B Explanatory memorandum
by Ms Victoria Tiblom and Mr Yunus Emre, co-rapporteursNote
1 Introduction
1. Since 2003, Serbia has been
under the Assembly’s monitoring procedure. The most recent report
of the Committee on the Honouring of Obligations and Commitments
by Member States of the Council of Europe (Monitoring Committee)
on the honouring of obligations and commitments by Serbia dates
from 2012.
Note In its
Resolution 1858 (2012) of 25 January 2012 on “The honouring of obligations
and commitments by Serbia”, the Parliamentary Assembly welcomed
the significant progress achieved in implementing obligations and commitments
entered into at accession in 2003. It praised Serbia for its political
stability, its efforts towards integration into the European Union
(EU) and its co-operation with the International Criminal Tribunal
for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY).
Note At the same time, it resolved to
pursue its monitoring of the honouring of obligations and commitments
by Serbia and invited the latter to make substantial progress in
the following five key areas: 1) full implementation of the reform
of the judiciary in order to guarantee its independence and efficiency;
2) adoption and implementation of effective anti-corruption policies;
3) adoption of amendments to the Criminal Code in line with the
Group of States against Corruption (GRECO) recommendations; 4) improvement
of the situation of the media and 5) full implementation of the
rights of minorities, especially Roma.
Note
2. In January 2019, a preliminary draft of a further report on
the honouring of obligations and commitments by Serbia was considered
by the committee and sent to the Serbian authorities for their comments.
The process of the preparation of a new draft report took a long
time, which was due not only to the frequent changes of co-rapporteurs
but also to the fact that early general elections had been called
twice in-between (in 2014 and 2016). In May 2019, the committee
considered the authorities’ comments. However, further to the decision
of the previous co-rapporteurs, the submission of the draft report
to the committee was postponed. The preparation of the report was
then delayed by the Covid-19 pandemic, further changes of rapporteurs, parliamentary
elections held in Serbia in June 2020, early parliamentary and presidential
elections held in April 2022 and early parliamentary elections of
December 2023.
3. On 2-4 October 2023, in the absence of the co-rapporteur Ms Eva
Decroix (Czech Republic, EC/DA), co-rapporteur Axel Schäfer (Germany,
SOC) carried out a fact-finding visit to Belgrade and Novi Sad (Vojvodina).
Note The
conclusions of his visit, during which he tried to take stock of
the developments which had happened in Serbia since
Resolution 1858 (2012), are included in the information note
AS/Mon
(2023) 20.Note Unfortunately, Mr Schäfer could not finalise his report
due to the post-electoral developments (see below) and the unavailability
of the other co-rapporteur.
Note
4. We were appointed as co-rapporteurs respectively on 29 January
2025 (Ms Tiblom) and on 9 September 2025 (Mr Emre).
5. On 23-24 March 2026, we carried out a fact-finding visit to
Belgrade. During our visit, we met with the Speaker of the National
Assembly, the Minister of Justice, the chairpersons of the ruling
and opposition parliamentary groups, members of the Committee on
Constitutional and Legislative Issues, the Serbian delegation to
the Assembly, the Ombudsperson, the Commissioner for the Protection
of Equality, the President of the Supreme Court and the Prosecutor
General, as well as representatives of civil society, including
the students movement, and the diplomatic community. During our
visit, we discussed issues related mainly to the 2024 railway station
canopy collapse in Novi Sad, the mass protests that followed, the
alleged use of a sonic weapon, the reform of the judiciary and prosecution
services, electoral matters, and the state of freedom of association
and expression.
Note
2 Democracy and political context
2.1 General
context
6. The Serbian political landscape
is dominated by the Serbian Progressive Party (SNS) and its leader,
the incumbent President of the Republic Aleksandar Vučić.
7. The President of the Republic is directly elected for a five-year
term from a single nationwide constituency. A candidate needs a
majority of the votes cast to be elected; if this is not achieved,
a second round is organised between the two leading candidates within
15 days.
Note
8. Although the Constitution foresees only relatively limited
presidential powers,
Note over the past years Aleksandar Vučić,
first as Prime Minister (till 2017) and then as President of the
Republic, has been playing a central role in Serbian politics. According
to civil society and other stakeholders, the political debate and
the decision-making is in practice steered by the President of the
Republic in a way which is not foreseen by the Constitution.
Note
9. The 250 members of the parliament are elected for a four-year
term through a proportional system with closed candidate lists from
a single nationwide constituency. Mandates are distributed among
candidate lists that receive at least 3% of the votes cast. Lists
representing national minorities are exempt from the threshold requirement.
Note
10. There is a strong polarisation between the ruling parties
and the opposition, which is divided. Over the past years, parliament’s
effectiveness and oversight function continues to be hampered by
the low frequency of sessions and the lack of genuine political
debate. The process of public consultations on draft laws still
needs further strengthening
Note and parliamentary
oversight of the executive is weak.
Note Moreover, debates
in parliament are marked by tensions with reports of derogatory
language and occasional incidents, disruptions, including violence,
and boycotts. For example, on 4 March 2025, several MPs were injured
following a parliamentary session which was seriously disrupted
by opposition members throwing smoke grenades and flares.
Note
2.2 The
2020 and 2022 parliamentary and presidential elections
11. Since 2000 all but two parliamentary
elections (the May 2012 and the June 2020 regular election) in Serbia
have been early elections. While
legally possible, the “culture” of early elections impacts the efficient autonomous
functioning of the parliament according to the constitutional term
of office, no matter which political forces are in power.
12. The June 2020 parliamentary elections were boycotted by most
of the opposition (including the Democratic Party, the People’s
Party, the Party for Freedom and Justice, the Serbian Movement Dveri,
and the Social Democratic Party), citing a lack of conditions for
holding democratic elections and limited media freedom.
13. Following the dissolution of parliament by the President of
the Republic of Serbia, an early election took place on 3 April
2022, along with the regularly scheduled presidential election.
Prior to these elections, a broad range of political actors from
the government and opposition engaged in the Inter-Party Dialogue,
facilitated by the European Parliament. A number of the measures
identified by the Inter-Party Dialogue were implemented, including
the adoption of new election laws (see below).
Note
14. The 3 April 2022 presidential and early parliamentary elections
took place against the backdrop of intense polarisation between
the ruling coalition and opposition parties. While a number of opposition
parties expressed dissatisfaction with the Inter-Party dialogue
processes, all of them decided to participate in these elections.
