B Explanatory
memorandum by Ms Zanda Kalniņa-Lukaševica, rapporteurNote
1 Introduction
1. The basis for the Parliamentary
Assembly’s monitoring procedure is
Resolution
1115 (1997) on the setting up of an Assembly Committee on the honouring
of obligations and commitments by member States of the Council of
Europe (Monitoring Committee) (as modified by
Resolution 1431 (2005),
Resolution
1515 (2006),
Resolution
1698 (2009),
Resolution
1710 (2010),
Resolution
1936 (2013),
Resolution
2018 (2014),
Resolution
2261 (2019),
Resolution
2325 (2020),
Resolution
2357 (2021),
Resolution
2428 (2022),
Resolution
2551 (2024) and
Resolution
2634 (2025).
Resolution
1115 (1997) defines the mandate of the Monitoring Committee and
stipulates that “it shall be responsible for verifying the fulfilment
of the obligations assumed by the member States under the terms
of the Council of Europe statute [(ETS No. 1)], the European Convention
of Human Rights [(ETS No. 5)] and all other Council of Europe conventions
to which they are parties, as well as the honouring of the commitments
entered into by the authorities of member states upon their accession
to the Council of Europe.”
2. In accordance with Paragraph 14 of
Resolution
1115 (1997) as amended, the Monitoring Committee is obliged to report
to the Assembly, on a yearly basis, on the general progress of the
monitoring procedures. In line with established practice, the committee
has entrusted me, as its chairperson, with the task of being the rapporteur
on the committee’s activities for the period from January to December
2025.
3. In line with its mandate, the Monitoring Committee follows
all Council of Europe member States with regard to the honouring
of their membership obligations, and if relevant, specific accession
commitments. Currently, ten countries are subject to a full monitoring
procedure: Armenia, Azerbaijan, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Georgia,
Hungary, Republic of Moldova, Poland, Serbia, Türkiye and Ukraine.
4. Three countries are currently engaged in a post-monitoring
dialogue (Albania, Montenegro and North Macedonia). The post-monitoring
dialogue concerns the States that have progressed to this stage
following the termination of a full monitoring procedure. It is
a less intensive procedure focusing on a limited number of remaining
issues that are expected to be resolvable within a limited timeframe.
Therefore, the Rules of Procedure specify that only two post-monitoring
dialogue reports will be issued. The second post-monitoring report
has to determine whether the post-monitoring dialogue can be ended
for that country. If not, the country will return automatically
to a full monitoring procedure. In a welcome development, on 1 October
2025, the Assembly resolved to close the post-monitoring dialogue
with Bulgaria with the adoption of
Resolution 2620 (2025).
5. In accordance with its terms of reference, the Monitoring
Committee is tasked to ensure and assess the fulfilment of obligations
assumed by all member States under the Council of Europe Statute,
the European Convention on Human Rights and all other Council of
Europe conventions to which they are parties. Therefore, as set
out in
Resolution 2261
(2019), the Monitoring Committee prepares periodic review reports
on the honouring of obligations to the Council of Europe for all
member States that are not subject to any of the two specific monitoring
procedures mentioned above. As specified in this resolution, the
Monitoring Committee selects the countries for periodic review according
to its internal working methods, on substantive grounds, while maintaining
the objective of producing, over time, periodic monitoring reports
on all member States. The committee is currently preparing periodic
review reports on Greece, the Netherlands, Spain and Sweden.
6. Finally, the committee can prepare a report on the functioning
of democratic institutions in any member State when particular developments
warrant. Following a motion for a Resolution, tabled by Ms Rian
Vogels (Netherlands, ALDE) and others, the Committee was, on 29
September 2025, seized for a report on the functioning of democratic
institutions in the Slovak Republic.
7. The country-specific comments and paragraphs have been prepared
on the basis of the inputs of the respective country rapporteurs
and reflect their reports, notes and statements as well as well
as findings of other Council of Europe monitoring mechanisms. They
should therefore not be considered as a political statement by the
chairperson of the Monitoring Committee.
2 Overview of the Monitoring committee’s
activities
2.1 General
comments
8. 2025 proved to be another very
busy year for the committee and its mandate to monitor the honouring of
membership obligations to the Council of Europe by all our member
States.
9. During the January 2025 part-session, the committee was seized
for a report on the challenge, on substantive grounds, of the still
unratified credentials of the parliamentary delegation of Georgia,
and I was appointed rapporteur in line with the procedure agreed
in the committee.
10. Over the reporting period, the rapporteurs carried out the
following visits to the countries under their respective responsibility:
Georgia (twice), Bosnia and Herzegovina, Bulgaria, the Republic
of Moldova, North Macedonia, Spain, Sweden, Türkiye and Ukraine.
11. On 30 September 2025, the committee held an exchange of views
with Mr Alain Berset, Secretary General of the Council of Europe,
in the context of the report on “The honouring of obligations and commitments
by Azerbaijan”.
12. Furthermore, at the initiative of the relevant rapporteurs,
several hearings were held during committee meetings. A hearing
was organised on the situation regarding the media in Albania. A
hearing in March and four exchanges of views were organised in respect
of Georgia: in April, May, September and in October 2025. An exchange
of views and a hearing were organised on Hungary: in March on recent
developments in the country, and in May on “Challenges to civil
society and independent media in Hungary”. A hearing was organised
on “Revelations concerning surveillance of journalists and activists
and the situation of civil society” in Serbia. In September, an
exchange of views was organised on “The state of Spain’s implementation
of the recommendations of the Group of States against Corruption
(GRECO) concerning preventing corruption in parliament, judiciary,
central governments and law enforcement agencies”. In January, a
joint hearing with the Committee on Legal Affairs and Human Rights
was organised on the implementation of judgments of the European
Court of Human Rights concerning Türkiye, in the framework of the
preparation of the report entitled “Implementation of judgments
of the European Court of Human Rights – 12th report”.
In September, a joint hearing with the Committee on Equality and
Non-Discrimination was organised on the situation of national minorities
in Ukraine.
13. In May, the Latvian Parliament invited the committee to hold
a meeting, and an exchange of views was organised with Latvian authorities
including Ms Irēna Kucina, President of the Constitutional Court,
and Ms Lauma Paegļkalna, Vice-Minister of Justice. A public Seminar
on “Resilience and preparedness of civil society in the face of
crises” was organised with Ms Claire Bazy Malaurie, President of
the European Committee for Democracy through Law (Venice Commission),
Ms Inese Vaivare, Director of the National Platform for Development
Cooperation, Latvia, Ms Olena Suslova, Founder and Senior Analyst
of the Women’s Information Consultative Center, Ukraine, and Mr Iulian
Groza, Executive Director of the Institute for European Policies
and Reforms (IPRE), Republic of Moldova.
14. The Monitoring Committee submitted four ordinary country reports
to the Assembly during the reporting period: “The honouring of membership
obligations to the Council of Europe by Hungary”, and “Post-monitoring dialogue
with Bulgaria” which the Assembly resolved to close. Two other reports
which will be debated to the Assembly during the January 2026 part
session: “Post-monitoring dialogue with North Macedonia” and “The functioning
of democratic institutions in Bosnia and Herzegovina”.
15. Several reports were prepared under urgent procedure, two
with regard to Georgia (in addition to the report on the challenge
of its unratified credentials): “The situation in Georgia and follow-up
to Resolution 2585 (2025) ‘Challenge, on substantive grounds, of
the still unratified credentials of the parliamentary delegation
of Georgia’” during the April part-session and “Uphold democracy
and the rule of law in Georgia” during the October part-session;
and one on Türkiye: “The arrest of the Mayor of Istanbul and the
state of democracy and human rights in Türkiye” during the April
part-session.
16. During the year, the committee considered and declassified
an information note on the “honouring of obligations and commitments
by the Republic of Moldova” and one on the “honouring of obligations
and commitments by Georgia”.
17. As in previous years, the outstanding co-operation with the
Venice Commission continued over the reporting period and the committee
remained one of its most prolific clients. The Committee requested
the opinions on the Georgian Law on the registration of Foreign
Agents, the amendments to the Law on Grants and other Laws related
to “foreign influence”. In respect of Hungary it requested opinions
on the draft bill on “The transparency of Public Life” and other
legislation relating to “foreign influence”, the fourteenth amendment
to the Fundamental Law of Hungary and Act LXVII of 2024 on the amendment
of Act CLI of 2011 on the Constitutional Court and on the legal
status of the Prosecutor General, prosecutors and other prosecutorial employees
and on the career of a prosecutor, as well as on the December 2024
electoral reform. In respect of Poland, it requested an opinion
on draft laws on the status of judges as prepared by the Codification Commission
of the Ministry of Justice of Poland and with regard to the Slovak
Republic it requested (urgent) opinions on the draft amendments
to the Constitution of the Slovak Republic and on Law No. 109/2025 amending
the Law “on non-profit organisations providing services of general
interest”.
2.2 Countries
under a full monitoring procedure
2.2.1 Armenia
18. The latest monitoring resolution
on Armenia is
Resolution
2560 (2024), adopted in June 2024. The Assembly commended Armenia
for its ongoing commitment to democratic development in the face
of significant security challenges, particularly following the recent
humanitarian crisis in Nagorno-Karabakh. The Assembly acknowledged
Armenia's efforts in pursuing a peace treaty with Azerbaijan and
supported the ongoing electoral reforms that have led to more transparent
elections. While acknowledging progress in areas such as judicial
independence and anti-corruption measures, it emphasised the necessity
for ongoing dialogue between the ruling majority and opposition,
as well as the importance of safeguarding democratic institutions from
political influence.
19. In 2025, the conclusion of the Armenia-Azerbaijan peace treaty
talks, announced in March, dominated proceedings. On 8 August 2025,
the Prime Minister of Armenia and the President of the Republic
of Azerbaijan met in Washington to sign the text of the draft peace
treaty and a joint declaration. This meeting was a significant turning
point in the history of the bilateral relationship. Following this,
the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) decided
to close the Minsk process and its related structures at the request of
Armenia and Azerbaijan. On 18 November 2025, Armenian and Azerbaijani
parliamentarians met for a bilateral meeting in Istanbul. The delegations
discussed the role of the parliaments in implementing confidence-building
measures between the two countries. Both sides emphasised the significance
of constructive dialogue among parliamentarians within international
organisations.
20. In March 2025, Armenia's National Assembly passed a law approving
accession to the European Union, signifying a major foreign policy
shift towards stronger European integration.
