section B setting forth the practical arrangements to be taken to give effect to that policy. Section A lays down the following four principles for a European defence policy :
.1 Need for rapid strengthening of the European defence structure ;
.2 Reinforcement of the Atlantic Alliance, as the linchpin of the security of the free world, and development of the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation ;
.3 Participation of the German Federal Republic on the basis of complete equality of rights; (iv) Need for unremitting efforts to achieve the political and economic unification of Europe.
7.1 Need for rapid, strengthening of the European defence structure
29. This preoccupation which had become particularly urgent with the failure of the Treaty of Paris and consequent weakening of the whole defence system, finds a prominent place in the Paris Agreements. The accession of the German Federal Republic to N.A.T.O. fulfils the desire often expressed in the debates of the Assembly — notably by the United Kingdom Representatives — that the reinforcement of defence by a German contribution should not onCe more be held up by the search for a political infrastructure.
7.2 Reinforcement of the Atlantic Alliance and development of the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation
30. The Assembly had two aims in formulating this principle : first, the transformation of the present system of Atlantic defence into a genuine political community, and secondly, the assignment to N.A.T.O. of new tasks, for example, in the field of integration. The opinion expressed by all the Governments represented at London, that they considered the North Atlantic Treaty as being of indefinite duration, goes some way towards satisfying the first of these two requirements. In this context it is be noted that Mr. Dulles in his declaration to the London Conference, stated that the European countries could count upon the United States " if there is, on this side, a movement toward unity, if there is a beacon light still, ahead, if we do not feel that we have come to a watershed where efforts toward unity finally are ended and we are going-down on the other side into the abyss of continuing disunity ". With regard to the second recommendation (development of N.A.T.O.), the "Resolution to implement Section IV of the Final Act of the London Conference", after recognising "the need to reinforce the structure of N.A.T.O. and the collective security system in Europe ", proposes a number of technical measures. The most important of these is contained in paragraph 4 to the effect that " all forces of member nations stationed in the area of Allied Command, Europe, shall be placed under the authority of the Supreme Allied Commander, Europe ".
7.3 Participation of the German Federal Republic with equal rights
31. This principle reaffirmed the frequently expressed opinion of the Assembly that a German contribution to European defence was indispensable. Refusing to entertain discriminatory measures, the Assembly wished to convey that an effective system of defence must be founded upon absolute equality of rights and obligations. It adopted this general term in preference to that of German sovereignty, not wishing to involve itself in legal discussions over the validity of the Bonn Agreements.
32. The first part of the Paris Agreements contains a Protocol on the termination of the Occupation Statute in the German Federal Republic. The Conventions concluded on 26th May, 1952, are modified by five schedules in a manner necessitated by the failure of the Treaty of Paris and the new phase in relations between the Allies and Germany. One outward sign of this modification is that the former designation of the parties as " the Three Powers and the German Federal Republic " is replaced by the expression " the signatory States ". Recognition of the sovereignty of Western Germany appears in the following terms (Schedule I, Article I, para. 2) : " The Federal Republic shall exercise the full authority of a sovereign State over its internal and external affairs. " The former text mentioned only " full authority " without qualification.
33. German sovereignty is limited only in so far as its international situation may require. By Article 2 the three Powers, " in view of the international situation, which has so far prevented the reunification of Germany and the conclusion of a peace settlement " retain their former rights and responsibilities " relating to Berlin and to Germany as a whole including the reunification of Germany and a peace settlement. "
34. It has been claimed that the sovereignty of the Federal Republic, restored by Article 1, makes German reunification more difficult by reason of the creation of an independent State in Eastern Germany. That would be true if the Federal Republic were recognised as a separate entity. But the fact is that the three Powers " consider the Government of the Federal Republic as the only German Government freely and legitimately constituted and therefore entitled to speak for Germany as the representative of the German people in international affairs. " This Declaration — made at the London Conference — was confirmed by the other NATO countries at the Paris Conference in the " Resolution of Association by other Parties to the North Atlantic Treaty with the Declaration made at the London Conference by the Governments of the United States, the United Kingdom and France ", paragraph 1.