15. The Election Observation Mission (composed of observers from
Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights of the Organization
for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE/ODIHR), the Parliamentary Assembly
of the OSCE and the Assembly), which observed these elections, had
found that the elections were held in a generally calm and peaceful
atmosphere. Although the observers found that fundamental freedoms were
generally respected, they concluded that a number of shortcomings
resulted in an uneven playing field, favouring the incumbents.
Note
16. The incumbent President Vučić (the joint presidential candidate
of the SNS coalition, the Socialist Party of Serbia (SPS), and the
Alliance of Vojvodina Hungarians) won the presidential election,
with 59.5% of votes. The SNS won 42,91% of votes (120 seats).
Note Since
all relevant political actors took part in the elections on 3 April
2022, the composition of the parliament became more pluralistic.
2.3 The
2023 parliamentary elections and consecutive events
17. Following the mass shootings
that occurred in Belgrade and its vicinity in May 2023, multiple
protests under the name “Serbian against Violence” took place in
the country.
Note As a consequence,
there was a mounting pressure on the ruling party to organise new
parliamentary elections.
18. The early parliamentary elections took place on 17 December
2023. The OSCE/ODIHR deployed an Election Observation Mission (EOM),
together with the OSCE Parliamentary Assembly, the Assembly, and
the European Parliament (International Election Observation Mission).
On the same day, local elections for 65 of the 174 self-governing
units, including the capital, took place,
Note as
well as provincial assembly elections in the Autonomous Province
of Vojvodina.
Note
19. The parliamentary elections were won by the SNS, winning 48.06%
of the vote, and129 seats. The opposition coalition “Serbia against
violence” came second, winning 24.32% of the vote, with 65 seats.
The SPS won 18 seats, the National Democratic Alternative (NADA)
13 seats, and the List ‘We – Voice from the People’ also won 13
seats. Voter turnout was almost 59%.
20. In their
report presented to the Assembly in January 2024, the Assembly’s
observers concluded that although Serbia’s early parliamentary elections
offered voters a choice between political alternatives and freedoms
of expression and assembly were generally respected, the elections
were marred by isolated instances of violence, procedural irregularities
and frequent allegations of organising and bussing of voters to support
the ruling party in local elections.
Note Pressure on voters as well as
the decisive involvement of the President of the Republic and the
ruling party’s systemic advantages undermined the election process
overall and created unjust conditions.
21. The results of the elections and the alleged irregularities
triggered mass protests in the country. In a
resolution
of 8 February 2024 on “Situation in Serbia following elections”, the European
Parliament proposed to carry out an independent international investigation
into irregularities and even suspending pre-accession funding. The
Monitoring Committee discussed the post-electoral situation in Serbia
during its meetings in January 2024
Note,
March 2024
Note and in April 2024 (during a hearing
on the post-electoral situation).
Note
22. In April 2024, the Speaker of parliament called new municipal
elections in Belgrade. They took place on 2 June 2024, at the same
time as elections in 89 local assemblies in the country. Part of
opposition boycotted the elections. The Congress of Local and Regional
Authorities was not invited to observe these elections. According
to the
ODIHR
EOM’s report, the elections “were well-administered, offering voters
a wide range of political alternatives, but concerns about widespread
pressure on public sector employees, misuse of public resources
and media bias in favour of the ruling coalition negatively impacted
the process. (…)” The ODIHR EOM recalled once again the need to
reform the electoral legal framework in light of ODIHR’s recommendations.
It also pointed out a general lack of confidence in the accuracy
of the voter register, the polarisation of media landscape, cases
of intimidation against journalists and, on the election day, issues related
to the secrecy of vote, procedural irregularities, allegations of
pressure and vote buying. The SNS’s alliance won the elections in
most local assemblies. In the election for the Belgrade city assembly,
the SNS alliance won a majority of seats (52,4%), followed by the
opposition
Kreni Promeni (Go-Change)
(17,2%). Opposition parties claimed the SNS had falsified the results
in Niš and New Belgrade to claim a narrow majority of seats in their
assemblies.
23. The new government was approved by the parliament on 2 May
2024, with Miloš Vučević as the new Prime Minister. While pointing
out that membership in the European Union as a strategic goal for
his country, Mr Vučević also stressed that he disagreed with the
EU’s policy of sanctions against the Russian Federation. He also
mentioned that Kosovo’s
Note membership
in the Council of Europe, which had been recommended by the Assembly
in its
Opinion 302 (2024) of 16 April 2024, was a challenge for Serbia and announced
that his government would fight against it.
2.4 The
Jadar valley protests
25. During the protests, the authorities cracked down on environmental
activists, media and civil society. In August 2024, around 30 000
people took part in a protest organised by the Association of Environmental Organisations
of Serbia in Belgrade. In response, the government made at least
41 arrests or detentions across 17 cities in just ten days. Many
protesters were accused of 'threatening the constitutional order'.
Those who shared information about the protests on social media
were summoned to police stations for 'informative interviews', while
some activists received home visits accompanied by warnings.
Note
2.5 The
Novi Sad tragedy and the subsequent events
26. At the end of 2024 and in 2025,
Serbia experienced significant political turmoil, marked by widespread protests.
The political landscape was profoundly affected by a tragic incident
of 1 November 2024, when the collapse of a railway station canopy
in Novi Sad resulted in 16 fatalities. This disaster ignited a massive
anti-corruption movement, predominantly led by university students.
The movement quickly expanded nationwide, encompassing a wide spectrum
of Serbian society. Protesters demanded new elections, transparency, accountability,
and the eradication of corruption. Huge protests took place in Belgrade
and other major cities in March, June and August 2025. According
to some sources, the protest of 15 March 2025 in Belgrade gathered
around 300 000 people. The June and August 2025 protests culminated
in violent clashes between demonstrators and police. On 1 November
2025, a big march was organised in Novi Sad to commemorate the 1st anniversary
of the tragic incident at the railway station. During our visit
to Belgrade, our interlocutors from the Ministry of Interior indicated
that nearly 28 000 protests took place between their start at the
end of 2024 and the end of 2025, with the participation of nearly
3.8 million people and an average of nearly 70 gatherings per day.
27. In response to the protests, several high-ranking officials,
including Prime Minister Miloš Vučević, resigned. On 16 April 2025,
Mr Ðuro Macut was appointed as the new Prime Minister. At the same
time, legal actions were initiated against individuals implicated
in the incidents related to the protests. Despite these measures,
the protests persisted till the end of 2025, underscoring a deep-seated
public desire for comprehensive political change.
Note The authorities
stated that the protests were being fuelled from outside, by Western
countries to destabilise Serbia.