21. In June, a significant dispute between State and the Armenian
Apostolic Church arose. Important protests were initiated by religious
leaders, fueled by ongoing tensions between the government and the Armenian
Apostolic Church. The protests were notably led by Archbishop Bagrat
Galstanyan, who initiated a civil disobedience campaign known as
the “Holy Struggle”, calling for marches and rallies including a demonstration
in Yerevan. Although couched in moral and spiritual terms, the movement
had clear political demands, including calls for Prime Minister
Pashinyan to step down. This blended religious considerations with opposition
politics. By June 2025, the conflict had escalated, resulting in
the arrest of Archbishop Galstanyan and other clergy members. They
were accused of plotting to usurp power and overthrow the constitutional order.
22. In January 2025, following the conclusion of the former co-rapporteur
Kimmo Kiljunen's mandate, Mr Piero Fassino (Italy, SOC) was appointed
to serve alongside Ms Boriana Åberg (Sweden, EPP/CD) as co-rapporteur.
A monitoring visit had been scheduled for October 2025 but had to
be postponed. The next parliamentary elections in Armenia are scheduled
for 7 June 2026. These elections will determine the composition
of the National Assembly and the prime minister’s position.
2.2.2 Azerbaijan
23. In 2025, the Azerbaijani delegation
remained absent in the Assembly for a second year, as it had not presented
its credentials during the January part-session (27-31 January 2025).
Note Therefore, the examination by
the Assembly of the Monitoring Committee’s report of 5 December
2023
Note on the honouring of obligations and
commitments by Azerbaijan was further delayed.
24. The co-rapporteurs for Azerbaijan – Ms Lise Christoffersen
(Norway, SOC) and Sir Christopher Chope (United Kingdom, ECPA)
Note –
continued to monitor the situation in the country. On 30 September
2025, the Monitoring Committee held an exchange of views with Mr Alain
Berset, Secretary General of the Council of Europe, about ways of
cooperation with the country.
25. The co-rapporteurs monitored, in particular, the dire situation
of human rights defenders, journalists and other civil society representatives.
On 16 January 2025, Ms Christoffersen issued a statement, along
with the then General Rapporteur for political prisoners, Ms Thórhildur
Sunna Ævarsdóttir (Iceland, SOC) (Committee on Legal Affairs and
Human Rights), condemning the sentencing of Mr Bakhtiyar Hajiyev,
a well-known Azerbaijani civil activist.
Note
26. According to independent civil society groups, there are 392
political prisoners in the country, including human rights defenders,
activists, journalists and media figures, politicians and political
activists, academics and intellectuals.
Note Human rights activist, Mr Anar Mammadli,
Head of the Election Monitoring and Democracy Studies Centre and
winner of the Assembly’s 2014 Václav Havel Human Rights Prize, has
remained in detention on remand since 30 April 2024, awaiting trial
on charges of foreign currency smuggling, tax evasion, illegal entrepreneurship
and forgery.
Note
27. On 20 May 2025, Mr Igbal Abilov, a Talysh historian and ethnographer,
was sentenced to 18 years’ imprisonment and found guilty of treason
and incitement of hatred, in relation to his professional exchanges with
Armenian scholars.
Note
28. On 20 June 2025, the Baku Grave Crimes Court sentenced seven
journalists and media workers affiliated with Abzas Media (Mr Ulvi
Hasanli, Ms Sevinc Vagifgizi, Mr Hafiz Babali, Mr Mahammad Kekalov, Mr Nargiz
Absalamova, Ms Elnara Gasimova and Mr Farid Mehralizade) to prison
sentences of 7,5 to 9 years, mainly of “foreign currency smuggling”.
On 9 September 2025, the Baku Court of Appeal upheld this judgment. The
journalists and their legal representatives have denied all accusations
and denounced the trial as politically motivated.
Note These convictions
raised criticism within the Council of Europe.
Note Abzas Media
director Mr Ulvi Hasanli had participated in Assembly committees’
hearings in the past and had cooperated with its rapporteurs. In
2025, he was one of the three short-listed nominees for the Václav
Havel Human Rights Prize.
29. In 2025, the Azerbaijani authorities resumed co-operation
with the European Committee for the Prevention of Torture and Inhuman
or Degrading Treatment or Punishment (CPT). The CPT carried out
a periodic visit to Azerbaijan from 22 September to 3 October 2025;
it was its sixth periodic visit to the country. The CPT examined
the treatment and conditions of detention of persons in the custody
of law enforcement agencies, in prison establishments and in psychiatric
institutions.
Note
30. On 8 August 2025, a significant milestone was reached with
the initialling of the Armenia-Azerbaijan peace agreement in Washington
DC, United States. This agreement stipulates that both States will
relinquish all territorial claims against each other, refrain from
the use of force, and commit to upholding international law. It
thus paves the way for a final settlement of the longstanding conflict
between the two countries, both of which have been Council of Europe
member States since 2001.
Note
31. On 25 January 2025, local elections were held for the country’s
685 municipalities, with a turnout of over 31,45% of the overall
electorate.
Note The Congress for
Local and Regional Authorities of the Council of Europe did not
observe them.
2.2.3 Bosnia
and Herzegovina
32. The latest resolution adopted
by the Assembly is
Resolution
2574 (2024), in which the Assembly reaffirmed its support for Bosnia
and Herzegovina and urged member States to respect its sovereignty.
The Assembly has commended recent reforms in the country, including
anti-corruption measures and the establishment of a human rights
ombudsman, which have led to the opening of EU accession negotiations. However,
it has expressed concern over the electoral framework's compliance
with human rights standards, the functioning of the Constitutional
Court, and the need for further constitutional reforms. The Assembly
has made a number of calls for improvements, including to electoral
legislation, judicial efficiency, anti-corruption efforts, and the
protection of human rights.
33. On 3 December 2024, the committee decided to appoint Mr Pablo
Hispán (Spain, EPP/CD) as co-rapporteur. On 20 September 2025, the
mandate of Mr Zsolt Németh (Hungary, ECPA) was extended until 31 January
2026. The committee conducted a discussion on the latest developments
in May, and subsequently held a hearing with Mr Elmedin Konaković,
Minister of Foreign Affairs of Bosnia and Herzegovina, in September.
In November 2025, both co-rapporteurs conducted a country visit
in Sarajevo. The delegation met with the Chair of the Council of
Ministers, Ms Borjana Krišto, the Ministry of Justice, Mr Davor
Bunoza, the Ministry of Human Rights, Mr Sevlid Hurtić, and representatives
of the most prominent political parties in parliament. They also
met with the acting president of Republika Srpska, Ms Ana Trišić
Babić.
34. The co-rapporteurs have prepared a report on the functioning
of democratic institutions that was adopted by the committee on
9 December 2025.
Note In their report, the co-rapporteurs
covered the political developments that took place since the latest
Assembly resolution, in 2024. They addressed the issue of the institutional reforms
needed to fully honour Bosnia and Herzegovina’s commitments undertaken
on its accession to the Council of Europe. The report also explores
the issue of State property, a key element in the political situation.
2.2.4 Georgia
35. The rapid dramatic democratic
backsliding in Georgia has been an important point of attention
of the work of the committee. The corapporteurs for Georgia made
two fact-finding visits to the country, in January and November
2025. In addition to the report on the challenge, on substantive
grounds, of the still unratified credentials of the parliamentary
delegation of Georgia, the Assembly debated two reports prepared
under urgent procedure by the two co-rapporteurs for Georgia, in
April and October 2025.
Note
36. In addition, a hearing and three exchanges of views were organised
on Georgia. In March, the committee organised a hearing on “The
human rights concerns in relation to the ongoing crisis in Georgia”,
with Mr Marc Cools, President of the Congress of Local and Regional
Authorities of the Council of Europe, Ms Nino Lomjaria, Executive
Director of Georgia’s European Orbit and former Public Defender
(Ombudsperson) of Georgia, Mr Ucha Nanuashvili, Founder of the Human
Rights Center of Georgia, Vice-President of the International Federation
for Human Rights (FIDH) and former Public Defender (Ombudsman) of
Georgia, Ms Tina Bokuchava, representative of the three political
forces (Coalition for Change, Unity – National Movement, and Strong
Georgia), and Ms Natia Mezvrishvili, Deputy Chair of the political
party For Georgia. In April, an exchange of views on the situation
in Georgia and follow-up to
Resolution
2585 (2025) was organised with Ms Salome Samadashvili, Strong Georgia,
and Ms Tina Bokuchava, Unity – National Movement. During its May
meeting, the Committee organised an exchange of views on “The human
rights situation and challenges to civil society and media in Georgia”,
with Ms Claire Bazy Malaurie, President of the Venice Commission,
and Mr Michael O’Flaherty, Commissioner for Human Rights of the
Council of Europe. Lastly, in September, the committee held an exchange
of views on “the impact of the transparency legislation on civil
society”, with Ms Eka Gigauri, Executive Director, Transparency
International Georgia, and Mr Dave Elseroad, Head of Advocacy and
Geneva Office, Human Rights House Foundation.
37. Over the last year, the authorities' policies have become
increasingly isolationist and antagonistic towards the European
organisations and their member States, as evidenced by the baseless
attacks and damaging accusations against members of the international
community in Georgia. Regrettably, despite their credentials being
ratified, all members of the Georgian delegation resigned following
the adoption of
Resolution 2585
(2025) “Challenge on substantive grounds of the still unratified
credentials of the parliamentary delegation of Georgia”. The Georgian
authorities' rejection of any form of dialogue and their refusal
to co-operate with,
inter alia,
the Venice Commission in preparing its opinions on Georgian legislation
are deeply concerning.
38. Regrettably, despite the many calls to the contrary, no inclusive
process to establish an electoral environment conducive to new,
genuinely democratic elections was implemented. Consequently, the
majority of opposition parties decided not to participate in the
local elections that took place on 4 October 2025. Only Lelo-Strong
Georgia and For Georgia of the main democratic opposition parties
participated, while the others called for a boycott of the local
elections. In this contested electoral environment, Georgian Dream
won 81.7% of the vote with a turnout of 40.9%, Strong Georgia won
6.7%, and For Georgia won 3.7%. The main democratic opposition parties,
including those that had participated in the elections, decried
the elections as rigged and manipulated in favour of the ruling
majority. Regrettably, these elections were not observed by civil society
organisations with a well-respected track record in election observation
due to the crackdown on such organisations. The Georgian authorities
invited the Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights
of the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE/ODIHR)
to observe these elections purposefully so late as to render their
observation impossible and outright declined to invite the Congress
of Local and Regional Authorities of the Council of Europe.
39. Nevertheless, following the elections, both Strong Georgia
and For Georgia announced that they would take up the mandates won
in the different local councils. In addition, in a move that was
decried by the other opposition forces, For Georgia announced on
20 October that it would end its boycott of the parliament, and its
members took up their mandates on 28 October 2025.
40. The past year was characterised by an increasingly harsh and
relentless crackdown of the Georgian authorities on political dissent.