35. In this same Declaration (para. 3) it is stated that " a peace settlement for the whole of Germany, freely negotiated between Germany and her former enemies... which should lay the foundation of a lasting peace, remains an essential aim of their policy ". This affirmation implies refusal of a separate peace treaty, which would in any event be in contradiction with the Ânglo-Soviet Treaty of 1942 (Article 2).
36. The limitation of German sovereignty in all questions concerning Germany as a whole has its corollary in paragraph 4 of the London Declaration, which reads " the achievement through peaceful means of a fully free and unified Germany remains a fundamental goal of the policy " (of the three Powers). The new Article 7, paragraph 2, of the Convention on relations between the three Powers and the German Federal Republic embodies this undertaking of the Powers : " pending the peace settlement, the signatory States will co-operate to achieve, by peaceful means, their common aim of a re-united Germany, enjoying a liberal-democratic constitution like that of the Federal Republic, and integrated within the European Community. "
37. It has been objected that this provision fails to explain how the common aim announced may be attained. The reply is that one can hardly stipulate in a diplomatic instrument the policy to be followed in the coming years to solve a problem as complex as that of German re-unification. Furthermore, the transformation of the former Consultative Council of the Brussels Treaty into a deliberative council has provided a political body capable of framing a common policy for the Member States in respect of major European problems.
38. It goes without saying that the re-unification of Germany should be pursued only by peaceful means. The undertaking given by the German Federal Government at London and confirmed in the Paris Agreements " never to have recourse to force to obtain the re-unification of Germany or the modification of its present frontiers " affords an additional guarantee, the value of which should not escape Germany's Eastern neighbours. This commitment takes on added significance when considered in relation to paragraph 6 of the Declaration of the three Powers : that they will regard any Government responsible for a violation of the principles of the United Nations Charter " as having forfeited its rights to any guarantee and any military assistance provided for in the North Atlantic Treaty and its Protocols. "
39. With regard to the validity of the Paris Agreements in the event of German reunification, the principle of the united German Government's freedom of decision — laid down by the Assembly in Resolution 44 (Section B, paragraph 4) and upheld by the Western Powers at the Berlin Conference — is confirmed. Article 7, paragraph 3 of the former Convention on relations between the three Powers and the German Federal Republic, which has given rise lo so much controversy, has been deleted.
7.4 Need of unremitting efforts for the political and economic unification, of Europe
40. This question is dealt with in the last section of the Report, concerning political problems (see paras. 75 et seq.).
8 SECTION B
41. The Assembly had indicated in paragraph I its preference for the constitution of a new European organisation within N.A.T.O. based upon a modified or enlarged Treaty of Brussels. The Assembly took the view that military and political integration, as well as the arrangements for control which the Assembly considered, should accompany the German contribution to defence, could not be secured by action at the Atlantic level. Once a new organ possessing adequate powers had been set up, objections to the admission of the Federal Republic to N.A.T.O. would fall to the ground, as Mr. Fletcher-Cooke so pertinently observed in his information document. The Paris Agreements follow the same course ; they extend the Brussels Treaty to the German Federal Republic and Italy and widen its terms of reference, thus permitting the adherence of the Federal Republic to N.A.T.O.
42. This decision was rendered possible thanks to the epoch-making step taken by the United Kingdom on 29th September, 1954. Mr. Fletcher-Cooke. has analysed the historical and psychological circumstances which should be taken into account in any assessment of this initiative. It is scarcely possible to over-estimate its importance. The Committee on General Affairs was never blind to the fact that the principal weakness of the E.D.C. in French eyes was that it did not include Great Britain. No alternative could be accepted which did not make good that deficiency. The success of the London Conference was therefore bound up with the attitude of the British Government. By taking this " formidable " decision, the United Kingdom turned its back on its traditional policy and threw in its lot with the Continent. The importance, of this move lies not only in the commitment to maintain British forces on the Continent but much more in the willingness to accept a majority decision as to the length of time they will be stationed there.
43. In the second sub-paragraph of paragraph I, the Assembly expressed a desire that the new organisation should allow of the participation of other European States not represented at the Conference. In so doing, the Assembly had in mind not only the other Members of the Council but also non-member countries. The Paris Agreements make no mention of this possibility.
44. From the strictly military angle the defence system should, according to the Assembly, comprise :
.1 the strengthening of N.A.T.O. by long-term agreements on the relative proportions and mutual control of the armed forces stationed on the continent of Europe ;
.2 the development of the administrative and technical integration of the European armed forces based on the European continent, in particular with regard to logistics support;
.3 arrangements for control of armaments manufacture in Europe, particularly in strategically exposed areas.