Note
28. While the right to freedom of assembly was generally respected
during the protests, the government’s response to protests combined
negotiation rhetoric with repression. Authorities held selective
talks with loyal or minor parties, but there were also reports of
police crackdowns, also with the use of tear gas and batons, detentions,
and smear campaigns against protesters. In some instances, law enforcement
officers failed to protect protesters from physical attacks by violent
individuals. Journalists were also hampered in doing their work
during the protests. According to our interlocutors from the Ministry
of Interior, nearly 3 000 people were prosecuted in relation to
the protests for misdemeanors against public order.
29. Some of the students whom we met in Belgrade reported physical
attacks from law enforcement officers, lack of protection during
protests, ill-treatment by police in custody, infiltration and surveillance
measures and disclosure of information about protesters’ private
lives. We also heard that at least 23 people – protesters and journalists
– had been arrested for 'attacks against constitutional order' and
that some protesting students were seeking asylum abroad. Some graduates
who took part in last year’s protests now have difficulties in finding jobs
in the public sector. Some professors and teachers who publicly
supported the movement or participated in protests were dismissed
or subject to disciplinary proceedings. Additionally, we heard that
on several occasions police officers had entered university campuses
without the rector’s permission, thus violating university’s autonomy.
30. The 15 March 2025, a protest in Belgrade, although largely
peaceful, was disrupted when a loud blast, possibly from a Long
Range Acoustic Device (LRAD) (“sonic weapon”), caused panic and
injuries. During our visit to Belgrade, we heard reports about a
brief, loud disturbance, which had created a stampede, after which some
people had felt dizzy or panicked. Our interlocutors from civil
society said this had resembled a sonic weapon. The government denied
using such a device. Our interlocutors in the Ministry of Interior
acknowledged police had acquired a device but maintained it had
never been used. Following an application by 47 individuals, this
issue is now being examined by the European Court of Human Rights
(ECtHR), which issued an interim measure on 29 April 2025. According
to the ECtHR, up to 4 000 people reported their experience of the incident.
Note
31. The Monitoring Committee current and former co-rapporteurs
issued statements, in which they expressed concern about the deterioration
of the situation in the country due to the escalation of mass protests.
Note They urged Serbian
authorities to respond with dialogue rather than force. They condemned
all forms of violence – whether by the State, pro-government groups,
or protesters and expressed concern about incidents of police brutality
(including excessive use of tear gas and batons), arbitrary detentions,
the use of surveillance against journalists and activists and harassment
of civil society groups.
32. The situation has also been followed by the Council of Europe
Commissioner for Human Rights, Mr Michael O’Flaherty, who visited
Serbia in April 2025 and expressed concern about increased levels
of the use of force by the police during protests as well as arbitrary
arrests and detention of protesters.
Note
33. On 22 October 2025, the European Parliament condemned the
repression used by the authorities to silence the protesters.
Note
34. From late 2025 to early 2026, the nature of the protests shifted
from constant daily mass marches to organised symbolic events, blockades,
commemorations and regional demonstrations. Academic blockades at
many universities have ended, and the academic year has resumed.
35. The tragic death of a female student at the Faculty of Philosophy
of the Belgrade University on 26 March 2026 led to police raids
at the faculty in the consecutive days. The raid of 31 March was
broadcast live on pro-government TV channels and led to a students’
protest, that the police tried to disperse by using violence. According
to our interlocutors from civil society, the death of the female
student was quickly politicised by the authorities and pro-government
media to discredit the students’ movement and the academic community.
36. On 26 January 2026, President Vućić (who is not eligible for
re-election) mentioned the possibility of holding early parliamentary
elections later this year, most probably between October and December.
The next presidential election is due in spring 2027, while parliamentary
elections are due at the end of 2027. It is also possible that the
parliamentary elections will be held with the presidential one in
2027. The holding of early elections was an initial demand of the
protesters. During our visit to Belgrade, our interlocutors from
parliament did not rule out the possibility of organising the elections
by the end of this year; however, no one was able to indicate more
precise timing.
37. As regards accountability for the Novi Sad tragedy, there
are currently three investigations pending. A criminal investigation
was opened immediately after the Novi Sad train-station canopy collapse
in November 2024 for negligence in construction. Moreover, the Prosecutor’s
Office for Organised Crime is examining broader financial flows
related to the construction works, while the Belgrade Higher Prosecutor’s
Office handles the corruption angle involving oversight officials.
In total, 13 people were detained in the immediate aftermath of
the tragedy, including the former Minister of Transport, though
several have since been released pending trial. No convictions have
been handed down yet and the case remains in the pre-trial phase.
During our visit to Belgrade, our interlocutors from civil society
criticised the slow pace of the proceedings. They also stated that
the Chief Prosecutor for Organised Crime and some other prosecutors
involved in the Novi Sad investigations were targeted by the authorities.
2.6 Local
elections of 29 March 2026
38. After our visit to Belgrade,
on 29 March 2026, local elections were held in 10 municipalities
across Serbia (in Aranđelovac, Bajina Bašta, Bor, Kladovo, Knjaževac,
Kula, Lučani, Majdanpek, Sevojno and Smederevska Palanka). Voter
turnout was high, at 70%, and the SNS, running under the list “Aleksandar
Vučić – Our Family” and its coalition partners, won in all ten municipalities
Note but lost some seats compared
to previous elections. These were the second local elections since
the beginning of the student protests at the end of 2024 – the previous
ones were held in June 2025 in Zaječar, Kosjerić, Mionica, Negotin
and Sečan.
39. The elections were observed by the Congress of Local and Regional
Authorities, which expressed concern about incidents of violence
against observers, journalists and civic activists from the opposition
and about irregularities, including accusations of vote buying,
parallel voter lists, and photographing ballot.
Note The elections were
also preceded by an unprecedented number of visits by the President
of the Republic, members of government and other officials to the
municipalities where elections were to be held.
3 Electoral
framework
40. As mentioned above, in February
2022, a set of new election laws was adopted (including the framework Law
on election of Members of Parliament, Law on election of the President
of the Republic, Law on local elections, Law on financing of political
activities, and the amended Law on prevention of corruption), which addressed
some prior OSCE/ODIHR recommendations.
Note
41. In December 2022, at the request of the Monitoring Committee,
the European Commission for Democracy through Law (Venice Commission)
and the OSCE/ODIHR issued a “joint opinion on the constitutional
and legal framework governing the functioning of democratic Institutions
in Serbia – electoral law and electoral administration”.
Note The opinion is
critical and contains several recommendations, in particular with regard
to the use of public media to promote the government, the lack of
independence of the Central Electoral Commission (made up of political
representatives close to the government), the financing of political
parties and election campaigns, the failure to verify voters' lists,
misuse of administrative resources and the limited access to litigation
procedures.