This included the adoption of repressive legislation and the abuse
of politically motivated legal proceedings against civil society,
independent media, opposition forces and individual protesters.
The politically motivated prosecution of opposition members and
independent journalists, including Ms Mzia Amaghlobeli, was strongly
condemned by the international community including the Assembly.
This relentless crackdown exacerbates the country’s social and political
crisis, violates its obligations as a member of the Council of Europe
and accelerates its democratic backsliding.
41. In stark contrast with the lengthy prison sentences handed
down to protesters on questionable and allegedly fabricated charges,
no effective investigations have been conducted into police brutality
and other human rights abuses during the demonstrations, nor into
the many substantiated reports of torture and ill-treatment of demonstrators
during their arrest and detention.
42. A large-scale popular protest against the increasing authoritarianism
of the ruling majority was organised on 4 October 2025, the day
of the local elections. While reportedly largely peaceful, regrettably
violence broke out when a number of protesters tried to storm the
Presidential Palace, which was prevented by the police. While criticised
by most of the opposition and civil society as a regrettable and
misguided, but spontaneous, action by a number of protesters at
the instigation of some individual organisers, the authorities considered
the unrest on 4 October as an attempt of violent overthrow of the
government with the backing of western governments and other actors.
A total of 44 individuals were placed under pre-trial detention
for their involvement in the unrest. Amendments were adopted to
the Law on Administrative Offences and the Criminal Code, that substantially
increased the administrative and criminal penalties for actions
such as covering faces, blocking roads and participating in assemblies
that officials had ordered to be terminated. In a clear signal that the
authorities wish to crackdown on the daily demonstrations that are
taking place, many protesters are reportedly being detained on nearly
daily basis, some of them facing long prison times for being charged
with blocking a road for a second time.
Note
43. Several former members of the Georgian Dream leadership, and
high-level government officials – including former Prime Minister
Mr Irakli Garibashvili and former Prosecutor General Mr Otar Partskhaladze
– have been arrested and charged with corruption and abuse of office.
While widely considered part of an internal power struggle and retribution,
it highlights the continuing existence of widespread high-level
corruption within Georgian governmental circles.
Note
44. Civil society in Georgia has historically played a pivotal
role in the country's democratic development. However, the different
actions by the Georgian authorities impede the proper functioning
of civil society organisations, including through the controversial
Transparency of Foreign Influence Law and Georgian Foreign Agent
Registration Act (GEOFARA) which was adopted on 1 April 2025. In
addition, on 16 April and 11 June 2025, the Georgian authorities
adopted a series of amendments in 2025 which require international donors,
including the Council of Europe and its member States, to obtain
the Georgian Government's approval before providing funds or assistance
to Georgian civil society organisations. Receiving an unauthorised
grant will result in criminal prosecution. The cumulative effect
of these laws has been devastating for civil society in Georgia,
whose survival is currently at risk.
45. In its opinion on the Law on the Registration of Foreign Agents,
the amendments to the law on grants and other laws relating to “foreign
influence” that was requested by the Monitoring Committee, the Venice Commission
concluded that “the legal regime established by GEOFARA risks undermining
the rule of law, civic space, and democratic freedoms”
Note and recommended this
law to be repealed. With regard to the law on grants, the Venice
Commission considered that the amendments “provide no clear and
objective criteria for refusal and contain insufficient safeguards,
thereby leaving wide scope for arbitrary or discriminatory application.
The extensive investigatory and enforcement powers of the Bureau,
including the power to order immediate seizure, combined with constrained
procedural time-lines and disproportionate sanctions, further undermine
fairness and due process”.
Note It therefore recommended that
the amendments be repealed.
46. In this opinion, the Venice Commission also evaluated the
amendments to the Law on Broadcasting, that introduce a blanket
ban on foreign funding for broadcasters, which “undermines media
pluralism and fails the standards of necessity and proportionality”
and recommended that these amendments be repealed.
Note On
the other hand, the Venice Commission felt that amendments to the
Organic Law on Political Association of Citizens that fully prohibit
political parties from receiving in-kind support, such as free lectures
or seminars, from legal entities or associations in Georgia or abroad
fall within the permissible national margin of discretion.
47. At the moment of writing, more than sixty civil society organisations
had been informed that they will be subjected to inspections by
the anti-corruption Bureau, the independence of which from the executive
branch of government is questionable, and at least seven well-respected
civil society organisations had their bank accounts frozen as part
of a criminal investigation into alleged sabotage on behalf of foreign
entities.
48. On 2 September 2025, the Parliamentary Investigative Commission
into the activities of the “United National Movement (UNM) regime”
and its political representatives between 2003 and 2012 – this investigation was
later extended to cover the period from 2012 until the present day
– published its report. This report concluded that the UNM and its
affiliated parties hindered the establishment of a healthy political
system in Georgia and should therefore be banned. On 16 October,
the Georgian Parliament adopted in final reading a legislative package
that will make it possible to deprive any individual “associated”
with parties declared unconstitutional of basic political rights
such as their passive voting rights, including the right to found
or join political parties or hold public office. On 28 October,
the ruling party announced that it had filed an appeal to the Constitutional
Court to ban three key opposition movements – the UNM, Ahali/Coalition
for Change, and Strong Georgia/Lelo. It stated that it had not appealed
for a ban of the For Georgia party as it had now entered the parliament,
or – for the moment – the ban of smaller opposition parties, reportedly
as they, “do not have a significant influence due to their size
and organisational structure, including the real prospect of overcoming the
electoral threshold”. At this stage, the ruling majority is not
appealing to deprive individuals associated with these parties of
their political rights as envisaged by the legislative package adopted
on 16 October. On 29 October, the co-rapporteurs issued a statement
reiterating the Assembly’s position that banning the democratic
opposition would effectively establish a one-party dictatorship
and urged the ruling majority to reconsider their appeal.
49. On 4 November 2025, the European Commission presented its
annual Enlargement Package. In its report on Georgia, it noted that
it had witnessed “serious democratic backsliding marked by a rapid
erosion of the rule of law and severe restrictions on fundamental
rights”
Note and that restrictive laws targeting
activists, civil society and sever restrictions independent media
threaten the survival of democratic foundations. It therefore concluded
that “[t]he basic foundations of democracy were significantly undermined
during the reporting period. The Georgian authorities’ attack on
democratic institutions and fundamental freedoms through hostile rhetoric,
constant spreading of disinformation, intimidation, repressive actions
and legislative measures is a drastic setback for the country's
democracy. Civil liberties, the principle of checks and balances,
and democratic decision-making have been eroded”.
Note As a result, “Georgia has no viable
path to the EU unless conditions change dramatically. It is now
a candidate country in name only”.
Note
50. The crackdown on the opposition further escalated when, on
6 November 2025, the Prosecutor General’s office announced that
it had started criminal proceedings
Note against
several leading politicians from different opposition parties (Mr Mikheil
Saakashvili, Mr Giorgi Vashadze, Mr Nika Gvaramia, Mr Nika Melia, Mr Zurab
Japaridze, Ms Elene Khoshtaria, Mr Mamuka Khazaradze and Mr Badri
Japaridze) for crimes against the State, in particular sabotage,
assistance in hostile activities to a foreign country, financing
activities directed against the constitutional order of Georgia
and the foundations of national security, and calling for the violent
change of the constitutional order of Georgia or the overthrow of
the State government.
Note If convicted on these, widely considered
trumped-up, charges, these persons could face lengthy prison sentences,
in some cases, up to 15 years. In addition, on 12 November, the
Prosecutor General filed criminal charges against Mr Giorgi Gakharia,
the leader of the “For Georgia” party for “organising the intentional
infliction of severe bodily harm against two or more persons” and
“abuse of official powers” when he was Minister of the Interior for
Georgian Dream.
Note These charges carry potential sentences
of up to 13 years.
51. The co-rapporteurs for Georgia visited Tbilisi from 10 to
12 November 2025. During their visit, they met with the ruling majority
and main parliamentary and extra parliamentary opposition parties
and visited several of the detained opposition leaders in prison.
Regrettably, the representatives of the government and its institutions
refused to meet with the co-rapporteurs. Following the visit, the
co-rapporteurs called again on the authorities to immediately end
the politically motivated charges against the opposition parties
and their leadership and urged them to repeal the foreign agent
legislation and the law on administrative offences which are incompatible
with European standards and norms, as noted by the Venice Commission
in its opinion on these pieces of legislation.
2.2.5 Hungary
52. The committee has discussed
the developments in Hungary on several occasions in 2025. In January, it
agreed to request two opinions to the Venice Commission, on the
fourteenth amendment to the Fundamental Law of Hungary and on the
December 2024 electoral reform. In March, the committee held a hearing
on recent developments in the country, with the participation of
Mr Tamás Bodoky, journalist, editor and publisher at atlatszo.hu,
and Mr András Léderer, Head of advocacy at the Hungarian Helsinki
Committee. In May, the committee held an exchange of views entitled
“Challenges to civil society and independent media in Hungary”, with
the participation of Ms Claire Bazy Malaurie, President of the Venice
Commission and Mr Michael O’Flaherty, Commissioner for Human Rights
of the Council of Europe. On 19 May 2025, the co-rapporteurs issued
a
statement according to which “the Hungarian draft law on ‘transparency
in public life’ must not be adopted.
53. In June, the committee considered a preliminary draft report
and agreed to send it to the authorities of Hungary for comments
and to request the Venice Commission for an opinion on the draft
bill of Hungary on “The transparency of Public Life” and other legislation
relating to “foreign influence”. The committee considered a draft
report and adopted a draft resolution in September 2025, and
Resolution 2617 (2025) was then adopted by the Assembly on 30 September 2025.
54. According to the co-rapporteur’s explanatory memorandum, Hungary
has undergone dramatic political and legal transformations since
2010, marked by the dominance of the Fidesz-KDNP coalition and a
series of structural changes to the country's constitutional order,
electoral system, and State institutions. As a result, there has
been a significant decline in the quality of democracy, rule of
law, and the protection of human rights, leading to growing concerns
at both domestic and international levels.
55. Following its transition to a parliamentary republic and accession
to the Council of Europe in 1990, Hungary initially made strides
toward pluralist democracy and respect for human rights. However,
the adoption of a new Constitution in 2011 triggered mounting scrutiny,
with international bodies repeatedly urging Hungary to honor democratic
standards amid fears of “illiberal democracy”.