8.1 the strengthening of N.A.T.O. by long-term agreements on the relative proportions and mu-tual control of forces stationed on the continent) of Europe
45. Long-term agreements on the relative proportions of the forces have been concluded within Western European Union. Article 1 of Protocol No. II on the forces of the Union prescribes certain maxima for the total strength and number of formations of the land and air forces which each of the High Contracting Parties shall place under the Supreme Allied Commander, Europe, in peace-time on the mainland of Europe.
46. Article 3 stipulates that any increase in the level of the forces thus laid down shall be subject to the unanimous approval of the High Contracting Parties expressed either in the Council of W.E.U. or in N.A.T.O.
47. Within W.E.U., the strength of internal defence and police forces on the mainland of Europe shall also be fixed by Agreements (Article 5).
48. The same Protocol contains in Article 6 the British undertaking to maintain on the Continent four divisions and the Second Tactical Air Force, which will not be withdrawn without the consent of the majority of the Members of W.E.U. The three reservations accompanying the declaration of Sir Anthony Eden are also mentioned. They have been explained by Mr. Flet-cher-Cooke in his information document. With regard to the second reservation, namely that the undertaking "shall not bind the United Kingdom in the. event of an acute overseas emergency ", Mr. Fletcher-Cooke says that the continental countries have no reason to fear that it may at some time be used as an excuse for unilateral action. Now the British decision has been taken, it will be kept in the spirit as well as in the letter.
49. Though the maximum effectives to be placed under SACEUR are to be fixed by the W.E.U., the decision as to the minimum levels will continue to lie with N.A.T.O. On the other hand it has not been possible to determine the relative strengths of the troops at the N.A.T.O. level, since the President of the United States is unable to commit American troops for a period extending beyond his term of office. On this point it was not possible to give effect to the wishes of the Assembly.
50. On the other hand, the long-term agreement called for by the Assembly on the relative state of the - forces has become a reality ; the Brussels Treaty having been concluded for fifty years, W.E.U. is for a period of 44 years.
51. Reciprocal control of forces stationed on the European mainland has been placed in the hands of SACEUR, whose powers in this respect have been extended. Article 7 of the Resolution to implement Section IV of the Final Act of the London Conference stipulates that all forces of the Member States stationed within the area controlled by the Allied Command in Europe" shall be placed under the authority of SACEUR, that " all deployment shall be in accordance with NATO strategy" and that they "shall not be re-deployed or used operationally within that area without the consent of SACEUR ". This provision precludes Governments from taking unilateral action without the approval of the entire Organisation.
8.2 Development of the administrative and technical integration of European armed forces based on the continent of Europe, especially with regard to logistics services
52. The Assembly considered it advisable to confine the integration of armed forces to those originating from the European countries, on the view that the United States and Canada would be reluctant to go to the lengths necessary to attenuate the specific national character of armies. The Paris Agreements placed this matter in the hands of N.A.T.O. (Article 8 of the Resolution to implement Section IV of the Pinal Act of the London Conference). The Council of N.A.T.O. decided, in fact, that "the integration of forces at the level of army groups and the tactical air force would be maintained " and that integration at lower levels would be carried to the maximum. The powers of SACEUR in connection with logistics support are equally extensive. It is also entrusted with the training of troops placed under its command (Article 13).
53. The control of SACEUR over the deployment of the troops and the integration of logistics services for all NATO forces will prevent any unit of divisional strength or above from undertaking independent action.
8.3 Control of the manufacture of armaments in Europe, especially in strategically exposed areas
54. It is on this point that the Paris Agreements are most at variance with the Recommendations of the Assembly. The latter had advocated control over all European armaments. Although all the signatories of W.E.U. participate in the new Armaments Agency, its activities are to be limited to the European mainland (Article 9 of Protocol IV to the Brussels Treaty). The United Kingdom will take part in. this control, but will not itself be subject to control except as regards its troops stationed on the European continent.