42. Serious shortcomings were also identified by the international
election observation mission, in which the Assembly participated,
and which observed the early parliamentary elections of 17 December
2023. Therefore, a number of long-standing recommendations remain
unaddressed, some of them requiring legislative measures.
Note They pertain to the
independence and effectiveness of the Regulatory Authority for Electronic Media
(REM), measures aimed at tackling the misuse of administrative resources
and pressure on voters and public scrutiny and the audit of voter
lists. During our visit to Belgrade, our interlocutors in the parliament
told us that the reform electoral legislation was ongoing and that
some progress had been achieved with the adoption of the Law on
Unified Voter Register on 7 November 2025, in cooperation with civil
society experts.
43. Nevertheless, we are concerned by the fact that, at the beginning
of February 2026, draft amendments to three electoral laws – the
Law on the Election of the President of the Republic, the Law on
the Constitutional Court, the Law on Election of Members of Parliament,
and the Law on Local Elections, were forwarded to members of parliament.
Authorities describe these as fulfilling recommendations from the
OSCE/ODIHR. According to opposition and civil society, they incorporate
only a fraction of the 24 OSCE/ODIHR recommendations, and their
substance appears to exacerbate rather than resolve electoral vulnerabilities, creating
a facade of compliance.
44. According to the critics of these draft laws, their key provisions
raise serious alarms. The draft laws would permit so-called “phantom
tickets” – lists from essentially fictitious parties or movements,
to participate without hindrance. Previously exposed abuses involving
forged support signatures would become obsolete under a new rule
allowing voters to endorse multiple lists simultaneously. Such a
change could enable ruling-party supporters to bolster numerous
additional lists, granting those entities seats on electoral commissions
that adjudicate results and thus potentially influencing outcomes
decisively. Furthermore, the amendments would facilitate greater
exploitation of national minority electoral privileges. They would
relax criteria for minority-list status, limiting scrutiny to only
the list leader and top candidate rather than all members, and eliminate consultations
with national minority councils. Such lists require far fewer signatures
to register and a mere 0.3 percent of votes to secure parliamentary
seats, compared to the three percent threshold for others.
45. Should these measures pass, prominent ruling-coalition figures
could run on minority tickets without penalty, amplifying advantages
for the incumbents. Another troubling proposal would restrict opposition participation
in electoral commissions and polling boards by mandating certification
from the Republic Electoral Commission for all members – a requirement
affecting tens of thousands of roles.
Note
46. During our meetings in parliament, we were informed that the
authorities had received a preliminary opinion from OSCE/ODIHR on
these draft laws and were analysing it.
4 Rule
of law issues
4.1 The
2022 constitutional amendments and the reform of the judiciary
47. Serbia took an important step
on the independence and accountability of the judiciary with the
approval by parliament of relevant amendments to the Constitution
on 9 February 2022 (following a referendum held on 16 January 2022).
48. The laws on the judiciary – on the organisation of courts,
on judges, the Office of the Prosecutor General, the High Judicial
Council (HJC) and the High Prosecutorial Council (HPC) – had been
aligned with the constitutional amendments and entered into force
on 10 May 2023. These laws, which had been rather positively assessed
by the Venice Commission in October and December 2022
Note, seek to make
the judiciary and the prosecution service more independent and efficient
and reduce the impact of the executive and Parliament on the appointment
of judges and prosecutors. The Venice Commission also found that
the process of public consultations was sufficiently inclusive and
transparent.
49. With regard to the organisation of the justice system and
judges, the Venice Commission was satisfied with the proposed reforms.
Judges are now appointed by the HJC, while before they used to be
appointed by the Parliament. The Venice Commission had reservations,
however, about the provisions concerning the autonomy of courts
and the supervision of lower courts by higher courts, the provisions
on conflicts of interest and incompatibilities with judicial office
and the provisions on disciplinary and civil liability of judges.
Note Moreover,
it noted that “the Serbian judicial system is still characterised
by a hierarchal spirit and multiple forms of evaluations and controls.
Coupled with the problem of modest judicial salaries it may affect
the attractiveness of the judicial profession for young judges.
A change in the legal culture within the judiciary may be required
to supplement positive changes brought by the ongoing legislative
reform”.
Note
50. As for the law on the High Judicial Council, the HJC is now
composed of 11 members: six judges elected by their peers, four
prominent lawyers elected by parliament and the President of the
Supreme Court as an ‘ex officio’ member (which is in line with Council
of Europe’s recommendations). In its follow-up opinion of December
2022,
Note the Venice
Commission was still concerned about the risk of politicisation
of the election of the four lay members elected by the parliament
but welcomed the proposal to introduce a qualified majority in the
Committee on the Judiciary of the National Assembly (which chooses
the candidates).
Note
51. As regards the reform of the prosecution service, prosecutors
are now elected by the HPC, which is composed of five members elected
by prosecutors themselves, four prominent lawyers elected by parliament and
two
ex officio members: the
Minister of Justice and the Prosecutor General. When assessing the
draft Laws on the High Prosecutorial Council and the Public Prosecutor’
Office, the Venice Commission expressed concerns, albeit less serious
ones, about the balance in the composition of the HPC (and, in particular
the presence of two
ex officio members,
– the Prosecutor General and the Minister of Justice) and the criteria concerning
the competence of prosecutors filling temporary vacancies.
Note
52. According to the 2022 reform, further legislation was to be
adopted within one year for judicial laws and within two years for
the alignment of all other relevant legislation. Two expert working
groups (one for prosecutors, one for courts) were established in
April 2022 and tasked with the drafting of the implementing legislation.
During our visit to Belgrade, we were informed that 36 out of 37
bylaws aimed at finalising the reform of the judiciary and the prosecution
service had been adopted. Only one by-law – on the Rules of Court
– remains to be adopted jointly by the HJC and the Ministry of Justice.
53. According to the European Commission’s 2025 Rule of Law Report,
political pressure on the judiciary and the prosecution still remains
high.
Note Government
and public officials at the highest level, including the President
of the Republic, and members of parliament make undue public comments
on ongoing investigations and court proceedings, including as regards
the work of individual prosecutors and judges. According to ‘Flash Eurobarometer’,
the level of perceived judicial independence in Serbia continues
to be low among both the general public and companies. Overall,
30% of the general population and 36% of companies perceive the level
of independence of courts and judges to be ‘fairly’ or ‘very good’
in 2025.