56. Electoral legislation has been systematically modified to
favour the ruling coalition, through gerrymandering and the introduction
of first-past-the-post voting amplifying majoritarian advantages. Additionally,
the financing of political parties and campaigns has displayed profound
disparities, with pro-government actors enjoying far greater resources,
weak transparency and little effective oversight of campaign funding
practices. Such changes allowed to transform simple majorities
out of the ballot boxes into 2/3 “supermajorities” in parliament,
giving the power to single-handedly change the Constitution. Numerous constitutional
reforms have consolidated executive power and undermined institutional
checks and balances.
57. Partisan control has extended to judicial institutions, regulatory
bodies, and public oversight offices through supermajority appointments,
challenging the independence of the judiciary and weakening mechanisms
that ensure government accountability. While recent reforms aimed
at accessing frozen EU funds have introduced improvements in judicial
functions, broad discretion over appointments and disciplinary controls
remain vested in ruling party allies.
58. The fight against corruption, a persistent and serious issue
in Hungary, does not seem to make any progress. Anti-corruption
authorities are either undermined or subject to political influence.
Despite the introduction of institutions such as the Integrity Authority
and the Anti-Corruption Task Force at the behest of the EU, these
bodies face operational crises and accusations of political persecution,
compounded by non-transparent asset transactions and procurement
irregularities. Independent media and civil society helping to expose
corruption cases are targeted by official authorities and hampered
in their functioning.
59. Media freedom and pluralism have greatly suffered, with media
regulatory authorities and public service broadcasters dominated
by government affiliates. Media ownership is concentrated in pro-government
hands, limiting independent journalistic voices to a small minority
and subjecting critical outlets to administrative and financial
pressure.
60. Civil society and academic independence have likewise been
eroded, with public interest foundations taking control of universities
and cultural institutions, removing them from public or parliamentary
oversight. Funding for independent NGOs has been curtailed in favour
of government-aligned organisations, and new laws threaten the operation
and existence of critical civil society actors.
61. In its
Resolution
2617 (2025), the Assembly called for a complete overhaul of the
electoral legislation after the 2026 elections; the publication
of the GRECO reports and the strengthening of independent anti-corruption
institutions; restoration of public oversight over public interest
asset management foundations; and for measures to strengthen the
independent oversight of the media. The Assembly also called for
the abolition of the Sovereignty Protection Office. The Assembly
expressed its readiness to further the constructive dialogue and
close co-operation with the Hungarian authorities within the framework
of the monitoring procedure.
2.2.6 Republic
of Moldova
62. The co-rapporteurs visited
the Republic of Moldova from 26 to 28 May 2025. On 1 October 2025, Mr Antonio
Gutiérrez Limones (Spain, SOC) was appointed co-rapporteur to replace
Mr Pierre-Alain Fridez (Switzerland, SOC) who had left the Assembly.
63. The political agenda in the Republic of Moldova during 2025
was dominated by the preparations for the parliamentary elections
that took place on 28 September. Nevertheless, the reform progress
continued unabated during this period. Election preparations were
dominated by significant concerns over foreign interference, especially
from the Russian Federation through disinformation campaigns and
vote-buying schemes during as it had been the case for the 2024
presidential contest and constitutional referendum.
64. The parliamentary elections were observed by an International
Election Observation Mission (IEOM) of which the Assembly was a
part. According to the IEOM, the Republic of Moldova’s parliamentary
elections were competitive and offered voters a clear choice between
political alternatives, but the process was marred by serious cases
of foreign interference, illegal funding, vote buying, cyberattacks
and widespread disinformation campaigns especially by the Russian
Federation.The electoral legislation provides a sound basis for
conducting democratic elections but frequent changes to the legislation,
including shortly before the elections, have raised some concerns
about legal certainty and stability of electoral legislation.
Note
65. The Republic of Moldova has a very sizable diaspora, with
about 1/3 of its citizens living outside the country. As a result,
the issue of diaspora voting is an important as well as a sensitive
issue. This is compounded by the fact that the diaspora vote has
had a significant impact on the outcome of recent elections including
the parliamentary elections. In this context, the postal vote was
an issue of some controversy. Moldovan authorities introduced postal
voting on a trial basis for the last presidential election and constitutional referendum.
During this trial phase, the number of countries where postal voting
took place was limited to six: the United States, Canada, Norway,
Sweden, Finland, and Iceland. In its opinion on the Law on the partial implementation
of the postal vote, the Venice Commission highlighted that “The
limited territorial scope of this trial is acceptable due to its
application to one vote only” and that for future elections it should
be introduced “to all countries where postal voting is safe and
reliable, to be identified by decisions of the Central Electoral Commission”.
Postal voting for the parliamentary elections was introduced in
two additional countries: Japan and Australia. The Central Election
Commission stated that it did not have the required administrative resources
to conduct postal voting across the board in all countries.
66. These elections were won by the incumbent Party of Action
and Solidarity (PAS) with 50,2% of the votes, or 55 seats. The Patriotic
Electoral Bloc consisting of the Bloc of Communists and Socialists
(PSRM), the Party of Communists of the Republic of Moldova (PCRM)
and two other smaller parties, won 24.2% of the vote, or 26 seats
while the Alternativa of Chisinau mayor Ion Ceban won 8% of the
votes or 8 seats. Two other parties, the Our Party (PN) and Democracy
at Home (PPDA–Costiuc) each won 6 seats in the new parliament, while all
other parties failed to win any mandates. In the light of the contentious
and tense electoral cycles, the ruling party will have to follow
an inclusive governance and reform policy in order to ensure the
effectiveness as well as irreversibility of the reforms.
67. Media freedom and pluralism are balanced by the urgent need
to counteract disinformation and hate speech, especially given foreign
attempts to sway public opinion and disrupt democratic processes.
Legislative initiatives to strengthen mass media regulation and
oversight, as well as to clarify the responsibilities of regulatory
bodies, have been introduced and evaluated with recommendations
from the Venice Commission. However, critics have expressed concern
over the closure of media outlets for national security reasons, emphasising
the importance of transparency and safeguards to ensure such measures
do not erode trust in the Republic of Moldova’s democratic path.
68. Judicial reforms reflect the Republic of Moldova’s determination
to meet international standards, especially in its quest for European
Union accession. Noteworthy steps include the appointment of judicial officials,
the proposed merging of prosecutorial bodies to streamline anti-corruption
efforts, and comprehensive changes to the Constitutional Court’s
legislation. The Venice Commission has generally supported these reforms
but continues to advocate for strengthening judicial independence
further and clarifying constitutional controls over international
treaties. Judge appointments and term limits have become points
of attention, as these will shape the institutional landscape for
years to come.
69. On 4 November 2025, the European Commission presented its
annual Enlargement Package. In its report on the Republic of Moldova,
it concluded that the Republic of Moldova had continued to show
resilience and commitment to reforms progress despite unprecedented
challenges as a result of attempts by the Russian Federation and
its proxies to destabilise the country. The European Commission
emphasised that the authorities should ensure that its electoral
legislation fully aligns with European standards and to increase parliamentary
transparency, accountability, integrity and overall effectiveness.
It welcomed the progress in the reforms of the judiciary and the
fight against corruption and called for the strengthening of the
capacities of the anti-corruption institutions. It acknowledged
the legislative and institutional framework for the protection of fundamental
rights, but with regard to freedom of expression, it called for
the mechanism allowing the withdrawal of the licences of TV/radio
channels under the law on strategic investment to be brought in
line with European standards and for the adoption of a new law on
mass media.
2.2.7 Poland
70. Due to the presidential election
no co-rapporteurs’ visits took place during 2025. On 9 September
2025, Mr Christophe Brico (Monaco, EPP/CD) was appointed co-rapporteur
to replace Mr Pieter Omtzigt (Netherlands, EPP/CD) who had left
the Assembly.
71. The presidential election in Poland took place on 18 May and
1 June 2025, against a backdrop of deep political polarisation and
unresolved institutional disputes that have defined the country
since 2015. This election was observed by an IEOM of which the Assembly
was a part. The IEOM concluded that “the presidential election in
Poland was competitive and well managed, but deeply affected by
long-standing political polarisation, media bias, and continuing
controversies regarding the independence of key oversight institutions.
Both rounds respected fundamental freedoms, and election day was
calm and professionally organised. However, ballot secrecy was not
always ensured, campaign finance lacked transparency, and disinformation
and foreign interference posed serious risks”.
Note
72. Mr Karol Nawrocki, who was supported by Law and Justice party
(PiS) and its allies, narrowly won the second round of the elections
with 50.89% of the vote, beating Mr Rafał Trzaskowski, who was supported
by the parties of the governing coalition, who received 49.11% of
the vote. This result highlights the deep political division in
the country. As a result, the President and Government of Poland
continue to belong to opposing political camps. In the polarised
political climate of the country, this risks a continuation of the
constitutional standoff between the government and the president
that has plagued the country since the last parliamentary elections.
This standoff has impeded the necessary judicial reforms demanded
by the European Court of Human Rights in its judgments on the judiciary's
lack of independence. It is likely that the President Nawrocki will
continue former President Duda’s practice of blocking practically
all of the government's legal initiatives, including the much-needed
judicial reforms demanded by the European Court of Human Rights.
The need for these urgent reforms to the rule of law was underscored
by the Court of Justice of the European Union's judgment on 4 September
2025, which ruled that any judicial decision rendered by a panel
that does not comply with the requirements of EU law – in other
words, any decision involving judges appointed after the controversial
reform of the National Council of the Judiciary in 2017 – must be
declared null and void.
73. On 23 July 2025, Prime Minister Tusk announced a government
reshuffle in the wake of the presidential election. The most notable
change was the dismissal of the Minister of Justice Mr Adam Bodnar,
who was replaced by Mr Waldemar Żurek, a former member and spokesperson
of the National Council of the Judiciary and one of the most vocal
critics of PiS-led reforms.
74. To support the reform of the judiciary, the Monitoring Committee
requested an opinion from the Venice Commission on the draft laws
on the status of judges, prepared by the Codification Commission
of the Polish Ministry of Justice, on 4 March 2025. On 10 October
2025, Waldemar Żurek formally presented the draft law, titled “Act
on Restoring the Right to an Independent and Impartial Court Established
by Law by Regulating the Effects of Resolutions of the National
Council of the Judiciary Adopted in 2018–2025. This will now enable
the Venice Commission to finalise its opinion in the near future.
2.2.8 Serbia
75. The co-rapporteurs of the Monitoring
Committee closely followed the situation in Serbia, although a visit to
the country could not be organised due to the political developments
(see below) and changes in the rapporteurships.
Note The
Monitoring Committee discussed the situation in Serbia during its
meetings in March, April and May 2025. At the April meeting, it
held a hearing on “Revelations concerning surveillance of journalists
and activists and the situation of civil society”.
Note The Assembly held two current affairs
debates – on 8 April (“Protests and rallies in the Western Balkans
and Central Europe”) and on 1 October (“Political crisis in Serbia”)
– during which it discussed the situation in the country.