55. The new agency has ne responsibility for the control of arms manufacture, as had been particularly requested in Eesolution 63. In this connection, the Governments decided to call together a group of experts on 17th January next to examine the proposals of the , French Government. It is known ,that the London negotiations found this point stumbling-block. The Committee hesitated to support forthwith the idea of an armaments pool, as the position of the French Government was not quite clear on this point. The fear that the industry of a particular country may be favoured scarcely justifies the rejection of this control, which could quite well be accompanied by specific guarantees.
56. The Paris Agreements make only two provisions concerning this point. Protocol III to the Brussels Treaty concerning the control of armaments refers first of all to the voluntary undertaking of the Federal Republic not to manufacture in its territory atomic, chemical or biological weapons. No modification of that undertaking is envisaged. In a second declaration, the Federal Republic promises not to manufacture long-range weapons, guided missiles or influence mines, warships other than small defensive craft, and strategic bombers. The Council of "W.E.U. may, however, by a two-thirds majority, amend or annul this undertaking on the submission of a request to that effect by SACEUR. The Federal Republic agrees that the Armaments Agency may satisfy itself that these obligations are observed.
57. This undertaking of the German Federal Republic has every appearance of a discriminatory measure. Nevertheless, the fact that it was given spontaneously and encountered no opposition in Germany justifies confidence in its permanent character.
58. Secondly, Protocol No; III specifies the armaments subject to control, such as atomic, biological and chemical weapons, in those countries which have not disclaimed the right to produce them, in addition to the other heavy weapons listed in its Annex. This list may be modified by unanimous decision of the "W.E.U. Council.
59. Protocol No. 4 on th e "WEU Armaments Agency instructs the Agency to verify that the German undertakings are fulfilled and to supervise the level of armaments stocks of the types referred to above. This supervision " shall extend to production and imports to the extent required to make the control of stocks effective". In order to carry out this control, the Agency may cany out " test checks, visits and inspections at production plants, depots and forces other than forces and depots under NATO authority ". In the latter case test checks, visits and inspections shall be undertaken by the NATO authorities. It may be wondered whether this provision will not complicate the work of the Agency, whose officials could simply have been instructed to leave American armaments aside in their inspections.
60. In the event of violation of the agree-ment not to manufacture prohibited weapons or to accumulate excessive stocks of armaments, the Agency must report to the Council, which will require the Government in question to furnish an explanation. Should the explanation appear unsatisfactory, the Council "will take the measures which it deems necessary in accordance with a procedure to be determined " (Article 20). Decisions of the Council under this Article will be taken by majority vote.
61. It will be seen that the powers of the new Agency are extremely restricted. All it may do is to make a report. No sanctions are provided. Although it is not possible for a decision in such matters to be vetoed in the "W.E.U. Council, it is, nevertheless, true that up to now no one has any idea what measures the Council might take in the case of non-compliance. It would appear preferable, in view of past experience of sanctions by Ministerials bodies, for such a decision to be taken by an independent authority, in this instance the Agency itself, its structure being appropriately modified for the purpose. Its powers of inspection would take on quite a different complexion if it also had power to pass judgment on infringements.
62. In the political sphere, the Assembly had called for a form of political direction and democratic control over the new organisation. The Paris Agreements make no express provision for political direction. The only organ capable of exercising this function, the Council of "W.E.U., is expected under the new Article 7 of the Brussels Treaty to follow a policy " of strengthening peace and security, and of promoting unity and of encouraging the progressive integration of Europe ". This formula is too vague to bear close examination. The Pinal Act of the London Conference had referred to a Council " possessing powers of decision ". Under the Paris Agreements, it will in fact have clearly defined powers to determine the maximum forces allowed to each Member State (by unanimous decision — Article 3 of Protocol No. II to the Brussels Treaty), to decide on the maintenance of British, troops on the Continent (by simple majority — Article 6 of Protocol N° II to the Brussels Treaty), to specify which weapons shall be subject to control (by unanimous decision — Article 5 of Protocol No. III of the Brussels Treaty) to allow modification of the German undertaking not to manufacture certain weapons (by two-thirds majority — Protocol No. III to the Brussels Treaty, Annex I), to decide what sanctions shall be taken in case of violation of obligations undertaken in respect of armaments (by simple majority — Article 20 of Protocol No. IV to the Brussels Treaty).