Note
54. Therefore, despite progress in reforming the judiciary, there
are still many issues that need to be addressed by the authorities
as a matter of priority. The transparency of the HJC needs to be
further strengthened, as its sessions are not audio-visually recorded
due to the lack of technical capabilities, while sessions of the
HPC are recorded and livestreamed.
Note Challenges
remain to fill the considerable number of vacant positions for judges
and prosecutors: as of May 2025, out of 3 117 positions for judges,
394 were vacant, and, out of 899 positions for prosecutors, 139
were vacant.
Note While
an IT solution for the new prosecutorial case management system
was finalised and is being implemented, a new uniform and centralised
case management system for courts is still lacking. As regards courts’
efficiency, the situation remains stable for civil, commercial,
and criminal cases, while serious challenges in the handling of administrative
cases and constitutional complaints remain.
Note
55. As regards prosecution, there are concerns with regard to
prosecutorial autonomy, and the effectiveness and confidentiality
of criminal investigations, which are hampered by shortcomings in
law and practice.
Note During our visit to Belgrade, we heard
complaints from the Prosecutor General and the President of the
HPC about the blockage in the election of new HPC members by their
peers, following the cancellation of the election procedure by the
Constitutional Court. Our interlocutors considered that the latter
had no power to interfere in this process and gave a politicised
decision.
4.2 “Mrdić
laws”
56. Following a proposal by Ms Uglješa
Mrdić, an MP from the SNS, on 28 January 2026, parliament adopted
a package of new judicial laws, i.e. amendments to the Law on Public
Prosecutor's Office, the Law on the High Prosecutorial Council,
the Law on the Organisation and Jurisdiction of State Authorities
in the Fight against High-Tech Crime, the Law on Judges, and the
Law on the Seats and Territorial Jurisdictions of Courts and Public
Prosecutor's Offices (“Mrdić laws”). On 30 January, the President
of the Republic signed them into law.
57. The new laws were adopted via an urgent procedure without
any public debate, drawing sharp criticism from legal experts, the
European Union, and the opposition. According to the latter, these
laws undermine judicial and prosecutorial independence and hinder
the fight against corruption, as the changes in prosecutors’ temporary
assignments to the Organised Crime Prosecution Office might have
an impact on ongoing corruption investigations, including the Novi
Sad case. On 4 March 2026, five opposition parties submitted a request
to the parliament to repeal the amendments to the five laws. Moreover,
EU Commissioner Marta Kos called the adoption a “serious step backwards”
on Serbia’s EU accession path and stated that the European Commission could
suspended payments from the EU Growth Plan for the Western Balkans
for Serbia due to concerns over democracy, rule of law and media
freedom.
Note
58. According to these laws, prosecutors’ temporary assignments
to other prosecution offices will now be decided by the HPC, rather
than the Prosecutor General. The competence to decide on objections
to hierarchical decisions is now attributed to the Chief Public
Prosecutor of the immediately superior public prosecutor’s office,
instead of a specialised commission of the HPC. The temporary assignments
of all public prosecutors temporarily assigned to a Public Prosecutor’s
Office of special jurisdiction (including the Public Prosecutor’s
Office for Organised Crime) shall have their temporary assignments
terminated by 9 March 2026. The new laws also permit court presidents
to be re-elected, rather than serving a single five-year term, and create
a new Fourth Basic Court in Belgrade for the municipalities of Zemun
and Surčin.
59. On 10 February 2026, the Parliament’s Speaker, Ana Brnabić,
requested an urgent opinion of the Venice Commission regarding these
laws. The Venice Commission issued its urgent opinion on 24 April 2026
(
CDL-PI(2026)007). It will be submitted for endorsement at its June 2026
plenary session.
60. The Venice Commission has criticised the majority of provisions
in the “Mrdić laws”, except for the provision that prosecutors’
temporary assignments will now be decided by the HPC and have made
a number of recommendations to the Serbian authorities to amend
the laws.
Note It considered that
the identified shortcomings, viewed both individually and cumulatively,
remove previously existing safeguards designed to protect prosecutorial
autonomy.
Note In its opinion, “additional studies
and impact assessments on the reorganisation of the judicial and
prosecution maps should be conducted, based on a comprehensive prior analysis
of the key factors”.
Note The Venice Commission has also criticised
the fact that the laws were adopted without public consultations
and has recommended that “in the future, the principles of transparency, inclusiveness
and democratic debate be applied consistently and rigorously throughout
the legislative process”.
Note
61. During our visit to Belgrade, our interlocutors from civil
society and the opposition stressed that these laws were adopted
without public consultations. The Speaker of the National Assembly
explained to us that, according to the Rules of Procedure, a bill
proposed by an MP does not require public consultation and that the
opposition had not been cooperative regarding the 2022 judicial
reform. The Speaker also announced that the authorities would implement
the Venice Commission’s recommendations. We welcome this announcement and
hope that the authorities will fulfil this promise.
4.3 The
Judicial Academy
62. In 2024, at the request of
the Minister of Justice, the Venice Commission assessed the draft
law on the Judicial Academy, along with corresponding draft amendments
to the Law on Judges and the Law on the Public Prosecutor’s Office,
Note which were prepared
in the context of the judicial reform.
63. The central issue in the draft legislation was whether the
Judicial Academy should become the exclusive channel for entry into
the judicial and prosecutorial professions through the completion
of the "prior training" programme and the passing of a professional
examination at the Academy. The authorities proposed two options:
the first maintained the current dual system, where candidates could
choose to sit for the professional examination either at the Academy
or directly before the Judicial or the Prosecutorial Council without undergoing
the training; the second option assigned exclusive responsibility
for the professional examination to the Academy. In both options,
however, the final assessment and appointment decision of candidates remained
under the competence of the High Judicial and Prosecutorial Councils.
Note
64. For the Venice Commission, both options were viable as they
fall within the limits of broad national discretion in this area.
However, it had a preference for the second option.
Note The
Venice Commission recalled that the Judicial Academy must be protected
from undue influence and welcomed the fact that it was adequately
distanced from other branches of power and was closely linked to
the High Judicial and Prosecutorial Councils. It concluded that
the draft legislation aimed to reinforce the institutional status
of the Academy, even though some further improvements were recommended.
Note A
draft law is now to be adopted by the parliament.
4.4 Prosecuting
and investigating war crimes
65. Serbia needs to show a genuine
commitment for investigating and adjudicating war crimes cases,
as its authorities continue to challenge publicly the judgments
of the ICTY, including at the highest levels.
Note
66. Serbia continues to avoid filing indictments against high-level
suspects and the time for processing cases is excessive. It should
take steps to increase the pace of processing war crimes cases and
address the significant case backlog of over 1 700 pre-investigative
cases, which remains a very serious concern.