76. The co-rapporteurs, Mr Axel Schäfer and Ms Victoria Tiblom,
issued a few statements, in which they expressed concern about the
deterioration of the situation in the country due to the escalation
of mass protests since November 2024.
Note The unrest began
after a tragic accident in November 2024 – the collapse of the Novi Sad
railway station canopy – that left sixteen people dead. Initially
driven by student-led protests, the movement quickly expanded nationwide,
encompassing a wide spectrum of Serbian society. Protesters demanded
new elections, transparency, accountability, and the eradication
of corruption that they claim erodes the rule of law and public
trust. Huge protests took place in Belgrade and other major cities
in March, June and August 2025. The March protest, although largely
peaceful, was disrupted when a loud blast, possibly from a Long-Range
Acoustic Device (LRAD), caused panic and injuries. The June and
August protests culminated in violent clashes between demonstrators
and police. On 1 November 2025, a big march was organised in Novi Sad
to commemorate the first anniversary of the tragic incident at the
railway station.
77. The co-rapporteurs urged Serbian authorities to respond with
dialogue rather than force. They condemned all forms of violence
– whether by the State, pro-government groups, or protesters and
expressed concern about incidents of police brutality (including
excessive use of tear gas and batons), arbitrary detentions, the
use of surveillance against journalists and activists and harassment
of civil society groups.
78. The situation has also been followed by the Council of Europe
Commissioner for Human Rights, Mr Michael O’Flaherty, who visited
Serbia in April 2025 and expressed concern about increased levels
of the use of force by the police during protests as well as arbitrary
arrests and detention of protesters.
Note The state of freedom of expression
and media remains an issue of concern. In 2025, the Council of Europe
Platform to promote the protection of journalism and safety of
journalists issued at least
11 alerts, including cases of denigration of journalists criticising
the government, physical attacks or other harassment against journalists covering
protests and Pegasus surveillance.
Note
79. In February 2025, the Advisory Committee on the Framework
Convention for the Protection of National Minorities (“Framework
Convention”) issued its
Fifth
Opinion on Serbia.
Note It
concluded that although Serbia has a strong legal framework for
the protection of minority rights, progress is still needed on the
practical level. Persons belonging to national minorities face ongoing
difficulties in fully enjoying their rights under the Framework
Convention. These challenges are influenced by shifting political
priorities, social polarisation, and inter-State relations. There
are notable regional inequalities, with stronger minority rights
protection in Vojvodina compared to southern Serbia, underscoring
the need for a more consistent, nationwide approach. Additionally,
Roma communities experience significant obstacles in accessing their
rights across multiple areas.
2.2.9 Türkiye
80. In 2025, the Monitoring Committee
and its co-rapporteurs on Türkiye – Mr Stefan Schennach, (Austria, SOC)
and Lord David Blencathra (United Kingdom, ECPA) – continued to
closely follow the situation in the country. The Monitoring Committee
discussed different issues concerning Türkiye at its meetings in
January,
Note April, May, June and
October 2025. The co-rapporteurs on Türkiye made a fact-finding
visit to Ankara and Istanbul on 9-13 June 2025.
Note
81. Türkiye experienced significant political turbulence in 2025,
marked by developments focusing around two issues: attacks and judicial
harassment against the main opposition party – the Republican People’s
Party (CHP) – and the start of the Kurdish peace process.
82. As regards the first topic, attacks against the CHP culminated
with the arrest on 19 March 2025 of Mr Ekrem İmamoğlu, the Mayor
of Istanbul and President of the Union of Municipalities of Türkiye,
alongside over 100 local officials, politicians, journalists, and
businessmen on charges of corruption and aiding terrorism. This
arrest sparked a major controversy as Mr İmamoğlu was set to become
the main opposition Republican People’s Party (CHP) candidate for
the 2028 presidential election, making the timing of his detainment
and the revocation of his university degree highly contentious and
perceived as politically motivated.
83. The detainment of Mr İmamoğlu and related individuals triggered
an extraordinary wave of mass protests across the country, with
youth and students taking a leading role in major cities like Istanbul,
Ankara, and İzmir. Despite a strict ban on demonstrations, the opposition
mobilised millions, and the State's response was forceful, involving
pepper spray, water cannons, stun grenades, and plastic bullets.
Nearly 2 000 people were arrested, with numerous reports of serious
human rights violations against those in custody. During these protests,
media workers were not spared, facing physical assaults and detention,
and access to social media and major internet platforms was temporarily
restricted.
84. In its
Resolution
2597 (2025) “The arrest of the Mayor of Istanbul and the state of
democracy and human rights in Türkiye” of 9 April 2025, the Assembly
expressed deep concern over these developments and, like other European
and Council of Europe institutions,
Note urged the Turkish
authorities to release Mr İmamoğlu immediately and drop all unfounded
charges against him and others involved in the same investigation.
The co-rapporteurs on Türkiye met him in the Silivri Prison (Istanbul)
on 12 June 2025 during their fact-finding visit. Nevertheless, despite
these calls, Mr İmamoğlu and his collaborators remain in detention
on remand. In July, he was sentenced to one year and 8 months of
imprisonment for insulting election officials in 2022 and was banned
from political activities. In October, a new “political espionage”
charge was brought against him.
85. Mr İmamoğlu’s arrest was followed by increasing political
pressure, judicial harassment and intimidation being directed at
the CHP and its members. Hundreds of CHP mayors, party administrators
and municipal officials were arrested on terrorism and corruption
charges. More than a dozen of CHP mayors, including those of İstanbul,
Antalya, and Adana, have been suspended. On 2 September, an Istanbul
court annulled the legality of the party’s Istanbul provincial congress
held in October 2023, removed the elected Istanbul leadership and appointed
a new interim administration from the faction that lost the internal
election. The future of the CHP and the fate of its current leadership
are also under threat pending the outcome of legal proceedings concerning
alleged irregularities in the election of delegates at the CHP's
general congress in November 2023.
Note
86. In a statement of 29 September 2025,
Note the co-rapporteurs
on Türkiye condemned these developments as an “attempt to weaken
the main opposition party in Türkiye”. They stressed that safeguarding
the rights of the CHP was “essential to protecting the country’s
democratic future” and called on the authorities “to immediately
halt all judicial harassment and politically motivated investigations
targeting CHP representatives”. Moreover, the Assembly discussed
the situation in the country during its autumn part-session.
Note
87. On 24 October 2025, a first-instance civil court in Ankara
rejected a lawsuit demanding the annulment of the CHP 2023 Congress,
allowing the current party leadership to remain in place.
Note
88. As regards the second important set of developments, the “terror-free
Türkiye” process started following the call on 27 February 2025
by the imprisoned leader of the Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK),
Abdullah Őcalan, for the PKK to lay down its arms and disband. In
response to this call, the PKK announced in May that it would dissolve
itself. In July, it held a symbolic disarmament ceremony, marking
the end of its 40-year armed campaign. A parliamentary committee
was subsequently formed in August to outline the framework for legal arrangements
related to the peace process. It has since heard from a wide range
of stakeholders, including human rights groups, academics, and civil
society representatives.
Note At the end of October, the PKK announced
a new step, declaring that it had begun withdrawing its forces from
Türkiye. Moreover, a series of talks had been held between President
Tayyip Erdoğan and pro-Kurdish Peoples' Equality and Democracy Party
(DEM Party) to advance peace process.
Note It is believed
that, within this process, Mr Őcalan, could benefit from the “right
to hope”, after over 26 years of imprisonment and following the
judgment delivered in his case in 2014.
Note
89. Moreover, on 3 November 2025, the Grand Chamber of the European
Court of Human Rights rejected Türkiye’s appeal against its judgment
of 8 July 2025, which found the pre-trial detention of the Kurdish
leader and former co-chair of the People’s Democratic Party (HDP)
Selahattin Demirtaş’s in the Kobani trial to be politically motivated
and in violation of several provisions of Article 5 of the European
Convention on Human Rights and of its Article 18.
Note With this decision, the judgment is now
final. During their June 2025 visit to Türkiye, the co-rapporteurs
discussed with the authorities the execution of the previous judgment
of the European Court of Human Rights concerning Mr Demirtaş
Note and of the judgment concerning
Ms Figen Yüksekdağ Şenoğlu,
Note the
other former co-chair of the HDP party, whom they met in the Kandira/Kocaeli
prison on 13 June 2025.
90. The co-rapporteurs also followed the situation of the imprisoned
civil society activist and philanthropist Mr Osman Kavala. During
their visit to the country, they met him again in the Silivri prison
(Istanbul) and called on the authorities to release him and fully
implement the judgments of the European Court of Human Rights concerning
him.
Note Moreover, in its
Resolution 2599 (2025) “Implementation of judgments of the European Court of
Human Rights”,
Note the Assembly considered “it absolutely
unacceptable that the judgment in the case of
Kavala
v. Turkey, which was the subject of infringement proceedings
under Article 46, paragraph 4, of the Convention, has not yet been
implemented and that Mr Kavala is still imprisoned”. It reiterated
its call on Türkiye to immediately release Mr Kavala, in line with
its obligations under the Convention and the Statute of the Council
of Europe.
Note The Assembly also
noted that Türkiye was amongst the nine States which had over 40
leading cases pending implementation, including leading cases which
had been pending implementation for more than five years.
Note Following their June 2025 visit
to the country, the co-rapporteurs for Türkiye were left with “the
overwhelming impression” that Türkiye had reached “a tipping point”.
They reiterated their concerns about the repression of opposition
politicians, civil society activists, and individuals deemed a threat
to the government; the abuse of pre-trial detention, the politicisation
of the judiciary, and the continued practice of replacing democratically
elected mayors with trustees appointed by the Ministry of the Interior
in opposition-run municipalities.
Note
91. On 5 August 2025, the Congress of Local and Regional Authorities
youth delegate in respect of Türkiye, Mr Enes Hocaoğulları, was
arrested, questioned, and placed in detention pending trial. The
charges against him – for “publicly disseminating misleading information”
– related specifically to a speech he made during a plenary debate
held by the Congress in Strasbourg on 27 March 2025, on dismissals
of mayors in his country; his arrest and detention were firmly condemned
by the Congress.
Note Following a visit
of its delegation to Ankara and to Sincan prison, where he had been
detained, the youth delegate was released under judicial control
until the end of the trial.
Note
2.2.10 Ukraine
92. On 29 January 2025, Mr Damien
Cottier (Switzerland, ALDE) was appointed co-rapporteur to replace Mr Alfred
Heer (Switzerland, ALDE) whose term had ended. On 4 March 2025,
Ms Saara-Sofia Sirén (Finland, EPP/CD) was appointed co-rapporteur
to replace Mr Birgir Thórarinsson (Iceland, EPP/CD) who had left
the Assembly.