63. That the unanimity rule has been dropped is in itself a notable advance, by comparison with the Council of Europe, for example. This decision takes on special importance as regards fixing the maximum level of the defence contribution, and in the decision as to the maintenance of British troops on the Continent. Though this is a favourable development, it does not alter the fact that the need for unanimity is maintained in all other fields of activity of W.E.U.
64. By " direction of policy ", the Assembly understood more than a co-ordination of the foreign policy of the Member States, an essential precondition for the creation of an instrument of common defence. What the Assembly visualised was an organisation with powers which would give it more the character of a "European Political Authority with limited functions but real powers", such as the Assembly has been advocating since 1949. It should be the duty of the new body to direct the pace and guide developments in every field of European unification. Prom what is known at present of its Statute, it is to be feared that the W.E.U. Assembly is in no position to play such a rôle. It would be desirable, therefore, that the W.E.U. Assembly should possess the appropriate structure and machinery for taking the necessary measures to promote the unity and encourage the progressive integration of Europe.
65. The question of democratic control has been dealt with in the Report presented on behalf of the Committee by Mr. Maelay
Note
9 The Paris Agreements and Resolution 44
66. The general principles laid down by the Assembly in this Resolution of September, 1953 have lost none of their validity. Section A will serve equally well today as a basis for European policy in regard to the U.S.S.R.
67. Section B on the application of those principles ealls for certain modifications in the light of the new situation.
9.1 Convocation of a Four-Power Conference
68. When the Paris Agreements have been ratified and have secured for the West a certain internal cohesion, a Pour-Power Conference should be convened. The main points on its agenda should be the search for a new balanco of power in Europe, allowing of tho re-unification of Germany and the conclusion of a State treaty Math Austria. But it is only too clear that the Soviet Notes of October and November are aimed at preventing the ratification of the new Agreements, just as the Soviet Notes of July and August were designed to bring about the failure of the E.D.C. Hence our watchword of ratification first, negotiations afterwards.
9.2 Austrian Peace Treaty
69. As already stated in the Introductory Report of September (
Doc. 291), there is little hope of a separate solution to this problem. The U.S.S.R. intends to keep all its cards up its sleeve until they can be played with most effect. In these circumstances, it looks as if the Austrian question will only be settled as part of the solution to the general problem of European security.
9.3 The German question
70. It was clear from the Berlin Conference that there is little hope for a solution of the German problem solely by means of free elections. There is no indication that the U.S.S.R. is prepared at the present moment to allow a question as vital for her as the German problem to depend upon the vote of some millions of Germans. Is it therefore necessary to determine the political and military status of Germany before those elections can take place ? This might provide for the adherence of the whole of Germany to European institutions in the political, economic and social fields, together with limitation of armaments to a mutually agreed level.
9.4 Policy of European integration
71. We must pursue a policy of European integration aimed at the constitution of an independent and united Europe. A Europe of this structure is itself " a factor of primary importance in the establishment of a lasting peace ", the value of which should not escape the U.S.S.R. if that country wishes to be relieved of too heavy responsibilities in Europe.
72. In order to make the idea of a United Europe acceptable to the U.S.S.R., its institution should be accompanied by supplementary guarantees, one possibly taking the form of reciprocal limitation of armaments, the other that of a mutual security pact.
a Limitation of armaments : That Eastern Germany is rearmed is an inescapable fact, which entirely justifies the rearmament of Western Germany to the same level. Once that level has been reached, it should be possible to negotiate limitation of armaments in the two parts of Germany, followed by progressive reduction. Respect for of obligations on both sides could be ensured by a control agency under a neutral president. The second stage might be limitation of the armaments of Germany's Western and Eastern neighbours. Here the W.E.U. Armaments Agency might form the nucleus of the control authority. The final stage might be the limitation of armaments in the U.S.S.R., the United States and the United Kingdom, which countries would not have been affected by the arrangements made in the previous stages.
b Mutual Security Pact : 74. This scheme, already outlined in Resolution 44, might well be taken up again. It should be less difficult of achievement if undertaken parallel with a limitation of armaments, since there would then be less ground for mutual mistrust.