Note
67. In 2023, the War Crimes Prosecutor’s Office filled three indictments
against seven individuals, of which one was transferred from Bosnia
and Herzegovina. At the end of 2023, trial proceedings were ongoing
in 19 cases. In 2023, final decisions were rendered in seven cases,
of which one case involved elements of sexual violence.
Note In
2024, the War Crimes Prosecutor’s Office filed eight indictments
against 10 individuals, including one case involving two individuals
that was transferred from Bosnia and Herzegovina. Two final decisions
and one first instance verdict were rendered against three accused.
At the end of 2024, trial proceedings were ongoing in 17 cases.
Note A case categorisation plan
has yet to be finalised.
68. Since 2024, the post of Chief Public Prosecutor for War Crimes
has been vacant. An acting Chief Public Prosecutor was appointed
(in May 2024) until his mandate ended on 15 May 2025, leaving the
position vacant.
Note During
our visit to Belgrade, we were informed that the position was vacant
due to the lack of adequate candidates to fill it.
69. The War Crimes’ Prosecutor’s Office cooperates with the International
Residual Mechanism for Criminal Tribunals (IRMCT) and with other
Balkan States.
Note While co-operation with Bosnia
and Herzegovina has continued, little progress was made with Croatia
and Kosovo.
Note
70. The sentencing policy is inconsistent and not systematically
aligned with the criminal sanctions for the gravity of the crimes.
A number of Serbian political parties, politicians and media outlets
continue to provide support to, and public space for, convicted
war criminals and to deny war crimes, including the Srebrenica genocide,
without repercussions.
Note
71. According to former Council of Europe Commissioner for Human
Rights, Dunja Mijatović,
Note the lack of extradition
of convicted war criminals and war crimes suspects to other countries
in the region remains another obstacle in the fight against impunity.
The authorities’ toleration of murals honouring war criminals is
another unfortunate illustration of this. Civil society organisations
have mapped more than 300 such murals across Serbia and called on
the authorities to remove them.
72. The unresolved fate of missing persons who disappeared during
the conflicts in the 1990s remains a key issue to be solved in the
Western Balkans. 9 624 persons are still missing as a result of
the conflict and further efforts are needed at bilateral level and
at regional level to identify them.
Note According to Dunja Mijatović,
there is a stagnation in the resolution of pending cases concerning
missing persons and more should be done in this respect; the Commissioner
called for opening police and military archives.
4.5 Fight
against corruption and organised crime
73. The perception among experts,
citizens and business executives is that the level of corruption
in the public sector in Serbia remains high. In the 2024 Corruption
Perceptions Index by Transparency International, Serbia scored 35/100
and ranked 105th globally. This perception has remained relatively
stable over the past five years. The 2025 Special Eurobarometer
on Corruption shows that 85% of respondents consider corruption widespread
in their country and 31% of respondents feel personally affected
by corruption in their daily lives.
Note
74. Serbia has some level of preparation in the fight against
corruption and its legal framework to fight this phenomenon remains
broadly in place.
Note However, although in the last few years
progress has been made to implement the recommendations of the GRECO,
the picture remains mixed.
75. As regards GRECO’s Fourth Evaluation Round concerning members
of parliament, judges and prosecutors, in its
Second
interim compliance report assessing Serbia´s level of compliance published
on 25 March 2022, GRECO concluded that eight recommendations have
been implemented satisfactorily and five remain only partly implemented
(out of thirteen). No recommendations are considered not implemented,
and GRECO concluded that Serbia’s performance in this field is no
longer ‘globally unsatisfactory’. GRECO welcomed in particular the
new Law on Prevention of Corruption (recently amended), the adoption
of a Code of Conduct for MPs and the reform of the High Judicial
Council and the High Prosecutorial Council (see above). As of December
2023, Serbia has implemented ten of the thirteen recommendations
contained in GRECO’s Fourth Evaluation Round concerning corruption
prevention, and respect of members of parliament, judges and prosecutors
(see
Addendum
to the second compliance report).
76. As regards GRECO’s Fifth Evaluation Round, which tackles preventing
corruption and promoting integrity in central government (persons
with top executive functions – PTEFs) and law enforcement agencies, in
its
Evaluation
report of 25 March 2022 (published on 5 July 2022), GRECO issued
24 recommendations and invited the Serbian authorities to submit
a report on the measures taken to implement the recommendations by
30 September 2023. It called on the Serbian authorities to take
further measures to prevent corruption in respect of PTEFs (in particular,
by including in the Law on the Prevention of Corruption the definition
of ‘public official’ Prime Minister’s and Deputy Prime Minister’s
chiefs of cabinet and advisers working for ministers), as well as
members of the police (in particular by a adopting a public strategy
on corruption prevention in the police). According to GRECO’s
Addendum
to the second compliance report of June 2024, out of 24 recommendations only one has
been fully implemented, ten have been partly implemented and thirteen
have not been implemented (in particular concerning checking the
integrity of members of government, trainings on integrity standards,
the definition of lobbying, disclosure of conflicts of interests
and corruption prevention in the police).
77. The Agency for the Prevention of Corruption, in its advisory
role to the government, has remained active in exposing and analysing
cases of systemic corruption. Nevertheless, the government still
has not established a constructive relationship with this institution
(for example, it does not systematically consult it on draft legislation),
does not follow up on its reports and recommendations and needs
to increase its financial and human resources.
Note
78. Other important anti-corruption institutions also remain understaffed
(such as the Prosecutor’s Office for Organised Crime, which has
jurisdiction over high-level corruption cases, and the Higher Court
in Belgrade, which deals with corruption).
Note
79. In July 2024, a national anti-corruption strategy for 2024–2028
was adopted and, in December 2024, an accompanying action plan.
Better coordination mechanisms and a system for monitoring and evaluating progress
are needed to ensure the strategy is implemented effectively. The
anti-corruption strategy covers the areas of police, health, education,
local self-government, construction, financing of political activities,
taxes and customs, public procurement, privatisation and public
enterprises as risky, while the areas of whistleblower protection
and lobbying are represented within these areas.
Note However, according
to the European Commission, “the activities included in the action
plan are to some extent narrower in terms of addressing the corruption
problems and challenges identified in the strategy and do not comprehensively
address the GRECO recommendations of the 4th and 5th evaluation
rounds.”
Note While
the Agency for the Prevention of Corruption monitors its implementation,
adequate coordination mechanisms, budgetary means, as well as an
effective monitoring and evaluation system to track progress and
impact should be put in place for its effective implementation.