93. Following the Russian Federation's full-scale invasion of
Ukraine in February 2022, the Monitoring Committee agreed to suspend
preparations for the next monitoring report while continuing to
monitor developments in Ukraine. At the same time, the Ukrainian
authorities have made enormous and commendable efforts to ensure
the effective functioning of their democratic and legal institutions,
despite the limitations imposed by martial law. They have also initiated
an ambitious reform programme as part of their accession negotiations
with the European Union. Many of these reforms address areas covered
by the monitoring procedure in respect of Ukraine. It was therefore
agreed by the committee that preparations for a new monitoring report
should be started on the basis of one or more fact-finding visits
to the country. In that context, a fact-finding visit to Kyiv took
place from 8 to 10 October 2025.
94. Following their visit, the co-rapporteurs issued a statement
in which they welcomed the reforms implemented by the Ukrainian
authorities to ensure the functioning of the country’s democratic
and rule of law institutions in line with European standards but
noted that important challenges remain. They called upon the authorities
to strengthen parliamentary oversight and regretted, in that context,
reports of unnecessary obstacles preventing members of the Verkhovna
Rada and local self-government bodies from playing their proper
role.
95. Ukraine continued to make marked progress with regard to fighting
the endemic corruption in the country. In June, the Verkhovna Rada
adopted a law that stripped Ukraine’s anti-corruption bodies of
their independence and brought them under the effective political
control of the presidential administration. Following a domestic
and international outcry, this law was repealed on 31 July 2025,
which was welcomed by the co-rapporteurs. However, reports of subsequent
actions that could affect the independence and effectiveness of
the anti-corruption bodies remain a point of concern. It is important
that the authorities take all necessary steps to ensure the independent
functioning of these institutions both in law and practice.
96. Minority rights and freedom of conscience remain sensitive,
especially in the light of the instrumentalisation by the Russian
Federation as an excuse for its full-scale military aggression against Ukraine.
It is therefore important that the legislation on these two sensitive
issues fully align with European standards. The authorities have
continued to make efforts to address the Venice Commission's recommendations
regarding the “Law on National Minorities (Communities) of Ukraine”
and have indicated that the remaining recommendations regarding
this law, as well as other laws affecting minority rights – such
as the Education Law and the State Language Law – will soon be fully
addressed.
97. On 4 November 2025, the European Commission presented its
annual Enlargement Package. In its report on Ukraine, the European
Commission concluded that “Ukraine has continued to show remarkable resilience
and strong commitment to its European path despite the escalation
of Russia ongoing war of aggression”.
Note While commending
the authorities’ efforts uphold the democratic framework, it noted
the need for strengthening parliamentary oversight and inclusiveness
of the legislative process. Continued efforts are necessary so strengthen
the fight against corruption as well as the efficiency and independence
of the justice system.
98. On 10 November 2025, the National Anti-Corruption Bureau (NABU)
and the Specialised Anti-Corruption Prosecutor's Office (SAPO) of
Ukraine announced charges against several officials, reportedly including
close associates of President Zelensky, for allegedly receiving
up to €100 million in kickbacks for contracts involving Ukraine’s
State-owned nuclear energy company. These revelations sparked a
nationwide outcry, particularly given the escalating attacks by
the Russian Federation on Ukraine’s energy infrastructure. These
developments highlight the prevalence of high-level corruption in
Ukraine and the need to safeguard and strengthen the independence
and efficacy of the country's anti-corruption bodies, including
against interference from the executive.
2.3 Post-monitoring
dialogue
2.3.1 Albania
99. In the absence of a consensus
among the political groups in the Assembly, the second co-rapporteur
for the post-monitoring dialogue with Albania, was not appointed
until June 2025. On 24 June, Ms Mónika Bartos (Hungary, ECPA) was
appointed co-rapporteur. Consequently, no fact-finding visits were
conducted to the country in 2025. A visit is planned for the beginning
of 2026.
100. Parliamentary elections took place in Albania on 11 May 2025.
The Assembly observed these elections as part of an IEOM. According
to the IEOM, the elections were competitive and well conducted,
but they took place in a highly polarised environment, and contestants
did not enjoy a level playing field. Although candidates could campaign
freely, the campaign was marred by reports of the abuse of administrative
resources, allegations of pressure being placed on certain groups
of voters (especially civil servants), and vote buying. As with
previous elections, the observers noted that the legal framework
for elections provides an adequate basis for democratic elections
if it is implemented in good faith by all stakeholders. The observers
therefore called upon the authorities, and in particular the incoming
parliament, to address the shortcomings and ambiguities in the electoral
framework that hinder its implementation. In a welcome development,
voting abroad for the sizeable Albanian diaspora was introduced
for the first time during these elections, in line with the judgments of
the Constitutional Court of Albania, addressing an important recommendation
in
Resolution 2544 (2024) of the Assembly.
101. The Socialist Party, led by Prime Minister Edi Rama, won the
elections for a fourth consecutive time, obtaining 53.3% of the
votes and 83 seats in the 140-seat Albanian Parliament. The Democratic
Party of Mr Sali Berisha obtained 46.5% of the vote, securing 53
seats in the new parliament. Meanwhile, the Albania Becomes Movement
received 4% of the vote, earning them one seat in the new parliament.
The Democratic Party strongly contested the veracity of the results
of these elections.
102. The new parliament began work on 12 September 2025. On 27
October 2025, the Socialist Party and Democratic Party reached an
agreement on establishing parliamentary ad hoc committees on electoral
and territorial reforms, which were set up by parliament with 113
and 15 votes in favour, respectively.
103. The media situation in Albania was identified as a cause for
concern by the Assembly in
Resolution
2544 (2024), which concluded the full monitoring process and initiated
the post-monitoring dialogue. Unfortunately, this remains a cause
for concern, as noted by the IEOM during the recent parliamentary
elections. The IEOM deplored the lack of transparent financing and
ownership concentration in the media, as well as editorial interference,
all of which undermine the integrity and diversity of reporting.
Contrary to the Assembly's recommendations, defamation remains criminalised
and the sanctions would be further strengthened if controversial
amendments to the Criminal Code were adopted. Additionally, the
issue of the strategic lawsuits against public participation has
yet to be addressed by legislation. On 9 December 2025, the Monitoring Committee
organised a hearing on the situation of the media as part of the
preparations for the report on the post-monitoring dialogue.
104. On 4 November 2025, the European Commission presented its
annual Enlargement Package. In its report on Albania, it welcomed
the firm political commitment of the Albanian authorities to EU
integration but noted that the reform process would need to be stepped
up to maintain the current momentum in the accession process. With
regard to the recent parliamentary elections, it noted that they
were held competitively but regretted the shortcomings noted by
observers, in particular regarding abuse of administrative resources
and lack of level playing field for all electoral contestants. It
urged the authorities to fully address the Venice Commission and
OSCE/ODIHR recommendations in this respect. It regretted that the
political polarisation and lack of genuine political dialogue and
consultation were hindering the work of the parliament. With regard
to the judiciary, the Commission, highlighted the success of the
ongoing vetting process of judges and prosecutors, which should
conclude in 2026. However, it stressed that sustained “reform efforts
are needed to continue to strengthen the judicial system and maintain
high standards of integrity after the completion of the vetting
process”. It furthermore expressed concern about the continuing
prevalence of widespread corruption in connection to the still limited
impact of the institutional anti-corruption structures. With regard to freedom of expression,
the European Commission expressed its concern about the situation
of the media which continues to suffer from the high concentration
of media ownership, as well as “intimidation and precarious working conditions
for journalists”.
2.3.2 Bulgaria
105. Although the Monitoring Committee’s
proposed to close the post-monitoring dialogue with Bulgaria already
in its report of 6 March 2024,
Note the Assembly took such a decision
only on 1 October 2025 by
Resolution
2620 (2025), on the basis of an updated committee report of 9 September
2025.
Note
106. The committee’s report focused on six outstanding areas of
concerns: reform of the judiciary, high-level corruption, transparency
of media ownership, human rights of minorities, hate speech and
violence against women.
107. The committee noted that significant constitutional and legislative
reforms were undertaken to address long-standing concerns regarding
the governance of the judiciary and prosecution service. Regrettably,
the majority of constitutional amendments adopted in December 2023
were declared unconstitutional by the Constitutional Court on 26
July 2024,
Note citing procedural requirements,
which stalled further reform efforts. Nonetheless, reforms to the
Criminal Procedure Code and laws limiting the powers of the Prosecutor’s
Office were upheld, aligning with recommendations from the Venice
Commission and reinforcing mechanisms for accountability and criminal
liability within the legal system.
108. Bulgaria aimed to strengthen its fight against high-level
corruption through the Anti-Corruption Act of October 2023, modernising
investigatory powers and promoting transparency in public procurement. Regrettably,
despite these legislative advancements and compliance with multiple
GRECO recommendations, the country continues to face persistent
challenges in securing final convictions in high-profile corruption
cases, and an improved legal framework is expected to translate
into more effective anti-corruption outcomes.
109. Human rights and freedom of expression have seen notable improvements,
such as enhanced protection for journalists and clearer legal definitions
of hate speech. However, issues remain – including media ownership
concentration, strategic lawsuits against journalists, and the slow
integration of the Roma minority, which represents about 5% of Bulgaria’s
population. Recent legislative measures and national awareness campaigns
have bolstered protections against hate speech and domestic violence,
but further investments in victim support and Roma inclusion are
needed to close persistent social gaps.
110. Over 90 leading judgments of the European Court of Human Rights
concerning Bulgaria are pending implementation, with around one
third of them pending for at least 10 years. The Committee of Ministers,
which supervises execution of the Court judgments, still expects
tangible progress in the execution of some of them.
Note
111. The committee concluded that Bulgaria had made significant
progress in the honouring of its accession commitments and obligations
stemming from membership in the Council of Europe since it joined
the Organisation in 1992. Despite the notable instability of its
political landscape between 2021 and 2024, with seven consecutive
early parliamentary elections, Bulgaria established a coalition
government in January 2025, demonstrating renewed political will
to honor its international commitments. Moreover, following the
decisions of the relevant European Union institutions of June and
July 2025, it has been decided that Bulgaria will join the Eurozone
as of 1 January 2026.
112. Therefore, in its
Resolution
2620 (2025), the Assembly decided to close the post-monitoring dialogue with
Bulgaria and follow the developments in the country with regard
to the rule of law, pluralist democracy and human rights in the
framework of its periodic reviews.