10 The Paris Agreements and the question of political integration
73. If one can forget, in the history of Europe, the period of time running from the date on which the E.D.C. was first conceived to that when it was finally defeated, the Paris Agreements represent a step forward of unquestioned importance in the building of Europe. It means a great deal that Great Britain should have agreed to underwrite a Treaty, which incorporates a declaration on her part that she will encourage the progressive integration of Europe. It means a great deal that she should have agreed to take, her place in a Council whose decisions, among them decisions dealing with questions of importance, may be taken by majority vote. For those who know traditional British policy, that she should have given these two undertakings is witness of great good will.
74. How is this development to be interpreted ? Does it mean that Great Britain has suddenly revised all her traditional ideas, and that having so long refused it she has now suddenly become a partisan of the supranational solution ? It would be a serious mistake to think so. Any attempt to take advantage of this effort by Great Britain to modify her outlook to meet the needs of the hour, in order to lead her to go beyond what she has agreed to accept, would be grossly unfair.
75. For it is there that the explanation of the British attitude is to be found — in the sincere effort to adapt herself to the needs arising from a common peril, in the decision to associate herself, in the most effective way possible, with a common task. She has declared herself willing to do everything she considers necessary in order to reach the common goal. What she has agreed to do is to act in the given circumstances, not to give her support in principle to a political idea. It would be both lacking in a sense of fair play and ungrateful to attempt to seek to read other motives into her gesture.
76. For those who saw in the E.D.C. the means at the same time of organising our defence and of making an important step forward towards supranationality, the conclusions to be drawn are clear : the defence aspects of E.D.C. can be considered to have been achieved. Its political purpose has, however, been profoundly modified. On the debit side of the balance it must be recognised that the Western European Union remains a union; that the two principles referred to above fall far short of the intended political integration; that the Assembly of the new organisation will, once again, have no more than consultative functions. On the credit side of the balance there is the British participation, important both for the reasons which have been analysed, and because it establishes a community of interests between Great Britain and the Continent.
77. Should we continue to deplore the defeat of the E.D.C? Many shrewd judges would have preferred that a Political Community precede the establishment of a Defence Community. Unfortunately, the needs of our security were so pressing that we could not afford to wait. But did the urgency of defence problems really represent the best lever for achieving political integration ? Can it not be argued that the Council of Europe, now that it has been relieved of the problems of defence at least in their immediate form, will hereafter be able to press forward with greater freedom its activities on the purely political level ?
78. How is this to be done ? The moment does not seem to have come to give the answer, which will perhaps become clearer after the Paris Agreements have been ratified.
79. The moment however seems to be opportune to recall that the Consultative Assembly was set up by the Treaty of London in 1949 for the purpose of being consulted. This may seem to be a glimpse of the obvious : it is, nevertheless, a pertinent observation. The Council of Europe has studied many problems, done much useful preparatory work, and delivered many Opinions which have been amply justified by subsequent events (of which the Paris Agreements provide one example). But if it had only been allowed to express an opinion on the occasions when it was consulted, the record of its activities would have been meagre indeed. Is this not the moment to remind the Governments that it is they who established the Council of Europe as an organisation which they were to consult ?
80. For the last two years the Consultative Assembly lias included in its agenda the examination of European policy in the light of recent international developments. It is not immodest to claim that these debates have not been without influence on the development of the political situation. But would it not have been more logical that these debates should have taken place at the instance of the Governments themselves ?
81. To what extent will the scope of the competence of the Council of W.E.U. limit that of the Council of Europe ? It is necessary first of all to agree on what would appear to be the competence of the Council of W.E.U. The W. E. U. has been set up for a clearly-defined purpose, namely the organisation of Western defence. That is its specific purpose, which belongs to it alone, within the limits set out in the Paris Agreements.
82. This does not, however, mean that the Council of Europe will therefore be relieved of all responsibility in matters of security, which will, in fact, often exceed the scope of questions affecting the Seven alone. In all other fields, there can be no question of any limitation of the competence of the Council of Europe, for the very reason that the Paris Agreements have this specific and limited purpose.
83. On the other hand, as these regional organisations increase in number, so does the task of co-ordination by the Council of Europe become the more important. Whatever success may be achieved by the unification of certain Member States in a specific field, such progress cannot be considered as an end in itself, but only as a step towards the unification of Europe as a whole.
84. To maintain in its integrity the solidarity of the fifteen nations represented at Strasbourg was the dominating preoccupation of thé Council of Europe in the presence of the .efforts among six of its Members to achieve political integration. This must still its major preoccupation.