Note
80. According to the European Commission, Serbia should further
improve its track record on investigations, prosecutions and final
court decisions in high-level corruption cases, including the seizure
and confiscation of criminal assets.
Note Shortcomings remain
in the regulation of the role and the mandate of the Prosecutor’s
Office for Organised Crime and risk hindering consistency of action
in corruption investigations of the different specialised bodies,
resulting in a lack of effectiveness (as illustrated by the investigations
concerning the Novi Sad tragedy).
Note
81. As regards fighting against serious and organised crime, according
to the European Commission, the legal framework is partially aligned
with the EU
acquis but the
capacity to fight against such crime needs to be improved.
Note
82. As regards anti-money laundering (AML) and counter terrorist
financing (CFT) measures, according to a
MONEYVAL’s
(Committee of Experts on the Evaluation of Anti-Money Laundering
Measures and the Financing of Terrorism) report of December 2023, Serbia has made progress in relation
to virtual assets and virtual assets service providers. According
to MONEYVAL’s latest report of December 2025, Serbia has made progress
in implementing AML/CFT measures (policy coordination, European
and international cooperation of law enforcement authorities, improvement
in banks’ and financial institutions’ procedures for monitoring transactions
and reporting suspicious activities, etc.) but still needs to address
areas of concern to fully comply with MONEYVAL and Financial Action
Task Force (FATF) (in particular with respect to standards on-financial sector
compliance, the number and quality of investigations, asset confiscation,
addressing emerging risks like virtual assets, data collections
and analysis, etc.).
Note
83. There is well-established cooperation with Eurojust, Interpol
and with Europol, notably in weapons trafficking, drugs trafficking,
and the fight against organised crime groups.
Note
84. Trafficking of weapons is still an issue in Serbia. According
to the European Commission’s report, the new Law on weapons and
ammunitions and the programme on the control of the small arms and
light weapons and its action plan for 2025-2030 have yet to be adopted.
Note
5 Human
rights issues: the state of public freedoms
5.1 Freedom
of expression
85. Freedom of expression and media
remains an issue of concern, mainly due to the State monopolisation of
the majority of media outlets as well as harassment and intimidation
measures against journalists and independent media outlets. These
problems were already noted by the previous Council of Europe Commissioner
for Human Rights, Dunja Mijatović, in her 2023 report.
Note In 2026, Serbia ranks
104th on the
Press Freedom Index
of Reporters Without Borders (it ranked 96th in 2025 and
98th in 2024).
86. According to the 2025 Centre for Media Pluralism and Media
Freedom’s Media Monitoring Monitor (MPM), there has been a high
risk (68%) in Serbia, over the concentration of the media market
under a growing state-party control.
Note In April 2025, the main independent
TV channels, N1 and Nova TV, were removed from satellite television
service, leaving viewers with no choice but to watch these channels
on the internet.
Note
87. While Serbia has further aligned its media legislation with
the EU
acquis and other European
standards, there are serious concerns about the current blockage
of work of the Regulatory Authority for Electronic Media, whose
independence is still threatened. Its composition has not been entirely
renewed since November 2024, due to irregularities and the cancellation
of election process.
Note
88. The safety of journalists is another issue of serious concern.
According to the
Council
of Europe Platform to promote the protection of journalism and safety
of journalists (“Platform”), there are currently 13 active alerts concerning
Serbia, including three cases of death threats against journalists.
Note Other cases
concern other threats, physical assaults on journalists covering
recent local elections or protests and cyberattacks. In 2025, Serbia
recorded one of the highest numbers of alerts on the Platform along
with Belarus, Georgia, Russia, and Türkiye. Many of these alerts
involved physical attacks against journalists, especially during
protests.
Note The June 2025 protest in Belgrade
was particularly violent and many journalists were injured.
Note
89. Past cases of killings of journalists, including the killings
of journalists Slavko Ćuruvija, Radislava Dada Vujasinović and Milan
Pantić that occurred between 1994 and 2001, have still to be elucidated
and the perpetrators and those who ordered these crimes, must be
brought to justice.
Note
90. Independent journalists, media outlets (including the independent
TV station N1) and journalists’ unions are often subject to smear
campaigns. They are labelled as ‘enemies of the State’ or even ‘terrorists’
by public officials (Including the President of the Republic), tabloids
or other perpetrators.
Note
91. Serbia is also among Europe's leading countries for SLAPPs
(Strategic Lawsuits Against Public Participation) against media,
in particular investigative journalists, and also civil society
activists.
Note Journalists still
lack adequate protection under defamation and insult laws, as the
domestic case law is still not aligned with that of the European
Court of Human Rights.
Note
92. Concerns also remain with respect to editorial autonomy and
pluralism of public service media, which are accused of biased reporting
in favour of the government. In particular, the public broadcaster
RTS, was criticised for its coverage of protests. In 2025, some
media professionals in various media outlets, were fired or forced
to resign, for resisting censorship and defending ethical journalism.
Note
93. In December 2024, Amnesty International revealed that the
Serbian secret service had used advanced technology to illegally
spy on journalists and civil rights activists, which had a serious
impact on their personal and professional lives.
Note In its report
"A Digital Prison: Surveillance and the Suppression of Civil Society
in Serbia", Amnesty International revealed that Serbian security
services and police used spyware to monitor journalists and opposition
activists. This software enabled authorities to capture screenshots
and copy contact lists from infected devices, sending the data to
government-controlled servers. Serbian authorities denied these
allegations, claiming that their tools were used in accordance with
international standards. The Serbian authorities were using Pegasus
Spyware system and a local product – NoviSpy. The NoviSpy software
allowed the remote activation of the microphone and camera on the
victims' phones, the interception of their data and the monitoring
of their activities. Amnesty International has documented cases
of NoviSpy being installed on the devices of activists and journalists
during police interrogations. Serbian legislation does not provide effective
protection against illegal digital surveillance. Amnesty International
emphasises that the courts and the prosecutor's office are under
strong political influence, which makes the surveillance of the
services illusory. It has been revealed that NoviSpy was linked
to the Serbian Information Security Agency (BIA), which clearly indicates
government involvement.
Note
94. In February 2025, according to Amnesty International’s Security
Lab, two journalists from the Balkan Investigative Reporting Network
(BIRN), were investigating foreign investments and alleged corruption
in the country were reportedly targeted with Pegasus spyware via
suspicious Viber messages. This marked the third documented instance
in two years of Pegasus targeting Serbian civil society actors,
including journalists.
Note In April 2025, the
Monitoring Committee held a hearing on the surveillance of journalists
and activists in Serbia.