Note It also called on the Bulgarian authorities
to resume the reform of the organisation of the State (which was
stopped following the ruling of the Constitutional Court of 26 July
2024), through the adoption of ordinary legislation and/or new constitutional
amendments by the Grand National Assembly. It also invited the authorities
to address other outstanding issues in close co-operation with relevant
Council of Europe bodies.
Note
2.3.3 Montenegro
113. In April 2024, the committee
appointed as co-rapporteur Ms Liliana Tanguy (France, ALDE), alongside Mr Nicos
Tornaritis (Cyprus, EPP/CD), to prepare the second and final post-monitoring
dialogue on Montenegro. The first post-monitoring dialogue resolution,
adopted in 2021, identified areas of improvement regarding the independence
of the judiciary, trust in the electoral process, fight against
corruption and the situation of the media. Following the last country
visit in 2022, the co-rapporteurs had hailed advances in the fight
against corruption and encouraged political leaders to adopt a set
of critical measures.
114. In 2025, Montenegro has been the subject of several developments
across Council of Europe bodies, mainly on constitutional/judicial
reform, anti‑discrimination, trafficking, and execution of decisions
of the European Court of Human Rights.
115. On 7 October 2025, the Committee of Ministers adopted a resolution
on execution of the European Court of Human Rights decision in Brahim Kovačević and Others v. Montenegro,
illustrating Montenegro's ongoing process of implementing and complying
with earlier judgments and rulings from the European Court of Human Rights.
Montenegro is still working on addressing previous findings regarding
the excessive length of judicial proceedings and ensuring guarantees
of fair trials. This involves putting in place remedies for violations
found by the European Court of Human Rights, such as reducing case
backlogs, improving judicial efficiency, ensuring transparency,
and safeguarding fair trial rights throughout the court system.
116. In June 2025 the Venice Commission adopted an opinion for
Montenegro “On some questions relating to the procedure of early
termination of the mandate of Constitutional Court judges due to
age limits”, in accordance with the political agreement signed on
15 March 2025 between the government and opposition representatives
to end a controversy as regards the termination of the mandate of
a judge of the Constitutional Court on the grounds that she reached
the retirement age. A legislative reform is required to ensure that
a similar situation should not arise again, and the Venice Commission’s
opinion contains proposals to include in the future reform. On 28 October
2025, the minister of Justice of Montenegro, Mr Bojan Božović, submitted
the draft of this reform for a follow-up opinion to the Venice Commission
and the opinion is scheduled for discussion and adoption in December
2025.
117. In June 2025, the Venice Commission adopted a follow-up opinion
on the draft Law on the Government. The Commission welcomed the
fact that the revised draft law addressed most of its 2023 key recommendations
but drew the attention of the authorities to some key recommendations,
including the requirement of a constitutional revision.
118. In October 2025 the sixth‑cycle ECRI report on Montenegro
was published. ECRI requests priority implementation from the authorities
of Montenegro on two specific recommendations: to ensure the full independence
of the Protector of Human Rights and Freedoms, and to complete the
registration of all displaced Roma and Egyptians from Kosovo*
Note present
in Montenegro, including their children.
119. Montenegro remains under GRECO’s Fifth Evaluation Round “preventing
corruption and promoting integrity in central governments (top executive
functions) and law enforcement agencies”. A compliance report, adopted
and authorised for publication in 2024, noted partial progress and
set a deadline of 31 December 2025 for Montenegro to report further
implementation, after which a Second Compliance Report will be prepared. Reforms
of the executive and police integrity framework are expected.
120. In 2025, the Group of Experts on Action against Trafficking
in Human Beings (GRETA) adopted its new evaluation report on Montenegro
for the 3rd round (2021-June 2025), following a December 2024 country
visit and consideration of government comments in June 2025. While
the report welcomes positive developments in a number of areas,
GRETA once again urged the Montenegrin authorities to take action
regarding the compensation of victims of human trafficking, on the
access to a recovery and reflection period, and on strengthening
the criminal justice response to traffic of human beings.
121. A country visit from the co-rapporteurs is scheduled in 2026,
with a view to adopt the second and final report on post-monitoring
dialogue before the end of the year.
2.3.4 North
Macedonia
122. In 2025, the co-rapporteurs
Ms Sibel Arslan (Switzerland, SOC) and Mr Joseph O’Reilly (Ireland,
EPP/CD) followed closely the developments in North Macedonia and
reported to the committee at its June and October meetings.
123. A fact-finding visit to Skopje took place on 23-25 April 2025,
for the first time since 2019.
Note During their visit,
the co-rapporteurs examined in particular the situation in the judiciary,
the measures taken to fight against corruption, the electoral framework,
the human rights issues and the rights of persons belonging to national minorities.
They recognised some progress as regards ensuring transparency of
work of the Judicial Council and the functioning of the judiciary
in general. However, they were concerned about numerous allegations
of politicisation of the judiciary and widespread corruption throughout
the public sector, as well as the lack of effective measures to
combat these phenomena. They also noted that there was an urgent
need to reform the electoral framework, in line with long-standing
recommendations from the OSCE/ODIHR and the Venice Commission. They
also concluded that political freedoms – including the rights to
freedom of association, assembly and expression, and media pluralism
– were generally respected and that North Macedonia, as a multi-ethnic,
multi-cultural and multi-confessional country, could serve as a
model for other countries in promoting a “living together” culture
and mentality. They were nevertheless concerned about the poor conditions
in some places of detention (especially in the Idrizovo prison)
and urged the authorities to implement without delay the outstanding
recommendations of the CPT.
124. During their visit, the co-rapporteurs called on all political
parties to find a compromise to implement the “French proposal”
by including a reference to the Bulgarian ethnic minority in the
Constitution, which is a condition for moving ahead in the negotiation
process on accession to the European Union.
125. Following the visit, the co-rapporteurs prepared a report
on post-monitoring dialogue with North Macedonia, which was examined
for the first time by the Monitoring Committee on 1 October 2025.
On 9 December 2025, the committee adopted the report, in which it
proposed to close the post-monitoring dialogue and follow the developments
in the country with regard to the rule of law, pluralist democracy
and human rights in the framework of its periodic reviews.
Note
126. The Council of Europe Commissioner for Human Rights, Michael
O’Flaherty, visited North Macedonia at the same time as the co-rapporteurs
(22-25 April 2025). In his memorandum published in July 2025, the Commissioner
commended North Macedonia’s long-standing commitment to address
human rights issues faced by Roma and commended, in particular,
the adoption of the National Strategy for Roma Inclusion (2022–2030)
and the efforts made by government bodies, the Ombudsperson, and
the Commission on Prevention and Protection against Discrimination.
Note However,
he was concerned about environmental risks disproportionately affecting
Roma, including air and waste pollution, lack of sanitation, and
by exclusion from public services.
Note
127. Moreover, 2025 was another electoral year in North Macedonia.
On 19 October 2025, the first round of local elections was held.
The main ruling centre-right VMRO DPMNE party crushed its main rival,
the Social Democrats (SDSM), so extending its domination of politics
to local level. VMRO DPMNE came first in 53 of the country’s 81
municipalities. The turnout was just under 48%, a slight decline
from the 50% who voted in the previous local elections in 2021.
In those municipalities where a mayor was not elected in the first
round by winning more than half of the votes, a second round was
held on 2 November.
Note Consequently, the
ruling VMRO DPMNE party won in 21 out of the 33 municipalities where
second rounds were held (also in Skopje), confirming its overall
dominance at the local elections. In total, after the two election
rounds, the party is set to govern 54 of the country’s 81 municipalities.
This is 12 more than in the previous 2021 local polls, when it won in
42.
Note
128. The Congress of Local and Regional Authorities observed the
elections, along with the OSCE/ODIHR and the European Parliament.
In its
statement
of 20 October, it welcomed the fact that election day was well-organised,
which was “a positive backdrop for resolving outstanding issues
affecting local democracy in North Macedonia”, such as “the overly-politicised
environment and perception about corruption that erode public confidence
in institutions”. It also regretted the low number of women mayoral
candidates and the lack of accessibility for voters with disabilities
and older people as well as the absence of local media, particularly outside
the capital.
2.4 Periodic
monitoring reports
2.4.1 Greece
129. The Monitoring Committee has
appointed as co-rapporteurs Ms Miapetra Kumpula-Natri (Finland,
SOC) in January 2025, alongside Ms Laura Castel (Spain, UEL) who
had been appointed in March 2024.
130. The preparatory work started with an exchange of views with
members of the Greek delegation. The members of the delegation welcomed
the periodic review as an important opportunity to highlight the
significant transformations that had occurred in Greece over the
last years. The latest periodic review, from 2017, concluded that
Greece was generally fulfilling its membership obligations and that
its democratic institutions functioned in line with the Council
of Europe’s standards. The report nonetheless identified various
concerns and made recommendations across all three pillars of the
Organisation mission.
131. Since then, Greece has achieved significant improvements.
It enjoys robust economic conditions, The asylum system has been
reformed, and the democratic landscape has also strengthened. Greece
is now the only major EU democracy without a strong far-right party
threatening democratic norms. The three deficits that the country
had to face – indebtedness, trade deficit and lack of trust – have
been resolved. Nevertheless, significant challenges within the scope
of the periodic review persisted. Corruption by governing officials,
verbal attacks against civil society organisations, very serious
instances of strategic lawsuits against public participation and
the use of Pegasus spyware against politicians and journalists have
been mentioned. The work of the Monitoring Committee should allow
to clearly identify the real problems and distinguish them from fake
news.
132. The co-rapporteurs will carry on the preparatory work and
organise a country visit in 2026, in order to present a report before
the end of the year.
2.4.2 The
Netherlands
133. The report on the Netherlands
has been under preparation for a considerable amount of time. In
2023, a preliminary draft report was transmitted to the Dutch authorities
for comments. However, when we were preparing our final draft, the
government fell, and new elections were called for 22 November 2023.
The elections dramatically changed the political landscape with
the hard right and populist party of Mr Geert Wilders (Party for
Freedom, PVV) emerging as the largest party. In the increasingly
polarised political environment, the negotiations to form a government
were drawn out and contentious and concluded only after 223 days.
134. Given that the political makeup of the country had completely
changed, the original report needed to be thoroughly rewritten and
preparations for a new visit by the co-rapporteurs were underway
when, on 3 June 2025, Mr Wilders announced that his party was withdrawing
its support for the coalition. The government fell, and new elections
were called for 29 October 2025. The margin of votes and seats between
the winning and second placed parties, Democrats 66 and Party for
Freedom, was the smallest since the size of parliament was last
enlarged in 1956.
135. The report will therefore have to be practically rewritten
from scratch, as the co-rapporteurs should wait until a new government
is formed to schedule a country visit, the committee agreed to request
an extension of the reference until March 2027.
2.4.3 Spain
136. In 2025, the co-rapporteurs
Ms Valentina Grippo (Italy, ALDE) and Ms Elvira Kovács (Serbia,
EPP/CD) followed closely the developments in the country. At its
meeting in Paris on 4 March 2025, the committee held an exchange
of views with Mr Antonio Gutiérrez Limones, Chairperson of the delegation
to the Assembly, and members of the delegation. On 9 September 2025,
it held an exchange of views on “The state of Spain’s implementation
of the recommendations of the Group of States against Corruption
(GRECO) concerning preventing corruption in parliament, judiciary,
central governments and law enforcement agencies” with Ms Sophie
Meudal Leenders, Senior Legal Adviser, Secretariat of the GRECO,
Council of Europe.
137. A fact-finding visit to Madrid and Barcelona took place on
12-14 November 2025.
Note During the visit
to Madrid, the co-rapporteurs met the Speaker of the Congress of
Deputies, Ms Francina Armengol, members of the Constitutional Committees
of the Congress of Deputies and of the Senate, the leader of the
main opposition party – the Popular Party (
Partido
Popular), Mr Alberto Núñez Feijóo, members of the Spanish
delegation to the Assembly, the President of the Constitutional
Court, Mr Cándido Conde-Pumpido Tourón, the President of General
Council of the Judiciary, Ms Isabel Perelló Doménech (who is also
President of the Supreme Court), high-level civil servants at the
Ministry of Home Affairs and the Ministry of Presidency, Justice
and Relations with the Parliament. They also had meetings with representatives
of the bar, associations of magistrates and prosecutors and civil
society. In Barcelona, the co-rapporteurs held meetings with the
President of the Parliament of Catalonia, Mr Josep Rull i Andreu,
members of the European Union and Foreign Action Committee of the
Parliament of Catalonia, the Counsellor of Justice of the Regional
Government of Catalonia, Mr Ramon Espadaler i Parcerisas, members
of the Republican Left of Catalonia (
Esquerra
Republicana de Catalunya) party and representatives of
civil society.
138. Spain is currently trying to reform its justice system and
the General Council for the Judiciary (CGPJ), which, between 2018
and 2024, remained in an institutional paralysis due to a parliamentary
blockage on a renewal of its members.
139. On 5 February 2025, the CGPJ adopted a report examining similar
European systems of election of judicial councils’ members, together
with a proposal to reform the election of the judges-members, presenting alternative
models both with and without parliamentary involvement. The CGPJ
was unable to reach a consensus on a single proposal and instead
submitted two diverging models. The first model, supported by 10 members
from the conservative sector, proposes that those members be elected
by the judges themselves. This latter system is the one backed by
the Popular Party.
Note The second model,
supported by 10 members from the progressive sector and aligned
with the government, maintains the final vote for judicial members
by the parliament. The report was submitted to the Venice Commission.
Note
140. At its plenary session on 9-10 October 2025, the Venice Commission
adopted its “Opinion on the manner of election of the judicial members
of the General Council of the Judiciary”.
Note It
recalled that according to Council of Europe’s standards, not less
than half the members of judicial councils should be judges elected
by their peers.
Note It concluded that the first model
(“option 1”) complied with this European standard, although it implied
a risk of internal politicisation, especially where judicial associations
might exert significant influence over the election process.
Note As
regards the second model (“option 2”), the Venice Commission was
of opinion that “in addition to the internal risks of politicisation
discussed under Option 1”, [it made] the procedure vulnerable to
external politicisation in Parliament” and did not comply with the
European standards.
Note Moreover, it stressed “the importance
of ensuring the composition of the judicial council, with balanced participation
of judges from all levels of the judiciary, as well as adequate
diversity in terms of specialisation, gender, and region” and added
that “the principle of pluralism should likewise apply to lay members,
who should represent academia and other legal professions”.
NoteNote
141. As regards preventing and combatting corruption, on 1 August
2025, GRECO published the
Addendum to
the Second Compliance Report (adopted in June 2025) concerning the Fifth Evaluation
Round on “Preventing corruption and promoting integrity in central
government (top executive functions) and law enforcement authorities”,
in which it found that Spain had not implemented satisfactorily
any of the 19 recommendations. Sixteen recommendations had been
partly implemented and three had not been implemented. This marked
a slight progress from the previous report, with three further recommendations being
assessed as partly implemented. Two of the recommendations where
progress had been recorded concerned persons in top executive functions
and one concerned the Civil Guard.
Note
142. As regards GRECO’s Fourth Evaluation Round concerning the
“Prevention of corruption in respect of members of parliament, judges
and prosecutors”, in April 2025, GRECO published its
Second
Addendum to the Second Compliance report on Spain, by which it closed the compliance procedure. As of
June 2024, Spain had fully implemented seven of the eleven recommendations.
Three were partly implemented and one was not implemented.
Note
2.4.4 Sweden
143. The co-rapporteurs, Ms Yelizaveta
Yasko (Ukraine, EPP/CD) and Ms Anne Stambach-Terrenoir (France,
UEL), made a fact-finding visit to Stockholm from 22 to 24 April
2025. They met civil society organisations, government officials,
and political parties in parliament.
144. In April, GRECO published an addendum to the second compliance
report of its Fifth Evaluation Round on “Preventing corruption and
promoting integrity in central governments (top executive functions)
and law enforcement agencies”. GRECO concluded that Sweden had implemented
satisfactorily or dealt with in a satisfactory manner eleven of
the fifteen recommendations contained in the Fifth Evaluation Round
report. Of the remaining recommendations, one has been partly implemented
and three have not been implemented. This report terminated the
fifth round compliance procedure with respect to Sweden. The perception
among experts, citizens and business executives is that Sweden is
one of the least corrupt countries in the world.
145. In April 2025, the government introduced a Bill titled “Enhanced
Protection for Democracy and the Independence of the Courts”. This
proposal aimed to substantially reform Sweden’s constitutional amendment procedure
and strengthen judicial independence to counter democratic backsliding
observed in Europe. The constitutional amendment procedure would
be made more stringent by requiring a qualified majority for all changes
to Sweden’s fundamental laws (the Instrument of Government), rather
than just the current simpler majority separated by an election.
146. The Bill also proposes judicial reforms to increase independence
from political influence, such as creating a board composed mostly
of current and former judges to oversee the court administration
agency, excluding executive and legislative members. Permanent judges
would be appointed following recommendations by a judges’ majority
body and could only be removed upon reaching statutory retirement age.
For the Supreme Court, the Bill mandates a set number of justices,
with appointments made only after a request by the court itself.
147. Political consensus over the proposal has fragmented: initially,
an all-party committee supported the Bill, but the Sweden Democrats
opposed the proposals concerning the constitutional amendment procedure
and submitted a motion to reject that part. On 21 October 2025,
the Riksdag voted against the Sweden Democrats' motion on whether
to hold a referendum on the constitutional matter related to the
Bill. The Riksdag then approved the government's proposal to reform
the constitutional amendment procedure. Political support mainly
came from the government coalition parties (Moderate Party, Christian
Democrats, Liberals) and opposition parties who favoured stronger
democratic safeguards. The reforms are designed to enter into force on
April 1, 2027, after confirmation by a second Riksdag vote following
the 2026 elections.
148. Other major issues include ongoing concerns about security
and crime, with the government emphasising policy actions against
organised crime and public safety. Migration and integration policies continue
to be a significant focus as they impact multiple policy areas.
Sweden is also navigating its foreign policy challenges, particularly
related to security tensions with Russia and its support for Ukraine
in the context of the broader geopolitical confrontation.
149. The next general elections in Sweden are scheduled to take
place on 13 September 13, 2026. These elections will choose the
349 members of the Riksdag, who will in turn elect the prime minister.
Regional and municipal elections will also be held concurrently
on the same day. The co-rapporteurs will carry on their preparatory
work in order to present a report to the Assembly after the next
elections.
2.5 Functioning of democratic institutions
2.5.1 Slovak Republic
150. The corapporteurs for the report
on the functioning of democratic institutions in the Slovak Republic
are expected to be appointed at the Committee meeting on 9 December
2025. On 23 June 2025, the Monitoring Committee agreed to request
an urgent opinion of the Venice Commission on the (draft) amendments
to the Constitution of the Slovak Republic as well as an opinion
on Law No. 109/2025 amending the Law “on non-profit organisations
providing services of general interest” and other related laws.
These opinions were respectively endorsed (
CDL-AD(2025)040 and adopted (
CDL-AD(2025)041) during the plenary session of the Venice Commission
on 9 and 10 October 2025.
3 Some thoughts
concerning the efficiency and impact of the committee’s work
151. This year has again been very
intense for the committee and its mandate. The events on our continent, as
described in the previous sections, have underscored the ongoing
importance of the committee's work.
152. In order to ensure the Assembly’s capacity to carry out systematic
and effective monitoring, to ensure continuity in the political
dialogue with the country concerned, and to produce high-quality,
pertinent and timely resolutions, it is important to have rapporteurs
that have the required availability to execute their important and often
time-consuming tasks.
153. A significant rotation of rapporteurs also took place in 2025
(inter alia concerning Ukraine,
Poland, the Republic of Moldova, Türkiye and Azerbaijan). In a welcome
development, vacant posts were generally swiftly filled by the political
groups. Given the number of changes of rapporteurs in the last year,
as well as the vacancies that can be anticipated in the coming year,
the political groups are invited to nominate members who are ready
and available to take on the role of co-rapporteur, which carries
a heavy workload and demands considerable time commitment.
154. As I mentioned in the previous progress report, the ability
of the committee to request Venice Commission opinions has been
an important instrument in the context of both detecting and addressing possible
malfunctioning democratic and rule of law institutions in a country.
This mechanism is of increasing interest and demand among committee
members, particularly in relation to strengthening the committee's
early warning capabilities. This also includes proposals for requests
for opinions on countries that are not subject to a report under
one of the Assembly's monitoring procedures, as the terms of reference
explicitly mandate the committee to monitor compliance with membership
obligations in all Council of Europe member States.
155. In this report, my last progress report as chairperson of
the Monitoring Committee, I wish to raise the issue of how frequently
these reports are presented to the Assembly. According to paragraph
15 of
Resolution 1115
(1997), as amended, the Monitoring Committee is required to
report to the Assembly once a year on the general progress of the
monitoring procedures. These reports are very labour-intensive and
time-consuming to produce, especially compared to the level of interest
they generate among members during plenary discussions. At the same
time, all committees have been asked to reflect on how they can
reduce the number of reports discussed in plenary. The progress
report should be presented biennially, which would enable each outgoing
chairperson to present a progress report at the end of their term
and share their reflections on the committee's work. I believe this
would also increase the relevance of these reports, and consequently
the attention they receive from our members.