Note
95. During our visit to Belgrade, we learnt about the proposed
amendments to the Law on Public Order and Peace, which had been
put forward by the Ombudsman. According to our interlocutors from
civil society, such a proposal does not fall in the scope of his
remit, and the proposed amendments foresee that the offenses covered
by the law question will also apply to social media communications,
which may lead to abuses. If that is indeed the case, this would
constitute another threat to freedom of expression.
5.2 Freedom
of assembly and association
96. In February 2022, Serbia adopted
a Strategy for Creating a Stimulating Environment for the Development
of Civil Society in the Republic of Serbia for 2022-2030, along
with an action plan foreseeing to establish a council for civil
society cooperation. This step was welcomed by the then Council
of Europe Commissioner for Human Rights.
Note However, its impact
has still to be demonstrated. In particular, transparency and fairness
of public funding to civil society remains to be improved.
Note
97. An enabling environment for developing and financing NGOs
still needs to be created on the ground, as verbal attacks and smear
campaigns against such organisations continue, including by high-level
officials (see above “freedom of expression”)
. Organisations
and individuals that criticised the authorities are put under pressure,
in particular in relation to electoral irregularities, the glorification
of war criminals or environmental protection (including lithium
mining).
Note According
to the European Commission, which refers to rating by CIVICUS, the
space for civil society is rated as ‘obstructed’.
Note During
our visit to Belgrade, we heard about an increase in the number
of GONGOs and “phantom organisations”, whose role was to receive
public funds through public tenders, thus preventing other civil
society organisations to receive such funding. Such GONGOs are also
meant to target government critics.
98. On 25 and 26 February 2025, the police searched the offices
of four NGOs (including the Centre for Research, Transparency and
Accountability – CRTA, which is specialised in election observation,
Civil Initiatives, Trag Foundation and Center for Practical Politics)
at the request of the Special Anti-Corruption Department of the
Higher Public Prosecutor's Office in Belgrade. The raid was carried
in relation with suspicions of misuse of funds from the US Agency
for International Development (UNSAID) and so far, no information
on this case had been provided by the competent prosecutor’s office.
Following this raid, 29 NGOs announced their withdrawal from working
groups organised by the government and ministries. In January 2025, civil
society organisations also froze their membership in the Council
for Cooperation and Development of Civil Society due to the latter’s
lack of reaction to increasing attacks on NGOs and human rights
defenders.
Note
99. While the right to freedom of assembly has been generally
observed and the protests were and are allowed to take place, several
incidents occurred which might amount to violations of this freedom
(see above).
100. The legislation on freedom of assembly and association is
generally in line with European standards, but Serbia has yet to
align further with the joint Venice Commission and the OSCE/ODIHR
Guidelines on Freedom of Peaceful Assembly
. In
its conclusions of March 2024, the UN Human Rights Committee expressed
concern over the notification requirements in the Law on Public
Assembly and recommended that Serbia amend its legislation.
Note
101. During our visit to Belgrade, we raised the issue of a “foreign
agents” bill, which was moved by two MPs at the end of 2024. However,
according to our interlocutors from the National Assembly, it has
not been processed and has not been adopted. We also inquired about
amendments to Law on Associations, which have been announced by
the Ministry for Human and Minority Rights without details. Our
interlocutors from civil society were afraid of possible restrictions
to access to foreign funding, in case of adoption such amendments. However,
our interlocutors in the parliament were not aware of this legislative
initiative.
102. Recently, we have also been informed about a draft Law on
Internal Affairs, which will authorise the police to prohibit movement
in public places for a period of 15 days, in case of “large-scale
disturbances of public order”. Such restriction could be prolonged
and will not be subject to any judicial review. If the draft law is
adopted, it will negatively affect the possibility to organise mass
protests and will thus restrict freedoms of assembly and movement.
6 Relations with Kosovo
103. The normalisation of Serbia’s
relations with Kosovo, whose 2008 declaration
of independence Serbia does not recognise, remains a serious issue
and is also crucial for the country’s EU accession.
Note
104. On 24 April 2026, a court in Pristina delivered a judgment
relating to the events in Banjska in September 2023, during which
police clashed with a group of Serb gunmen, leaving four people
dead. The court sentenced two ethnic Serbs to life in prison and
a third to 30 years in jail. However, other perpetrators, including
Milan Radoićić, a politician, wealthy businessman close to the SNS,
have not yet been prosecuted.
Note
7 Conclusions
105. Serbian political life is characterised
by significant polarisation and ongoing tensions between President Aleksandar
Vučić’s government and the ruling majority, on one hand, and opposition
parties and civil society, on the other. The widespread protests
that followed the tragedy in Novi Sad have led to the emergence
of the student movement, which seeks to depoliticise State institutions
and combat corruption, but which has yet to establish itself as
a new political force.
106. We are concerned about the frequent organisation of early
elections, lack of dialogue between the ruling majority and the
opposition, risks to the independence of the judiciary, institutional
control, corruption, threats to freedom of association and expression
and media capture. Therefore, we conclude that the Serbian authorities
should make more sustained efforts to honour all obligations and
commitments arising from their membership in the Council of Europe
and we have included our detailed recommendations in the preliminary draft
resolution.
107. One of them concerns the “Mrdić laws”, which were adopted
without public consultations and were recently criticised by the
Venice Commission, mainly because of removing previously existing
safeguards designed to protect prosecutorial autonomy. The Serbian
authorities should amend them as soon as possible, in line with
the Venice Commission’s recommendations and should pursue further
reform of the judiciary and prosecution services in line with Council
of Europe standards.
108. We are particularly concerned about the state of freedom of
association and expression in Serbia and condemn reprisals, intimidation
measures (including surveillance, physical attacks and death threats),
and smear campaigns against civil society activists, human rights
defenders, journalists, and independent media outlets. As a matter
of priority, the authorities should stop these bad practices and
ensure a conducive environment for the exercise of the right to
freedom of association and expression in general. They should also refrain
from taking any legislative measure that could restrict these freedoms,
should resume structured dialogue with civil society and to ensure
media pluralism.
109. Finally, we would like to add that, during our visit to Belgrade,
we also discussed other human rights topics, such as the measures
taken to prevent discrimination against national minorities, women,
and LGBTI people. Due to time constraints, in this report which
focuses on the functioning of democratic institutions and in particular
the parliament and the judiciary, we preferred to focus only on
the state of public freedoms (freedom of expression, assembly and
association), since the serious violations of these freedoms affect
the whole functioning of democracy in Serbia. We will come back
to other human rights issues, including the prohibition of non-discrimination,
within the framework of a forthcoming report on the honouring of
obligations and commitments arising from Serbia’s membership in
the Council of Europe.
